Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy 10

Shirley Chan *Editor*

Dao Companion to the Excavated Guodian Bamboo Manuscripts



Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy

Volume 10

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Chapter 1
Introduction: The Excavated Guodian 郭店 Bamboo Manuscripts



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Newly recovered ancient Chinese texts, particularly those found in the last 40 years, have provided numerous fresh insights into our understanding of Chinese intellectual history and the development of early Chinese thought. Among the manuscript treasures are some 800 bamboo slips found in a fourth-century BCE tomb in the village of Guodian 郭店, near Jingmen 荆門 City, Hubei 湖北, China. Discovered in 1993, these texts and their archaeological contexts bear invaluable evidence of development in early Chinese thought, history, culture, and language, some of which have been lost for more than 2000 years. They have augmented the transmitted record with original materials, providing new insight into the formation of socio-political and ethical systems, and challenging the traditional typology of schools of thought and genres. Interred in an early tomb, as the contributors will show in this volume, these recovered documents present philosophical debates and conceptualizations different from those found in the so-called received texts—those that have been continuously handed down to the present. Crucially, the excavated texts have been preserved from centuries of selection and redaction that have adulterated the transmitted corpora. As such, the Guodian manuscripts offer a unique opportunity to re-explore the philosophical discourse in ancient China.

The contributors to this volume have used the Guodian bamboo manuscripts dated to the late Warring States period (ca. 475–221 BCE) as examples of early textual production and transmission, dynamic philosophical discussions, debates, interactions and even fusions of ideas from early thinkers and resources on various subjects, including cosmology, socio-political development, ideal government, human nature and moral cultivation. Some of the recovered texts were known before the Guodian finds, but many others were not.

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1 The Guodian Manuscripts

The Eastern Zhou, divided into the Spring and Autumn (770–256 BCE) and Warring States periods (ca. 475–221 BCE), has been described as the Golden Age of Chinese Philosophy, as different intellectual camps and schools of thought were in the process of formation, while rulers of the various competing states were seeking ideas from early thinkers on how to consolidate their power. It was a period characterized by social mobility that saw the transformation and rise of the *shi* 士 class, the distinct social and cultural elite which had existed since early Zhou times as the lowest noble class serving in various official capacities in the Zhou court or the feudal states. They were men of talent, now wandering from state to state, ruler to ruler, actively participating in intellectual discourse and giving political advice. In the latter part of the Warring States period, those who aspired to seek an advisory role in an attempt to guide or influence political decisions caught the attention of politically ambitious leaders, thus forging ties between the state and the intellectual elite (Lewis 1999: 82). This intellectual breakthrough, which included teachings attributed to Confucius, Laozi, Mozi and Mencius and the nascent schools of Confucianism, Mohism and Daoism in the main, laid the philosophical foundation that has continued to inspire and influence Chinese civilization for the last two and a half thousand years. The ideas attributed to the masters of different intellectual camps were transmitted (orally to start with and eventually in writing), copied, and edited by different hands. These texts were studied, circulated and sometimes buried with other objects in the graves of nobles. While some of these texts have come down to us through the ages, others, in manuscript form, have only recently been unearthed. It is the painstaking study and interpretation of this previously unattested material that will shed new light on the intellectual discourse in early China.

In October 1993, about 800 bamboo slips were discovered in a tomb located south of a mound in Guodian to the east of Mount Ji (Jishan 紀山), in what was the state of Chu 楚, an ancient state of the Zhou dynasty and later one of the seven states which strove for supremacy during the Warring States period. Sitting mainly astride today's Hubei and Hunan 湖南 provinces, Chu survived until its final defeat by the Qin 秦 in 223 BCE. Jishan is about eight kilometres north of the old capital of Chu, Yingdu 郢都, presently Ji'nan 紀南城 which is part of the city of Jingmen 荊門市 in central Hubei. During the Warring States period Jishan was the burial site for the inhabitants of Ji'nan City (Liu and Long 2005: 1). The tomb was dated to the latter half of the Warring States period, that is, mid-fourth to early-third centuries BCE. By analyzing the tomb contents and the manner in which the deceased was buried (size of the pit and existence of a *guo* 槨 outer coffin), scholars agree that the tomb occupant was a member of the lower ranks of the aristocracy and an elderly male scholar interested in philosophical issues (Henricks 2000: 4; Allan 2015: 42–46).[1]

[1] Li Xueqin cited the inscription on a lacquer cup discovered in a compartment of the tomb as evidence suggesting that the deceased was the tutor of the crown prince. However, it has also been argued that the tomb and its contents are inadequate evidence for proving someone of such status, who would likely have had the rank of Middle Magnate (Allan 2015: 44).

Prior to its archaeological excavation, the tomb was looted at least twice, in August and mid-October 1993. We do not know how many artefacts have been destroyed or stolen. When discovered, the bamboo slips were mud-caked and waterlogged, making them difficult to separate and remove. The ties binding the slips in their original order had rotted. Specialist conservators spent about 3 months cleaning and preserving the slips. Fortunately, most of the inscribed texts appeared to be complete and, apart from a few damaged slips, legible.

The recovered cache of texts comprises a total of 804 bamboo slips, of which 730 are intact, and bear 12,072 Chu-script graphs, which, it is assumed, were brush-written on the bamboo slips close to the time of burial. The graphs were inscribed by a number of professional scribes and exhibit fine calligraphic qualities (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 1). According to the arrangements of the bamboo slips by the editor(s) there are about 18 manuscripts written on slips of three different lengths (32.5 cm, 26.5–30.6 cm and 15–17.5 cm) and 2 different shapes: slips with square ends, and those with bevelled ends. It took nearly 3 years for the archaeologists, palaeographers and philologists to restore, edit and organize the corpus for publication. After restoration, the texts were transcribed into contemporary Chinese orthography and published with photographs of the slips under the title *Guodian Chumu zhujian* 郭店楚墓竹簡 (Bamboo Slip Manuscripts from the Chu Tomb at Guodian) (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998). The manuscripts originally bore no titles. The current Chinese titles were assigned by the editors:

01–03	老子甲、乙、丙 (*Laozi A, B & C*)
04	太一生水 *Taiyi shengshui* (The Great Oneness Generates Water)
05	緇衣 *Ziyi* (*Black Robes*)
06	魯穆公問子思 *Lu Mu Gong wen Zisi* (Duke Mu of Lu Asked Zisi)
07	窮達以時 *Qiong da yi shi* (Ultimate Success Depends on Timeliness)
08	五行 *Wuxing* (Five Conducts)
09	唐虞之道 *Tang Yu zhi dao* (The Ways of Yao and Shun)
10	忠信之道 *Zhong xin zhi dao* (The Way of Integrity and Trustworthiness)
11	成之(聞之) *Cheng zhi* [*wen zhi*] (Bringing Things to Completion)
12	尊德義 *Zun deyi* (Revering Virtue and Propriety)
13	性自命出 *Xing zi ming chu* (Nature Derives from Endowment)
14	六德 *Liu de* (Six Virtues)
15–18	語叢一、二、三、四 *Yucong* (The Thicket of Sayings, 1, 2, 3 and 4)

The editors of the bamboo slips have divided the texts into three major categories. The first category contains Daoist texts (1–4), including the earliest manuscripts of what is now called the *Laozi* or *Daodejing* 道德經, and the *Taiyi shengshui*. The

second category has been labelled "Confucian" or Ruist (5–14), and includes the *Ziyi* text, known in the transmitted tradition as one of the chapters of the *Liji* 禮記 (Book of Rites).[2] The third category consists of a group of miscellaneous sayings, the *Yucong* texts, considered to have no distinctive affiliation. These Guodian texts have also been grouped into the following categories based on their relation to the transmitted tradition. First are the texts that have not been transmitted (e.g., *Taiyi shengshui*, *Lu Mu Gong wen Zisi*, *Qiong da yi shi*, *Tang Yu zhi dao*, *Zhong xin zhi dao*, *Cheng zhi wen zhi*, *Zun deyi*, *Xing zi ming chu*, *Liu de* and *Yucong* 1, 2, 3, 4). Second are those with titles mentioned in the tradition, though the texts themselves have not been transmitted (e.g., the *Wuxing*). In the third category are those texts whose titles match those of transmitted texts, though the Guodian versions show substantial variation from traditional versions (*Laozi* and *Ziyi*) (Wang 2011).

1.1 The Challenges

Scholars will agree that new knowledge can only be correctly inferred from these recovered manuscripts by pursuing a program of vigorous, multidisciplinary investigation involving palaeography, historical phonology and grammar, philology, history, literature and philosophy. Apparently, there are technological and philological hurdles that prevent us from a smooth reading of the recovered Guodian corpus. Put another way, just how we assess, analyse, compare, and integrate these new materials remains a challenging task due to their complex nature. There are a few things we need to consider when reading, studying and interpreting the excavated materials.

Firstly, the dating, authorship, emendations, and ultimate affiliation of the texts cannot be determined with any certainty. To be sure, the bamboo slips have gone through C-14 dating. The result was 2257 ± 65 BP or 306?±65 BP, meaning the slips are dated roughly between 371 and 241 BCE. This confirms the antiquity of the physical slips themselves and is generally consistent with the dating of the calligraphic styles employed in their inscription. However, since the site of the

[2] Some scholars have argued that the term "Ruist"is more appropriate than "Confucian" (*rujia* 儒家) because the latter suggests an eponymous tradition that grew out of the foundational teachings of one person and the elaboration of those teachings by a school. *Ru*, on the other hand, has been suggested as referring more generally to a social group whose members made their living by applying their knowledge of archaic cultural practices to a wide variety of problems. Among the Ruists were scholars of many distinguishable sub-types, all of whom sought to instruct the rulers and other noblemen in culture (*wen* 文), which, of course, included ancient literature and the knowledge of ritual. The Chinese term *Rujia* 儒家 contains the word *ru*, also found in "Ruist", though the Chinese term makes no mention of Confucius, unlike its standard translation, "Confucian". It makes perfect sense to use "Ruist" (or "proto-Confucian") for texts and ideas predating Kongzi, reserving "Confucian" for those works coming thereafter that are either attributed to or directly inspired by him. Since work in the present volume discusses both Confucian philosophy as presented in the Guodian texts as well as earlier Ruist writings in general, individual contributors may choose to use *ru* or "Ruist", for obvious reasons.

Guodian grave was robbed and then damaged by rain, a great deal of information has been lost irretrievably. To date, the identity of the tomb occupant remains uncertain, except that he may have been an old male scholar; even this speculation is based only on certain burial objects recovered at the time of excavation.

Likewise, there is no consensus on the affiliation of the manuscripts themselves. Some scholars in China argue that the majority of the Confucian texts belong to the Zisi-Mencian lineage because the corpus contains a few texts that are associated with Zisi (Liang 2008). Others believe such texts could have come from the school of Xunzi (Goldin 2005), or even Gaozi. One may argue that mention in a text of a master's name is not sufficient evidence of direct textual affiliation with the intellectual camp associated with the named figure. Li Zehou considers that the heterogeneity of the texts in the Guodian corpus suggests that the manuscripts may have been brought together from different sources and it therefore cannot as a whole be affiliated with any particular intellectual camp or school, much less be attributed to a single individual (Li 2000: 8). Li is one of the minority of Chinese scholars who have questioned attributing the corpus to the Zisi-Mencius school. He suggests that the Guodian texts as well as the manuscripts themselves are from different times and are diverse in content. However, he agrees that the texts are in general Confucian, but are documents representing different views or different groups (Li 2000: 9). Li claims that the texts contain ideas that are closer to Gaozi and even Xunzi than to Mencius, leading him to speculate that these texts emerged from a period when different *ru* factions and lineages (e.g., those that later evolved into the Mencian and Xunzian traditions) were not yet clearly distinguished. He does, however, note that the emphasis Xunzi places on rituals and music, a focus shared with early Ruists, is also evident in the Guodian corpus, proposing that the Guodian manuscripts might have emerged during or slightly after Xunzi's time (Li 2000: 8–9).

Another challenge in studying these excavated materials arises from the corrupted nature of the manuscripts. It is fortunate that most of the Guodian slips are intact and their physical characteristics (e.g., the length and the bevelled ends of the bamboo slips) have enabled reconstruction of the texts without great difficulty. However, there are slips that were damaged and, where the graphs used sometimes are so idiosyncratic that scholars are not fully confident in deciphering them. Furthermore, the strings that had originally bound the slips together have long since rotted, leaving the slips to become disordered, not to mention the collateral damage caused by tomb robbers. Consequently, the reading of the recovered materials has had to rely heavily on the reconstruction of the physical documents and the transcription of the inscribed graphs provided by archaeologists, philologists and palaeographers. While there is general consensus on the transcriptions, some issues remain problematic and are the subject of ongoing debate.

The first of such issues is related to graphic inconsistency. Since the manuscripts were written in ancient Chu script, what is assumed to be the same word in the manuscripts can be found written in various forms, which then came to be used for two or more different words in a continual process of evolution. In other cases the characters could have simply been miscopied or "misspelled" by the manuscript's copyist(s). All of the above pose difficulties to palaeographers in deciphering the

characters, requiring their painstaking examination from different angles such as phonetic loans, graphic appearance, textual parallels and philosophical significance.[3]

Secondly, sequencing the loose bamboo slips is another challenge. As mentioned earlier, some of the slips were broken and the entire cache was in disarray when discovered in the burial site. In the course of textual reconstruction, different sequences of slips were proposed, resulting in completely different readings and interpretations of the texts. Fortunately, this has not been a major problem for most of the Guodian texts, but differences of opinion on the possible arrangements of some of the slips still remain.[4] Without further manuscript evidence, we cannot be sure that our current readings are correct. The rethinking and rewriting of early Chinese textual history will always be an ongoing process, requiring scholars of today and the future to be ready to relinquish even their most cherished premises and interpretations when new evidence or more robust, better substantiated interpretations become available. In this context, the present volume can serve as only a starting point for ongoing debate and discussion.

2 Significance of the Guodian Bamboo Manuscripts and the Discussions in This Volume

Described as China's equivalent of the Dead Sea Scrolls, the Guodian Chu slips are significant in many ways (Allan and Williams 2000). The Guodian corpus is to date the only excavated cache of manuscripts that are exclusively philosophical in content. They constitute one of the very few finds that can safely be dated to the Warring States period, a crucial time in the history of Chinese thought. The bamboo corpus contains both known and unknown manuscripts—Daoist and Confucian (or, more generally, Ruist) works, including the oldest version of the famous Daoist canon the *Laozi*, as well as a group of early manuscripts, many of which were previously unknown. With the exception of the *Ziyi* (a chapter in the transmitted *Liji*), there are no received counterparts for the other "Confucian" texts. The *Laozi* materials from the Guodian tomb and the *Ziyi* texts from both the Guodian and Shanghai Museum

[3] For example, scholars have proposed different readings of the characters *wei* 憍 that combines action (為) with the heart radical (心) (爲+心) and *de* 悳 (直+心) that appear in the Guodian *Laozi*. Such palaeographic conundrums have been the subject matter of workshops in ancient manuscript reading and important implications for our understanding of the development of writing in early China. See Shaughnessy (2006: 19–31).The Guodian manuscripts contain quite a few characters with the component 心, used to write words whose meaning involves some sort of "emotional activity" or a certain orientation of the heart. For example, we have 爲+心, and 甬+心, subsequently subsumed under other forms, such as *wei* 偽 and *yong* 勇 made "conventional" by the Han period editors. See Shaughnessy (2006: 30).

[4] For the different arrangements of the texts of the *Cheng zhi wen zhi*, *Zun deyi* and the *Liu de*, see Chen (2009); also Shaughnessy (2006: 30).

caches are, of course, early, relatively unadulterated versions of those texts.[5] As they were copied before standardization of the script in the Qin (221–207 BCE) and Han (206 BCE–220 CE) periods, they afford insight into the textual culture prior to imperial editing, enhancing our understanding of the early development of Confucian and Daoist teachings.[6]

Of the approximately 12,000 words contained in the corpus, approximately 15% form part of the Daoist *Laozi* and *Taiyi shengshui* texts; the remainder are mostly attributed to Confucian followers, including Confucius' grandson Zisi 子思 (ca.?483–402 BCE) or his disciples, in the first generation after Confucius' death. Some scholars believe texts such as the *Xing zi ming chu* may have been influenced by Gaozi 告子 (ca. 420–350 BCE), Xunzi 荀子 (ca. 310–238 BCE) or even Shi Shuo 世碩 (dates unknown, possibly a third-generation disciple of Confucius), who had views on human nature distinct from those of Mencius.[7] Further, the corpus shows some evidence of the conceptual changes of Daoist philosophy during the mid- to late Warring States period. For example, one may suggest that Daoist thought started to influence Ruist/Confucian teaching during the mid-Warring States period.[8] On the other hand, possibly under Confucian influences, Daoist thought came to be cited in political discourse in the late Warring States period, its adherents aspiring to engagement in the practical reality of politics. This intense cross-fertilization of ideologies means it is sometimes hard to pigeonhole texts according to the traditional Daoist/Confucian dichotomy. In contrast to the orthodoxy of clearly delineated schools of thought in the received tradition, the recovered corpus reveals a much more fluid, dynamic and hybrid intellectual field in mid- and late Warring States times. Here in these formative texts, core concepts normally ascribed to one

[5] In 1994, the Shanghai Museum acquired a bundle of bamboo texts, containing over 1200 slips, from the antique market in Hong Kong. These strips are now commonly known as the Shangbo jian 上博簡 (the "Bamboo Slips Collected by the Shanghai Museum" or the "Shanghai Museum collection") (Ma 2001–2012). They too are written in the Chu script, in a style similar to that of the Guodian texts, and have been dated to 300 BCE. The cache contains large numbers of unknown Confucian texts, two of which, the *Ziyi* (Black Robes) and the *Xingqing lun* 性情論 (Discourse of Xing and Qing), are also found in the Guodian corpus.

[6] The availability of these newly recovered texts allows us to reconsider the manuscript culture and textual formation of some received texts, such as certain chapters of the *Shujing* 書經 (Book of Documents) and the *Liji* 禮記 (Book of Rites).

[7] Scholars continue to debate the possible affiliation(s) of the Guodian texts. Many in China hold that the majority of the texts are from the Zisi-Mencian school of thought, whereas others argue they are closer to Gaozi's, Xunzi's or even ShiShuo's ideas. Liang Tao, for example, claims that most of the Confucian texts can be ascribed to the Zisi-Mencian lineage: the *Ziyi*, *Wuxing*, *Lu Mu Gong wen Zisi* and *Qiong da yi shi* are associated with Zisi 子思 or are part of the text of *Zisizi* 子思子 (Liang 2008). Others, for example Goldin, opposing the Chinese emphasis on Guodian's supposed affiliation with Mencius-Zisi, emphasize the Xunzian aspects in many of the texts (Goldin 2005: 36–37). Tao Lei and Maurizio Scarpari argue that the Guodian corpus contains the writings of Gaozi's school (Tao 2001; Scarpari 2002). Shirley Chan sees more diversity in the content of the *Xing zhi ming chu* with traces of the teachings from Mencius, Gaozi, Xunzi and SHI Shuo (Chan 2009: 380–81).

[8] Such influence can be observed from, for example, the *Hengxian* 恒先 (Constancy in the Beginning) in the Shanghai Museum collection.

school of thought in the received tradition are freely used in texts that some interpreters of the received tradition would ascribe to another competing school of thought. The Guodian texts, in particular those with no parallel transmitted versions, increase considerably our data base of pre-Han textual material, offering us fresh insights into the scope of intellectual inquiry in the late Warring States period.

The Guodian manuscripts are not mere repositories of ideas but were meaningful objects and cultural phenomena in their own right during the Warring States period. Recent scholarship has used the Guodian texts to illustrate the interplay among the material conditions of text and manuscript culture, writing, and thought. By doing so, scholars establish new understanding of the correlation among ideas, their material carrier, and the production of meaning in early China.[9] The diversity and interplay of intellectual traditions found in the Guodian texts (Daoist, Ruist, and others) reflect more syncretic and dynamic intellectual interaction amongst contemporary thinkers of the period than that depicted in later sources, beginning in the Han. The sponsor(s) of the corpus and the textual community itself were interested in, and had access to, some of the texts which may or may not have existed in their present forms.[10] We see that the Guodian manuscript composer(s) have adapted sayings or narratives from divergent sources to express their ideas on various philosophical topics: the debate on nature vs. nurture, the correspondence between the human world and natural law, human relationships and obligations in society, self-cultivation and ideal government.

The chapters in this volume are divided into two parts. Part I focuses on texts as cultural artefacts and what they may suggest to us about the construction and reconstruction of meanings within broader trends of writing and literary practice in the Warring States period. The contributors of these chapters use what we can broadly define as philological approaches to study the Guodian texts to gain insights into textual formation, transmission and manuscript tradition, with arguments often centering on the interpretation of variations. Part II is composed of chapters which study philosophical debates on various topics concerning human nature, self-cultivation, statecraft and cosmic patterns.

In Part I, contributors show how the Guodian manuscripts allow us to explore attested styles and processes of textual production and circulation in pre-Qin China. The use and reuse of such textual variants as the ancient graphs, words, ideas or even texts from older resources weaving in newer writings and messages in these manuscripts require careful philological engagement, as well as textual and intertextual reading not only to decipher the meanings of the texts and sub-texts but to better understand the textual conditions and contexts from which these texts and

[9] For example, Meyer provides close readings of the Guodian philosophical texts and analyses crucial strategies of meaning construction and casts light on the ways in which different communities used texts to convey their philosophical teachings (Meyer 2012).

[10] Sometimes, this is achieved through various borrowings of diverse materials from traditions, such as the *Shu* 書, the *Laozi* 老子 and the *Lunyu* 論語, as can be seen, for example, in the *Yucong* 語叢. While there is proof that the authors of the Guodian texts made use of other existing sources to get their point across, the extent of these borrowings cannot be known.

their meanings emerged. As part of the process of textual production, ancient adages are seen to have been increasingly cited and re-cited by intellectual communities. This created an intergenerational link to what were seen as the foundations—old sayings, rites and sagely images generating credibility and endowing schools and intellectual communities with self-declared orthodox authority (Lewis 1999: 109). The traditional view holds that the early texts in the pre-Han period "were sacred revelations … transmitted in secret from master to disciple and … safeguarded among doctrinal lineages" (Goldin 2005: 4).[11] However, with hindsight, many early texts appeared to have been composed of "mixed" intellectual sources, oral or written, including ideas from thinkers later seen as belonging to different "schools", if not diametrically opposed camps. In these excavated manuscripts, passages which may or may not be found in their transmitted versions were used to form a new idea in another text.

A number of textual and physical features of the Guodian manuscripts reveal that textual production and writing practice (e.g., semantic and graphic variants, borrowings and adaptations of various oral or written resources by composers and copiers of the recovered manuscripts) are crucial in interpreting authorial intention and underscoring the socio-political significance of these manuscripts as cultural objects. Taking into consideration such issues as evolving meanings and the adaptation of external material at different levels in the process of manuscript transmission (from conceptual words, sections, chapters or pericopes, to paragraphs),[12] the Guodian manuscripts should be read with some of the following questions in mind: *What* is the original meaning as can be perceived of the text? *Why* have the composer(s) borrowed from particular sources to present their ideas? *How* have they borrowed words and ideas? and, *to what degree* have the redacted texts achieved authorial intention? We may not be able to answer all of these questions, but we should at least be aware of the possible ways in which manuscripts of the period were composed and evolved and, consequently, of the kinds of meaning that modern readers may still be able to piece together for these ancient texts. Six studies are included in this section.

The *Laozi* or *Daodejing* 道德經 has long been regarded as the foundational Daoist text. The Guodian *Laozi* 老子, dated to the fourth century BCE, is the earliest version of the text to date.[13] Comprising 1,750 characters—no more than forty percent of the transmitted counterpart—the Guodian *Laozi* texts are an example of manuscript variation that allows us to examine the complex process of textual formation of an ancient manuscript. Franklin Perkins (Chap. 2) introduces the Guodian

[11] One can say that there is nothing inherently "Chinese" about this as it is so common, among Indian, Near Eastern and even early Western traditions.

[12] Shaughnessy translates *zhang* 章 as "pericope" while most others translate it as "chapter" or "section" (Shaughnessy 2006).

[13] The sequence of chapters of the Guodian *Laozi* is different from that in the received *Daodejing*; there are also some differences in wording between the Guodian slips and the transmitted *Daodejing* and the Mawangdui *Laozi*. Nevertheless, most of the contents and the philosophical messages of the Guodian *Laozi* are intact (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 1).

Laozi materials, known as *Laozi* A, B and C, by providing an overview of the manuscripts and the ways they differ from other versions of the text. He shows how the materials share a coherent philosophical position, discussing the nature of the materials as a text, and considering their relationship to the "complete" (i.e. transmitted) *Laozi*, providing insights into the broader context in which the *Laozi* was written and took form. Perkins suggests that the Guodian *Laozi* texts were not written by a single author as a single work. From the perspective of other early versions of the *Laozi*, there are a number of possibilities in considering how the Guodian *Laozi* was formed: it was composed by excerpting parts of an existing complete *Laozi*; different lines and passages were merged with other materials to form a self-contained document.[14]

In Chap. 3, He Ruyue and Michael Nylan take the study of texts and manuscript culture a step further by comparing citations related to the transmitted *Shu* 書 (Documents) to their parallels in the Guodian texts. The authors affirm that even an anthology like the *Shu*—later deemed "canonical"—had been circulating in various versions up until early Han times when it was more or less codified. Contrary to some Chinese scholars' belief that the *Shu* was a single classic that came into existence by 300 BCE through transmission by a single textual community or intellectual camp, He and Nylan demonstrate that the early history of texts, whether transmitted orally or in writing, had in fact generated multiple variants and different readings that were exploited by textual communities in adapting the texts to convey their own ideas. The Guodian citations of the *Shu* give us the opportunity to understand Guodian textualists as a textual community with their own version of the *Shu* that existed at a particular point in time prior to the Han effort to synthesize the Confucian classics.

Dirk Meyer in Chap. 4 questions the view that the Guodian text *Cheng zhi* 成之 is an exegetical reference to the *Shu*. By positing the existence of a range of texts of *Shu* traditions, Meyer examines their relationships with *Cheng zhi*, arguing that the Guodian passages in question make reference to cultural practice rather than to a sufficiently stable body of texts. In basic agreement with He and Nylan, Meyer shows that many writings in ancient China, including those comprising the later Confucian canons, existed in various forms before they were "canonized", reaching their definitive forms during and after the Han period. Meyer's chapter provides an

[14]Many early Chinese manuscripts were composed of different layers with the words, the pericopes, the paragraphs and perhaps the whole text of earlier sources, as possible pre-formed textual units, or what may be referred to as "building blocks" of later texts (see Boltz 2005). Both the Guodian and the Shanghai Museum collection strongly suggest that the *Ziyi* existed as an independent text, rather than as a chapter within the *Liji*, as it was later transmitted from the Han dynasty. The Guodian *Ziyi* exemplifies both textual stability as well as fluidity in the editing process. Textual stability is demonstrated, for example, by the general structure and many of the compositional patterns and indeed the contents of the *Ziyi* text, which seem to have undergone no significant change from around 300 BCE, reaching its final definitive form almost a thousand years later, early in the Tang dynasty. Textual fluidity is exemplified by the *Ziyi* being made part of the *Liji*, a now famous example of how one text, already extant in an independent and recognizable form, was incorporated into another.

analysis of the argument forms and construction in the Guodian *Cheng zhi* to demonstrate that conceptual communities during Warring States times drew on traditions of the *Shu* as cultural capital to pursue their own socio-political and philosophical agendas. Meyer concludes that while the *Shu* emerged as loosely textualized traditions during the Warring States period, they nonetheless framed the expectations of conceptual text communities, casting light on these traditions as something dynamic, yet authoritative.

Michael Schimmelpfennig's chapter is a comparative study of the Guodian texts *Tang Yu zhi dao* 唐虞之道 and *Zhong xin zhi dao* 忠信之道 in terms of their textual construction and argumentation structures. The study identifies the formal similarities of both texts and compares their textual construction and argument. The re-examination of the manuscripts is motivated by a hypothesis on the early development of books in early China. Although there are similarities, the two texts differ in how their arguments are deployed. The *Tang Yu zhi dao* cites historical examples to advocate the practice of abdication as a means of good government, whereas in the *Zhong xin zhi dao* the key concepts of *zhong* and *xin,* the meanings of which Schimmelpfennig attempts to re-negotiate, are more central to the quest for good government.

Analysing and comparing the meanings of key conceptual terms within the Guodian corpus will lead to new insights into the transmission and development of the different philosophical traditions attested in this period. In Chap. 6, Constance A. Cook tests the sensitivity of textual boundaries and literary culture in the Guodian manuscripts by examining the usage of the terms *dao* 道 and *de* 德 in both the Daoist and Ruist (Confucian) texts found in the corpus. Cook gives a detailed survey of the distribution and contexts of usage in the sixteen texts and demonstrates the order of the two terms and their evolving meanings in the Warring States period before the concept of *dao* became paramount compared to that of *de* in the Han period.

Efforts to reconstruct the original meaning of a text continue in Liao Mingchun's chapter where he presents philological justifications for reading the graph *heng* 恆 as *ji* 亟 in the *Lu Mu Gong Asked Zisi* 鲁穆公問子思. By tracing the usage of 亟(極) in pre-Qin texts, Liao establishes the meaning of *ji cheng* 亟稱 as forthright admonishing. An important implication of Liao's reading is that ministers played a significant role in the government in giving honest advice to the ruler—a good king makes few mistakes and a bad king tends to make a lot more, of which it is the remonstrators' duty to be outspoken. This view is consistent with the socio-political situation in the Warring States period when a state's "ruling mechanism" was growing more complex so that a ruler was no longer capable of running an efficient government alone but needed to surround himself with worthy men who could give honest advice. This idea of remonstrance, as we see it exemplified in the early texts, has been traditionally attributed to Zisi and Mencius by Xunzi. With the discovery of this Guodian text, we are able to retrace such precepts to Zisi, although one can suggest that the text could well be an imagined construct attributed to him, to lend authority to the words.

Part II turns to exploring the philosophical ideas found in the Guodian texts and their implications for the received philosophical tradition. As mentioned, a major

significance of the Guodian manuscripts is that they encourage us to re-examine the early development of the key concepts and debates in Chinese philosophy, including Daoist and Confucian thought during their formative period in the late Warring States. At the very least, we now should be aware that "non-traditional thinkers," that is, those lesser known/unknown thinkers of unclear philosophical affiliation and/or political persuasion, contributed to intellectual discourse and ongoing debates on various philosophical and socio-political issues of the time. We may here raise a few questions. What is the basis for characterizing some of the Guodian texts as "Confucian", and did early Confucian scholars transmit only Confucian texts? How much do we really know about the development of early Confucianism? How is Confucianism and Confucian discourse defined, especially in the period between Confucius and Xunzi, who was active in the third century BCE, the period to which the Guodian texts have been dated? Likewise, what is the nature of Daoist teachings during this same period? What was the relationship between Confucian and Daoist thought and other so far unnamed streams of thought within a more diversified intellectual milieu than has previously been recognized? What can the Guodian texts tell us about the development of Chinese intellectual traditions?

The chapters in Part II discuss the main philosophical concepts and arguments attested in the Guodian texts and have been arranged thematically under cosmology and metaphysics (Chaps. 8, 9, 10, and 11), human nature and moral cultivation (Chaps. 12, 13, and 14), and socio-political thought and intellectual traditions (Chaps. 15, 16, 17, and 18). These chapters enquire into the various concerns ancient Chinese thinkers had about nature, the Way, the cosmic order, the ruler/subject relationship, ideal kingship and the relationship between nature and the human world. We are aware that it has often been hard to draw clear boundaries between these overlapping and interrelated subject areas. As social and moral thinkers, rather than metaphysicians, the ancient Chinese philosophers conceptualized the cosmic order in order to develop an understanding of its implications in the human realm—a synergy of cosmic, political, religious and ethical dimensions. Thus, when cosmic order is discussed, so are its implications for human practice and its rhythms in the human world. Similarly, discussions of human nature are closely related to socio-political systems and the cosmic order or heavenly way.

A very important feature of the Guodian corpus is its emphasis on cosmological ideas. Several texts, such as the *Taiyi shengshui* 太一生水 (The Great Oneness Generates Water), the *Heng xian* 恒先 (Constancy in the Beginning) and the *Fan wu liu xing* 凡物流形 (All Things are Flowing in Form) in the coeval Shanghai Museum collection demonstrate the evolution of cosmology in the Warring States period. The key concepts of these texts are, respectively, the *Taiyi* 太一 (Great Oneness), *heng* 恒 (constancy), and *yi* 一 (one, oneness), all of which contrast sharply with the Daoist texts that take *dao* 道 as the foundation of the origin and way of all things. The Guodian texts describe the process of the generation of the universe in detail based on their core concepts, at the same time putting forward some new concepts, clearly demonstrating that cosmology was one of the prominent issues in the late Warring States. The one overriding concern that pervades the Guodian texts is the attempt to define the essential conditions for an ideal socio-political order: claims concerning nature's features and patterns are seen as having

implications for the human world, including general principles of human behaviour and polity.

As an example of the pre-Qin synthesis of political theory and cosmology, the Guodian *Taiyi shengshui* 太一生水 reflects on, discusses and develops the key themes of cosmology and how the understanding of the cosmic order and its manifestations should be translated into proper guidelines and principles for managing the human world—concepts that emerged from intellectual discourses during the Warring States period. Erica Brindley (Chap. 8) compares the *Taiyi shengshui* to various other cosmogonies in the textual tradition and presents insights into both the overarching moral agenda of the text as well as its specific contributions to cosmological thinking in early China.

Barbara Hendrischke (Chap. 9) explores the concept of "being of oneself" (*ziran* 自然) in the Daoist materials in the Guodian corpus, the *Laozi* 老子 A, B, and C. Actions can only succeed when guided by "being of oneself" in regard to one's own person and simultaneously in regard to the things or people one acts on. Secondly, humans are primarily beings that were born and will die, like all other beings. From this perspective, human life should follow rules that are different from those designed for people entangled in a web of social contacts and expectations.

Traditionally, Confucianism has focused on a "human way" and it is accepted that Confucius himself was not interested in dwelling on topics related to the way of Heaven and (human) nature. The *Analects* (Lunyu 論語) does not record explicit discussions of either the nature of things or of human nature.[15] Nevertheless the notions of *xing* 性 (nature, human nature) and *tian* 天(heaven) attracted considerable attention in the Warring States period, as seen in the extant works of Mencius and Xunzi. It is generally agreed that Mencius focused on the moral dimensions of Heaven and maintained that nature has endowed humans with an innate, but incipient moral tendency. To develop the inborn goodness in humans as imparted by Heaven is fundamental to realizing the Way of Heaven. This is followed by Xunzi's pragmatic approach, which posits human nature as originally bad, thus needing regulation, with heaven and humans playing distinct roles. The apparent gap between Confucius and Mencius and probably also Xunzi in intellectual deliberations on human nature and the relationship between the human way and the Way of Heaven could have gradually evolved. The Guodian texts seem to fill this gap with an ideological trajectory explicating the relationship of heaven and the human world.

Through an analysis of musical metaphors that reveal the nature of the human–Heaven relationship in the human body, Erica Brindley (Chap. 10) demonstrates how, in the Guodian *Wuxing* 五行 text, early Chinese Ruist thinkers grounded their ethics in a highly spiritual attitude embodied in the concept of *sheng* 聖 (sagacity). The significance of *sheng* lies in its ethical ideal associated with an individual's moral psychology and connection to the divine world of Heaven. By highlighting

[15] Zigong, one of Confucius' disciples, points out that the Master's view on heaven and *xing* cannot be heard.子貢曰: 夫子之文章, 可得而聞也; 夫子之言性與天道, 不可得而聞也。(*Analects* 5.13).

sagacity as "a human–Heaven connection and the divinity within individuals," Brindley presents a theory of cosmic harmony associated with five interacting virtues (*ren* 仁, *yi* 義, *li* 禮, *zhi* 智 and *sheng* 聖).

The Mencian concept of the unity of Heaven and Humans which later became Confucian orthodoxy has a prominent position in Chinese intellectual history. On the other hand, it was believed that Xunzi proposed the division of Heaven from Humans in the late Warring States period. What does the Guodian notion of the division between Heaven and Humans entail? How does it relate to Mencius and Xunzi? Liang Tao (Chap. 11) uses the *Qiong da yi shi* 窮達以時 text to trace the development of the concept of Heaven and Humans in early Confucianism. Liang argues that the Guodian bamboo texts appear to suggest that the notion of a division between Humans and Heaven is a basic precept of early Confucianism, with discernible influence on Mencius. Mencius and Xunzi have both propounded ideas of the division as well as the unity of Heaven and Humans, but they differ in specific terms on practical levels.

The extensive discussion of *xing* 性 (nature, human nature) in the Guodian *Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出 and in the closely related *Xingqing lun* 性情論 (Discourse of Human Nature and Human Dispositions) in the Shanghai Museum collection reveal that the concept is as diverse as it is complex. The recovery of virtually the same text from two excavations suggests the rather broad circulation of the text during a time when both *xing* and *qing* were important subjects of discussion. The author of the *Xing zi ming chu* did not espouse a simple view on human nature as being either good or bad. Instead, in addition to *xing*, the *Xing zi ming chu* focuses on *qing* 情 (emotions or predispositions, human nature's response to external stimuli), a concept rarely encountered in the pre-Qin period before the Guodian discovery. *Xing* is both an inborn nature and a characteristic development as part of the life process, *sheng* 生; it is imparted by heaven (*tian* 天) and defines the direction of development, with *qing* functioning as the expression of *xing* drawn out by external stimuli. This suggests that human conduct is based on the interaction between an internal foundation and the external environment, and/or of integration of the body and the mind-heart. Shirley Chan (Chap. 12) analyses the interrelationship of the key concepts of *xing*, *qing*, and heart-mind *xin* 心 in the Guodian *Xing zi ming chu*. She focuses on how *qing* is derived from *xing* and defines *qing* (generally rendered as "emotions") as "manifested *xing*," i.e. an affective response to external stimuli as manifestation of human nature (*xingqing* 性情). The intellectual range in this Guodian text is more syncretic and dynamic than any found within a single tradition, such as those of Gaozi, Mencius, Xunzi or ShiShuo.

Body (*shen* 身) and heart-mind (*xin* 心) are the very core objects of moral cultivation and human excellence in ancient Chinese philosophy. The crucial questions this body/mind division raises, include: (1) What are the relationships between body and mind? (2) What kind of roles do the body and mind play in the discourse of cultivation? (3) What sort of impacts will cultivation generate on the body and mind? (4) Can the arguments be characterized as "Chinese holism", implying that there was no mind-body dualism in early China, or are we dealing with a more Western-style "dualism"? Lisa Raphals (Chap. 13) addresses the treatment of inter-

relations between body and mind in several Guodian texts, especially how they affect each other, and the place of the Guodian material in the broader context of debates about mind-body dualism. She uncovers a scale of views on the relation between mind and body in the recovered texts, with one end of the scale showing a strong mind-body dualism and the other a robustly holistic view of *qi* 氣 as unifying the body and mind.

Shirley Chan (Chap. 14) reads the less discussed *Yucong* 語叢 texts as one of the earliest responses in early China to questions of human development and social advancement. She argues that the *Yucong* is a good example of the Guodian manuscripts not fitting neatly into received traditions such as the Daoist, which focuses on the natural way, the Way of heaven or the Confucian, which emphasizes cultural patterning, the way of humans, in moral development. Rather, the *Yucong* texts represent a third, more moderate picture of self-cultivation, evincing what Chan refers to as an "interweaving" of the Daoist "nature" and the Confucian "nurture" approaches.

The final chapters in this volume focus on socio-political thought and intellectual traditions. The rise of competing hegemonic states in the beginning of the Warring States era brought with it certain challenges, demanding judicious responses from traditional philosophies about rulership and at the same time stimulating altogether new doctrines. Scott Cook (Chap. 15) enquires into the ongoing debates over good government and efficient leadership in the Warring States period. Using the Guodian texts, Cook expands upon previous studies by describing in detail the path along which the argument of "virtue" versus "coercion" developed from early Warring States times up until unification. Cook discusses how these manuscripts argue against coercive order and, instead, favours rulership through ritual and music education. This latter advocacy is underpinned by the claim that government based on ritual and music is ultimately derived from human nature and, for this reason, is the only true and natural means of ruling.

Tang Siufu (Chap. 16) surveys a selection of Guodian texts and suggests that they espouse the Confucian framework of governance through ethical cultivation. Without claiming that Xunzi lies in the direct line of descent from the Guodian manuscripts, Tang proposes that the Guodian Confucian texts are responses to the Confucian vision of restoring order and harmony, thus providing for the subsequent development in Xunzi's and other Confucian teachings of advocacy for rules of propriety as the backbone of an effective government and stable society.

China's encounters with modernization, Communism, and capitalism since the nineteenth century have motivated considerable intellectual campaigning against Confucian values and the traditional socio-political order. Li Rui's essay (Chap. 17) challenges modern criticisms of traditional Chinese ritualism regarding *san gang* 三綱 (Three Principles), a concept mistakenly attributed to Confucian thought, though it was actually championed by Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (179–104 BCE) in the Han dynasty. By examining numerous recovered and transmitted texts, Li traces the development of the key philosophical and political concepts, arguing that a clearer distinction should be drawn between the doctrines of early Confucianism and what Dong promoted. Li expounds the original meaning of the *liu wei* 六位 (Six Positions)

as read in the Guodian *Liu de*, distinguishing the relationship between father and son as "internal" from that between minister and ruler as "external". The internal relationships are considered more important and should thus prevail over the external. Concluding that *san gang* is not originally "Confucian thought", Li seeks to vindicate Confucianism from charges of institutional oppression that the notion of *san gang* has brought to bear.

Finally, in Chap. 18, Kenneth Holloway seeks to draw parallels between self-cultivation in the Guodian texts and the religious practices in Buddhism, in particular, those described in the Buddhist sutra *Vimalakirti*. By contextualizing the Guodian texts in religious history, Holloway aims to clarify both our understanding of Guodian and also of later developments in Buddhism. Specifically, Guodian may suggest new insights into why particular Buddhist sutras became popular in China.

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Returning to my earlier point about challenges, I am confident that this volume represents the solid work of each of the learned colleague-contributors, all of whom have risen to the challenges posed by the Guodian materials. The diversity of expertise of the contributors—authorities in their own right in the different fields of philology, philosophy, intellectual history, socio-political psychology, textuality studies, and sinology overall—reflects a response to the complex nature of the ancient manuscripts, which embody such wide-ranging views on such diverse topics, couched in words so terse but so profound. Yet our effort is only one step forward in a long journey; in a book of this size, we can hardly claim to be comprehensive, or to explore fully each of our own views on ancient Chinese philosophy and intellectual history. We do not attempt to provide all the answers; nor do we claim to have read the Guodian texts exhaustively. Our aim has been to open up a new channel of discovery towards manuscript culture in ancient China, early Chinese philosophy and intellectual history. Research into the recovered manuscripts and the received traditions is a long journey. With collaborative efforts may we all continue the journey of exploration into this highly significant area within the archives of humanity.

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Part I
A Philological Reading of the Guodian Manuscripts: The Texts and Textual Formation

Chapter 2
The Guodian *Laozi* 老子 Materials



Franklin Perkins

1 The Guodian *Laozi* Materials

The *Laozi* 老子 or *Daodejing* 道德經 has been profoundly influential, shaping many aspects of Chinese culture, from medicine to art to philosophy and religion. According to tradition, the text was written as a whole by a single author, known as Lao Dan 老聃 or Li Er 李耳, who was senior to Kongzi 孔子 and thus lived in the mid-sixth century BCE. There has been little trace of the text or its impact, though, until the third century BCE, raising doubts about its antiquity. The discovery of two silk manuscripts (known as A and B) at Mawangdui 馬王堆 shed some light on the evolution of the text (Gao 1996). These were entombed in 168 BCE, but the A manuscript was likely copied before 195 BCE. That still left a gap of three centuries between the earliest manuscript and the supposed origins of the text. More recent archaeological discoveries of bamboo texts from the Warring States Period have begun to fill in this space, although their significance is still under debate. Several cosmogonic texts have been discovered, all buried around 300 BCE. The *Taiyi shengshui* 太一生水 (Great One Generates Water) was found with bundle C of the Guodian *Laozi* materials. Two other texts are unprovenanced and were purchased by the Shanghai Museum in 1994, but they are thought to date from roughly the same time and area as Guodian. The two texts are *Heng xian* 恆先 (Constancy First) (published in volume III; Ma 2004), and *Fanwu liuxing* 凡物流形 (All Things Flow into Form) (published in volume VII; Ma 2008). These texts share some of the concerns and assumptions of the *Laozi* but use a different vocabulary and stake out distinct positions.[1] They thus provide some insight into the broader context in which

[1] For an analysis of the cosmogonic thought found in these three texts along with the Guodian *Laozi* materials, see Perkins (2016).

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the *Laozi* was written and took form. Even more important than these texts, though, was the discovery is the three sets of bamboo strips found at Guodian, known as *Laozi* A, B and C (*jia* 甲, *yi* 乙, *bing* 丙).

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce these Guodian Laozi materials (GDL), with a particular focus on their philosophical significance.[2] This section provides an overview of the materials and some of the ways they differ from other versions of the text. Section 2 offers an interpretation of the content of the materials, showing that they share a coherent philosophical position. The third section discusses the nature of the materials as a text, and the fourth section considers their relationship to the complete *Laozi* that has been so significant in Chinese history.

Calling the GDL a version of the *Laozi* is somewhat misleading. The fact that they were copied separately on three different sets of bamboo strips raises the possibility that they are not a single unified text. Together they contain parts of 31 of the 81 chapters of the received text, but many of those chapters are partial. The order of passages within each bundle and their distribution across bundles have almost no connection to the order of the passages in any later versions of the text. The divisions between chapters are difficult to determine with certainty, but they are at least somewhat different.[3] For example, the received chapter 64 is certainly taken as two separate passages. The first and last half appear in separate places in the A materials, and the last half appears alone in C. Another possible division is within chapter 32, which is divided into two halves by a thick horizontal marker that usually (but not always) marks a chapter break. The fact that the two halves are placed next to each other on the bamboo strips, though, is unlikely to be a coincidence. The Guodian version may mark a stage in which the two parts were associated but not yet taken to be a single passage. In the other direction, chapters 17 and 18 in C are presented as a single chapter.

Aside from these differences in the arrangement of the text, there are many differences in content.[4] In some cases, terms are changed. Such changes can have

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[2] The Guodian texts were first published in Jingmenshi Bowuguan (1998). Unless otherwise noted, I follow the reconstruction of the texts in Cook (2012). I have also regularly consulted (Liu Zhao 2003; Liu Xiaogan 2006). Throughout this essay, Guodian *Laozi* passages are cited by bundle (A, B, or C) and strip number, along with the chapter number in the received text. For passages not found in the Guodian materials, unless otherwise noted I rely on the Mawangdui B manuscript as reconstructed in Gao (1996). All translations are my own, but I have incorporated elements from Cook (2012) and Henricks (2000), as well as Moeller (2007).

[3] Chapter divisions are clear in C, because the remainder of the strip is left blank after the last characters of a chapter. That is not the case in A and B, when one chapter is directly followed by the next on the same strip. The materials use a marker that generally corresponds to a chapter division, but its use is not entirely consistent (Cook 2012: 219–22).

[4] For general discussions of these differences, see Cook (2012: 210–16), Henricks (2000: 17–19), Allan and Williams (2008: 191–93), and Moeller (2007: 191–93). For a detailed comparison of the various editions of each chapter of the *Laozi*, including the Guodian materials, as well as a general discussion of the ways in which the *Laozi* was modified through transmission, see Liu Xiaogan (2006: 1–42).

significance for the kind of close readings now done by scholars, but they were likely seen as insignificant by the users of the texts. For example, chapter 25 in GDL says "there is a shape that took form in the undifferentiated" (*you zhuang hun cheng* 有狀混成) (A: 21) while other versions of the text use thing (*wu* 物) instead of shape (*zhuang* 狀). The change has little significance, unless one is trying to carefully reconstruct early Chinese ontology. In 32, GDL says that heaven and earth cannot make *dao* their subordinate (A: 18), but other versions of the text change heaven and earth (*tiandi* 天地) to the world or realm (*tianxia* 天下), making it less clearly a cosmological claim. For chapter 15, the GDL version describes aspiring officials (*shi* 士) (A: 8), but other versions describe one who acts for the way (*dao* 道). The change obscures the political dimension of the Guodian chapter. Such differences suggest that the text was transmitted without careful attention to its exact wording, but in some cases there appears to be a deliberate change in meaning. The best known example is chapter 19 (A: 1–2), which advises us to cut off or abandon six forms of action. In GDL, these are wisdom (*zhi* 智), discrimination (*bian* 辨), craft or skill (*qiao* 巧), benefit (*li* 利), striving (*wei* 偽), and deliberation (*lü* 慮). Other versions instead include sagacity (*sheng* 聖), benevolence (*ren* 仁), and rightness (*yi* 義) (in place of discrimination, striving, and deliberation, respectively). That changes the passage from a criticism of generally active values to a direct engagement with the moralizing discourses of other philosophers, particularly the Ru. Another possible change that would be of great significance is in chapter 40. Other versions of the text set up a progression:

> 天下之物生於有, 有生於亡。
> The things of the world are born from being, being is born from no-being.

The GDL version, though, leaves out the repetition of "being," saying:

> 天下之物生於有, 生於亡。
> The things of the world are born from being, born from no-being. (A: 37)

The line presents a fundamentally different ontology in which things emerge from both being (*you* 有) and no-being (*wu* 無, *wang* 亡). The GDL lines, though, are odd grammatically and suggest textual corruption. It is likely that a repetition mark was accidentally left out when the text was copied and thus that it should be read according to the received version.[5]

The greatest difference between GDL and the corresponding chapters in the received text is the addition of further lines or stanzas. In some cases, the extra lines are written into the passage. In other cases, the GDL materials are grouped with independent lines to form a longer chapter. We can consider chapter 5 as an example. The GDL includes only two lines:

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[5] As Cook argues, one would expect the line to include a character such as *yi* 亦 or *you* 又, saying "too" or "also" (Cook 2012: 282). Cook, Liu Xiaogan and Henricks all read the passage according to the received text (Cook 2012; Liu Xiaogan 2006 419–20; Henricks 2000: 77).

天地之間, 其猶橐籥與?
虛而不屈, 動而愈出。
The space between heaven and earth—isn't it like a bellows?
Empty but never exhausted, the more it moves the more comes out. (A: 23)

Other versions add a passage before it, and a line after:

天地不仁, 以萬物為芻狗。
聖人不仁, [以]百姓為芻狗。
Heaven and earth are not humane,
They take the myriad things as straw dogs.
Sagely people are not humane,
They take the people as straw dogs.

多聞數窮, 不若守於中。
Hearing much leads to rapid exhaustion. That is not as good as preserving in the centre.

The three parts of the received chapter have no clear connection, and given that the second part is found alone in GDL, it is likely that they were originally three independent passages. Similarly, the Guodian version of 20 contains only the first few lines, which are then followed by a long and unrelated self-description in other versions. Chapter 46 is an interesting case. The GDL has the following:

罪莫重乎甚欲,
咎莫險乎欲得,
禍莫大乎不知足。
知足之為足, 此恆足矣。
Of crimes, none is weightier than deep desires.
Of shames, none is more dangerous than desiring to attain.
Of harms, none is greater than not knowing contentment.
If one knows contentment as contentment, that is constant contentment. (A: 5–6)

In other versions, this passage is preceded by two lines criticizing warfare:

[天下有]道, 卻走馬[以]糞。
无道, 戎馬生於郊。
When the world has the way, saddle-horses are returned to manure the fields.
When it lacks the way, war horses are born in the suburbs.

The GDL passage has no connection to war, but once these lines are added to it, they do not stand out as out of place. The passage then reads as an explanation for the causes of wars through general principles about desire. That illustrates the difficulty in picking out divergent sources within the *Laozi* as a whole—it is too easy to invent connections. In general, there is no way to know for sure the source of the added materials. The passage that opens the received version of chapter 5 sounds like a typical *Laozi* passage. It may have originally been a distinct chapter that was merged with another (as we know happened with the two chapters that merged to become 64). The self-description added to 20, though, fits less well with the rest of the *Laozi* and may come from another source. The lines about horses and war could easily be a common saying that was added to a more philosophical passage.

In spite of all of these differences, GDL provides definitive evidence that the key ideas of the *Laozi* were in existence by the late fourth century BCE, that is, during the lifetime of Mengzi. In the next section, I reconstruct the philosophical position of the GDL, provisionally taking A, B, and C together as a whole, excluding both the non-*Laozi* materials in C and *Laozi* materials not found in GDL. These assumptions will be examined afterwards, in the last two sections of the chapter.

2 The Philosophy of the Guodian *Laozi* Materials

If we rely only on internal evidence, the audience and purpose of GDL is clear. The majority of passages in each bundle are intended for those with some role in governing. A few directly mention being used by lords and kings (*houwang* 侯王). Others give advice for affairs that would only be within the realm of leadership, such as how to conduct war, eliminate thieves, or educate the people. Chapter 15 describes what it is like to be a good aspiring official (*shi* 士), suggesting that the materials may not be intended directly for rulers but rather for those who would influence him. While many passages could apply to anyone, none are explicitly intended for those outside the power structure. So it is likely that the whole collection was meant for potential leaders. The message to these leaders is also consistent across the vast majority of chapters, which give advice justified in terms of concrete benefits. Sometimes, the goal is directly to gain or maintain political power. Chapter 59 says that ruling the people and serving heaven with frugality or restraint (*se* 嗇) will enable one to have a state (*youguo* 有國) and last long (*zhangjiu* 長久) (B: 1–3). In most passages, the goal is more general—the way will allow one to avoid difficulties (*nan* 難), evade harm (*huo* 禍, *dai* 殆), blame (*zui* 罪, *jiu* 咎) or shame (*ru* 辱), and have no defeat (*bai* 敗) or loss (*shi* 失, *wang* 亡). Some passages describe the results as transforming the people, but the concern is keeping the people from rebelling and thieves from arising, as in 57 (A: 30–31). Chapter 31 criticizes the beautification of war, but justifies that as a way of avoiding failure (C: 7–8) rather than on ethical grounds. No passages justify their advice by appeal to some need for human beings to serve the way or play a cosmic role in nature.[6] None emphasize the intrinsic value of a mystical state of mind, nor do they justify the way in terms of contentment or internal satisfaction. Contentment is important, but as a means of avoiding harm, not an end in itself. Thus whatever context the ideas of the text may have arisen from, the GDL is intended as useful advice for the success of those with power.

[6] One possible exception is chapter 37 (A: 13–14), which says that if lords and kings preserve the way through non-action, then the myriad things will transform and stabilize of themselves. The focus on stability, though, suggests that, as in chapter 57, the ultimate goal is for the ruler to maintain his state. That is supported by the second half of 64, which mentions “assisting the self-so spontaneity of things” (輔萬物之自然) as a means of avoiding defeat and loss (A: 10–13; C: 11–14).

The *Laozi* does not lay out a carefully formulated system, but the various passages together form a coherent philosophical position that relates action, self-cultivation, and cosmology. I will discuss each of these elements in detail, but in short, the most effective way of acting is to be without effort or striving. That goes along with self-cultivation as reducing or eliminating desires or cultivating stillness and simplicity. The ability to succeed without effort is justified by a cosmology based on an ultimate source or ground that exceeds the grasp of language and sensory experience and generates things with their own spontaneity and vitality.

Opposition to excessive or forceful action is one of the most frequent themes across GDL. We could generalize this ideal as non-action (*wuwei* 無為 or *wangwei* 亡為), which literally means not having (*wu* 無) actions (*wei* 為).[7] The phrase occurs in six GDL chapters. The point is not to do nothing but, rather, to avoid action that is coercive, purpose driven, or full of effort. This qualification is supported by the use of a now lost character form, 愚, which combines action (為) with the heart radical (心), thus emphasizing action done with a certain orientation of the heart.[8] In GDL, the term *wuwei* is misleading if taken alone. Two passages use the phrase *wushi* 無事, which has the narrower meaning of having no work, duties, or business, and 64.2 pairs *wuwei* with not-grasping (*wuzhi* 無執) (A; 10–11; C: 11). More often, *wuwei* is embedded within broader paradoxical formulations. Chapter 63 says that one should act without acting (為亡為) and work without working (事亡事) (A: 14–15). Chapter 2 says that sagely people reside in the work of no-actions (居亡為之事), just as they enact teachings without doctrine or words (行不言之教) (A: 17). That the text is advocating something that is neither acting nor not acting is stated explicitly in 48, which says "have no acting but have no not-acting" (亡為而亡不為) (B: 4). Another attempt to articulate some middle ground between action and non-action can be seen in the final line of 64.2, which contrasts action (*wei*) with "assisting the self-so spontaneity of things" (*fu wanwu zhi ziran* 輔萬物之自然) (A: 13; C: 14). Action thus implies coercing things against their natural tendencies. Other passages can be read as criticizing specific forms of *wei*. We should avoid competition and struggle, which connects to wanting to be prominent or in front. Another concrete form to be avoided is the use of political coercion, as in 30, which says that "the good attain results and stop, without seizing by force" (善者果而已, 不以取強) (A: 7). Chapter 19 can also be read as listing specific forms of action to be rejected:

> 絕智棄辨, 民利百倍。
> 絕巧棄利, 盜賊亡有。
> 絕偽棄慮, 民復稚子。
> Cut off wisdom and abandon discrimination and the people will benefit a hundredfold.
> Cut off skill and abandon benefit and thieves and robbers will cease to be.
> Cut off striving and abandon deliberation and the people will return to being like children.
> (A: 1–2)[9]

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[7] Guodian C uses *wu* 無 while A and B use *wang* 亡. I take the two phrases as equivalent, which is supported by the switch between them in the two versions of 64. Many scholars simply read 亡 as 無 in reconstructing the text. I follow Cook in leaving them as distinct.

[8] On the significance of this point, see Pang (2005: 39–41).

[9] Cook has deception (*zha* 詐) rather than deliberation (*lü* 慮). The ambiguity of 偽 in the line could support either reading, making it either artifice or effortful action. The passage seems to criticize

In these cases, *wuwei* is not justified as an end in itself but as the most effective way to achieve success. In that sense, even if we take *wuwei* as non-purposive action, it ultimately serves a purpose.

Another of the most common themes across GDL is the reduction of desires. Chapter 46 explains most fully, saying that the heaviest crime is having deep desires, the worst shame is the desire to attain, and the greatest harm is not knowing contentment (A: 5–6). The absence of desires is formulated positively in terms of a state of simplicity, stillness, or emptiness. These are linked in several passages, most clearly in 19, which says:

> 示素保樸, 少私寡欲。
> Manifest plainness and embrace the unhewn,
> Reduce selfish concerns and make desires few. (A: 2)

These are presented as the alternative to active values like discrimination, skill, and deliberation. The link to non-action appears explicitly in 57, which concludes:

> 是以聖人之言曰:
> 我無事而民自福。
> 我無為而民自化。
> 我好靜而民自正。
> 我欲不欲而民自樸。
> Because of this, the words of sagely people say:
> Through my non-working the people enrich themselves;
> Through my non-action the people transform themselves;
> Through my love of tranquillity the people correct themselves;
> Through my desiring without desiring the people simplify themselves. (A: 31–32)

A person with excessive desires will inevitably try to force the world to give them what they want. Thus desire without desiring and loving tranquillity are parallel to having no work and no effortful action. The reduction of desires and attaining of contentment is directed toward avoiding concrete harms. That may be the point of the phrase "desire without desiring" (欲不欲). If we read that as parallel in meaning to "act without acting" (為亡為), the point would be that one desires a certain outcome but in a way that is in some sense free of desires.

The effectiveness of *wuwei* is grounded in a particular ontology and cosmology centred on *dao* 道. While *dao* often refers to a path or way of acting and living, at least three chapters in GDL give an account of *dao* as part of the structure of the world.[10] Chapter 25 describes it as original source and ontological ground:

> 有狀混成, 先天地生: 脫寥, 獨立而不改, 可以為天下母。
> 未知其名, 字之曰道, 吾強為之名曰大。
> 大曰逝, 逝曰轉, 轉曰返。
> 天大, 地大, 道大, 王亦大。
> 域中有四大焉, 王處一焉。
> 人法地, 地法天, 天法道, 道法自然。
> There is a shape that took form in the undifferentiated, generated before heaven and earth.

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things that are usually taken as positive, though, making striving and deliberation more appropriate than artifice and deception (Cook 2012).

[10] For an excellent account of how these two senses of *dao* relate, see Robins (2011).

> Detached and isolated, standing alone but unaltered, it can be considered the mother of the world.
> Its name is unknown, but it is styled '*dao*'; if forced to make a name for it, one says 'great.'
> Great is called passing, passing is called turning, turning is called return.
> Heaven is great, earth is great, *dao* is great, and the king too is great.
> In the realm there are four greats, and the king occupies one of them.
> People follow earth, earth follows heaven, heaven follows *dao*, *dao* follows what is so of itself [*ziran* 自然]. (A: 21–23)

Chapter 40 introduces the role of *wu* 無 (*wang* 亡 in the manuscript), a state that lacks differentiation:

> 返也者, 道動也。
> 弱也者, 道之用也。
> 天下之物生於有, 【有】生於亡。
> Returning is the movement of *dao*,
> Weakness is the function of *dao*.
> The things of the world are born from being, [being is] born from no-being. (A: 37)

The third example is the first part of 32:

> 道恆亡名, 樸雖細, 天地弗敢臣。
> 侯王如能守之, 萬物將自賓。
> *Dao* is constantly without name. Although in its unhewn simplicity it is minute, heaven and earth do not dare subordinate it. If princes and kings can preserve it, the ten thousand things will make themselves guests. (A: 18–19)

The "shape that took form in the undifferentiated" cannot be named. Given our need to refer to it, though, we can tentatively label it as "the way" or "guidance," or as "great." Chapter 41 similarly ends by saying "*dao* is hidden and nameless" (道隱無名) (B: 12),[11] and 35 says the ultimate cannot be recognized by the senses (C: 4–5). Two other key terms appear in the above chapters as ways to characterize the ultimate. One is *wu* 無, which in its normal use means to lack or not have. As a metaphysical concept, it does not refer to pure nothingness but rather a state without differentiated beings. The passage thus stakes out an important ontological claim, that what generates beings is not itself a being. The second key concept is *ziran* 自然, which 25 presents as the ground of *dao* itself. *Ziran* literally means to be so of itself, referring to a kind of immanent spontaneity. The operation of the ultimate can be described as *ziran*, but 32 shows that the spontaneity lies in things themselves. The opening of chapter 37 has a version of the same lines, using *zihua*, to transform of oneself:

> 道恆亡為也; 侯王能守之, 而萬物將自化。
> *Dao* constantly non-acts.
> If princes and kings can preserve it, then the ten thousand things will transform of themselves. (A: 13)

In this passage, *dao* could equally describe the ultimate or the proper way of acting. Either way, it is the inherent self-so spontaneity of things that justifies the efficacy of no-action, *wuwei*. Thus 57, quoted above, uses four *zi* 自 phrases to show that if

[11] The bamboo strip is broken off after the character *dao* 道, so the remainder is speculative. All other versions of the text, though, include this statement.

the ruler has no work and no desires, the people spontaneously become simple, prosperous, correct, and transformed (A: 31–32). Similarly, in 17, with a minimal government the people will see peace and order as arising of itself, by *ziran* (C: 2). The fact that action arises not from the *dao* as an agent but from the spontaneity inherent in things explains why generation is inexhaustible. The fragment from chapter 5 thus compares heaven and earth to a bellows: "Empty but never exhausted, the more it moves the more comes out" (A: 23). The inexhaustibility of *dao* is also connected to cyclical processes—return is the movement of *dao*. Chapter 16 illustrates the same point:

> 萬物方作, 居以顧復也。
> 天道云云, 各復其根。
> The ten thousand things arise together, dwell and look back for their return.
> The way of heaven goes round and round, each returns to its root. (A: 24)

In this cosmology, heaven (*tian* 天) is explicitly subordinated to *dao*. Chapter 25 says that heaven follows *dao*, and that *dao* precedes both heaven and earth. Chapter 32 says that heaven and earth cannot subordinate *dao* or make it serve. The claim in chapter 40 that the ultimate origin is *wu* can also be read as dismissing a definite being like heaven as a possible source. The very pairing of heaven and earth decentres heaven, making it just one side of what constitutes the natural world. This marks a radical shift, as heaven was the dominant term for the ultimate in classic texts like the *Shang Documents* (Shangshu 尚書) and in the philosophies of the Mohists and the Ru.

While no-action, reducing desires, and the spontaneity of *dao* form the core of GDL, another recurring theme is the interplay of opposites. Chapter 2 presents this through a critique of binary distinctions:

> 天下皆知美之為美也, 惡已;
> 皆知善, 此其不善已。
> 有亡之相生也,
> 難易之相成也,
> 長短之相形也,
> 高下之相盈也,
> 音聲之相和也,
> 先後之相隨也。
> 是以聖人居亡為之事, 行不言之教。
> 萬物作而弗始也, 為而弗恃也, 成而弗居。
> 夫唯弗居也, 是以弗去也。
> When all the world knows beauty as beauty, this is already repulsive.
> When they all know good, this is its already not being good.
> Having and lacking generate each other,
> Difficult and easy complete each other,
> Long and short form each other,
> High and low fill each other,
> Sound and tone harmonize each other,
> First and last follow each other.
> Thus sagely people—
> dwell in the work of no-action,
> practice teaching without words.
> Regarding the myriad things,

they make them arise, but do not start them,
they act on them but do not rely on them,
they complete them but do not dwell in them.
Only because they do not dwell in them, do they not lose them. (A: 15–18)

The primary concern is with values: setting up one side of a dichotomy as desirable is counter-productive because it necessarily produces its opposite as well. The way to avoid this problem is through residing in the work of no-action and practising a teaching without words or doctrines. This connection implies that action involves setting up deliberate goals that privilege one side of a dichotomy over the other. Non-action avoids the problem. A similar point is made in 57, which says:

夫天多忌諱, 而民彌叛。
民多利器, 而邦滋昏。
人多知而奇物滋起。
法物滋彰, 盜賊多有。
When heaven multiplies taboos and prohibitions the people are more rebellious,
When the people multiply sharp tools the state is more in confusion,
When people multiply knowledge more odd things arise,
When exemplary things are illuminated, there are more thieves and robbers. (A: 30–31)

The passage continues by saying "because of this" (是以), sagely people engage in no-work and no-actions. Another strategy arising from the interdependence of opposites appears in 66, which says:

聖人之在民前也, 以身後之;
其在民上也, 以言下之。
Sagely people in being before the people place themselves behind them;
In being above the people, use words to be below them. (A: 3–4)

Instead of avoiding binaries altogether, one brings both sides together. In this case, being above and in front is balanced by actions conveying the opposite. Staying below and behind is a form of *wuwei*. Other passages present the same theme in terms of appearances. Chapter 41 has a long list of things that appear as their opposite. Chapter 45 connects the same point to success:

大成若缺, 其用不敝。
大盈若盅, 其用不窮。
大巧若拙,
大盛若絀,
大直若屈。
躁勝滄, 靜勝熱, 清靜為天下定。
Great completion is as if defective—its use cannot be blocked.
Great fullness is as if empty—its use cannot be exhausted.
Great craft is as if clumsy.
Great abundance is as if deficient.
Great straightness is as if bent.
Activity overcomes cold,

Stillness overcomes heat.
Pure stillness is what settles the world. (B: 13–15)[12]

What makes something great is its ability to appear as its opposite.

One other recurring theme is the critique of language and naming. The difficulties in naming *dao* already point to the inherent limits of language. Since the ultimate is unnameable, dividing the world according to names expresses alienation from the way. Thus chapter 37 begins with the line we have seen, that *dao* is always *wuwei* and if lords and kings preserve it things will transform of themselves. It then says that if desires do arise, one should restrain them using "nameless simplicity" (亡名之樸), which will lead to contentment and spontaneous stability (A: 13–14). This nameless simplicity is the alternative to controlling the people by raising up values or multiplying taboos and restrictions, either of which would be counter-productive. This connection between naming and one-sided values probably explains the suspicion of study and learning. Chapter 48 links study to the opposite of *wuwei*:

學者日益,
為道者日損。
損之又損, 以至亡為也,
亡為而亡不為。
Those who study daily increase
Those for the way daily decrease.
Decrease it and decrease again, by this reaching non-action,
No acting but no not-acting. (B: 3–4)

The *Laozi* is written in words, so a full rejection of language would be impossible. Chapter 2 places "practise teaching without words" in parallel to "dwell in the work of no-actions," in both cases pointing not toward a total rejection of language or action but rather to a particular form of them (A: 17). Chapter 32 sets up this middle ground:

天地相合也, 以逾甘露。民莫之命而自均,
焉始制有名。名亦既有, 夫亦將知止。知止, 所以不殆。
譬道之在天下也, 猶小谷之與江海。
Heaven and earth combine together to bring down sweet dew, and the people, without being commanded, will even themselves out.
Only at this are names instituted. Once names are had one must still know where to stop. Knowing where to stop is that by which there is no disaster.
Dao in relation to the world is like the rivers and oceans in relation to small streams. (A: 19–20)

Names are necessary, but they must be kept in check. This claim is made in the context of nature's ability to organize itself spontaneously, implying that naming instead tends toward force and coercion.

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[12] Cook reads the final *ding* 定 (settles) instead as *zheng* 正 (corrects or rectifies). The latter appears in all other versions of the text, but *ding* fits at least as well, and so I prefer to leave it as is (Cook 2012).

3 The Unity of the Guodian *Laozi* Materials

I have provisionally read the GDL as one whole, but is there evidence that the three collections of bamboo strips should be distinguished? All three contain indications of being the same kind of materials—directed toward the ruling classes and offering means of success grounded in a broader philosophical vision. The key elements of the philosophical system run across all three collections. I see nothing in any of the bundles that would clearly contradict this common philosophical system. Collections A and C are linked by the inclusion of the last half of 64 in both. A and B are linked by the common reference to "closing the openings and blocking the gates" in 56 (A: 27) and 52 (B: 13). There are differences in how ideas are expressed and even possible contradictions between passages, but these occur as much within bundles as across them. There have been various attempts to distinguish the bundles by thematic emphasis, but the lack of consensus on what those themes are shows the limits of the evidence.[13] Whatever differences there are in emphasis seem to result from the small sample sizes rather than deliberate planning. Overall, the connections between the bundles outweigh the differences and the evidence supports reading them together.

Even if there is no clear distinction between the bundles, there is still a question of what kind of unity they have. While the materials form a fairly coherent whole, they do not have the kind of consistency one would expect from a single author writing a single work. They read more plausibly as the work of a single person or coordinated group that composed new materials while including and more or less integrating others. There are passages with no connection to the overall philosophical system, and thus these could have independent origins. One example is the first half of chapter 64, which contains practical advice with no clear connection to any particular philosophy. Since the same lines appear in one of the cosmogonic texts mentioned earlier, "All Things Flow into Form" (strips 8–9), it is likely to have been a bit of freestanding practical wisdom incorporated into different texts. A few chapters are relatively anomalous. Chapter 55 (A: 34–35) describes the power or virtuosity (*de* 德) of an infant as making him invulnerable to harm. There are no other indications of such super-natural powers in GDL, and this is the only passage to mention refined essence (*jing* 精), the heart (*xin* 心), or vital energy (*qi* 氣). Its closing lines run against the overall focus of the text:

> 益生曰祥,
> 心使氣曰強,
> 物壯則老, 是謂不道。
> Increasing life is called propitious.
> The mind compelling vital energy is called strength.
> Things reaching maturity get old—this is called not following the way. (A: 35)

Increasing life and using the heart to command vital energy both go against the focus of GDL on following natural tendencies. For all of these reasons, chapter 55

[13] For a summary of various attempts to find thematic unity in the collections, and the problems with this attempt, see Cook (2012: 301–02).

may reflect the incorporation of an independent view of self-cultivation focused more on force and less on following natural patterns, using a specific set of terms not shared by other GDL passages. Another somewhat anomalous passage is 31 (C: 6–10). It is a generic anti-war passage that could have come from many different lines of thought in ancient China, but it specifically advocates feeling sorrow (*aibei* 哀悲) and using rituals of mourning (*sangli* 喪禮). The *Laozi* nowhere else advocates rituals, although the harshest criticism of ritual (in chapter 38) is absent in GDL. The cultivation of specific feelings also is missing in GDL and stands in tension with the overall focus on stillness, emptiness, and simplicity. In contrast, the focus on cultivating sad feelings and using ritual would fit the Ru, although there is little reason to give the passage such a definite affiliation.

We can draw no certain conclusions from these examples regarding the authorship of GDL. It is possible that the materials reflect a single author whose system was far more extensive and complex than it appears to be, including, for example, an account of self-cultivation based on the heart controlling the vital energy and an affirmation of rituals of mourning. What seems most likely, though, is that there is a philosophical system that was held by the authors, based on the efficacy of non-action, the need to reduce desires, and a cosmology in which things arise spontaneously from an unnameable generative source. These authors wrote passages expressing that philosophy in terms of its efficacy for political rule, at the same time incorporating common sayings and ideas that originated from other thinkers or practitioners. Whoever drew together the whole set of materials found at Guodian (which may or may not have been those authors) also incorporated related ideas that were not fully digested into the overall system. As the collection of materials became a classic in itself, there was nothing to mark passages as more or less integral to the original position, essentially forcing readers to construct a broader system that would either account for them or find ways of reading them against their more obvious meanings. This hermeneutic process nicely explains why the philosophical positions attributed to Laozi have varied so radically.

4 Guodian and the Received *Laozi*

One key question raised by the discovery of GDL is the status of all of the materials not included in Guodian. If we had found only the GDL without any knowledge of the *Laozi*, we would no doubt conclude we had found a complete work. No strips appear to be missing, and nothing indicates this is only a third of a text. Nonetheless, the archaeological evidence itself is open to multiple interpretations. We can distinguish three basic possibilities. One is that GDL was a complete text that we could call the proto-*Laozi*. Everything not found in those materials would then be interpolations, and GDL would have a claim to the greatest authenticity. The second possibility is that GDL represents source materials from which the *Laozi* as a whole was formed. The other materials could have been contemporaneous, older, or later, but they would not necessarily have been composed as extensions of GDL (as in the

first view), nor would they necessarily be less authentic. The third possibility is that GDL is a selection of passages from a single larger text that would be close to the received *Laozi*. This view is most common, at least among Chinese scholars, and it allows traditional views of the composition of the *Laozi* to remain intact. These possibilities are not mutually exclusive and can be combined in various ways.[14]

Regarding the archaeological evidence, there are four key points:

1. A and B have no overlapping passages.
2. All materials in A and B are found in the *Laozi*. If we exclude the non-*Laozi* materials in C as a separate text, then the remainder of C would also include only materials found in the *Laozi*.
3. There is one overlap between C and A, as both contain the last half of chapter 64.
4. The three sets of strips seem to have been copied separately, with at least A and C copied from different manuscripts.

These facts give some guidance but do not decisively eliminate any of the above three possibilities. Point 3 shows that the second half of 64 was copied from two manuscripts that shared a common ancestor, but that does not mean that all of the passages in A and C came from those manuscripts. It is quite common for versions of the same passage to appear in entirely different texts. As mentioned earlier, lines from the first half of chapter 64 also appears in *Fanwu liuxing* [FWLX], but no one would therefore conclude that all of FWLX and *Laozi* A derive from the same text. Point 2, the fact that all of the materials in A and B appear in the *Laozi*, is easily explained if the source from which they were copied contained only *Laozi* materials, as Scott Cook argues (Cook 2012: 204–05), but it is equally compatible with taking the *Laozi* materials as a single and complete text, a proto-*Laozi*, to which other materials were added. Another possibility is to take Guodian as a collection (or three collections) of materials that were already to some degree canonical. In that case, the Guodian materials would represent a stage in which diverse materials were coalescing into what would eventually become the full *Laozi*. The C materials may have been part of that collection, with 64 copied twice in error, or C may have been a different collection that did not become canonical, with only some passages ending up in the *Laozi*. The Guodian collection of materials could have been merged with other collections and supplemented with newly written materials, in order to form the *Laozi* that we know. This view aligns most with points 1 and 4. If GDL formed a single coherent text, it is difficult to see why it would have been copied in

[14] For a detailed discussion of the various positions and arguments see Cook (2012: 199–205). He concludes: "It thus seems more likely that the tomb occupant, or whoever may have 'created' these texts, formed them separately on the basis of different editions of a pre-existing (if still perhaps 'incomplete') *Laozi* more or less like we know it," although he says that more emphasis should be placed on the "less" (Cook 2012: 205). For other balanced discussions of the various possibilities, see Allan and Williams (2008: 142–46) and Henricks (2000: 19–22). For one of the most thorough and up-to-date arguments for the traditional view of the text, see Liu Xiaogan (2015). For an argument in favor of taking the Guodian strips as source material for the *Laozi*, see Boltz (1999: 594–96). For a hybrid position that takes the Guodian materials as selected from a shorter version of something like the received text, see Brooks (2010: 59–61).

three separate parts from at least two different manuscripts. One could argue that the sets of strips represent three different selections from one text, but point 1 requires that these have been made in coordination. It is then difficult to see why someone would go to the effort of making three coordinated selections rather than just copying the whole text, particularly if the text was seen as the coherent product of a single author that had been passed down for two centuries.

The indeterminacy of the material evidence leaves the content itself as crucial evidence. One way to approach the question of the status of the materials not found at Guodian then, is to see if they are distinctive in ways that suggest their exclusion was not a product of sampling. If groups of passages that seem particularly distinct can also be shown to have their own internal coherence, then we have good reason to see them as another set of source materials. There are at least two strong candidates for that, coming from the two concepts most markedly absent in GDL—discussions of the one or oneness (*yi* 一) and discussions of the way of heaven (*tiandao* 天道 or *tianzhidao* 天之道).[15]

No chapters between 67 and 81 of the received text appear in the Guodian materials. That is by far the longest stretch of missing chapters and the odds of such a large group being left out of a random sampling of the text is implausibly low.[16] Aside from their absence in Guodian, there is some evidence for internal connections among those chapters, as in the discussion of the "three treasures" (*sanbao* 三寶) in chapter 67 and the mention of "my treasures" (*wubao* 吾寶) in 69, or discussions of taking death seriously (*zhongsi* 重死) in 80, taking death lightly (*qingsi* 輕死) in 75, and the importance of fearing death (*weisi* 畏死) in 74, which then connects to fearing authority or might (*weiwei* 畏威) in 72. The more compelling reason for treating the last 15 chapters as a distinct unit is that they generally conflict with the philosophical system of GDL. The most fundamental difference is that they focus on heaven or the way of heaven rather than on *dao*. Heaven appears as an authority in 6 of the last 15 passages (67, 68, 73, 77, 79, and 81). Chapter 73 speaks of what heaven hates, describes the way of heaven, and then ends with the claim: "Heaven's net is cast far and wide, loose-meshed but losing nothing" (天罔恢恢, 疏而不失). Chapter 67 brings in heaven to support one of the three treasures:

> 夫慈,
> 以戰則勝;
> 以守則固。
> 天將建之, 如以慈垣之。
> Now, with nurturing care,
> if they go to battle, they are victorious;
> if they undertake protective measures, they are secure.
> Heaven will establish them, as if using nurturing care to fortify them.

[15] Both points are noted in Henricks (2000: 17–19). I have written extensive arguments in favour of each of these as distinct clusters in the *Laozi*. Those arguments cannot be repeated here and I just summarize their results. For the full arguments, see Perkins (2014, 2015).

[16] Brooks makes this point and argues that the last 15 chapters were not in existence at the time of the GDL (Brooks 2010). Cook says that this "may well be the most likely explanation" of their absence (Cook 2012: 205 n23).

This passage implies that heaven singles out those who are good for support, and thus that it is aware of human actions. Chapter 81 connects heaven to benefit (*li* 利), and 79 links it to impartial support of those who are good:

> 夫
> 天道无親;
> 恒與善人。
> Now,
> The way of heaven has no familial attachments;
> it is constantly with good people.

Chapter 68 ends by saying: "This refers to pairing with heaven, the ultimate of the ancients" (是謂配天, 古之極也). None of the last 15 passages suggest anything more fundamental than heaven, mentioning neither *dao* nor *wu* as an ultimate ground. Instead, they present a coherent cosmological view in which heaven is the dominant force, is aware of human actions and assists those who are good, promoting benefit and equality. The final 15 chapters differ on another of the key elements in the philosophical system in GDL in that they show no concern with internal cultivation. They make no use of knowing satisfaction (*zhizu* 知足), stillness or quietude (*jing* 靜), emptiness (*xu* 虛), or unhewn simplicity (*pu* 樸). Reducing desires is never mentioned. In fact, the only significant point of agreement between the last 15 chapters and GDL is on avoiding force and prominence, relying instead on softness and yielding. Even so, the term *wuwei* is not used in these chapters, and there is no use of *zi* phrases to describe the way order spontaneously arises through nonaction. Taken together, there are good reasons for taking the last 15 chapters as a distinct group of passages expressing a related but different philosophical position.

Another significant grouping of passages that are missing in GDL are those that mention the one, oneness, or unity (*yi* 一). The one is used in a philosophical sense in five chapters of the *Laozi* (10, 14, 22, 39, and 42), none of which appear in GDL. That would be statistically unlikely for a random selection. The possible coherence of these passages has been illuminated by the previously mentioned FWLX.[17] This text resembles the *Laozi* in its concern with cosmogony, the immanence of the ultimate source of the world, and its focus on internal cultivation, but it takes the ultimate as the one rather than *dao*. That one can be grasped and used as a guide, and FWLX shows no concern with the dangers of positing values or the limits of language. That the *Laozi* passages on the one have some connection to this view is clearest by considering chapter 42 of the *Laozi*, which begins with a cosmogony:

> 道生一, 一生二, 二生三, 三生萬物。
> 萬物負陰而抱陽, 中氣以為和。
> *Dao* generates one, one generates two, two generates three, three generates the myriad things.
> The myriad things shoulder *yin* and embrace *yang*, centring vital energies to make harmony.

[17] Two copies of FWLX were found in the Shanghai Museum Bamboo Strips and were first edited by Cao Jinyan 曹錦炎, published in Ma (2008). Unless otherwise noted, I have followed the reconstruction of a manuscript by Scott Cook (Gu Shikao 顧史考) in Cook (2009a, b).

This cosmogony takes a fairly standard form of increasing differentiation from one to two and then onwards, but it is the only *Laozi* passage to present such a view. Now it seems to have not been entirely original, as FWLX has the following lines:

> 聞之曰:
> 一生兩, 兩生三, 三生女, 女成結。(21)
> It has been heard:
> One generates two, two generates three, three generates the feminine, the feminine completes bonds.

There are several uncertain aspects of this passage, but the similarity with the lines from the *Laozi* is clear. The *Laozi*, though, changes this cosmogony by subordinating it to *dao*. Chapter 39 can be approached in this context. It begins with a series of lines claiming the dependence of the world on the one, a position that is conceptually and linguistically similar to that of FWLX, but it then qualifies this claim. For example, it first says "Heaven attained the one and thereby became clear" but then adds, "If heaven were incessantly clear, it might fracture." This attack on one-sided values is rooted in a critique of the one as ultimate—if the one leads only to clarity, then we must move beyond the one to something more fundamental. The passage ends very similar to 42 on the interdependence of opposites, saying that "it is necessary for the noble to take the ignoble as root; it is necessary for the high to take the low as foundation" (故必貴以賤為本, 必高矣而以下為基). Another of the *Laozi* passages opposes the claim in FWLX that the one can be grasped by the senses:

> 是故一,
> 咀之有味,
> 嗅〔之有臭〕,[18]
> 鼓之有聲,
> 近之可見。(19)
> For this reason, regarding the one:
> If tasted it has flavour,
> If smelled it has scent,
> If tapped it has sound,
> If approached it can be seen.

In contrast, chapter 14 of the *Laozi* says:

> 視之而弗見, [名]之曰微。
> 聽之而弗聞, 名之曰希。
> 捪之而弗得, 名之曰夷。
> 三者不可到計,[19] 故混而為一。
> Looked for but not seen—it is named minute.
> Listened for but not heard—it is named slight.
> Reached for but not attained—it is named smooth.
> These three cannot be fully calculated, so they are confused and become one.

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[18] These three characters are damaged in the A manuscript and are filled in based on the B manuscript.

[19] Both Mawangdui manuscripts use *ji* 計. Gao Ming reads it as *jie* 詰, which is the character in the received versions of the text (Gao 1996). I read it as is.

The ultimate cannot be seen or heard, leading to a vagueness and confusion that is labelled as the one. One other passage can be placed within this group, even though it does not refer to the one. It is directed against one-sided values. The FWLX says:

> 人白爲執。
> 奚以知其白?
> 終身自若。(18)
> The white of human beings must be grasped.
> How does one know its white?
> To the end of one's life, being spontaneously at ease.

Chapter 28 of the *Laozi* admits this principle, but only if coupled with its opposite: "Know the white but preserve the dark to be the model of the world" (知其白, 守其黑, 為天下式). None of the *Laozi* passages with links to the ideas in the FWLX are found in GDL, and that is unlikely to be the result of a random selection of passages. It may be that whoever collected the Guodian materials deliberately excluded them, or that they were written as a distinct group in an attempt to incorporate and subordinate a philosophical position centred on the one.

What do these two clusters of passages tell us about the formation of the text? The differences between the last 15 chapters and the GDL makes it implausible that the entire *Laozi* was written under a single authorial intention. One could still claim that a complete *Laozi* was in existence at the time and that GDL were selected from them, but the complete absence of either cluster in GDL cannot be coincidental. It is possible that the selector(s) deliberately avoided both clusters, perhaps because they were seen as distinct and as less valuable, but there is no evidence for this. The last 15 chapters also weigh strongly against the proto-*Laozi* model. It is possible that they were written to modify and qualify the GDL position, but then one would expect the author to explicitly reconcile and situate these new views. The last 15 chapters thus strongly support seeing the Guodian materials as a group of passages that were merged with others to form the whole text. In contrast, the passages clustered around the one reinforce the philosophy of the Guodian materials. They thus fit the proto-*Laozi* model, in which new materials were written to extend a core position. None of this evidence is decisive, but it suggests a complex process of textual formation in which different groups of passages were combined while other passages and lines were written to make the collection more coherent and to strengthen its core philosophical position. As argued in the previous section, a similar process seems to be at work within the GDL itself.

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Chapter 3
On Citation Practices in the Guodian Manuscripts



He Ruyue and Michael Nylan

1 Introduction

Much of the recent work on the *Documents* (Shu 書) seems to be motivated by dislike, bordering on outrage, for what nationalist scholars identify as the stance of the "Doubting Antiquity faction" (*yi gu pai* 疑古派).[1] The scientifically excavated Guodian manuscript cache, two essays of which appear to cite the *Documents* classic, offers a good vantage point from which to examine several questions, including the distinctive features of manuscript culture and the likely "social practices" of the textual communities in the areas and centuries we now assign to "early China." By definition, philosophical and historical inquiries are to pose questions of the evidence, rather than impose normative and anachronistic accounts on the materials at hand. Our essay will demonstrate, we believe, that disinterested inquiry yields more interesting, if more complex, hypotheses about pre-Qin classical learning than those typically offered by those imagining identical social practices of the text observed uniformly throughout the vast territory of the present boundaries of China.

[1] Cheng Yuanmin 程元敏, Qiu Xigui 裘錫圭, and Li Xueqin 李學勤, three senior scholars in Taiwan and the China, operate on such sectarian assumptions (Qiu 2004: chapter). These are generally deferred to by, for example, Cook 2012.

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2 Background: Citation Practices in the Early Extant Corpus

When the *Odes* (Shi 詩) were circulating, in Chunqiu or early Zhanguo periods, some "writings" or "documents" (perhaps not yet compiled into one or more authoritative sets) were written on bamboo and silk, to commemorate historical events. By the Warring States, the classicists (Ru 儒) and Mohists were both emphasizing such "writings," often to opposing rhetorical ends. *Mozi* cites two or three of today's Jinwen 今文 *Documents* chapters, for a total of four or five quotations, three of which list chapter titles (all to the "Lü xing" 吕刑 chapter).[2] *Mencius* definitely cites the *Documents* six times (thrice by chapter titles); *Xunzi* eleven times (once by chapter title), and the chapter title "Kang gao" 康誥 is named as the authority for a paraphrase taken from that *Documents* chapter. The *Zuozhuan* 左傳, of uncertain date, cites the *Documents* eighteen times (once by chapter title, to "Pan geng" 盤庚). Only three citations of a *Documents* chapter (once by title for the "Pan geng") appear in the *Guoyu*. In the pre-Qin literature, chapter titles do not appear to be fixed. The "Yao dian" 堯典 (Canon of Yao), for example, is cited as the "Imperial Canon" ("Di dian" 帝典) in the *Liji* 禮記; meanwhile, the *Han Fei* 韓非 ascribes a "Kang gao" passage to the "Jiu gao" 酒誥 (Proclamation Against Wine).

These pre-Qin works[3] identify citations in a variety of ways, as the teachings or "intentions" of sage-rulers and ministers, as "Xia," "Shang," or "Zhou writings," by chapter titles, or simply by saying "The *Documents* says." By comparison, the Guodian in two essays (the only ones to cite the *Documents*) mentions three pieces by title: "Jun shi" 君奭, cited in *Ziyi* 緇衣 strip 36 and *Cheng zhi wen zhi* 成之聞之 strips 22, 29; "Lü xing" in *Ziyi* strips 13, 26, and 29; and "Kang gao" in *Ziyi* strip 29 and *Cheng zhi wen zhi* 成之聞之 strip 38. The two Guodian manuscripts are unique in usually identifying *Documents* citations by title. They are also unique in citing the "Jun shi" chapter.

The total number of citations in the received pre-Qin literature we count as 57, far fewer than Liu Qiyu's 115 (which counts several texts, including the *Liji* and *Yi Zhoushu* 逸周書, as pre-Qin literature). The pre-Qin literature (aside from Guodian) cites the "Kang gao" chapter eighteen times; the "Hong fan" eight times, and the "Lü xing" chapter, seven times.[4] Add Guodian, and those figures become 20, 8, and 10, for Guodian cites "Kang gao" and "Lü xing" writings as well, but not "Hong fan." Significantly, none of the citations in the pre-Qin period from the received

[2] It is not clear whether the *Mozi* cites the "Hong fan" *Documents* chapter or a "Zhou ode" (not yet incorporated into a *Documents* classic).

[3] In the *Zuo,* materials that are either citations or parallels to passages in the *Documents* are ascribed to various writings, for example, the "decrees of the former kings" (*xian wang zhi ming* 先王之命) or to specific diviners (e.g. Diviner Yi 史佚), or to unnamed "records" (*zhi* 志). For details, see Gu and Liu (2005: 44–49).

[4] To include the "Hong fan" in this count is to presume that the rhymed verse section now included in the "Hong fan" always belonged to that *Documents* chapter, and was not a late insertion into that text. We cannot be sure that this presumption is correct.

texts, nor from Guodian, evinces interest in correlative cosmology, though many of the treatises organize their arguments by numbering their parts, natural enough in a culture relying so heavily on oral transmission and teaching. Systems of correspondence are evident in daybooks and divination charts (e.g., at Kongjia po) but the high cultural elite, so far as we know, did not regard divination practices as an important subject for theoretical debates, as opposed to the technical control by the courts (e.g. Zhangjia shan).

Citation practices seem to have varied widely, by text and, by implication, by each textual community. For example, only two Guodian essays, *Ziyi* (Black Robe) and *Cheng zhi wen zhi*, cite the "Jun shi" chapter. Only the *Mencius* and *Zuozhuan* cite the "Yao dian," while the *Mozi* never mentions the widely known "Kang gao" chapter. Only the *Zuo* and the *Guoyu* cite the "Pan geng" chapter. This clearly supports Matsumoto Masaaki's findings, which posit different sets of chapters known and taught by different textual communities (Matsumoto 1966). Those sets exhibited semantic, as well as graphic variations, in support of variant readings. Punctuation also differed, judging from the evidence and, perhaps more surprisingly, word order in passages.

As David Schaberg has written in an unpublished paper, "The availability of complete texts of … the *Shu* in the Han and afterward should not blind us to the likelihood that in earlier periods no such thing as a 'complete text' existed" (Schaberg 2003: 42). Even the conservative Scott Cook has wondered in print whether it accords with the available evidence to be "thinking of a simplified, straight-line model of written transmission," thinking that construction farfetched. However, the dominant line among Han Chinese scholars in the PRC casts textual transmission in antiquity in precisely this simplified way. Most therefore presume the existence of a single Urtext for the *Documents* from at least the time of Kongzi, with the alternate versions produced either when careless or self-interested scribes left the text corrupted or activist editors left it "improved" according to their own lights.[5] Chinese scholars mainly base themselves on a collection of separate strips in the Guodian *Six Virtues* (Liu De 六德) treatise, which appear, as reconstructed, to speak of Six Arts *(liu shu* 六術) as the six (or four?) foundational texts, the *Odes* and the *Documents*, the *Rites* and *Music* (or rites and music), and the *Changes* and *Annals* (see below).[6] This statement, which is unique in the whole of the pre-Qin literature, received or excavated, contradicts other passages in the Guodian cache, leaving us to speculate that the Guodian corpus, buried in a single tomb, did not all originate in a single time and place.[7] Unlike the vast majority of scholars examining

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[5] Matsumoto Masaaki disproved this simplistic view long ago, but presumably his work is not well enough known in China (Matsumoto 1966).

[6] The phrase six arts (*liu shu* 六術) has not appeared in the Guodian. However, the Guodian *Liu De* 六德 mentions *Shi* 詩, *Shu* 書, *Li* 禮, *Yi* 易, *Yue* 樂 and the *Chunqiu* 春秋 (strips 23, 24).

[7] The claim is repeated in Jia Yi's *Xin shu* from Western Han, but groupings of Four Classics and later Five Classics, Six Arts, and such are much more common later, in the early empires. Xunzi, as is well known, did not include the *Changes* in his list of Classics. Han and pre-Han speak of Five or Six Classics. For details, see Nylan 2001: Introduction.

the Guodian materials, we do not believe that the works included in that corpus can be neatly assigned to Daoist, Legalist, and Confucian "schools" (Chao 2002: 2, 25–29; Guo 2009: 2, 84–92). Accordingly, we underscore the need to consider each work in the Guodian corpus in its own right (see below), as well as in intertextual relations with works outside the corpus.

To round out our picture of early citation practices, it will surely prove helpful to look at citations of the *Documents* in Sima Qian's monumental history, viewing that text as the last significant testimony to Warring States-style rhetoric. The *Shiji* invokes 27 of the 28 chapters ascribed to Fu Sheng (in anachronistic nomenclature, the so-called Jinwen or Modern Script chapters).[8] Sixteen of those 27 *Shiji* 史記 chapters include substantial quotations of several sentences or more from the *Documents*, namely the "Yao dian" 堯典, "Gao Yao mo" 皋陶謨, "Yu gong" 禹貢, "Tang shi" 湯誓, "Pan geng" 盤庚, "Gaozong rongri" 高宗肜日, "Xibo kanli" 西伯戡黎, "Wei zi" 微子, "Hong fan" 洪範, "Jin teng" 金縢, "Duo shi" 多士, "Wu yi" 無逸, "Jun shi" 君奭, "Lü xing" 呂刑, "Bi shi" 費誓, and "Qin shi" 秦誓, along with a rival account of events covered in the "Jin teng") (Jin 1963: 61–80).[9] Clearly, by mid-Western Han, Sima Qian 司馬遷 had access to the *Documents* corpus of today, albeit with graphic and semantic variants, some of them important. Still, in ten additional chapters, nothing save the fact of the chapter's composition is noted and this, curiously enough, is true for a clear majority of the chapters associated with the Duke of Zhou (9 out of a total of 12), despite the extensive coverage given the Shang–Zhou transition in the *Shiji*. Soon after Sima Qian's time and Wudi's reign (r. 141–87 bce), especially with the dramatic "classical turn" of Chengdi's reign (r. 33–7 bce), court scholars made conscious efforts to summon archaic models, which resulted in more frequent citations of the Classics, greater resort to archaizing formulae when composing new texts, and the deliberate retrojection of archaisms by editors into old texts, as we know from several secondary studies (Wang 2009; Nylan and Vankeerberghen 2014: Introduction).

Again, we notice unique patterns in the citations selected, for Sima Qian seems relatively uninterested in a chapter that otherwise commands widespread attention in the early literature: the "Kang gao," a chapter assigned to the Shang–Zhou transition. Moreover, the passages selected for citation in the Guodian manuscripts in no case match those selected in the *Shiji*.[10] Thus appeals to tradition, far from inducing a uniformity of views and appeals, allowed those well-versed in the literature of high cultural elites to pick and choose their models from the wide spectrum available to them. That, as much as the hypothetical "lost chapters" of an archaic script *Documents*, may likely account for the many citations to a *Shu* or *shu* (a *Documents*

[8] The 29th chapter ascribed to Jinwen is "Tai shi" 太誓, but that chapter "was found" during the reign of Han Wudi, after being lost, and most scholars assume a forgery was submitted to the throne.

[9] For the last, see *Shiji* 33: 1516–19. Some speculate that Sima Qian only cited passages whose language and grammar was relatively easy to parse; we are unsure about this.

[10] We do not speak here of the Guodian citations of the chapter titles, which match those found in the *Shiji*, but rather the content of the *Shangshu* chapters.

or "writings") that we cannot find today anywhere in the received pseudo-Kong chapters of the *Documents* (He and Nylan 2016). A final point to register by way of preliminaries: the *Shiji* general pattern of citation, in company with the functions to which citations are put, differs so broadly from that of the *Zuozhuan* that we need not assume, as many do, that *Shiji* relies on *Zuozhuan* as a main source for its historical records.

Present indications suggest that many pre-Qin, Qin, and early Western Han texts deployed fewer archaisms than the post-Han pseudo-Kong chapters of the *Documents*. There is thus the strong possibility that in the pre-imperial and early imperial period classicists generally avoided archaic and archaizing formulae, as they were hoping to have their arguments receive a good response and wider reception.[11] Besides, resort to the technologies of reading and writing already sufficed to mark members of the elite in that era.[12] For this reason, in our translation of the *Documents*, we have come to see the *Shiji* passages as closer, perhaps, to Fu Sheng's version of the *Documents* than to the pseudo-Kong versions.[13]

3 Shifting Contexts for Explicit Citations and Parallels

Explicit citations to a *shu/Shu* (a *Documents* version or some other authoritative collection(s) of writings) are found in 9 of the 23 sections in the Guodian *Ziyi* (sections 3, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18),[14] with seven chapter titles named in a total of ten citations.[15] Three of those seven titles correspond to *Documents* chapter titles believed to have their origins in Fu Sheng's chapters (now identified with a "Modern Script" or Jinwen block of chapters)[16]: the "Jun Shi" (Lord Shi), "Kang gao" (Proclamation to Kang), and "Lü xing" (Punishments of Lü). The Guodian *Ziyi* essay cites these works three, two, and two times respectively. The Guodian *Cheng zhi wen zhi* essay features two explicit citations of the "Lord Shi" and a single citation from the "Proclamation."[17] Altogether, the entire Guodian manuscript corpus cites "Lord Shi" five times by title, the "Proclamation" three times, and the "Punishments" twice.

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[11] Contra Schaberg's argument, which is worth reading on other points (Schaberg 2003).

[12] For one example, see *Mencius* 5A/4, citing a long passage from the "Yao dian," par. 11.

[13] Translation modified with Vogelsang (2002).

[14] As Shaughnessy notes, the Guodian *Ziyi* in 1156 characters is roughly 400 characters shorter than the received version in 1549 (Shaughnessy 2006: 64–66).

[15] As the pseudo-Kong *Documents* classic may have collected chapter titles from earlier sources, such as the *Shiji*, and ascribed them to an earlier *Documents,* we adopt neutral language throughout, rather than presuming the existence of *Documents* chapters in circulation.

[16] The chapter titles from a *guwen Shangshu* are "Yin gao," "Jun ya," "Jun chen," "Ji gong zhi gu ming."

[17] Two additional chapter titles that *may* come from a *Shangshu* version are listed as "Zhao ming" and "Da Yu."

What have scholars up to now made of these explicit citations, and what do they reveal about the circulation during the pre-unification period of materials that eventually come into the *Documents* classic? Answering those questions requires a close look at the two manuscripts *Ziyi* and *Cheng zhi wen zhi*, to establish the context and precise wording employed with the citations. Prior to making that inquiry, we alert readers to two basic principles of Euro-American textual criticism: (1) that the earlier extant version is not necessarily a better reading than that found in a later version, given how many texts were lost over the centuries; and (2) that the more difficult reading (*lectio difficilior*) is probably the earlier reading, since activist editors down through the ages tended to emend texts with a view to rendering them more reader-friendly. To these well-established principles, we add a third of our own devising, given our findings in the preceding section: that where variant readings exist, one should not leap, absent firm corroborating evidence, to hasty judgments about which version is earlier or better, nor assume that the current meaning assigned the *Documents*' citation was the prevailing meaning within the Guodian textual community, let alone beyond it. In multiple cases, readings differ, following shifts in context, subject, or vocabulary. With that in mind, we turn to our first explicit *Documents* citation.

4 Citations by Title in the Guodian *Ziyi*

The Guodian *Ziyi* (Black Robe), strips 36–37, cites "Lord Shi" as saying,

昔在上帝。割紳觀文王德。其集大命於厥身。

Today's *Liji* chapter by the same title, *zhang* 章[18] 18, says, by contrast:

昔在上帝周田觀文王之德。其集大命於厥躬。

Today's *Liji* version says, before emendations and glosses, "Long ago, the Lord on High looked hard at King Wen's charismatic virtue in the Zhou lands, and gathered the great charge on his person" (LJ-SSJZS, 935a). But the phrase "Zhou tian" has troubled scholars since the Eastern Han, at least. Zheng Xuan (130–200 CE) accordingly proposed an alternate reading for the phrase "in the Zhou lands" which has been accepted by many commentators: Zhou means *zhou* 周 (everywhere) and *tian* 田 means *shen* 申 ("extensively," and by extension, "repeatedly"). Meanwhile scholars are wont to emend the *Liji*'s *guan* 觀 (to look carefully at)[19] to *quan* 勸 (to encourage), in order to align the *Liji* with the pseudo-Kong *Documents* (see below), in the mistaken belief that the latter was earlier and more authoritative. Despite

[18] Shaughnessy translates *zhang* 章 as "pericope" (Shaughnessy 2006); most translate it as "chapter" or "section."

[19] We are less certain that Zheng is correct. Gu Jiegang and Liu Qiyu, prefer, on the basis of Guodian to read *guan* in its usual sense (Gu and Liu 2005). Nylan has been schooled not to emend the text, unless absolutely necessary. Hence, the first translation is generated by her. He prefers to show due deference to Zheng Xuan.

these three consequential variants, the *Liji*'s subject remains the relation between the Lord on High and King Wen, the pre-dynastic founder of Western Zhou, since Heaven above determines the dynastic transfer, supposedly in response to actions taken on earth below. Readers will recall that nearly every *Ziyi* pericope ends with praise of King Wen, so this citation may simply have supplemented the *Odes'* panegyrics to the same ruler.

Today's pseudo-Kong *Documents* classic reads 在昔上帝。割申勸寧王之德。其集大命於厥躬, in language closer, if hardly identical, to the Guodian "Black Robes" manuscript than to today's *Liji* "Black Robes" chapter.[20] Hence the hasty conclusion by some that the Guodian cache supports a pre-Qin date for at least part of today's pseudo-Kong *Documents*. This conclusion is unwarranted. Delving deeper, we find three standard readings for *ge*割 in the extant literature. First, Zheng Xuan, commenting on the *Liji*, reads *ge* as *gai* 蓋 (most probably), suggesting a likelihood, rather than a certainty, about Heaven's operations. Secondly, some scholars gloss *ge* as *he* 曷/盍, turning the sentence into a question, "Why did the Lord on High oversee this, rewarding and recognizing King Wen's great virtue, and conferring its charge upon his person?" (Liu 2003: 1576n1).[21] The very structure of the Guodian piece, which makes a series of identifications (惟 … 亦惟 … 又曰 … 亦惟 …惟 …), works against Zheng Xuan's gloss, and it is hard to discern any possible rhetorical advantage in either casting doubt on the assertion or posing it as a question.

In yet a third reading, the pseudo-Kong commentary takes *ge* in its usual sense of "to cut down,"[22] a reading distinctly at odds with Zheng Xuan's understanding, but an artefact of earlier rival Han traditions, as acknowledged by Zheng in his commentary to the *Liji Ziyi*, ca. 200 CE. Zheng Xuan writes:

> 古文周田觀文王之德為割紳/申勸寧王之德。今博士讀為厥亂勸寧王之德。三者皆異。古文近似之。
>
> In the archaic writings, the phrase *Zhou tian guan Wen wang zhi de* [found in today's *Liji* "Black Robe" chapter but ***not*** the Guodian version] reads as "cut down [Yin's ruler], to expansively encourage King Wen's virtue" 割申/紳勸寧王之德 [i.e., a phrase closer to the Guodian version].[23] Today's Academicians read the same phrase as 厥亂勸寧王之德. Each of the three versions differ. It seems more likely that the archaic writing approximates the correct version. (LJ-SSDZ 935a)

Bearing in mind the pseudo-Kong reading that takes *ge* 割 in the sense of "to cut down," we surmise that Zheng's group of "current Academicians" may have also

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[20] In a transposition, *xi zai* 昔在 becomes *zai xi* 在昔; and two graphic variations occur as well: *shen* 紳 for *shen* 申, and *shen* 身 for *gong* 躬; also *ning wang* for *Wen wang* (King Wen). Thus the pseudo-Kong follows closely, if not exactly, the passage Zheng identifies as the archaic or pre-Qin version (see immediately below).

[21] Note that this reading retains a whiff of an original teaching formula or catechism, first asking *why* something happened and then proceeding to answer the same question.

[22] The pseudo-Kong glosses this as 在昔上天割制其義。重勸文王之德。故能成其大命於其身。謂勸德以受命。reading *ge* as "to cut down."

[23] This is closer to, but hardly identical with the pseudo-Kong version; compare note 24.

had killing in mind, when they spoke of chaos (*luan* 亂).[24] This prompts the following translation of the situation the *Documents* passage describes: "In the past, the Lord on High, [deeming Yin to be misgoverned], had [the Yin] cut down. It thereby strongly encouraged King Wen's virtues, with the result that the great charge gathered upon his person."[25] After all, in the phrase *jue luan,* the possessive pronoun *jue* 厥 definitely refers to a superior, either Heaven, the ancestors, or the ruler above, and *luan* 亂 either denotes "disorder" or (more rarely) its antonym "good order."[26] A second "Lord Shi" passage immediately above the cited passage ought to prove of help, since it also uses the phrase *jue luan*: 今汝永念, 則有固命。厥亂明我新造邦。Unfortunately, this passage is liable to two opposing readings: (a) "If you now ponder this for a long time, then you may have a secure and stable charge, and **your good order** will illustrate [the legitimacy] of our newly founded state" or, more likely, (b) If you now ponder this for a long time, then you may have a secure and stable charge, given **their disorder** [that of Yin] will advertise [the excellence of] Our newly created realm [that we are instituting now]" (SSJZS 246b).[27] For now, we mildly prefer the second reading, absent new evidence to the contrary.

On the basis of Zheng Xuan's information and the Guodian version, we can generate several authoritative readings. Most scholars working in older traditions of textual criticism would have laboured to establish the single best reading, defined as "that which supposedly comes closest to a hypothetical Urtext" (in Chinese, *yuan ben* 原本), often through seeking perceived parallels in the oracle bone and bronze inscriptions. But Kai Vogelsang's painstaking analysis demonstrates that the language of the *Documents* does not match that of either the oracle bones or the bronze inscriptions (Vogelsang 2002). In addition, all studies of manuscript cultures support a similar picture where small textual communities—and not "general readers" over vast areas—have far fewer and shorter pieces at their disposal. For these reasons, we wish to retain multiple readings as variants appealing to discrete textual communities, as per Zheng's commentary on the three competing versions, until such time as more complete evidence allows us to establish a clear misreading due to a copyist's error.

So what? Admittedly, upon first reading, the three alternative readings do not seem to change our final analysis of the main events during the Yin–Zhou transition. Still, Zheng Xuan (and presumably others before him) emphasized the differences between these three alternatives, and both Western and Eastern Han scholars often

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[24] *Jin* and *gu* do not refer to "New Text" and "Old Text" "schools" (Nylan 1994, 1995).

[25] OR, if we read, by the principle of *lectio difficilior*, *shen* 紳 instead of *shen* 申, "cut down those robed [Yin leaders], to encourage …" Kong Yingda 孔穎達, following the pseudo-Kong, glosses *ge* 割 as *ge zhi* 割制: "it says that he cut off [the Yin]" (謂切割絕斷之意).

[26] Additionally, often within the *Documents* chapters *luan* means "good order," but since we believe the chapters come from different compilers and circulated in different textual communities, resort to other chapters may not be helpful.

[27] The first reading reflects Kong Yingda's subcommentary: 其 [the "Jun shi" chapter] 治理足以明我新成國矣。

highlighted the conflicts among interpretive traditions.[28] Certainly, the third gloss for *ge* introduces a new subject into the "Lord Shi" discourse, that of the Yin ruler and his rule, for the Yin king needed to be removed before King Wen's manifest virtues could secure him the throne. Is there anything else to be gleaned from Zheng Xuan's comment? Obviously, all three versions of the passage were known to Zheng writing in late Eastern Han. Unfortunately, modern scholars cannot precisely date any of Zheng's three versions, because centuries before Zheng's time and up through and even after Eastern Han the phrase *guwen* 古文 referred to two categories of documents. On the one hand, the phrase could refer to writings transcribed in current script (Modern Script) but believed to date to the pre-Qin period (as it did in the *Shiji*). At the same time, by late Western Han, fully two centuries before Zheng Xuan, *guwen* could also describe Han-era writings transcribed in archaic script (correctly or incorrectly identified), given the dramatic increase in the value then attached to formulae employing deliberate archaisms and archaizing phrases (Wang 2009).

That said, the Guodian manuscript notably shifts the context of this "Lord Shi" piece from Heaven's anthropomorphic gaze and its bestowal of favours to the powerful charisma accruing from the ruler's devotion to personal cultivation. "Lord Shi" spoke of King Wen as the only one who could "cultivate" the land, and this talk of cultivation (*xiu* 修) evidently gave rise to other ruminations on the cultivation of character, spawning an entirely new setting for the "Lord Shi" remarks. In the Guodian manuscripts, attention to virtue seems less outer-direction and more internalized, regardless of what tentative translation we adopt for the *Documents* citation.

> 子曰。言從行之， 則行不可匿。故君子顧言而行。以成其信。則民不能大其美而小其惡。大雅云。白珪之石。尚可磨也。此言之玷。不可為也。小雅云。允也君子。展也大成。君奭云。昔在上帝。割紳。觀文王德。其集大命於厥身。
>
> The Master said, "When speeches tally with deeds, then the deeds cannot be hidden. So the noble man looks back upon his speeches and deeds [to see that they have been circumspect], in order to perfect the trust [that others invest in him]. Then his leading men will find themselves unable to magnify his excellent points or to minimize his flaws. [They will find they must offer true assessments of his conduct. As the [*Odes*'] "Great Elegantiae" says, "A flaw in a mace of white jade/May be ground away." This speaks of the flaw, upon which one may not act. And, as the [*Odes*'] "Lesser Elegantiae" says, "Amply [treated] is the noble man. Expanding is his great perfection." As "Lord Shi" says, "Long ago, the decision lay with the Lord on High, who cut down those in court robes [at the Yin capital], and seeing King Wen's virtue, gathered the great charge upon his person."[29]

Superficially, this looks like a good "Confucian" text and context, especially given those citations from the *Odes* and *Documents*. That it is best not to label the Guodian manuscript in this way (contra many) becomes clearer when we realize how many Warring States texts cannot easily be categorized according to sectarian labels, and

[28] For example, see Pi (2002).

[29] The "Da ya" ode is Mao no. 256 (Yi 抑); the line continues, "But about a flaw in speech/Nothing can be done." The "Xiao ya" ode is Mao no. 179 (Che gong 車攻), which contains the final line, "Truly a noble man is [our king]/ Great are his achievements!" Note that the latter ode casts war as the necessary condition for heroic achievements.

not only because less idealistic advocates of Realpolitik also posited "trust" as the firmest foundation for stable rule. Equally notable, this sort of reframing of the contexts for citations is quite common at Guodian.[30] As collation, copying, and recombinant compilation was the norm in the manuscript culture of the early empires (Richter 2013; Lebovitz 2016), so rethinking and redeploying parts of older textual units went on even in the case of works commanding high authority.

A second explicit citation in the Guodian *Ziyi*, strips 28–29,[31] supplies an apparently unproblematic citation of the "Proclamation," insofar as the four-character phrase in Guodian matches precisely the same four-character phrase in the pseudo-Kong *Documents*: 康誥云。敬明乃罰. In the "Proclamation" chapter, the four characters are usually translated as "Be attentive and clear in your penalties."[32] The context for this exhortation within the Proclamations is plain. Prince Kang is to work to adjust his punishments, to make them "fit the crime," with particularly harsh punishments following the commission of intentional crimes, no matter how small. The "Proclamation to Kang" elaborates on the necessity to punish malefactors, in the process alerting Prince Kang himself to the severe treatment he may expect if he acts against the throne's interests, and likewise the other royal princes with their appointments, or the ministers and subjects below the princes. Nowhere in the Proclamations is Prince Kang ever urged to consider the conferral of rewards at his court.

However, alternative readings sporting impeccable grammar can be easily generated (and may be called for), as soon as the context shifts to the Guodian *Ziyi* essay. That piece not only does not centre on the topic of punishments. It also repeatedly couples punishments with rewards, as is common in Warring States texts, even as it subordinates both in transformative influence to the ruler's charismatic powers. One possible translation of the Guodian passage, in consequence, would be,

> 子曰。政之不行。教之不成也。則刑罰不足恥。而爵不足勸也。故上不可以褻刑而輕爵。康誥云。敬明乃罰。呂刑云。播刑[=? 型]之迪。
>
> The Master said, "If good policies are not carried out, then moral teachings will not be completed. Then penalties and fines will not suffice to induce shame. Nor will noble ranks suffice to encourage [good behaviour]. Therefore the good ruler does not think it right to carelessly dispense either punishments or conferrals of rank. As the "Kang gao" says, "Pay due heed to the brilliance 明 [of your own example or that of wise men], and only after that may you punish." As the "Lü xing" says, "In this way he did propagate the path by his punishments."[33]

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[30] Equally common at Guodian (as in other manuscripts) is the rearrangement of textual blocks (Richter 2013).

[31] Compare this to the *Liji* chapter, 13 *zhang*. However, we know that the *Liji* was compiled only in mid- to late Western Han, so the Guodian *Ziyi* was circulating as a separate essay, rather than a *Liji* chapter.

[32] Most commentators read *ming* as "fair" (*gong ping* 公平), but that seems a linguistic stretch.

[33] "By his model" seems preferable in this context to "by his punishments." The *Liji* adds a *bu* 不 (not) here, after the *zhi* 之, reading 播刑之不迪, but Zheng Xuan, probably on the basis of the *Documents* "Punishments" chapter, identifies the *bu* as an interpolation (LJ-SSJZS 299b). Pi disputes Zheng's idea, but Guodian may support Zheng here (Pi 1989). Note meanwhile, that in the *Shangshu* chapter, this phrase is said of Boyi 伯夷, not King Wen, and it could refer, given its

In that the Guodian *Ziyi* speaks repeatedly of the ruler's moral example and leadership, extended through rewards and punishments, but essentially derived from the ruler's own charismatic character, the basic idea of the Guodian passage ascribed to Kongzi or another unnamed "master" is clear: ethical teachings must be completely inculcated before punishments and penalties can deter wrongdoing, for only then will people feel ashamed of their misdoings. In the same vein, the Guodian *Ziyi* adds that no material rewards in the form of high-status posts will suffice to encourage leading men to perform their duties, unless they have already received moral instruction. Hence, our awareness that the Guodian community may have understood the line from the "Lü xing" to refer as much to King Wen's personal model (*xing* 型) of cultivation as to his use of punishments; if so, this would shift attention decisively away from the single preoccupation of both the "Proclamations" and "Punishments" chapters with correct deployment of the penal laws. As with other Guodian citations, the model of good rule, propagated first by the king himself and then by his appointees to court, should obviate the need for the ruler to enforce his will through severe punishments, not to mention calculated bribes or inducements.

The received "Proclamations" chapter in the *Documents* already upends modern expectations in that it explicitly enjoins the prince to heed the counsel of the "old accomplished men" of Yin, rather than officials long in service to the Zhou's own royal house. Needless to say, this exhortation contradicts some of the strong assimilationist models proposed in Chinese sources, early and late, recognizing that locally based groups may have more insights about governing their locale than men dispatched from the court at centre.[34] In their turn, the two Guodian citations from the two documents included at some point in the received *Documents* prompt us to consider revising the standard *Documents*' readings, in that the Guodian citations outline the ideal qualities of those assigned to governance, not just the correct ways to punish.

5 Citations by Title in the Guodian *Cheng zhi wen zhi*

There are two citations of "Lord Shi" in the *Cheng zhi wen zhi*. However, nearly every epigrapher who has worked on that Guodian essay has devised a different order for the strips, and different experts have proposed different readings for individual graphs, making it next to impossible to ascertain the precise context in which

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association with *dao* 道 (the Way), to models. Zheng writes, "It says that we ought to look to Boyi's propagation of the Way of *xing* (punishments? model institutions?), and take this to emulate it" (言當視是伯夷布刑之道而法之). Shaughnessy reads instead, "Respectfully make clear your fines … Publicize the following of the punishments" (i.e., when people follow them or do not follow them) (Shaughnessy 2006: 110). Shaughnessy obviously means to retain the translation suited to the *Documents*, here and elsewhere.

[34] The phrase "making new leading men" (作新民) could imply nothing more than that the Yin leaders are "newly incorporated subjects," though moralistic readings interpret the phase as "morally renewed."

the *Documents* parallels are embedded. With those caveats in mind, let us proceed cautiously.

The Guodian *Cheng zhi wen zhi* essay, strip 22, cites "Lord Shi" twice, in the first instance, speaking of King Wu:

唯冒丕單/墠稱德。

The received pseudo-Kong *Documents* chapter punctuates differently:

唯冒。丕單稱德。[35]

We begin with the received pseudo-Kong version, whose commentary tells us that "It was these four men[36] who made King Wu's virtue illustrious, causing it [his influence] to blanket all the realm. They thoroughly promoted and praised his virtues" (惟此四人明武王之德。使布冒天下。大盡舉行其德). Based on that commentary, the main text in the pseudo-Kong *Documents* should read, "They were diligent. They praised his virtue on a broad scale." But in the newly edited and punctuated Guodian passage, the main concern seems no longer to be King Wu's four supporters, who "powerfully (冒) praised his virtues to the full" (惟冒丕單稱德), but rather the good ruler's sense of urgency when governing:

> 君奭曰。惟冒丕墠/單稱德。何。言疾也。君子曰。疾之。行之不疾。【30】 未有能深之者也。勉之遂也。強之工也。申之摿也。詞之工也 … 是以智而求之不疾, 其去人弗遠矣。勇而行之不果, 其疑也弗往矣。
>
> "Lord Shi" says, "He it is who diligently and broadly matches [the ideal] virtues." What is [this *Documents* passage] about? It talks of urgency. The noble man says, "He deems it [good governance] an urgent matter. For if he does not act with a sense of urgency, he will never have the capacity to deepen it [his civilizing influence].[37] He works hard at it to produce results, ergo his assurance of merit. It [his virtue] is advertised far and wide, ergo his success in rhetoric …" This explains why, no matter how clever the person in charge, if he does not deem his search [for good men and good policies] urgent, his distance from [ordinary] people will not be great [enough to sway them].[38] And why also, despite his bravery, his hesitations will prevent him from advancing, if he shows no resoluteness when acting.[39]

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[35] Liao gives this punctuation for Guodian (Liao 2001: 99, 101). He also glosses *mao* 冒 as *yu* 於. Cook reads this as "With great diligence, they exhaustively [assisted King Wu to] put virtue into practice" retaining the same subject as the pseudo-Kong (Cook 2012: 615).

[36] The "Wu yi" chapter, section 6, also talks of "these four men," identifying them by reference to other sections as Taizong 太宗, Zhongzong 中宗, Gaozong 高宗, and King Wen 文王.

[37] As noted above, each Guodian editor arranges the strips in slightly different order. The CHANT arrangement (generated by an unidentified group of Hong Kong experts) differs substantially from the two versions we have mainly relied upon, those of Liu Zhao and Li Ling, who make the immediate Guodian context for citations the "urgency with which he [the ruler] acts" (CHANT Database 1988; Liu 2003: 138, 146; Li 2007: 159). *Shan* 墠 usually refers to building an altar for sacrifice, which would require punctuation after *tan*.

[38] The context in the pseudo-Kong *Documents* has the ideal ruler "praising" King Wen's virtues; see "Jun shi," par. 15.

[39] Or, "there will be no further advance [in his civilizing influence]." If Liu and company are correct, then a passage describing the "people's unilateral support for the ruler" (民孰弗從 …) does not relate to the citations (Liu 2003: 138, 146; Li 2007: 159).

Clearly, the Guodian changes the subject to the ruler's own tireless endeavours to improve his conduct and his determination in acting, these being preconditions for deserving the trust and allegiance of his subjects. Does it not, in consequence, mandate a new reading for its *Documents* citation?

A second citation from the Guodian *Cheng zhi wen zhi* essay, strip 30, raises many more questions, as it says:

> 襄我二人。毋有合才[=哉? 在?] 音 [=言?] 道不說(=悅)之司(=詞/辭)也。君子曰。唯又[=有]其互[=恒]而可。能終之為難。[40]

Li Xueqin has argued that this passage means:

> In the past with the two of us, you often lacked a cooperative tone.[41] Your speech showed displeasure.[42] The noble man says, "Only if there be constant harmony [between us] will [good governance] be possible. To be able to finish our task will be hard [if we go on in this less-than-ideal manner]."

Li's translation underscores the discord prevailing between the two nobles, then jointly serving their nephew, the young or inexperienced King Cheng, in some kind of regency, shortly after the untimely death of King Wu, only a few years after the establishment of the Western Zhou ruling house. (While some scholars have identified the "two men" to be kings Wen and Wu, the Guodian lends support to the alternative view that the "two men" must be the Duke of Zhou and the Duke of Shao.[43]) "It" in the last phrase presumably refers to the consolidation of the dynastic enterprise through good governance by its leaders.[44]

However, we note that yet another reading, closer to the received pseudo-Kong *Documents* version of the "Lord Shi" chapter, is equally possible. The pseudo-Kong version of "Lord Shi" reads,

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[40] Here we follow Chen Wei's solution for the punctuation, which was adopted by Li Ling (Li 2007: 159; Chen 2010).

[41] Cf. the original report, which follows Li Xueqin (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 170; Li 1998; cf. Li 2002). Some readings (notably those of Li Xueqin and Liao Mingchun), gloss *yin* 音 as *yan* 言, making the two graphic but not semantic variants: "From the past, you [Shaogong] have not been in accord with my policy pronouncements (*yan* 言)." Li Ling reads *cai* as *zai* 在 (Li 2007: 159). Li Rui assumes it is an empty particle, and so should be an ending particle, and should not go with the next sentence, as in the pseudo-Kong version (Li 2012).

[42] Quite bizarrely, in order to erase signs of discord, Scott Cook reads *bu shuo* 不說 not as *bu yue* 不悅 but as *bu chuo* 不輟 (unceasing) but I can see no basis for this substitution, as the phrase *bu yue* is well attested in Han *Documents* traditions, including the Minor Postface, which we date to late Western Han (He and Nylan 2016; Cook 2012: 210).

[43] The pseudo-Kong commentary and Kong Yingda's commentary both speaking of "respectfully honouring the moral teachings of Our Kings Wen and Wu, with which the Duke of Shao is to conform in his initiatives, thereby aligning himself with the Way" (遵循我文、武二人之教。你的舉動行事才能相合於道。).

[44] Similarly, Li Rui prefers to read *yan* 言 as *yi* 意 (idea), emending the first sentence to read, "For a long time now, you and I have differed in our ideas about how to rule." Li suggests a second change (following Qiu Xigui), reading *si* 司 as *shi* 始, but that change seems both less warranted and unnecessary (Li 2012). We doubt whether the abstract concept of an "idea" was developed during the pre-Qin period (Geaney 2018).

襄我二人。汝有合哉。言曰。在時二人。天休滋至。

In the past, insofar as we two men were concerned, you were fully cooperative. And I say unto you, at the time there were only we two men, and Heaven's favour still did drench us.

The preceding translation, which approximates a reading supplied by the Southern Song neo-Confucian Cai Chen 蔡沈, has the Duke of Zhou trying to recall the Duke of Shao to his better self; thus the rhetoric praises the Duke of Shao's former willingness to cooperate with the Duke of Zhou's plans and policies, in order to encourage the Duke of Shao to maintain a similar attitude for the rest of his days.[45] In this third rendering—which is totally at odds with Li Xueqin's and Li Rui's translation of the Guodian citation—the ideal state of harmony can be achieved in future, since it was once achieved in former days. We concur with Li Rui's construal of the main thrust of the complaint registered in Guodian to fit the *Documents* context: "even if [the two regents'] actions have been [ostensibly] in accord, their actions have had little force or impact[46]; the process [of governance] has not penetrated deeply, it being too superficial." Mindful of the foregoing, He Ruyue prefers to read the very same passage in the following way: "Unless we two men, with one mind and one heart, join forces to support the royal house and complete the great enterprise, [where else] can you find other men [to be supporters]?"

As "Lord Shi" states in a later paragraph, the ultimate goal is to have the Zhou house continue to receive Heaven's blessings. Yet the question regarding rhetorical strategies persists: "What attitude does the Duke of Zhou display here toward the Duke of Shao or toward other men in his court?" Does the Duke of Zhou intend to encourage future cooperation from the Duke of Shao by emphasizing the points of common ground between the two regents, or is he chiding and warning the Duke of Shao? A rhetorical strategy found in many early pieces, including the *Documents* "Pan Geng" chapter, first chides and then cajoles, combining the two strategies. The Guodian cache can never resolve this sort of basic issue, if different versions were generated for different purposes within different textual communities. All we know is that less idealistic portraits of the Duke of Zhou were in early circulation than those supplied by the moralists in late imperial China, reflecting the early suspicions about the Duke of Zhou's usurpation of power while regent (Gu 1998; Nylan 2009).

[45] Cai Chen's reading is more placating than earlier readings, however Wang Chunlin argues that Cai's "search for the underlying model in the hearts of the two emperors and three kings' hearts" (求二帝三王心法) in the *Documents* makes those in power considerably loftier than in earlier versions (Wang 2008). Specifically, in Cai's reading, the Duke of Zhou never claimed to speak for or as the king, but was only chief minister over the officials; Cai specifically refuted older readings of the "Lord Shi" chapter, calling them "vile" and the Postface, which spoke of the Duke of Shao "being unhappy", mistaken. Cai thought the main speaker in the "Lord Shi" chapter to be the Duke of Shao, not the Duke of Zhou, who wanted to retire. The Han-era *Shangshu dazhuan*, by contrast, had the Duke of Zhou justifying his killing of the three rebels (*Shangshu dazhuan* 1994). Cai Chen, changing *bi* 辟 into *bi* 避, prefers to emphasize the Duke of Zhou's self-imposed (short) exile, but Cai thought that the Duke of Zhou continued in office to help King Cheng.

[46] This requires Li to read *heng* 亙 not as *heng* 恆 but as *ji* 極/亟.

Examining the second citation in the Guodian *Cheng zhi wen zhi* essay, strips 29–30, we find that it contains only graphic variations familiar from the pseudo-Kong, according to QIU Xigui and LI Xueqin.[47] Fine, except that the word order in the passage of twelve graphs has inexplicably changed. The Guodian reads in the CHANT (ICS Concordance) version:

> 康誥曰。不還大暊。文王作罰。刑無茲赦。
>
> The "Kang gao" says, "For any person failing to follow the great constants [or "great institutions"?],[48] King Wen made the penalties. In punishing them, he issued no pardons."

Meanwhile the China transcription of the Guodian materials associates *huan* 還 (return to, or follow) with *ni* 逆 (to go against), as below:

> 唯君子道可近求而可遠措也。昔者君子有言曰。聖人天德。何。【37】言慎求之於己而可以至順天常矣。康誥曰。不還大暊。文王作罰。【38】刑茲亡赦何。此言也，言不逆[or 敦?]大常者，文王之刑莫重/厚焉。是【39】故君子慎六位以祀天常。【40】
>
> The noble man seeks the Way nearby [within himself and possibly his close advisors]; thus he can put in place far-reaching measures.[49] Long ago the noble men had a saying claiming that the sages were like heaven in their virtues. What does this mean? It means that sages are careful to seek it [the standard of good behaviour] within themselves, and thus they surely attain perfect conformity with Heaven's constants. The "Proclamation to Kang" says, "For those who do not return to Heaven's constants, King Wen devised punishments. In punishing them, he issued no pardons." What does this mean? This saying means, "So long as men do not offend the great constants, none of King Wen's punishments will be heavy."[50] This is why the noble man is careful as to the Six Roles so as to render offerings and service to Heaven's constants."[51]

The Guodian embedment for the citation retrofits the lines in the *Documents*, making the ideal ruler as modelled by King Wen preoccupied first with perfecting his own conduct and ultimately disinclined to apply harsh punishments: "So long as men do not offend the great constants, none of King Wen's punishments will be heavy" or even possibly, "will find King Wen's punishments to be the most lenient." These two readings, reliant upon *ni* 逆, draw upon another passage in the "Kang gao" in which the just ruler reserves the most severe punishments for those who are "not filial or not brotherly." The expected follow-up to "no pardons" has disappeared.

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[47] In the Guodian corpus, we have 不還大暊; the pseudo-Kong reads 不率大戛 (SSJZS 204b).

[48] LIAO Mingchun glosses 暊 as 大常 (Liao 2001: 102).The "Liu De" 六德 essay from Guodian defines these as ruler-subject, husband-wife, and parent-child relations.

[49] Deleting the *bu* 不, following LIU Zhao and LI Ling editions (Cook 2012: 624). However, if the *bu* is not deleted, it means that the wise ruler does not think it right to institute far-reaching institutions, before he has attended to his own cultivation.

[50] Alternatively, "there will be no more generous/lenient punishments that those of King Wen." However, the ICS concordance series reads *dun* 敦, in place of *ni* 逆, generating another possible reading: "If one is not earnest (敦) about [instantiating] the great constants, none of King Wen's models will deeply influence (*hou* 厚) …"

[51] For the identification of these six, see n55. CHANT reads *dun* 敦; LI Ling reads as *hou* 厚, which is sometimes a synonym for *zhong* 重, but not always (CHANT Database 1988).

There is more to notice: whereas the received pseudo-Kong *Documents* describes the legendary creation of mutilating punishments millennia before King Wen's time, when sage-rulers wisely responded to the violence and recalcitrance of the Miao, the Guodian manuscript associates the administration, if not invention, of punishments with good King Wen, who supposedly employed the laws for their deterrent value. Moreover, the Guodian describes the good ruler seeking to develop goodness within himself, so that he can better align himself with heaven's constants, as did good King Wen, when he devised a range of appropriate models and institutions (including a penal code). As all readers of classical Chinese will recall, the two graphs *xing* 刑 and *xing* 型 are loans for one another. Accordingly, Guodian, strip 37, conceivably generates this subtext for the strip: had he, King Wen, been less diligent about cultivating his morality, King Wen's model would hardly have been so impressive.[52] Absent sufficient context for the Guodian line, it is difficult to tell whether the Guodian wants us to ponder King Wen's model or his punishments; Warring States legends do not usually associate harsh punishments with King Wen's exemplary rule, except to suggest his restraint when applying them.[53] In any case, the utility of the "Kang gao" citation seems limited to its talk of "constants," which the Guodian then equates with prescribed social roles.

As readers may recall, today's pseudo-Kong *Documents* differs in two notable respects from the relevant Guodian lines: in the order of lines in the passage and in the broader context provided for the "Proclamation" passage. The pseudo-Kong "Proclamation" states:

> 元惡大憝。[twelve sentences intervene] 文王作罰。刑茲亡赦。不率大戛 …
>
> For the worst offenses and greatest of blameworthy acts … King Wen made the penalties. The penalties being such, there were no pardons [with wrongdoing]. For those who refuse to be led by the great laws and constants …

The topic throughout the pseudo-Kong "Proclamation" is high treason and other serious crimes; hence the talk of "the worst offenses and greatest of blameworthy acts …" Those 12 intervening sentences crucially trace the worst crimes to recalcitrant sons and unruly members of the ruling family; in effect, then, the pseudo-Kong Proclamation issues a thinly veiled warning to the Lord of Kang not to rebel or go against the royal house while ruling his lands. (Later glosses are of so little help that Wang Guowei confessed that he could not explain the passage well [*bu jie* 不解]) (Gu and Liu 2005: 1342). But once the precise historical setting of the "Proclamation" has been stripped away, the position of the synonymous Guodian four-character phrase 不還大暊 (parallel to the pseudo-Kong's 不率大戛) must change, in order to turn a specific warning to a particular person into a general rule applicable to more situations. (This sort of rearrangement of text passages was quite common in

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[52] Li Ling reads *zhong* instead of *hou*, which may, but need not, generate a different reading.

[53] Cf. "Kang gao," paragraphs 2–4, where King Wen's mildness is the subject. King Wen's cautiousness is the subject of paragraph 19 in the *Documents* chapter, by Ruan Yuan's edition of SSJZS.

antiquity, judging from other extant early citations of the *Documents* found in such texts as the *Shiji* and *Mozi*.[54]).

Another explicit *Documents* citation in the Guodian *Ziyi* chapter, 12th section or *zhang* 章, provides a second case stripped of its precise historical situation, although, at this remove, we cannot conclusively determine whether the pseudo-Kong version has *added* the historical context or the Guodian *Ziyi* (strips 26–27) *deleted* it.[55] Below we compare the Guodian with the pseudo-Kong versions:

> 呂刑云。非用旨。折以刑。惟作五虐之刑曰法。
> The "Punishments of Lü" says, "Anyone who does not follow the [ruler's] will is to be cut down by means of punishments. It is precisely this institution of the Five Mutilating Punishments that we call law."

By contrast, the pseudo-Kong says,

> 苗民弗用靈 [令?]。制以刑。惟作五虐之刑曰法。
> The Miao leaders[56] refused to heed the numinous powers,[57] when they instituted the punishments. Only the Five Mutilating Punishments did they recognize as "laws."

Both Qu Wanli and his disciple Cheng Yuanmin assumed that the earliest version of the chapter was aimed against misdeeds by commoners, and that *Miao min* refers to that group, rather than (as later) to the Miao people or the Miao leaders[58] (despite the fact that *min* often refers to the leading men at court in early writings). By such reasoning, to omit the phrase *Miao min* changes very little. However, the absence is not so easily dismissed. For the main thrust of the Guodian *Ziyi* chapter, like that of many other Guodian manuscripts, makes moral suasion prior to and more effective than rule by punishments (as noted above), in the belief that only through moral suasion can the ruler foster an admirable sense of closeness with his subjects. Thus in the Guodian *Ziyi*, King Wen, rather than some evildoers, assumes centre stage,

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[54] Another Guodian citation to the chapter title "Lü xing" 呂刑 in the received version reads "Fu xing" 甫刑, and uses the term *wan min* 萬民 instead of the received *zhao min* 兆民. It is this passage (*Ziyi*, strips 13–14), and particularly the first character in the quotation (pseudo-Kong *lai* 賴) that preoccupies Chao Fulin, as he hopes, contra many others, to prove that the Guodian graph (which he believes to be a graphic, rather than a semantic variant) is earlier (Chao 2002).

[55] In Guodian *Ziyi*, 13 *zhang* 章, the text also fails to historicize the event; by contrast, the *Documents* talks of Bo Yi, historicizing the speech. Most scholars feel that the two other explicit citations of the "Lü xing" chapter (found in the sections that compare to today's sections 7 and 13) do not differ much (Guo 2009: 84). Note, however, that the *Mozi* citation of this passage refers to the *Miao min*, as does the unprovenanced Shangbo manuscript version of the passage.

[56] These are not to be equated with the present-day Miao people. As Guo notes, Qu Wanli thought this expression simply meant "commoners" (Guo 2009: esp n4).

[57] The *Liji* cites this line instead as 苗民匪用命, perhaps referring to the king's orders but more likely to heaven's mandates (LJ-SSJZS 927b). The *ling* here may well refer to the divine ancestors and the gods in heaven. However, Zheng Xuan talks of *zheng ling* 政令 (Liao 2001: 88–89). A *Mozi* citation reads *Miao min fou yong lian* 苗民否用練 (The Miao people did not apply their training [to improve their characters]). Over time, the line tends to become more moralized: "The Miao people did not use efficacious goodness" (苗民弗用靈) is the pseudo-Kong reading (SSJZS 299b).

[58] *Min* often means "leading men" in early texts, though eventually it refers to commoners. Cook likewise assumes that the Miao are implied subjects (Cook 2005: 49).

and that alone may explain the Guodian disinclination to mention the Miao, who were not King Wen's contemporaries.

To the degree that Guodian tends to emphasize the power of the ruler's personal example or moral suasion, the Guodian compilers paradoxically employed a "Punishments" citation to undermine the ruler's ultimate reliance on punishment, as seen above (Cook 2005: 52). A single-graphic variant alerts us to the paradox: the Guodian *Ziyi* (like the *Mozi* citation) reads *zhe* 折 ("cut down" via punishments) rather than the received version's comparatively bland *zhi yi xing* 制以刑 (instituted punishments to regulate them), which condones retributive punishments.[59] (Note that other early traditions, including the *Shangshu dazhuan* balk at reading "cut down," and instead gloss the phrase as "adjudicate by law" (*duan yi fa* 斷以法) after the leader's civilizing influence has been duly propagated.[60]) If the Guodian passage cited here is to support the main message delivered in the Guodian, the passage must somehow convey the good leaders' distress when forced to employ the mutilations reluctantly. So while punishments are never the first resort of ideal rulers in the Guodian manuscripts, they can be justified, as in many other early traditions, on the assumption that swift and fierce punishment of malefactors protects the community.[61]

In addition, the Guodian *Ziyi* speaks of following the ruler's will (*zhi* 旨), rather than the powers above (*ling* 靈) or edicts or decrees, i.e., institutions below (*ling* 令). One scholar, Olga Gorodetskaya, pushes this discrepancy, showing that Zheng Xuan's gloss, which reads *ming* 命 as *zheng ling* 政令, makes a legal apparatus the ultimate authority to which subjects owe conformity, which may represent special pleading on Zheng's part (Guo 2009). The personal rather than institutional focus may suggest, though it can hardly prove, that this is an earlier version. At the same time, a resort to abstract notions of goodness, as posited by Edward Shaughnessy following some Chinese scholars, seems unlikely.[62]

6 Conclusion

Fierce arguments today rage over how reliable the *Documents* materials are for reconstructing the ancient history of the area we now call "China." The authors, believing the compilation of these materials to be fairly late, with individual

[59] But "Lü xing" 呂刑 talks repeatedly of "cutting down" malefactors (e.g. 伯夷降典, 折民惟刑).

[60] *Shangshu dazhuan*: 伯夷下典禮教民而斷以法.

[61] Song commentators are generally uncomfortable even with this, and their glosses try to do away with what they see as anomalies in the ideal portrait of good rule.

[62] Shaughnessy reads this as *zhi* 砥 (= *shan* 善 "good," "ideals"), an abstraction (Shaughnessy 2006: 109). Euro-American scholars, following the lead of the best twentieth-century Chinese scholarship, have long discussed the separate processes of authorship, transmission, compilation, and editing; recently, Cheng Sudong has written a strong essay defining such processes (Cheng 2016: 148–57).

chapters subject to repeated activist editing, prefer their essay to circle around two important questions: (1) how central to each textual community's efforts to portray a distant idealized past were such authoritative texts? (2) Can we find across textual communities a common rhetoric or general consensus about that past? While many scholars insist that the Guodian materials "prove" that an early and authentic Urtext for the *Documents* dates back to 300 BCE, at least, this essay's authors think it worthwhile to focus instead on the multiple readings generated by semantic variants and textual rearrangements, three of which Zheng Xuan's commentary lays out. Perhaps no single instance of "citation" is by itself significant, but taken together they support a vision of the *Documents* traditions which is fluid and dynamic, rather than fixed and static, the work of small textual communities rather than one general readership across the face of China.

This paper, in consequence, would register five main points:

1. Although a majority of scholars, Western and Eastern, have tried to adjust the Guodian material to fit the pseudo-Kong *Documents* readings, the Guodian citations do not lend themselves easily to such endeavours. As discrete textual communities during pre-Qin, Qin, and Han seem to have altered phrases and deployed even identical phrasing to different ends, attempts to determine the best reading for any given Guodian passage do not automatically have ramifications for the counterpart *Shangshu* passage (Guo 2009). Scholars of the *Odes* know that passages cited out of context acquire new meanings over time. We simply here reiterate the same point, this time about passages from the *Documents* classic, whether or not that text contains historical facts.
2. With the exception of Li Ling, nearly all scholars regard the single occurrence in the Guodian *Yucong* 語叢 1 of a string of words (*shi* 詩, *shu* 書, *li* 禮, *yue* 樂, *chunqiu* 春秋, and *yi* 易) to be a triumphant confirmation of the existence not only of the *Documents* classic by 300 BCE, the date the Guodian cache was buried, but also of a coherent grouping of Six Classics (all books) (Li 2007: 213). We, like Li Ling, believe the *Yucong* passage likely refers not to individual classics with those titles, but to six bibliographic categories. Noting that these six words appear on separate strips (strips 38, 39, 44, 36, 37, 40, and 41)[63] and may be compared to a *Guoyu* passage that outlines a plan for the instruction of a prince,[64] we await better evidence for the status of the Classics in the pre-Qin period.
3. The form of citations to the *Odes* (which follow either the Classic's title or section titles, the "Da ya" and "Xiao ya") differs so markedly from the way *Documents* chapters are cited that we must ask whether the Guodian textual

[63] According to Liu Zhao's version, they are strips 38, 39, 44, 42, 43, 37 in *Yucong 1* 語叢 1. *Liu De* 六德 mentioned a string of words 詩、書、禮、樂、易、春秋 on strips 23, 24.

[64] As noted earlier, the strip orders in various reconstructions do not always match. See also "Liu De," strips 23–24. *Guoyu*, "Chuyu, shang" opens with a similar string of words, which apparently refer not to separate books but to classes of books (*Guoyu* 1968). In *Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出, the list of four (詩、書、禮、樂) almost certainly does not refer to specific Classics. Nylan discusses the varieties of lists and the varying order of classics (Nylan 2001: Introduction).

community knew these three essays as separate treatises equipped with titles or as chapters belonging to a much larger *Document* compilation, something close to Fu Sheng's *Documents* in 28 chapters. Put another way, did the Guodian community have access to a complete *Documents* classic, as we today think of it?

4. Even if we could ascertain much more about the Guodian manuscript cache (or bring in other "found" manuscripts of unknown provenance with *Documents* parallels) would that ever bring us any closer to an original text of the *Documents* classic or even the original texts of individual pieces that now make up the *Documents*? This we doubt.
5. That notwithstanding, the great value of the Guodian manuscripts is that they provide enough context for us to gain a rough understanding of a *single* textual community at a specific point in time, long before concerted efforts to systematize versions of the *Documents* classic were made during Han and Song and Qing, in quite different settings generating new glosses in response to the multiple exegetical traditions they had at their disposal.

Scholars of the *Odes* have long noted, following the *Zuozhuan*, that lines from that classic were "broken off" and adapted for multiple rhetorical purposes, some of them at odds with the likely original meaning, as the narrative for Year 28 of Lord Xiang of Lu attests. Because the *Documents* classic has been recast as "history" in the modern period, some overlook the evidence attesting that lines from the *Documents* were similarly "broken off" to serve new rhetorical purposes in changed contexts. Matsumoto Masaaki has demonstrated that different versions of a *Documents* were in circulation during the early empires, and our own research confirms this. So we end by evoking the judicious conclusion reached by the distinguished Indologist Sheldon Pollock (Columbia University): that there always exist multiple readings of any authoritative text:

1. The meaning it had for its author or compiler, within the textual community that generated it and to which it was addressed;
2. The meaning or meanings it acquired over time, in tradition(s) (almost always plural), down through the ages;
3. The meaning or meanings it holds for people today, which often differs starkly from meanings 1 and 2.

In antiquity, there were no "general readers" and fixed editions, and we conflate these various readings at our peril.

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Chapter 4
Shu 書 (*Documents*) Repertoire in Argument-Based Texts from Guodian: The Case of *Cheng zhi* 成之 (*Things Brought to Completion*)



Dirk Meyer

1 Introduction: The *Shu* Traditions as Seen in Manuscript Texts

During the Warring States period (ca. 453–222 BCE) when the manuscript texts from Guodian were produced and most likely composed, the *Shangshu* 尚書 had not yet come into existence.[1] Just like the *Yi Zhoushu* 逸周書,[2] it is the work of later—imperial—communities who singled out certain texts to channel distinct forms of "documents" (or "writings"), *shu*, within their wider traditions. Why they did so is unclear, but it is likely that their work reflects the ongoing effort of gaining control over traditions that claim authority by using a repertoire of voices of high antiquity for socio-political claims in the present. The manuscript texts are from Guodian and from the Shanghai Museum and the Peking Tsinghua University (aka Beijing Qinghua Daxue 北京清華大學) collections (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998; Ma 2001; Li 2002, 2014).[3] They now show how diffuse these traditions were before imperial attempts channelled them in authoritative editions, with groups and sub-groups using and (re-)producing them for their own ends during the Warring States

[1] Despite its importance as "one of the pillars of the Chinese textual, intellectual, and political tradition", scholarship in Western language on the *Shangshu* and its related traditions is rather limited (Kern and Meyer 2017b: 1). Translations aside, there are just two book-length studies in any European language: Michael Nylan's monograph on the "Great Plan" ("Hongfan" 洪範) of the *Shangshu* and Martin Kern and Dirk Meyer's edited volume on composition and thought of the *Shangshu* and its related texts (Nylan 1992; Kern and Meyer 2017b: 1–2; Kern and Meyer 2017a).

[2] For a highly competent philological discussion of the *Yi Zhoushu*, see Grebnev (2016).

[3] Henceforth I refer to these collections as, respectively, *Guodian Manuscripts*; *Shanghai Manuscripts*; *Qinghua Manuscripts*.

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period. When analysing their pre-imperial manifestations we should therefore not speak of the *Shangshu* or the *Yi Zhoushu* but simply of *Shu* traditions. The manuscript texts also show that despite their diffuse and dynamic character, it was viable for communities to tap into the traditions of *Shu* for the making of an argument.[4] To position a given socio-political and philosophical stance by framing it with old cultural capital ensures that a given message is framed in such a manner that it carries authoritative value.

Unlike references to the *Shi* 詩 (Odes), though, references to *Shu* are not common. In the manuscript texts from Guodian, they only occur explicitly in *Ziyi* 緇衣 and *Cheng zhi* 成之 (Things Brought to Completion), short for *Cheng zhi wen zhi* 成之聞之.[5] Although *Liu de* 六德, *Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出 and *Yucong* 1 語叢一 also speak of *shu* 書 (documents/writing), they only do so in generic terms and never refer to any actual text.[6]

The ways the two texts from Guodian, *Ziyi* and *Cheng zhi*, incorporate the *Shu* could hardly be more different. *Ziyi* is a context-dependent text in 23 disconnected units of thought, organised formally in highly distinct building blocks that make regular reference to the *Shi* and the *Shu*.[7] These references appear parallel to sayings introduced as "the master said" (*zi yue* 子曰), which frame the various units and mark them each as independent entities. This may look as follows:

> 子曰：為上可賘(望)而智(知)也，為下 |4可頪〈頛(述)〉而等(志)也，則君不俟(疑)其臣，臣不惑於君。寺(詩)員(云)：吉(淑)人君子，其義(儀)不 |5弋(忒)。尹弄(誥)員(云): 隹(惟)尹身(允)及湯,咸又(有)一悳(德)。■[8]
>
> The master said: "When those on high can be looked up to and understood, and those below |4 can be [made to] follow and taken note of, then lords will not harbour doubt against their ministers, and ministers will not be confused about their rulers". "Odes" say: "The good and noble men, their standards are not |5 mistaken". Yin's Admonitions proclaimed: "Truly [Yi] Yin and [King] Tang both were of a unified mind".

As in this example, the units in *Ziyi* are introduced by a statement put into the mouth of the master, traditionally understood as Confucius (aka Kongzi). These "master

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[4] See Krijgsman (2016).

[5] I take the shortened form of the title from Cook (2012).

[6] I discuss this in more detail in my forthcoming monograph on the "Shu" traditions during the Warring States period and their use for the making of political arguments by contrasting communities (Meyer forthcoming).

[7] For the loose term "unit of thought", see Wagner (1999). William Boltz coined today's commonly used term the "building block" (Boltz 2005). Prior to Boltz, the modular form of Chinese manuscript texts had been discussed by Meyer (2002, 2005), calling them "components" in reference to Ledderose's groundbreaking study (Meyer 2002, 2005; Ledderose 2000). Analysing the transmitted *Guiguzi,* Broschat speaks of "text constituents" (Broschat 1985). For the terminology of "context-dependent texts" versus those that are "argument-based", a difference describing scale rather than absolutes, see Meyer (2011). Kern provides a full account of the compositional structure of the manuscript text *Ziyi* (Kern 2005).

[8] Guodian *Ziyi* unit 3 (*Liji* 10): Slips 3/14–5/13. For the reconstruction of the text, see Shaughnessy (2006: 96–97) and Cook (2012: 379–80).

phrases" (or master sayings)[9] are followed by reference to at least one of the two, *Shi* or *Shu*, sometimes to both, but mostly just to the *Shi*.[10] Altogether only eight units make reference to the *Shu*.[11] As far as the manuscript versions are concerned, in none of these is an argument developed, nor is any reference (say, *Shi* or *Shu*) read through another (say, the master phrases). Rather, the three cultural resources—*Shi*, *Shu*, and master phrases—are used in a strictly horizontal fashion with loose associative links.

Their purpose notwithstanding, in most cases there is a marked difference between the phrases as produced in the manuscript texts and their transmitted counterpart in the *Shangshu*. These differences go beyond the usual instability in writing that we expect in manuscript cultures. They show relatively stable speech-components coupled with unstable referents, suggesting that the *Shu* traditions at the time were not primarily texts but cultural capital made up by a repertoire of phrases that could be used in modular fashion (Meyer 2014a, 2018).[12]

While *Ziyi* in the first place seems to be a storehouse of cultural knowledge, *Cheng zhi* uses phrases associated with the *Shu* traditions in the making of an argument, thus confirming the authoritative value attached to them. Because of the ways *Cheng zhi* incorporates the *Shu*, it has even been suggested that it served as a tool to interpret the texts it refers to, in particular the *Shu*.[13] Given the shape of the *Shu* as cultural capital made up of phrases attributed to high antiquity rather than fixed texts, the situation is probably more complicated than that. *Cheng zhi* provides no one-way guidance to the *Shu*. Instead, it makes use of old cultural capital for the making of an argument in the present. The direction of support is therefore not a straightforward one-way of *Cheng zhi* illuminating the *Shu*. Rather *Cheng zhi* privileges a particular understanding of its repertoire of *Shu* so as to enforce the point put forward in *Cheng zhi*. What we see is a two-directional reading between *Shu* and *Cheng zhi*—but one that primarily enforces the point made in *Cheng zhi*.

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[9] My use of the term "master sayings" should not be taken as an equivalent to Denecke's "masters literature", which I consider methodologically problematic because it studies heterogeneous pre-imperial traditions from the perspective of imperial catalogues (Denecke 2011).

[10] A near identical text to the Guodian *Ziyi* is found in the *Shanghai Manuscripts*. The transmitted *Ziyi* of the *Liji*, which differs notably from the manuscript texts, also makes one reference to the *Changes* (*Yi* 易), as well as to the *Chunqiu*.

[11] These are the manuscript text-units 5 (*Liji17*); 7 (*5*); 10 (*15*); 11 (*14*); 12 (*3*); 13 (*13*); 17 (*23*); 18 (*18*).

[12] For a fuller discussion of this phenomenon, see Meyer (forthcoming).

[13] Chin considers it part of a tradition that took "the *Shangshu* as its source" (diacritics are mine). Chin further suggests that in *Cheng zhi* the authors (she considers *one* individual author behind that text) attempt to make sense of Zhou Gong's "abstruse utterances" in "Jun Shi" and "Kang gao" and place it within the text's central theme of "anxiety" (*ji* 疾) that features against the background of angst that the Mandate of Heaven might not be a constancy, pervading much of the *Shu* traditions and shared by contemporaneous Zhou communities (Chin 2003). Kern suggests that the text "assumes the gesture of a commentary" (Kern 2005: 321). Cook asserts that *Cheng zhi* is best understood against the backdrop of the *Shangshu* (Cook 2012).

2 The Manuscript Text *Cheng zhi*

Cheng zhi was published in 1998 with high quality black-and-white photographic reproductions of the Guodian bamboo slips.[14] It was unknown before the discovery of tomb no. 1, Guodian. Unfortunately it is not well preserved and the manuscript is difficult to order. It is written on forty bamboo slips each about 32.3–32.5 cm in length.[15] The slips are tapered towards both ends and the calligraphy uses the entire space, except that one slip carries just ten graphs on its top half plus one sign marking the end of the text. Two cords would have connected the slips in one bundle, and the slips show consistently fabricated notches where those cords used to run. There is some additional space left without writing near those notches. But we still cannot tell with any certainty whether it was the writing on the slips that came first, or the binding of the slips into one bundle. It is also unknown whether the slips were numbered on the back.[16]

Because we do not know slip numbers, their order remains disputed. The editors of *Guodian Manuscripts* identified blocks of consistent text as follows: 1–3; 4–6; 7–20; 21–23; 24; 25–28; 31–33; 34–36; 37–40. The mutual relation of the blocks is, however, not entirely clear; in some cases even their internal logic is doubtful.[17] The manuscripts carrying *Cheng zhi* 成之, *Liu de* 六德, *Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出, and *Zun deyi* 尊德義 all share the same physical properties (they are all written on slips, about 32.5 cm in length, cut in trapezoid shape at both ends, and showing marks of binding straps 17.5 cm apart), which further complicates the matter.[18] Because the slip now numbered 40 bears a mark signalling the end of the text, it is clear where that particular slip ought to be placed, unless we follow CHEN Wei's suggestion and

[14] For photographic reproduction of the bamboo slips and transcription of the text plus the philological annotations, see *Guodian Manuscripts* (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 48–52, 165–70). Depending on how the manuscript is arranged, alternative names for the text were suggested and include "Da chang", "Tian chang", "Tian jiang da chang", "Cheng wen", "De yi" and "Qiu ji" or "Junzi zhi yu jiao" (Guo 1998, 2001; Zhou and Lin 1999; Zhang 1999; Chen 2000; Liao 2001: 28).

[15] As such, the slips of *Cheng zhi* fall into one category with *Laozi A*, *Ziyi*, *Wuxing*, *Xing zi ming chu*, *Zun de yi*, and *Liu de*, all of which were produced on bamboo slips of that length.

[16] Unfortunately, the idea of taking the materiality of the bamboo slips into account as sources of information regarding the social situation of writing and manuscript production was not yet prevalent in China in the 1990s and so, unlike the slips from the *Qinghua Manuscripts*, no photographs were taken of the back of the Guodian bamboo slips.

[17] Already in the publication of *Guodian Manuscripts*, QIU Xigui suspects that slips 24 and 25 should not be put in two different text blocks (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 170n24).

[18] The identification of which slips belong to *Cheng zhi* is therefore a problem. CHEN Wei suggests moving slips |31–|33 to *Liu de* (he names the text "Da chang"). He further considers slip |40 as the ultimate slip of that text and thus not belonging to *Cheng zhi*. (CHEN Wei considers slip 18 the final slip of *Cheng zhi*.) Chen's main reason is the repeated mention of *liu wèi* 六位 "six positions"—a key concept in *Liu de*—on those slips; note that Chen also moves the first slip of *Zun deyi* 尊德義 (Chen 2003: 67f, 72f). The texts share the same physical properties and so Chen's suggestions make perfect sense. (There are, however, other weaknesses in his choice that apply to the consistent use of other concepts in those texts that would be broken up by his re-arrangement and so I do not follow him here.)

take it to belong to *Liu de* (Chen 2003: 72f). For the present, I provisionally follow the order suggested by Scott Cook with slip clusters as follows: 34–36; 29, 23, 22, [30]; 1–3, 24–28, 21; 31–33; 37–40, but with some hesitation whether slip 30 is correctly placed (Cook 2012: 595: 4–20).[19] This arrangement is not perfect because it still leaves a few break points between clusters, but it allows us to reconstruct well enough the structure of the argument of the text. Thus, although there remains a question mark behind the final organisation, *Cheng zhi* in its current form works well for studying the ways conceptual communities of the Warring States period had recourse to the *Shu* traditions to construct a relevant argument.[20] In what follows I shall therefore not give a linear reading of *Cheng zhi* but analyse its consistent clusters, in two stages. First I discuss the text by slip-clusters; then I analyse the make-up of its argument. The latter goes in three steps: first, a discussion of its argument clusters as structured around the use of *Shu* traditions; second the identification of three strings of argument; third, my analysis of argument construction in *Cheng zhi* on the macro level.

3 *Cheng zhi* by Slip-Cluster

Cheng zhi deals with the ideal way for a ruler to guide his people. The primary means is to nourish within himself the habitus of integrity. Integrity has three elements: nourishing "inwardness" (*nei* 内), bringing things to completion (*cheng zhi* 成之), and making sure that the words spoken are manifest in his deeds. For *Cheng zhi* this means being "genuine". A precondition for achieving that particular goal is the repetitive exercise of reflecting upon his own behaviour and nurturing in himself a general state where words and deeds correspond. That phrases such as "to seek it within oneself/himself" (*qiu zhi yu ji* 求之於己) and "to reflect it within oneself/himself" (*fan zhu ji* 反諸己) appear four times in the text[21] further show how important self-reflection is in the philosophy of *Cheng zhi*. But nurturing the habitus of integrity is not just a goal in itself. Integrity in the ruler is a means to generate trust

[19] Cook also provides a succinct overview over the debate concerning the arrangement of the slips (Cook 2012: 590–95). Slip |30 to my mind does not connect well with |22 as it repeats a formula which in *Cheng zhi* normally comes with references to the *Shu* traditions. However, I have no better solution and so I follow Cook's suggestion. In the following, I reference the slips and the graphs on them by superscript numbers in the Chinese text to indicate the beginning of the bamboo slip in question. When a slip indication is given without a vertical line "|" the head of the slip has broken off.

[20] To use—conceptual—communities and sub-groups is a productive way of thinking about the production of texts and their philosophical purposes. It draws our attention to the at times subtle distinctions in the ways the texts construct meaning and, historically speaking, address different—sometimes even contrasting—groupings. Because of a lack of factual evidences, however, it is impossible to pin them down historically, and so they must thus far remain conceptual projections.

[21] That is, on slips |1, |10, |19, |38.

towards him in the people and thus to assure their support in the long run. Hence the ruler secures his rule.

We do not know exactly when *Cheng zhi* was composed. Nonetheless, it exhibits a number of features that allow for a rough guess as somewhere around the second half of the first millennium BCE or, more precisely, the fourth century BCE. At that time there was a shift in the "production of philosophy"[22] when the philosophical texts of early China no longer constructed arguments in predominantly oral, linear, ways. The manuscript culture that was maturing implies that literary texts were multiplied. Written texts now circulated among wider communities, leading to cross-pollination of genres, text traditions, and ideas.[23] As ever more written texts circulated and information flowed accordingly, the philosophical texts became increasingly intertextual. Cross-referencing (explicitly or not) and incorporating rather eclectically a variety of phrases, notions, and concepts,[24] *Cheng zhi* is in many ways characteristic of the written philosophical exchange at the time. That it incorporates phrases associated with *Shu* traditions to produce trains of thought with novel types of argument is therefore no exception.

Besides its references to the *Shu*, *Cheng zhi* also hints at the socio-political background against which it was produced. Cook duly lists the relevant intertextual correspondences (Cook 2012: 586). Here I would just like to point out several notions and concepts that resonate with much of the transmitted and excavated literature. These include notions of self-reflection, or seeking one's inner self (*qiu ji* 求己) as aspects of self-cultivation; virtues operating "inwardly" (*nei* 內), ideas of "perseverance" (*heng* 恆), as well as the notion of "making a name" (*de ming* 得名 or *cheng ming* 成名). Ideas about the ruler as a charismatic model whose example exerts a moral power over his environment is equally prevalent in the literature, as is the insistence that war and punishment clearly indicate that a ruler is lacking in virtue (德). Despite such correspondences with ideas that shaped the intellectual debate at the time, explicit references in *Cheng zhi*—unfortunately consistently misunderstood in the literature as "quotations"[25]—are not limited to phrases from the *Shu* traditions, but include statements put into the mouth of an authoritative master (or masters).

[22] See Meyer (2014b: 21–38, 23).

[23] For discussions of maturing manuscript cultures in early China, see Meyer (2011) and Krijgsman (2016). For comparisons with Renaissance Italy and South India, see Richardson (2009) and Rath (2012).

[24] I here use "concept" as hardened terminology formed in socio-political and philosophical discourse.

[25] As in, for example, Chin (2003), Shaughnessy (2006: 38) and Huang (2010). The problem with the term "quotation" is that it produces a scenario where an imagined text (B) of a later date relates to a text of an earlier date (A) in a one-directional manner. Such a model misconceives the complex multi-directional relation between texts in early textuality. The way Warring States communities textualise old cultural capital is by rearticulating it, so adapting it to the communities' expectations. Intertextual correspondences should therefore not be understood as text B (for instance, a philosophical text) pointing to text A ("Shu"), but as renditions of a cultural praxis, because they do not entail a given, prescribed and one-directional relation to and appreciation of the materials referred to (A).

However, unlike the master sayings collected in *Ziyi*, the references to this body of cultural capital are not marked by the formula “the master said” (*zi yue* 子曰).

Following the order of the slips as suggested by Cook, the notion which *Cheng zhi* puts across first is that the means by which the ruler—named *junzi*—secures the support of the common folk is truthfulness (slips 4–6)—the ruler’s key virtue that makes the people follow him (Cook 2012). As *Cheng zhi* has it, should words and deeds of a ruler be in conflict, the people are sure to withdraw their support. That is because they incline to follow the actions and patterns of the superior man, and so any compromising of his trustworthiness necessarily generates doubt (slips 7–18). Being genuine is achieved through “seeking it within himself” in a profound manner (君子求諸己也深).[26] *Cheng zhi* insists that the ruler should therefore pursue the roots and not just the branches. Two metaphors support that notion, substantiating the claim that words on the part of the ruler must materialise in deeds:

君上卿(營)成(城)不唯(維)杳(本), 工(功) {弗 [X > 固] 矣}
|13 戎(農)夫叐(務)飤(食)不咖(耕), 糧弗足俟(矣);
士成言不行, 名弗得俟(矣)。

When the lord in setting out to erect a city wall on top but does not consider its basis, the work {*shan’t ever be solid*}[27];
|13 When the farmer in making it his task to [obtain] food does not plough [the fields], the grain won’t ever suffice.
[And equally], when the scholarly knight in completing his speech does not carry it out in [his deeds], he won’t ever make a name.[28]

Cheng zhi continues on that particular notion for another sixty-eight graphs, stressing the correlation of words, deeds, and the guiding of the people through nourishing one’s basis rather than the branches. This reads as follows:

是古(故)君子|14 之於言也, 非從末流者之貴, 窮湶(源)反杳(本)者之貴。句(苟)不從其繇(由),|15 不反其杳(本), 唯(雖)強之弗內(納)俟(矣)。上不以其道, 民之從之也難。是以民可 |16 敬道(導)也, 而不可穽(弇)也; 可馯(御)也, 而不可掔(牽)也。

Such being the case, the gentleman |14 in his relation to speech does not place value in seeking (lit. following *cong* 從) those which trail in the branches, but places value in those exhausting the one source that returns to the roots. Should he fail to seek (從) the shoot from a tree |15 without returning to the roots—even when [he is] compelling it with force, he won’t get [the common folk’s] acceptance. When those on top won’t make this their standard to guide, it will be difficult for the common folk to follow (從) them. This being so, the common folk can be |16 guided with respect, but they cannot be contained; [they] can be steered (like a chariot), but they cannot be led along by force (like a buffalo).[29]

[26] Slip 10/9–16.

[27] At this point the bamboo slip is broken and presumably three characters are missing. Given the pattern of the three parallel metaphors, it is clear that it should be a “弗 [X] 矣” construction. Cook follows the suggestion by Zhou and reads it as “complete” (成) (Cook 2012; Zhou 1999). I consider that reading equally valid.

[28] Slips 12/16–13/19. For the reconstruction, see Cook (2012: 601–02).

[29] Slips 13/21–16/16. For the reconstruction, see Cook (2012: 604). The image presented by the word *qian* 牽 is that of a halter or a nose ring.

At this point, *Cheng zhi* turns rather “Mengzian”:

古(故)君子不貴𢕟(庶)勿(物)而貴與 |17 民又(有)同也。智而比即(次), 則民谷(欲)其智之述(遂)也。福(富)而貧(分)賤, 則民谷(欲)其 |18 福(富)之大也。貴而龍(一)纕(讓), 則民谷(欲)其貴之上也。反此道(導)也, 民必因此𡍬(重)也。

That is why the gentleman does not value [the possession of] numerous goods but values |17 having preferences in common with the common folk. When [he] possesses wisdom and puts [himself] second, then the common folk will desire his wisdom to advance. When [he] has wealth and yet lives as though [he was] impoverished and humble, then the common folk will desire that his |18 wealth be great. When [he] is eminent and uniformly yields [to others], then the common folk will desire that his eminence be on top. If he returns to such ways of guiding [the common folk], the common folk will certainly go along with it most profoundly.[30]

|19 以復(報)之, 可不新(慎)虖(乎)? 古(故)君子所復(報)之不多, 所求之不遠。戠(察)反者(諸)㠯(己)而可以 |20 智(知)人。是古(故)谷(欲)人之㤅(愛)㠯(己)也, 則必先㤅(愛)人; 谷(欲)人之敬㠯(己)也, 則必先敬人。[31]

|19 When requiting someone (for something), can one [ever] be not cautious? That is why when the gentleman cannot requite for much his aims [too] are inadequate. When reflecting on and examining those [things] within himself, he is able to |20 know others. Such being the case, when [the gentleman] desires that others care for him he will certainly have to care for others first; when he desires that others respect him, he will certainly have to respect others first.[32]

|34 君子䈞(簟)箬(席)之上, 𠷎(讓)而受學(幼); 朝廷之立(位), 𠷎(讓)而処(處)戔(賤); 所厇(宅)不遠俟(矣)。少(小)人 |35 不緹(逞)人於刃(恩), 君子不緹(逞)人於豊(禮)。樢(津)汈(梁)埥(爭)舟, 其先也不若其後也。言 |36 語𠰔(告)之, 其𠡦(勝)也不若其已也。

|34 When the gentleman takes seat on the bamboo mat, he yields [to others] and accepts the seat of the junior.[33] When at his place at the royal court, he yields [to others] and takes the place of lower rank. Where he is dwelling is not far †.[34] The petty men |35 on no account strive to outdo others in kindness while the gentleman on no account strives to outdo others in ritual conduct. [For him] when fighting for a space on a boat along the ferry pier,[35] coming first would be nowhere as good as coming last; and when speeches are |36 made for

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[30] Slips 16/17–18/end. For the reconstruction, see Cook (2012: 604–06).

[31] The first graph here poses a question. I follow Cook in taking it as *bao* 報 in the sense of “repay”, “requite” and not as *fu* 復 in the sense of “to retaliate”, as repeatedly suggested in the literature.

[32] Slips 19/1–20/end. For the reconstruction, see Cook (2012: 606–08). As has been pointed out repeatedly in reference to this passage, the reciprocity of understanding, cherishing, or honouring in human interaction is a constant topos in literature from the Warring States period (Liao 1998; Cook 2012: 607).

[33] This reading follows Cook (2012: 609).

[34] This line is highly problematic as the sentence does not connect well to the line of thought. Cook reads “his residing place is not far off” (Cook 2012: 609). Zhao considers it to mean that the position the gentleman is taking is not far (Zhao 2000).

[35] This reading follows Cook (2012: 609).

making accusations, gaining the upper hand would be nowhere as good as having them stop.[36]

君子曰: 從允懌(釋)(過), 則先者余(豫), (來)者信。

The [exemplary] gentleman said [accordingly]: "if you seek (從) sincerity and acquit on transgression, then the frontrunners will be pleased and the retainers[37] will [pay back] with [their] trust."[38]

Accepting the organisation of the text, next we see the first explicit references to the *Shu*.

|[29] 君奭曰: (襄)我二人, 毋又(有) (合)才(在)音(言)? 害(蓋)道不說之司(治)也。君子曰: 唯(雖)又(有)其亙(恆)而 |[23] 行之不疾, 未又(有)能深之者也。(勉)之述(遂)也, 強之工(功)也; (墮)之(弇)也, (治)之工(功)也。|[22] 是古(故)凡勿(物)才(在)疾之。君奭曰: 唯(髟[?]), 不(丕) (單) (稱)悳(德)。害(蓋)言疾也, 君子曰: 疾之 …[39]

|[29] Prince Shi[40] said: "In the past, between us two, was there no agreement in our words?"[41] This undoubtedly recounts [matters of] discontent in governance.[42] The [exemplary] gentle-

[36] Slips [34]/1–[36]/12. For the reconstruction, see Cook (2012: 608–09).

[37] Literary, "those who come" (or "those who follow").

[38] Slips [36]/13–[36]/27. For the reconstruction, see Cook (2012: 609–10).

[39] Cook continues with slip |30 at this point but I remain hesitant because that line now has the gentleman say something, followed by the formulaic line "this undoubtedly recounts [the matter] X" (害(蓋)言X) (Cook 2012).

[40] Some commentators go into rather strained arguments to make the reference fit more closely the received text, here "Jun Shi" of the *Shangshu*. I intend to stick closer to established principles of reconstruction without being guided too closely by the *textus receptus*.

[41] Another way of taking *yin* 音 here would be to take its direct meaning as "voice" rather than as particle. When also reading 29/4 as *rang* 讓 "to yield" as is often suggested—a reading that would fit my argument even better—it would give the reading of the sentence as "[They] yield to us two men, [but] should there not be concordance on that [matter]?"

[42] I take graph [29]/16 () as originally read by the editors of *Guodian Manuscripts*, namely *yue* 說 (*lot), while Cook interprets it as *chuo* 輟 (*trot) "stop, cease, interrupt" (Cook (2012: 612). Phonetically, though, that choice is problematic. Although 說 *lot and 輟 *trot *do* rhyme, they *do not* make a good loan because the place of articulation of their initial is too different. (My reconstruction of the Old Chinese follows the system of Baxter and Sagart 2014). Cook defends his reading by stating that 不輟 is "a term commonly used to refer to a rule that can be maintained without cease for many generations, which is precisely the central theme of 'Jun Shi'", thus understanding new material through tradition and not in its potential particularity. Graph [29]/13 might also be read as an injunction, saying "why?" It would change the reading of the line into: "Why? It states the displeasure of governance." Cook follows Chen Wei and takes the graph [29]/18 (>司) (*s-lə) as 治 (*C.lrə) "rulership, governance" (Chen 2000, 2003). At first sight one might consider this choice unlikely because the structure placing intertextual references in *Cheng zhi* is commonly that of a repeated form of words, speech or utterance (言/詞). For that reason taking it as 詞 (*sə.lə) "utterance" might seem a good choice, having that line read: "That utterance speaks about displeasure." However, left unnoticed by the commentators on this passage, the slip cluster under review ties "to govern" 治, "persistence" 恆 and "anxiety/urgency" 疾 into one interconnected organic whole—I shall discuss that below—and so I think it is best taken as "rulership, governance" 治 (*C.lrə) here.

man said: "While there may well be persistence, if |[23] actions are not taken with anxiety/urgency, there will never be someone capable of adding profundity to it. The achievements of exhortation are the merit of exertion[43]; [and] the prevention of destruction is the merit of governance". |[22] Such being the case, to the things in the world thus applies [taking them with] anxiety/urgency. Prince Shi said: "It was by [X?][44] that [they] universally and greatly proclaimed his virtue". This undoubtedly recounts [the matter] of anxiety/urgency.

The [exemplary] gentleman [thus] said: "To treat [the things] with anxiety/urgency …"[45]

|[30] 可, 能終之為難。槁木三年, 不必為邦羿(旗)。害(蓋) 言[illegible](寅>陳)之也。是以君子貴 |[1] 成之 …

…|[30] one can [certainly] do so—[but] to be able to bring them to a close is difficult.[46] "After keeping a withered piece of wood for three years, one certainly won't make it into a banner [pole]". This undoubtedly recounts it having become old.[47] It is for that reason that the gentleman values |[1] bringing things to completion …[48]

Following these slip clusters, on slips 1–3 *Cheng zhi* continues on trustworthiness in the ruler so that the people may follow him. *Cheng zhi* therefore once more stresses the centrality of persistence (*heng* 恆), as well as the ruler's need to seek virtue in himself, as the dominant characteristics of the rulers of old. Since the people will take the ruler's words "with delight" if they manifest trust, he must seek goodness in himself so as to oversee the people. Crucially, the locus of his virtue is to be sought inwardly (*nei* 內).

[43] Another reading could be: "efforts lead to achievements, strength to merit".

[44] The first graph of the phrase pronounced by Prince Shi presents a problem. Interpretations range from interpreting it as *liu* 旒 "fringes of pearls on crowns"; "pennant" (*c-ru) to *mao* 旄 "animal tail used as banner" (*mˤaw)—both read as *mao* 冒 "spread"; "overspread" (*mˤuk-s) by Li Ling (1999, 2007). Zhou Fengwu considers the graph an abbreviation of *niao* 鳥 (*tˤiwʔ), read as *mao* 冒, while Tang and Wu interpret it as *shan* 髟 "long hair" (*sˤram) which they also read as *mao* 冒 (Zhou 1999; Tang and Wu 2001). To my mind, none of these suggestions justify the reading of *mao* 冒 "spread"; "overspread" (*mˤuk-s) as they all violate the principles of Old Chinese loans. However, *mao* 冒 "spread"; "overspread" is the Kong Anguo reading of the equivalent line in the *textus receptus*—惟茲四人昭武王惟冒, 丕單稱德—which Kong explains as "to spread [King Wu's virtue] over the world" 布冒天下 (*Shangshu Zhengyi* 2007). This shows the sometimes rather strenuous efforts made by modern-day editors to make a newly received text fit the received text. Liao Mingchun interprets the graph as *yu* 於 which he reads in the sense of *mian* 勉 "exert, take efforts" (Liao 1999). Cook follows Tang and Wu in their interpretation of the graph as *biao* 髟, but he takes it as *xu* 勖 "encourage" (*m̥ˤok) (Cook 2012; Tang and Wu 2001). His choice too, seems to be equally influenced by the *textus receptus* in that he follows Sun Xingyan's 孫星衍 (1753–1818) interpretation of the line, despite its violation of the phonetic principles of loans in Old Chinese (Sun 2004).

[45] Slip [29]/1–[29]/end; Slip [23]/1–[23]/end; Slip [22]/1–[22]/end. For the reconstruction, see Cook (2012: 610–15).

[46] Here and above my parsing of the sentences differs from Cook's.

[47] Cook reads the graph [30]/18 as *yin* 螾 "woodworm" (Cook 2012: 614). I provisionally follow the suggestion by Liu Zhao and read it as *chen* 陳 "old" (Liu 2003). Phonetically this reconstruction seems problematic, though, and should be taken with caution.

[48] Slip [30]/1–end; Slip [1]/1–2.

That same notion is continued in the cluster 24–28, 21, where the next reference to the *Shu* appears. Here I quote the first two-and-a-half slips ([24]/1–[26]/3):

> |[24] 民管(孰)弗從?型(/形)於中, 婁(發)於色, 其鍚(耀)也固俟(矣)。民管(孰)弗信?是以上之亙(恆) |[25] 矛(務)才(在)信於眾。詔(呂)命曰: 允帀(師)淒(濟)悳(德)。此言也言信於眾之可以 |[26] 淒(濟)悳(德)也。

> |[24] Who of the common folk would not follow [his example]? As it (i.e., the ruler's charismatic virtue) is taking shape within and emanating at the outside [through his demeanour], its radiance is already unflagging. Who of the common folk would not trust [him]? This being the case, for those on top it is their constant |[25] duty to gain the trust from the multitudes. Lü's Commands [therefore] have it: "Sincerely and masterful [was their] virtue carried forward!" This saying recounts that by securing the trust in the common folk [the gentleman's] |[26] charismatic virtue is carried forward.[49]

Much in line with what we see in the *Analects*, or even closer in argumentation to *Xing zi ming chu*, *Cheng zhi* continues with deliberations about human nature and in the ways sagacious persons differ from the common people.[50] With regard to their nature, the two do not differ, thus *Cheng zhi*. Instead, the differences lie in the sagacious persons' persistent quest for the "good way" (*shan dao* 善道), which they pursue in depth (*hou* 厚) through repetitive practice. It is therefore true that if the ruler were to grasp cognitively (*zhi* 知) a given situation but failed to act on it with some urgency/anxiety (*ji* 疾), he would not differ much from others, that is, the common people (其去人不遠矣).[51]

Slip clusters 31–33 and 37–40 then present the next reference to the *Shu*, quoted here in full:

> |[31] 天夅(降)大棠(常), 以里(理)人侖(倫), 折(制)為君臣之義, 者(著)為父子之新(親), 分 |[32] 為夫婦之支(辨)。是古(故)小人孌(亂)天棠(常)以逆大道, 君子詞(治)人侖(倫)以川(順) |[33] 天悳(德)。大墨(禹)曰: 余(舍)才(茲)厇(宅)天心。害(蓋)此言也, 言余(舍)之此而厇(宅)於天心也。

> |[31] Heaven sends down great constancy to pattern human relations, such that the propriety between lord and subject is regulated, the relation between father and son is made visible, the divisions between husband and wife are |[32] marked. Such being the case, when the petty men confuse the heavenly constancy and go against the great way, the gentleman [ought to] order/govern the human relations to accord with the |[33] Heavenly powers. The Great Yu announced [thus]: "I take my dwelling in the mind of Heaven." What these words exemplify is undoubtedly that by dwelling there (i.e., dwell in the inner space), I dwell in Heaven's mind.[52]

> 是古(故) |[37] 唯君子道可近求而可遠遣(措)也。昔者君子有言曰: 聖人天悳(德)。害(蓋) |[38]言新(慎)求之於吕(己), 而可以至川(順) 天棠(常)俟(矣)。康昇(誥)曰: 不還〈衍

[49] Slip [24]/1–[26]/3.

[50] Slips [26]/4–end of Slip 21.

[51] Slip [21]/9–14.

[52] Slips [31]/1–end; [32]/1–[33]/24. (For the reconstruction, see Cook (2012: 622–23). I do not follow Cook's transcription of the *Shu* reference—余(舍)才(茲)厇(宅)天心 because the graphs as appearing on the slip make perfect sense.)

(率)⟩大䫉(戛)，文王复(作)罰；|[39] 型(刑)𢆶(茲)亡惥(赦)。害(蓋)此言也，言不霸(霸)大祟(常)者，文王之型(刑)莫至(重)安(焉)。是 |[40] 古(故)君子訢(慎)六立(位)以巳(似)天祟(常)。

Such being the case, |[37] the ways of the gentleman can be sought near at hand and be implemented afar. The [exemplary] gentleman in days of yore had a saying as follows: "The sagacious person [embodies] Heavenly power." This undoubtedly |[38] recounts that once [the gentleman] is cautiously seeking it within himself, it is permissible [to say that he] has already come to the point where he is following the heavenly constancy.[53] Kang's Admonition [thus] said: "For those who did not follow the natural principles [of rites and law][54] King Wen created the punishments—in |[39] punishing them thus [he] showed no pardon."[55] As those words undoubtedly recount, none of King Wen's punishments were greater than those of the ones who did not adhere to (lit. take as dominant) the great constancy. Such being |[40] the case, the gentleman cautiously [guards] the six [human] positions (i.e., the three human relations) that [he himself] embody the heavenly constancy.[56]

4 The Patterning of Argument Cluster Around the *Shu* in *Cheng zhi*

Cheng zhi submits three interrelated argument clusters that are central to good rule, and it is there, or in the build-up of those clusters, that it goes back to the *Shu* to buttress, or elaborate on, the points made. It is not entirely clear whether these argument clusters are meant as a three-step pathway to be followed in a given sequence, or whether they should be seen as separate but interrelated components that come to fruition as the other components of good rule are also prevailing.

The references to the *Shu* traditions are not the sole elements marked explicitly as recourse to external institutions. Equally interesting is the provision of statements ascribed to the exemplary gentleman in the making of the argument clusters, introduced by the formula *junzi yue* 君子曰. But there is a question as to whether the phrases attributed to the gentleman manifest something like a "double voice" in

[53] On the paradox of self-cultivation, developed from Nivison's coinage of the "paradox of virtue", see Nivison (1996: 33ff.).

[54] This interpretation of *jia* 戛 follows the Kong Anguo interpretation of the transmitted "Kang Gao".

[55] Here we see again the tendency to understand—and thus reconstruct—newly received materials from the perspective of tradition, satisfying the students' wish in the stability of the canon. The transmitted text has 不率大戛 … (Those who are disobedient to the natural principles [of rites and low] …) and so the interpreters of the Guodian text have taken great pains to make the line 不還⟨衒(率)⟩大䫉(戛), 文王复(作)罰, which structurally (!) differs greatly from the *Shangshu*, to fit the received text. The graph 38/19 不⟨還 (還) was interpreted as a "miscopying" of 衒 >率. (see Li 2000; Guo 2001). Cook follows this interpretation (Cook 2012). Another interpretation of that line might be: "That those who do not return can be subjected to rules, King Wen created the punishments …"

[56] Slips 33/25–end; 37/1–40/end of slip. For taking *si* 巳 (*s-ɢəʔ) (the sixth early branch) as *si* 似 "resemble, embody", I follow Li (2000).

Cheng zhi, a notion I elaborate on below; or whether they serve a purpose similar to the *Shu* traditions and thus constitute another layer of reference to cultural capital in the making of an argument, parallel to the *Shu*.

The question arises because the gentleman, understood in this text as the ruler over a political entity and a morally superior being,[57] is also the imagined addressee. Taking the utterances as posed by the ruler himself would thus transform the *junzi yue* phrases into a double voice, such that they mark moments of insight on the part of the imagined addressee in line with the text's argument. However, when taken as external statements woven into *Cheng zhi*, we would need to evaluate them differently, namely as another set of explicit orientations to external resources that should be studied parallel to the phrases that correspond to the *Shu* traditions.

In one such instance where the voice of the gentleman provides a reflection on what is said in the text, the line is attributed to the "gentlemen of the past" (the gentleman in days of yore had a saying as follows … 昔君子有言曰).[58] Given that, as well as the fact that all the formulae which refer to the "gentleman" as reflecting on the preceding text are entirely parallel, it becomes plain that they cannot refer to the one who also constitutes the imagined addressee. This makes it safe to exclude the repetitive phrase "the gentleman said" as a double voice. Instead, as with the *Shu*, these sayings constitute a generic authority associated with voices of the past. They too belong to a group's cultural capital. It follows that in *Cheng zhi* we see a "target gentleman" as the imagined addressee of the text and ruler over a political entity, as well as the "commenting gentleman" as representing an off-text voice. The "off-text voice" thus represents another institution to buttress, or elaborate on, the point made in the text.

This leaves us with the conclusion that in *Cheng zhi,* the *Shu* traditions are not the sole reference to external resources—and so it would be mistaken to consider them a unique feature in the making of an argument. This considerably weakens the point made by nearly all commentators who read *Cheng zhi* primarily against the backdrop of the *Shangshu*, a reading largely based on common expectations in posing the existence of a consistent canon at the time. Since the make-up, grade of circulation, and presence of the elements of the *Shu* traditions in the text communities of the Warring States period is not yet fully understood—though some studies strongly suggest that the *Shu* were not as prevalent as commentators sometimes assume[59]—there is no basis for prioritising the references to *Shu* over those to the off-text voice of the "commenting gentleman". The notion that *Cheng zhi* primarily serves as an "exegetical tool" for the *Shangshu* is thus shown to be misguided, a

[57] The ruler, conceptualised as morally superior and thus considered a *real* gentleman, is envisaged in conceptually similar terms also in *Zhong xin zhi dao*, which, just as *Cheng zhi*, is part of the Guodian materials.

[58] Slip 37/13–18. (The *junzi* of the phrase 昔者君子有言曰 is written as a ligature—unlike the other mention of *junzi* on the same slip who is the imagined addressee). Note, however, that this should not be understood as a general formal feature in the manuscript. There is no attempt in *Cheng zhi* to mark the commenting *junzi* consistently in the form of a ligature writing.

[59] See Schaberg (2001, 2017), Kern and Meyer (2017b), and Meyer (2017). For detailed studies about the *Shangshu* in the transmitted literature, see Chen (1985: 3–29) and Chan and Ho (2003).

result of present-day anticipations (wishful thinking?) about the *Shangshu* and its related texts. It falls flat when we subject *Cheng zhi* to an analysis of the literary form of the argument.

5 The Three Argument Clusters

The first of the three central argument clusters is developed around the notion of "following" or "seeking something", named *cong* 從 in the text. The concept applies in a parallel fashion to both the ruler and the common folk.[60] However, in each case the direction differs. As the ruler seeks (從) values beyond the purely material, the people will take him as their model and follow (從) not only the model set up by the ruler, but also the ruler himself. The structure of that relationship, centred on the notion of *cong* (seeking/following), can be reproduced in schematic form largely as follows (Fig. 4.1):

That particular model of a mutual relationship is based on—and equally reinforces—the structure that underlies identifying "what is of value" (*gui* 貴) for the ruler on the one hand, and for the people on the other, which *Cheng zhi* develops next. Parallel to the way *cong* (seeking/following) is central to the relationship between the ruler and the people, to identify "what is of value" (貴) connects these two parties (Fig. 4.2).

To arrive at that particular point of insight, the ruler must exercise constant self-reflection. In a near Mengzian fashion, *Cheng zhi* now dwells on the notion that self-reflection leads to the understanding of one's self and, crucially, one's predilections. A true recognition of that will lead the individual to appreciate "the other" and, with it, their predilections too. From that point it is only a small step towards exercising "yielding" (*rang* 讓) in the different walks of life. Thus developed, the argument cluster on slips [13]/20–[36]/11 presents a circular relationship where the notions of *cong* 從 (seeking/following), identifying "what is of value" (*gui* 貴), "self-reflection", as well as the exercise of "yielding" mutually define and reinforce each other so that they become a consistent system, embodying the reciprocal relation between lord and subject. At this point, *Cheng zhi* brings in a phrase from the exemplary gentlemen:

> 君子曰: 從允釋過, 則先者豫, 來者信。
>
> The [exemplary] gentlemen said: "if you seek (從) sincerity and acquit of transgression, then the frontrunners will be pleased and the retainers will [pay back] with [their] trust."[61]

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[60] In my discussion of the argument clusters, I translate the "target *junzi*" consistently as "ruler" (or lord) and the "commenting *junzi*" consistently as "gentleman" to mark them as separate institutions in the text, which they are.

[61] Slip [36]/12–[25]/end of slip.



Fig. 4.1 Structure of *cong* (follow)



Fig. 4.2 Structure of identifying *gui* (what is of value)

This line comes closest to what one might call a "general principle", deduced from what has been said before. It cites the notion of *cong* 從 (seeking/following) from above, which introduces the argument cluster on the relationship between lord and subject, and then concludes the whole thing in its final word, namely "trust" (*xin* 信) from the subject towards their lord, summing up nicely the essence of the circular structure underlying that relationship. By bringing in that last phrase, the off-text voice of the "commenting gentleman" not only sums up the first argument cluster of the text, but reinforces the circularity of that system in formal terms because the notion of *cong* (following) on the part of the people is just another manifestation of their trust (*xin*) in the ruler.[62]

The second argument cluster (beginning on slipl[29]/1) focuses on the execution of rule. It constructs a system of governance as a triangular relation of the key features "perseverance" (*heng* 恆), "anxiety/urgency" (*ji* 疾), and "regulate, govern" (*zhi* 治). It is here that we find the first explicit references to the *Shu* traditions. The argument cluster is, of course, not fully separated from the first one. In fact, it connects nicely with the previous argument cluster and formally ties the treatise on ruling to that of the relationship between lord and subject from above. It sets off with a connecting phrase by Prince Shi:

> 君奭曰: 曩我二人, 毋有合在言?
>
> Prince Shi said: "In the past, between us two, was there no agreement in our words?"[63]

Accepting the reconstruction of that line as provided here, the phrase in the first instance serves to link the first argument cluster (A) to the next one (B), leading to the new theme that elaborates governance as structured by "perseverance" (恆) and "anxiety/urgency" (疾) in the context of "regulate, govern" (治), following on from the phrase and directly relating to it:

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[62] Such forms of reinforcing the argumentation pattern in compositional terms are common in argument-based texts of the Warring States period.

[63] Slips l[29]/1–12.




Fig. 4.3 The argumentation bridge in *Cheng zhi*

> 蓋道不說之治也。君子曰: 雖有其恆而行之不疾, 未有能深之者也。
>
> This (i.e., Prince Shi's statement) undoubtedly recounts the discontent in [matters of] **governance**. The [exemplary] gentleman said: "While there may be **persistence**, if actions are not taken with **anxiety/urgency**, there will never be someone capable of adding profundity to it."[64]

"This" (the statement by Prince Shi) recounts matters of "governance", a further, non-explicit, declaration says. The line is then elaborated upon by further remarks from the "commenting gentleman". It is clear from the non-explicit declaration of the line ("this recounts …") that it constitutes a separate voice in *Cheng zhi*, next to the off-text voice by the "commenting gentleman" and the phrases of *Shu* traditions. As it is not marked as something external of the kind seen in the "commenting gentleman" or the *Shu*, it constitutes a generic, structurally internal, voice. It is here that much of the contextualising of the outside sources takes place and I like to refer to that voice as the "authorial voice" of *Cheng zhi*.[65] Authorial voice in *Cheng zhi* comes in two levels. The phrase just analysed constitutes its first level. Unlike the authorial voice of the second level, to which I come below, the first-level authorial voice is continually non-explicit. As it is not marked as authorial, it is structurally "silent".

It is obvious that the off-text voice of the "commenting gentleman" here differs structurally from the one above. While the off-text voice there deduces a general principle from what has gone before, here it takes the notion introduced by Prince Shi as a stepping stone to give the discussion a new spin. The off-text voice thus sets up the key constituents of the argument cluster that dwells on the execution of governance. The intertextual references in *Cheng zhi*—including those to *Shu* traditions—clearly serve primarily to organise the making of argument clusters. In this particular case, the reference to Prince Shi (plus the first-level authorial voice) constitutes a bridge connecting argument cluster A to B, the "execution of governance" (Fig. 4.3).

In total, argument cluster B comprises two parallel pairs of phrases attributed to Prince Shi and the off-text voice by the "commenting gentleman". The pairs are each connected by the non-explicit authorial voice of the first level and bridged by a second-layer authorial voice, as I show below. In its formal presentation, *Cheng zhi* therefore presents the two pairs of references to the *Shu* traditions in connection

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[64] Slips ^{29}/1–12.

[65] Note that this does not speak of the author in Foucault's sense (Foucault 1969).

to the off-text voice in a strictly parallel manner, grouped around the authorial voice of first and second order. Argument cluster B thus presents a message of key importance:

[*Shu*]:	君奭曰: 曩我二人, 毋有合在言?
[first-level *authorial voice*]:	蓋道不說之治也
[off-text voice]:	君子曰: 雖有其恆而行之不疾, 未有能深之者也。勉之遂也, 強之功也; 墮之弇也, 功也
[second-level *authorial voice*]:	是故凡物在疾之
[*Shu*]:	君奭曰: 唯 [?], 丕單稱德。
[first-level *authorial voice*]:	蓋言疾也
[off-text voice]:	君子曰: 疾之可, 能終之為難。槁木三年, 不必為邦旗

[*Shu*]:	Prince Shi said: "In the past, between us two, was there no agreement in our words?"
[first-level *authorial voice*]:	*This undoubtedly recounts [matters of] discontent in governance.*
[off-text voice]:	The [exemplary] gentleman said: "While there may be persistence, if actions are not taken with anxiety/urgency, there will never be someone capable of adding profundity to it. The achievements of exhortation are the merit of exertion; [and] the prevention of destruction is the merit of governance."
[second-level *authorial voice*]:	*Such being the case, to the things in the world thus applies [taking them with] anxiety/urgency.*
[*Shu*]:	Prince Shi said: "It was by [X?] that [they] universally and greatly proclaimed his virtue."
[first-level *authorial voice*]:	*This undoubtedly recounts [the matter] of anxiety/urgency.*
[off-text voice]:	The [exemplary] gentleman [thus] said: "To treat [the things] with anxiety/urgency one can [certainly] do so—[but] to be able to bring them to a close is difficult. After keeping a withered piece of wood for three years, one certainly won't make it into a banner [pole]."

The two parallel *Shu* references paired with the off-text voice give this sequence a fine formal pattern. The authorial voice of the first level bridges two references ("Shu" and "commenting gentleman") conceptually. The marked authorial voice of the second level bridges two reference clusters. It is the one single phrase falling out of the otherwise balanced structure. Placing it between the two reference clusters marks it as a "principal insertion". As such it normally carries the main thought of such a unit.[66] In this case, the principal insertion is further stressed by the exclamatory feature "such being the case" (*shi gu* 是故) that draws the recipient's attention to this particular phrase: it applies to all matters that one ought to act with anxiety/urgency.

Parallel to the way the authorial voice of the first level conceptualises the *Shu* in line with the text's argument ("[T]his undoubtedly recounts [the matter] of anxiety/urgency" 蓋言疾也) it also situates the voice of the "commenting gentleman" in the text. By pairing the voice of the "commenting gentleman" with the authorial voice,

[66] For a discussion of the structuring device of the "principal insertion" in Chinese argumentation, see Meyer (2011: 99).

Cheng zhi contextualises—and thus conceptualises—these phrases by giving them a particular reading in line with the text's stance. See the following line:

> … 蓋言陳之也。是以君子貴成之 …
>
> … This undoubtedly recounts it having become old. It is for that reason that the gentleman values bringing things to completion …

The authorial voice here not only prioritises its own understanding of the preceding lines, it also links argument cluster B to the final argument cluster (C) of the text.

Argument cluster C, finally, translates clusters A and B into a cosmological principle that applies to the sagacious person (*sheng ren* 聖人). Central to argument cluster C is the discussion of the sagacious person as someone attuned to embody the Heavenly constancy (*tian chang* 天常). Contextually, the final argument cluster thus relates the preceding lines by connecting the idea of duration that resonates in "to bring the things to a close/finality" (*zhong* 終) to that of "constancy" (*chang* 常) that features centrally in this cluster. The ruler, *Cheng zhi* stresses, nourishes his charismatic virtue (*de* 德) through repeated self-reflection. The moral self-cultivation that relates to that exercise ensures that the locus of his virtue will be internal (*nei* 內), and thus genuine and real. As it is taking shape internally, it becomes manifest outwardly through his actions, and thus it becomes a habitus, unflagging and a natural aspect of himself. The people are therefore able to follow him. This is underpinned by reference to the *Shu* traditions:

> 民孰弗從? 形於中, 發於色, 其耀也固矣, 民孰弗信? 是以上之恆務在信於眾。
> 呂命曰:「允師濟德。」
> 此言也言信於眾之可以濟德也。
>
> Who of the common folk would not follow [his example]? As it (i.e., the ruler's charismatic virtue) is taking shape within and emanating at the outside [through his demeanour], its radiance is already unflagging. Who of the common folk would not trust [him]? This being the case, for those on top it is their constant duty to gain the trust from the multitudes.
> Lü's Commands have it: "Sincerely and masterful [was their] virtue carried forward!"
> This saying recounts that by securing trust in the common folk [the gentleman's] charismatic virtue is carried forward.[67]

It is obvious that the cited passage contains elements from the previous argument clusters, such as the notions of *cong* and its expression of trust (*xin*) on the part of the people from cluster A, plus the notion of perseverance (*heng*) in the context of its application to ruling from cluster B. The reference to Lü's Commands then formally reinforces the notion of the ruler's virtue in the final argument cluster, which formally connects these thoughts to the sagacious person and his embodiment of the Heavenly.

Formally the passage makes the non-explicit authorial voice of *Cheng zhi* embrace a phrase from the *Shu* traditions. What we see is therefore a three-step development that closely resembles the previous cases in that the phrase attributed to Lü's Commands adds to the discussion a new spin, in this case by drawing the attention to the ruler's "charismatic virtue", to be deepened by the second-level

[67] Slips ^{24}/1–^{26}/3.

authorial voice, which conceptualises the commands in line with the philosophy of *Cheng zhi*. The text's take on the phrase is therefore fundamentally designed by its own stance on rule. It prioritises a selective reading and thus appropriates the *Shu* traditions to make them fit the programmatic vision of rule as set out by the authors of *Cheng zhi*. This means, in other words, that *Cheng zhi* is moving cultural capital into a new argument space, to borrow a useful phrase coined by Randall Collins (Collins 2002). This is the primary function of the *Shu* traditions in this text.

Cheng zhi goes on to further the notion of the sagacious person and their quest for the good way (*shan dao* 善道), which he cultivates in depth through the repetitive practice of the good way, as well as his comprehension of the need to act on things with urgency (*ji* 疾). The argument cluster then concludes by linking the sagacious person and their practice of self-quest (*qiu zhi yu ji* 求之於己), which makes them attuned to—and thus embody—Heavenly constancy (*tian chang* 天常), directly to "charismatic virtue" (*de* 德):

天降大常, 以理人倫, 制為君臣之義, 著為父子之親, 分為夫婦之辨。
是故, 小人亂天常以逆大道, 君子治人倫以順天德。
大禹曰:「余在宅天心。」
蓋此言也, 言舍之此而宅於天心也。
是故, 唯君子道可近求而可遠措也。
昔者君子有言曰:「聖人天德」。
蓋言慎求之於己, 而可以至順天常矣。
康誥曰:「不還大戛,文王作罰; 刑茲亡赦。」
蓋此言也, 言不霸大常者, 文王之刑莫重焉。
是故, 君子慎六位以似天常。

Heaven sends down great constancy to pattern human relations, such that the propriety between lord and subject is regulated, the relation between father and son is made visible, the divisions between husband and wife are marked.
Such being the case, when the petty men confuse the Heavenly constancy and go against the great way, the gentleman [ought to] order/govern those human relations to accord with the Heavenly powers.
The Great Yu announced [thus]: "I take my dwelling in the mind of Heaven."
What these words exemplify is undoubtedly that by dwelling there (i.e., dwell in the inner space), I dwell in Heaven's mind.
Such being the case, the ways of the gentleman can be sought near at hand and be implemented afar.
The [exemplary] gentlemen in days of yore had a saying as follows: "The sagacious person [embodies] Heavenly powers."
This undoubtedly recounts that once [the gentleman] is cautiously seeking it within himself, it is permissible [to say that he] has already come to the point where he is following the Heavenly constancy.
Kang's Admonitions [thus] said: "For those who did not follow the natural principles [of rites and law] King Wen created the punishments—in punishing them thus [he] showed no pardon."
As these words undoubtedly recount, none of King Wen's punishments were greater than those of the ones who did not adhere to (lit. take as dominant) the great constancy.
Such being the case, the gentleman cautiously [guards] the six [human] positions (i.e., the three human relations) that [he himself] embody the Heavenly constancy.[68]

[68] Slips ^{31}/1–^{33}/end; ^{37}/1–^{40}/end.

In a strictly parallel pattern, the cited passage presents three instances that relate to the common repertoire of old cultural capital—either the *Shu* traditions or the "commenting gentleman"—paired with two layers of authorial voice. The first-level authorial voice works on a lower level. It provides an immediate conceptualisation of the cultural capital in line with the text's programmatic vision of rule. The authorial voice of the second level, constantly marked by "such being the case" (*shi gu* 是故) works on a higher level. In each instance it deduces a general principle from the preceding text, such that it includes both the recourse to the external cultural institution, as well as its immediate conceptualisation by the first-level authorial voice.

The ways the four layers of textual voice relate to one another is, however, not coordinated. Instead, they progress from one layer to the next. Structurally it is not entirely clear what the first line of the whole passage is doing,[69] but it seems to incorporate different ideas from what has been said before and other textual traditions. The "higher-level" authorial voice of the first instance draws on those notions and takes them as stepping stones to develop these thoughts further. It deduces, for instance, from "Heaven sends down great constancy" (*tian jiang da chang* 天降大常) the notion of "Heaven's constancy" (*tianchang* 天常) and links it with the "great way" (*dadao* 大道), which the ruler implements by ordering human relations. By so doing, the ruler is in harmony with the "Heavenly powers" (*shun tiande* 順天德). Next comes a reference to the *Shu* traditions. But really it is just rephrasing what has already been conceptualised by the authorial voice. As such, the *Shu* here just reinforce what is already there. As a next step, the "lower-level" authorial voice firmly aligns that phrase with the text's stance. Thus far, *Cheng zhi* establishes that by ordering the relations of humans, the ruler acts on the "great way" and thus accords with the "Heavenly powers". This makes him reside firmly in "Heaven's mind" (or centre). *Cheng zhi* thus produces a dialogical reference structure between old cultural capital and authorial voice of first and second order to articulate an argument that addresses the socio-political and philosophical concerns of its authors.

Read thus, the higher-level authorial voice of the second instance deduces the next rule: implementing the way of the ruler (*junzi dao* 君子道) lies in seeking what is near (*jin* 近) and not in the pursuit of some distant (*yuan* 遠) goals. That is underpinned by reference to the accomplished one through the voice of the "commenting gentleman". It is here that a re-conceptualisation of the ruler takes place. Based on the preceding text, the ruler who implements the "way of the gentleman" (*junzi dao* 君子道) as outlined previously should be considered a sagacious person (*sheng ren* 聖人) and thus one who is in line with the "Heavenly powers" (*tian de* 天德), which manifest within him as "charismatic virtue". That insight is again commented upon by the lower-level authorial voice, now taking that as a state in which the ruler is in accordance with "Heavenly constancy", which crucially depends on the practice of self-reflection (or seeking it in oneself). *Cheng zhi* has thus established a conceptual

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[69] Heaven sends down great constancy to pattern human relations, such that the ethics between lord and subject are regulated, the relation between father and son are positioned, the division between husband and wife are marked (天降大常, 以理人倫, 制為君臣之義, 著為父子之親, 分為夫婦之辨).

definition typical of argument-based texts from the Warring States period that presents a close relation between "Heavenly constancy" and "Heavenly powers" with the implementation of the "way of the gentleman" as "charismatic virtue" by ordering "human relations".[70]

The *Shu* reference that follows next applies that chain of correspondences to the implementation of punishments to those who go against the "natural principles" (*da jia* 大戛). Again, what we see here is not so much a reading that moves from *Cheng zhi* to the *Shu*, but the appropriation of cultural capital in support of the position as articulated in *Cheng zhi*. This is done by isolating phrases from the repertoire of *Shu* traditions and entextualising[71] them in the place of *Cheng zhi*, and then choosing a particular reading of the lines in their new environment. The *Shu* traditions therefore add gravity to the position developed in *Cheng zhi*; they are primarily not just elements that want clarification. As in the earlier cases, the lower-level authorial voice draws on the *Shu* phrase to stress once more what has already been established in the text: "This undoubtedly says that none of King Wen's punishments were greater than the ones applied to those who did not accord with the 'great (i.e., Heavenly) constancy' (*da chang* 大常)."

The whole section is finalised by the third instance of the higher-level authorial voice. But it is not that the line introduces a new thought. Instead, as in the previous cases, it concludes the argument cluster by going back to the beginning of the cluster in stressing, albeit in new terms, that the ruler ought to be cautious about keeping the three human relations (the text states the six human positions) in balance so that he may embody "Heavenly constancy".

6 Argument Construction in *Cheng zhi*

Cheng zhi is a good example of an argument-based text from the Warring States period that goes back to old cultural capital in making its stance. *Cheng zhi* contains different layers of textual voice that, woven together, formulate in a more or less coherent way a position on good rule through moral force. In that system, it is the task of the ruler to secure Heaven's favours, which he does by following the natural principles set out in the text. This keeps the six human relations intact. He thus embodies the constancy of Heaven in himself, which allows him to secure his rule *longue durée*. Through the intertextual conflation of different voices in one position,

[70] For a discussion of persuasive definitions and the distinction between "emotive" and "conceptual"—or "descriptive"—meaning, see Stevenson (1938) and Stevenson (1945). For a discussion of conceptual (or persuasive) definitions in Warring States textuality, see Meyer (2011: 41, 68, 220, 249).

[71] "Entextualisation" means that certain elements are taken from contexts other than the text itself (in other words, they become "decontextualised") and placed in a new environment, the "target text". To move such elements and integrate them in that new environment does not mean, however, that they are simply transposed from A to B. Rather, entextualisation always means that the entextualised elements themselves take on a new reality within their new environment.

Cheng zhi is a fine example of a text of the fourth century BCE when, in a maturing manuscript culture, a shift occurs in the writing of philosophy such that texts become increasingly multi-voiced, incorporating, sometimes rather eclectically, a whole variety of traditions, phrases, notions and concepts.

The textual layers of *Cheng zhi* manifest four textual voices, two that rearticulate old cultural capital— the *Shu* traditions and an off-text voice put into the mouth of the institution of the "commenting gentleman"—as well as two authorial voices where much of the contextualisation of the cultural capital takes place. Together they produce a dialogic reference structure for the making of a new argument. Any analysis that understands *Cheng zhi* primarily as a tool "commenting" on the *Shu* traditions will fall short of seeing the complex interrelation of cultural capital and the making of an argument relevant to groups in the present.

7 Conclusion

There are two important structural features in the social use of the *Shu* traditions around the second half of the first millennium BCE or, to be more precise, around the time when *Cheng zhi* was composed. First, the way the *Shu* traditions are used in *Cheng zhi* so as to frame the making of an argument confirms that, at least among certain communities, the *Shu* are a cultural institution of some authority. Despite the general paucity of primary sources from the Warring States period that explicitly incorporate *Shu* traditions, *Cheng zhi* confirms that the *Shu* were nonetheless judged important by these communities, who considered it useful to frame, and thus lend weight to, their arguments by means of these traditions.

The structure by which that is done in *Cheng zhi* is that its authors impose a certain reading of the repertoire of *Shu* to submit their very own position on good rule. That brings to light the second characteristic of the social use of the *Shu* at the time when *Cheng zhi* was in circulation, namely the flexible mode by which items of the cultural capital were entextualised in a new environment and used accordingly. The *Shu* traditions are used to adapt to the experience of communities, so that they serve the ends of these groups. The reference to Prince Shi on slip 29 is illuminating. *Cheng zhi* incorporates the phrase as follows:

> 君奭曰: 曩我二人, 毋有合在言?
>
> Prince Shi said: "In the past, between us two, was there no agreement in our words?"[72]

The modern script recension of the *Shangshu* contains a close parallel to that phrase. The received text is normally read as an address by the Duke of Zhou (Zhou Gong 周公) urging, in quite theatrical terms, his half-brother, Prince Shi (Shaogong Shi 召公奭), to serve the royal government and not retire. It reads as follows:

> … 襄我二人, 汝有合哉; 言曰: 在詩二人。

[72] Slip |[29]/1–12.

… [They] have raised us two men, [and] you have indeed given your consent! [Your] words [used to] say: "It rests in us two men!"[73]

Commentators have gone to great lengths to explain the kind of variation between *Cheng zhi* and the modern script recension of the *Shangshu* as a linear development from one text to the next, or making the transcription of the manuscript text such that it fits more closely the received "Jun Shi" chapter of the *Shangshu*.[74] I do not want to engage in that discussion. Instead, I simply wish to acknowledge the close phonetic correspondence between those two lines for much of what is reproduced in the texts.[75] I consider such deviation characteristic of a manuscript culture where variation is the norm, exact correspondence unusual. Although the kind of variation found in those two lines is the normal pattern one expects to see in manuscript cultures and can therefore for the sake of argument be ignored, it nonetheless confirms, and that is important here, that there is a different understanding underlying those two phrases by the communities in question. In the modern script recension, the speech is attributed to the Duke of Zhou, celebrated for his rhetorical skills and the power to manipulate others by means of "practical politics and moral suasion".[76] The Duke of Zhou urges Prince Shi to stay in office by "reminding" him of an earlier agreement to which he consented.[77] That is clearly not what we see in *Cheng zhi* where the phrase is put into the mouth of Prince Shi, not the Duke of Zhou. Entextualised as it is, it now frames the notion of anxiety/urgency in rule by moral force in the context of yielding as outlined in *Cheng zhi*. Through *Cheng zhi* we thus see a repertoire of *Shu* comprising relatively stable speech-components with unstable referents. Other manuscript texts from the Warring States period confirm this picture, with modular speech-components of the *Shu* in variable contexts.

Before closing, I want to draw attention to one more feature of the *Shu* as materialised in this particular text. *Cheng zhi*, the analysis has shown, is strikingly consistent in its layering of distinct textual voices in developing its socio-political and philosophical position: the voice of the *Shu* traditions, an off-text voice by the "commenting gentleman", as well as the authorial voices of higher and lower level that contextualise the cultural capital in a more or less cohesive treatise. But unlike *Ziyi* where we see "master sayings"—normally understood to be *the* master himself, that is, Confucius—as well as intertextual correspondences with the *Shu* and *Shi*, in *Cheng zhi* we see no explicit references to any other cultural institution besides that of the generic "commenting gentleman"—except the *Shu* traditions. The consistency with which *Cheng zhi* incorporates the *Shu*—and besides the "commenting gentleman" *only* the *Shu* deserves comment.

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[73] I read *shi* 詩 (*s.tə) as *shi* 是 (*[d]eʔ), a common loan in early Chinese textuality.

[74] Most prominently in Western scholarship is Shaughnessy (2006: 38–40).

[75] 讓 (*naŋ-s)-襄 (*s-naŋ) are phonetically similar; 毋 and 汝 feature close graphical correspondences in manuscript texts; 在 (*[dz]ˤəʔ)-哉 (*[ts]ˤə); 焉 (*[ʔ]a[n])-言 (*ŋa[n]) again share close proximity in phonetic terms. For an elaborate discussion of the line in reference to the received recension, see Shaughnessy (2006: 38ff).

[76] Shaughnessy (2006: 38).

[77] Shaughnessy elaborates his suspicions about the traditional readings of "Jun Shi" (Shaughnessy 1993).

The *Shu*, it is clear, struck a chord with the envisaged recipients of *Cheng zhi*, confirming that although the *Shu* traditions were dynamically adapted to different texts and contexts, they were nonetheless clearly recognised as traditions and deemed authoritative. This helps to comprehend how the communities of the time saw and used these traditions when rendered as texts. Although by the time of the Warring States period the speech-components of the *Shu* traditions were used in a modular fashion to be built into different texts and contexts—they were even ascribed to different speakers—they nonetheless belong to a relatively stable repertoire and cohere with given socio-political traditions to which they belong and, crucially, to which they were ascribed and in which context they were understood. At least for some communities this was a recognised repertoire of cultural learning, appreciated and used accordingly.

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Chapter 5
How to Achieve Good Governance: Arguments in the *Tang Yu zhi dao* 唐虞之道 (*The Way of Tang and Yu*) and the *Zhong xin zhi dao* 忠信之道 (*The Principles of Uprightness and Reliability*)



Michael Schimmelpfennig

The rescue excavation of Tomb one M1 at Guodian 郭店 in 1993 yielded a variety of bamboo texts unknown from traditional sources.[1] Among them were two manuscripts, one their editors Peng Hao 彭浩 and Qiu Xigui 裘錫奎 titled *Tang Yu zhi dao* 唐虞之道 (The Way of Tang [Yao] and Yu [Shun]) and the other *Zhong xin zhi dao* 忠信之道 (The Principles of Uprightness and Reliability). The first manuscript is named after its opening four characters while the name of the second is based on a fusion of characters from two definitions contained in its final section. While both texts address different subjects and have subsequently aroused scholarly interest for quite different reasons, the editors' choice of titles points to similarities between the two manuscripts related to their semblance and common syntactical elements. Both texts are written on bamboo strips of almost the same length (28.1 cm and 28.3 cm). Their ends are evenly cut; they are written in Chu script, and the similar calligraphy suggests that the same copyist created both manuscripts.[2] Some scholars have also pointed to similarities in the argument structure of both texts but these have not yet been explored in more detail (Meyer 2012: 16).

[1] Two attempts by tomb robbers to open the tomb in August and October of 1993 led to a rescue excavation, lasting from 18 to 24 October of the same year. The robbers reportedly had reached the head compartment of the tomb causing significant chaos and damage to grave goods. The situation was further aggravated by mud swept in during rainfalls. The head compartment of the tomb also contained the texts on bamboo. The excavation report mentions that the bamboo strips were in disarray. More important, parts of the strips had reportedly been stolen (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1997: 35, 37, chart 4).

[2] Scott Cook points out, however, that both texts are distinct in very subtle ways, like the consistent writing style of particular characters (Cook 2012: 50–51).

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Though the point has repeatedly been made that the similarities in writing material and copyist style cannot principally be seen as indicators for any connection between both manuscripts, I intend to take up these resemblances as a pretext for another comparison.[3] Both texts can be regarded as examples of early Chinese philosophical literature. More narrowly defined, both manuscripts are examples of political thought. They address aspects of rulership and share the intention to present arguments in favour of certain political attitudes or procedures.[4] Since the content of both texts is entirely different this comparison will focus on the argument structure of both texts. What do I mean by that?[5] The re-examination starts from the assumption that any author who tries to make a philosophical or political point and intends to make this point by means of arguments would attempt to arrange and present those arguments in a manner that, first, supports his claim(s), and second, makes his arguments most convincing. While the author's claims may be right or wrong, his argumentation weak or even flawed, the author will pay attention to the arrangement of the arguments in a manner that best serves to support his claims. One way to do that in ancient Chinese texts was to combine arguments in a structure that may rely on restatement, cross-references, divisions into parallel or interlocking chains of arguments, and so forth. What distinguishes a look at an argument or a chain of arguments from looking for argument structures, though, is that the former approach focuses on how arguments are built to make a claim, while the latter approach attempts to understand how a text is constructed to fulfil this purpose. The approach goes beyond understanding the argument as such in that it asks, for instance, what kind of opening an author employs or why and when he uses or reuses particular expressions or citations, and how he uses them.

Vice versa, the assumption of the presence of such argument structures necessitates an engagement with the text that may lead to a deeper understanding of a text's overall construction since it attempts to retrace and consistently represent the building blocks of a claim or claims of a particular text within a translation. The criticism of the danger of over-interpretation or the presupposition of the presence of a textual cogency or stringency that a text might not have cannot be entirely repudiated. What can be said, though, is that, first, these criticisms apply to any attempt at interpretation or translation and, second, that increased analytical precision rather raises alertness in regard to inconsistencies of construction or argument. This focus on both

[3] "The physical similarity does not say anything about an intellectual connection between the *Tang Yu zhi dao* and the *Zhong xin zhi dao*; it only suggests, again, that the manuscripts were produced in chronological and spatial proximity and were possibly even manufactured at the same workshop" (Meyer 2012: 16).

[4] Generally, texts that present an argument serve the purpose of persuasion. They can be distinguished, for instance, from chronicles that list historical events, or stories that narrate actual or fictional events. All these works may serve the purpose of persuading but they distinguish themselves from argumentation texts in that the latter make this purpose explicit.

[5] Rudolf Wagner's studies of early third century interlocking parallel style commentaries are an early example of research into argument structures (Wagner 1986: 95–96). More recently Dirk Meyer has taken up and slightly modified his approach (Meyer 2012). More on forms of argument in early Chinese texts can be found in Gentz and Meyer (2015).

text and argument construction is of particular use in approaching previously unknown texts on bamboo strips where it may even serve to improve the reconstruction of a text. A precise understanding of the argument structure of such texts may not only enable us to grasp a text's meaning more fully, this understanding further enables us to establish a common basis for comparison of such texts.

To arrive at this common basis, I will first present both *Tang Yu zhi dao* and *Zhong xin zhi dao* in complete retranslations accompanied by an analysis and reconstruction of their argument structure. This will be followed by a comparison of both texts with regard to argument style and ideas.[6]

With its emphasis on argument structure the present contribution questions a recently formulated hypothesis by Sarah Allan on the evolution of books, or what she calls "the formation of multi-chapter texts" in ancient China (Allan 2015: 27).[7] Starting from Li Ling's observation that most ancient writings were compiled from short passages, Allan argues that the key to understanding the process of the development from very short manuscripts to those book-long texts that have come down to us lies in the physical materials on which people wrote. Accordingly, people initially wrote on wooden tablets (*du* 牘) or wooden or bamboo slip scrolls (*ce* 冊 or *pian* 篇). Later, silk offered the possibility to gather these relatively short units of text into longer silk scrolls (*juan* 卷). Allan surmises that some of these short manuscripts might have been collected together before they reached a definite form. These similar units while circulated together tended to be open-ended and the passages did not have a definite sequence. Different collections by different people may not have contained the same subsets or been arranged in different order. When longer compilations of these short manuscripts were written on silk scrolls they began to acquire a more stable sequence and form (Allan 2015: 25–28; 320f.). Allan conceives this process as ongoing, adding that there certainly were also longer texts already in circulation during the Warring States period. Ultimately, however, "most transmitted pre-Qin texts reached their final, definitive form only when they were rewritten in the 'modern script' on long silk scrolls in the Han dynasty" (Allan 2015: 321).

With regard to what we presently know about texts discovered in tombs during the last four decades in Mainland China her scenario appears to be quite plausible. Yet with regard to the concept of the nature of texts that present an argument, her hypothesis appears to be problematic in two regards.

Firstly, her idea that the lack of consistency in argumentation texts was caused by pre-Qin authors forming larger textual units through puzzling together brief textual passages that belonged to a similar topic or fitted a common argument. Even though

[6] I should make clear from the beginning that such an approach would be impossible without the arduous work of many scholars around the world. This study is intended not as a critique of existing endeavours but as a continuation of their efforts.

[7] While Allan does not mention this explicitly, her approach may also have been inspired by the work of Dirk Meyer (2012). His work is mentioned in her bibliography. Meyer's theory, however, differs from Allan's insofar as he limits his observation to a particular subset of what he considers to be philosophical texts. He starts from the idea of units of thoughts that became gradually incorporated into complex argument-based texts. Allan's much broader starting point is the limits posed by writing materials in ancient China.

she clearly distinguishes between a pre-Qin and a post-Qin or Han development of the re-edition of texts necessitated by the introduction of a new script, and, possibly, the infamous Qin burning of books, it appears to me that Allan confuses two processes. Referring to the "Qin watershed" she is right in arguing that the editorial work at the Han court led to the (re-)construction of works like, for example, the *Xunzi* 荀子, whose chapters lack internal argument coherence.[8] Such works should, however, be clearly distinguished from texts compiled as collections of brief sayings and statements like the *Lunyu* 論語 (Analects) or collections of closed sections or chapters like the *Daodejing* 道德經 (or Laozi 老子). In a seminal contribution, William Boltz examined the composite nature of early Chinese texts. Based on a comparison of transmitted texts with various versions of these particular texts discovered at Mawangdui and Guodian, he argued that transmitted texts that have manuscript counterparts "show themselves to be constructed out of individual textual units of about a 'paragraph' in length" with the transmitted text's counterpart giving "the impression that the *zhang* is a kind of movable piece" (Boltz 2005: 58). It is noteworthy, though, that perhaps with the exception of an argument from *Mengzi* all texts examined by him, at least as they are known to us, are arranged as sequences of closed sections in the sense that one section forms a unit that does not need a successive paragraph to make a point. More importantly, to extend the argument of argument incoherence to the pre-Qin era by conceiving the evolution of longer texts as amalgamations of bits of arguments raises the question of the general purpose of such a process. Shouldn't we rather assume that a text is coherent unless the evidence strongly suggests the contrary? Even though this may be difficult to prove empirically, according to my own reading experience sections of pre-Qin argumentation texts are more consciously and meticulously constructed than is often assumed. This observation runs counter to the idea of a pre-Qin textual amalgamation, again with the exception of deliberately designed collections of statements.

Secondly, the possible consequence Allan's hypothesis might have for the treatment of some of the newly discovered materials. It is well known that for a variety of reasons previously unknown texts from Chinese tombs are very difficult to edit, they contain a flurry of unknown calligraphies of characters, and they may pose substantial questions regarding textual order or their characters' transcription. If

[8] Lack of coherence means, for example, that chapters like "The Way of Rulers" (*jun dao* 君道) or "The Way of Ministers" (*chen dao* 臣道) consist of sections that illustrate aspects of good or bad government or ministerial behaviour but that the sequence of sections lacks a particular setup. Theoretically sections within one chapter could be swapped around without serious impact on the overall argument. Chapter 13 "The Way of Ministers" is a case in point: It appears that Xun Kuang's 荀況 gist in this chapter is that disobeying the commands of one's lord could be an expression of absolute loyalty if it served to preserve the lord and his state. Other sections from the chapter, for example discussing grades of ministers, seem to prepare the argument surrounding the actions of Xun's contemporaries Lord Pingyuan and Lord Xinling. However, the chapter lacks a build up toward their actions or the author's conclusion (cf. Wang [1891] 1986: 8.151–71; Hutton 2014: 117–40). With regard to the degree of argument precision reached within each of the sections I find it hard to accept that Xunzi or his immediate transmitters could not achieve this degree of cohesion for an entire set of sections.

Allan's hypothesis were correct, sections of texts like *Tang Yu zhi dao* could be regarded as smaller units on the subject of two legendary rulers or the subject of abdication that over time were amalgamated into the version of the text discovered at Guodian. Reversed, this argument would even provide a pretext for researchers or translators to stop short in aiming for a reconstruction and representation of the overall argument of a newly discovered text.

This is not to say that in her rendering of *Tang Yu zhi dao* Allan did not do her utmost to arrive at a meaningful sequence of the slips.[9] In fact, her chapters in *Buried Ideas* contain the most in-depth treatment of *Tang Yu zhi dao* to date together with a range of other excavated materials on the subject of abdication. However, her specific idea of the nature of the evolution of such texts appears to surface when she distinguishes, for instance, between "primary theme" and other themes[10] within her analysis of *Tang Yu zhi dao* (Allan 2015: 92ff.). Also, when she presents her translation saying: "For convenience, I have divided the text into ten sections" (Allan 2015: 118). What she actually does is to divide the text into sections that appear to represent closed arguments on one topic to then retroactively link the arguments of these sections to her primary theme and subordinated themes. One could argue that this approach is related to her ultimate research focus of comparing a range of newly discovered sources on the subject of abdication. But even in her case, as I will try to show, establishing the cogency of the argument(s) of a text may lead to a more profound and comprehensive understanding which ultimately provides the thorough ground needed for such a comparison.

As I will demonstrate below, a similar case can be made for *Zhong xin zhi dao* though for slightly different reasons. This may come as a surprise since the starting point of Dirk Meyer's rather extensive occupation with this text was to lay bare the argument structure of this previously unknown text in minute detail (Meyer 2008: 51–79, 2012: 31–57). As I have demonstrated elsewhere, Meyer operated with a concept of argument structures he assumed to be detectable in certain ancient Chinese texts, but that turned out to be too rigid and led to forced interpretations when applied to *Zhong xin zhi dao* (Schimmelpfennig 2018: 76ff).

In the introduction to a recently published conference volume on literary forms of argument in early China, Meyer and his fellow editor Joachim Gentz take a broader approach. In an attempt to improve our understanding of the particular nature of philosophical argument in ancient China they distinguish between a formalistic, a functionalist, and a structuralist approach: The formalistic approach focuses on "linguistic forms on the level of words, utterances, paragraphs and entire text compositions" with the aim of generating a phenomenology of the formal patterns of arguments. The functionalist approach examines multiple functional devices of different formal patterns to enquire "into the way in which they are operational in

[9] That Allan arrived at the most meaningful arrangement of the bamboo strips of *Tang Yu zhi dao* to date is also attested by Yuri Pines in his review of her book (Pines 2016: 168).

[10] Allan considers the prime theme of *Tang Yu zhi dao* to be "Abdication as the fullest expression of humaneness and rightness." Further themes are "Loving kin and honoring worthies", "The six thearchs", and "The sage ruler and natural order."

the logic of the argument". The structuralist approach conceives literary devices as functional elements within the literary whole. This third approach identifies textual parts in their particular "significance as integral parts of an overall network of structure in which the individual parts are significantly interrelated in a relationship of interdependence" (Gentz and Meyer 2015: 18). The editors add that the contributions go much further and are not "restricted to the study of texts as consciously composed and philosophical coherent artifices". The present study, though, in light of Allan's hypothesis, is operating precisely on the assumption of a conscious and coherent composition underlying both the *Tang Yu zhi dao* and the *Zhong xin zhi dao*. While the study does not attempt to discover or establish formal patterns of argument whose application could be demonstrated in a variety of other early Chinese texts, it aims at defining the argument steps through highlighting the "building blocks" these steps rest on, to describe their function, and thereby establish their significance as integral parts of an overall network of an argument structure. The description of the argument steps is then used to trace and reconstruct the course of the argument. The question aside from how something is said is why something is said at a particular stage in the course of the text, and how this statement (inter-) relates with the previous and the following argument. The study thus combines what Gentz and Meyer have coined functionalist and structuralist approaches though perhaps in a less formal manner.[11]

The title of the present article mentions the most common denominator under which both texts could be grouped—ideas of how to achieve good governance. The comparison that follows the translations of *Tang Yu zhi dao* and *Zhong xin zhi dao*, aside from addressing certain syntactical and stylistic similarities, attempts to establish what distinguishes both manuscripts on the level of textual construction and argument.

1 *Tang Yu zhi dao*

"The Ways of Tang [Yao] and Yu [Shun]" aroused quite some interest immediately after its publication. Already in 2004 Carine Defoort published an article that examined the text's relation to Mohism and Yangism triggered by the text's ideas of abdication (*shan* 禪) and benefitting the world (*li tianxia* 利天下) (Defoort 2004). This was followed 1 year later by a study of three previously unknown texts including *Tang Yu zhi dao* that investigated what these texts could contribute to the existing traces of pre-Qin abdication discourse (Pines 2005). In 2012 the first complete rendering of *Tang Yu zhi dao* into English appeared in the seminal study and translation of all Guodian texts (Cook 2012: 521–64). Sarah Allan's aforementioned work contains the most recent translation of the text that consists of 706 characters on 29 slips

[11] This is also suggested by the approach in a dissertation on the text *Guiguzi* 鬼谷子 that the editors recommend and describe as an important predecessor of their own work (Broschat 1985: 87–107).

of bamboo. What qualifies her rendering is a rearrangement based on the discovery of traces of some of the binding cords found on slips 26, 27, 28, 4, 5, and 6 by a group of students working under the direction of Asahara Tatsurō 淺原達郎 at Kyoto University (Allan 2015: 85–88). The fact that the traces of some of the cords are at an angle allowed for the reordering, with slip 4 following slip 28.[12]

The retranslation follows the arrangement of the slips as suggested by Allan with the exception of the final five slips where, after quite some reflection on the possible point made by the final section of the text, I changed her arrangement of the last six slips from 11, 14, 15, to 15, 11, 14, ending like her with slips 16, 17, and 29. My own translation is essentially based on her reconstruction of the text and its characters (Allan 2015: 119–31). Notes indicate where I deviate from her decisions. For debates about character equivalents I refer the reader to the excellent discussions provided in the notes in Cook and Allan (Cook 2012: 541–64; Allan 2015: 119–31).[13] The slip numbers marking the end of each slip are provided within the Chinese text. Missing characters and their probable number are indicated with "□". Without an obvious parallel I refrain from suggesting which characters could have filled these spaces. Variant readings of reconstructed characters follow them in brackets "( )". Joined or reduplicated graphs in the original are indicated by curly brackets "{ }".

The manuscript of *Tang Yu zhi dao* opens by defining the most significant aspect of the relationship between the legendary rulers Yao and Shun, their particular way of succession and what qualified them to act thus:

唐虞之道, 禪而不傳。堯舜之王, 利天下而弗利也。禪而不傳, 聖之 1盛也。利天下而弗利也, 仁之至也。故昔賢仁聖者如此。身窮不均, 抎(捐) 2 而弗利, 窮仁矣。[14] 必正其身, 然后正世, 聖道備矣。故唐虞之□□ 3 之政者, 能以天下禪矣。

The way of Tang [Yao] and Yu [Shun] was to cede [their throne] instead of transferring [it to their heirs]. The regality of Yao and Shun was to benefit all-under-heaven instead of benefiting from it. To cede [a throne] instead of transferring [it to one's heirs] is the completion of sagacity. To benefit all-under-heaven instead of benefiting from it is the perfection of humaneness. The humaneness and sagacity of worthies in ancient times was like this: those who personally exhausted the limits of not being resentful and lost [something] without benefitting from it exhausted the limits of humaneness. For those who insisted on correcting themselves and only then corrected their contemporaries, the way of the sages was complete. Therefore the … of the government of the rulers Tang [Yao] and Yu [Shun] was that they were able to take all-under-heaven and cede it.

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[12] The earliest article that questioned the slip sequence proposed by the editors of the Jingmen museum appeared 1 year after the publication of the Guodian texts (Zhou 1999). For a list of different slip sequences that have been suggested by various researchers (see Allan 2015: 88n11).

[13] The manuscript *Tang Yu zhi dao* was first published in 1998 (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 39–41, 157–60). The Library of the Chinese University of Hong Kong provides a searchable online database for all texts discovered at Guodian (Library of the Chinese University of Hong Kong 2001).

[14] My rendering of the six sentences of the above passage follows the reconstruction of the editors with the exception of the fifth character where I follow Cook's choice (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 157; Cook 2012: 546). Contrary to Cook and Allan I assume that 窮 should have the same meaning (Allan 2015: 119).

They abdicated instead of handing their rule to the heir apparent, and in doing so they opted to benefit their kingdom instead of their own ruling house. Both behaviours are subsequently defined as the peak of sagacity (*sheng* 聖) and humaneness (*ren* 仁) respectively. The initial statement is followed by a generalizing argument about both these qualities of rulers in ancient times. Two characters at the end of strip 2 are missing. Provided that the reconstruction proposed by Huang Dekuan 黃德寬, Xu Zaiguo 徐在國 and others is correct, exhausting humaneness is defined as being able to refrain from being resentful even when giving up a kingdom without any personal gain (Cook 2012: 547n15). Sageness is defined as the understanding, even as a ruler over all-under-heaven, that rectification or alignment of the self must precede any attempt to control or correct one's subjects. The author[15] of *Tang Yu zhi dao* concludes his initial argument by saying that it was Yao's and Shun's embodiment of these qualities that enabled them to cede their rule, and that they shared these particular qualities with the worthies of the time.

The following section illustrates what made Yao employ Shun. The author of the manuscript makes an intertwined argument that presupposes knowledge of the abdication lore surrounding Yao and Shun:

> 古者堯之與舜也聞舜孝, 知其能養天下 22 之老也; 聞舜悌,知其能事天下之長也; 聞舜慈乎弟□□□ 23 為民主也。故其為瞽盲子也, 甚孝, 及其為堯臣也, 甚忠, 堯禪天下 24 而授之, 南面而王天下, 而甚君。故堯之禪乎舜也, 如此也。

> In ancient times, Yao giving (the rule) to Shun was because once he heard of Shun's filiality, he knew that he would be able to sustain the elderly of all-under-heaven; once he heard of Shun's brotherly love, he knew that he would be able to serve the seniors of all-under-heaven; once he heard of Shun's kindness towards his [younger brother Xiang] … [he knew that he would be able] to act as lord of the people. It was because he was the son of Gu Sou (the blind one) that he was exceedingly filial, that when it came to the time when he served Yao as minister he was exceedingly loyal, [with the consequence that] when Yao ceded all-under-heaven and bestowed it upon him to face south to be king over all-under-heaven, he was exceedingly lordly. And, it is therefore that Yao's cession [in favour] of Shun was like this.

The first point made is that Yao gets word of Shun's qualities that he shows through his interaction with members of his own family. The text uses well-known terms to refer to these qualities like filiality (*xiao* 孝), brotherly love (*ti* 悌), and concern (*ci* 慈).[16] And it is again Yao who realizes that these qualities of Shun can be extended from inside the family towards the elderly, towards those senior to Shun, and ultimately towards the people. The second argument initially explains why Shun's filiality ranks supreme: he remained filial towards a father who, according to the legend, intended to kill him. Secondly, it conceives the ruling qualities of Shun as a direct result of his more than difficult childhood. His exceeding filiality leads to exceedingly loyal behaviour as a minister and servant of Yao, and only after Yao's

[15] The term "author" is used here as a possibility. Various authors could have been involved in the creation of this text, not only when an amalgamation process of individual sections is assumed.

[16] 慈 is rendered here as "concern" since it primarily describes the intimate emotional concern of parents for their children, and by extension such concern of a ruler for his people (Harbsmeier 1989).

abdication, since Shun could not have demonstrated such a quality before, to exceeding regality. What I mean by the arguments being intertwined is that Shun's qualities in the first and the second arguments are clearly related:

孝→養老←孝, 悌→事長←忠, 慈→為民(主)←君

Shun's filiality signals his ability to nourish the old, his brotherliness points to his capability to serve seniors and thus be a loyal servant, and his kindness towards his younger brother demonstrates that in acting as the peoples' ruler, he will be an exemplary overlord. The concluding sentence serves to once more stress the consistency of the reasons for Yao's decision.

The complexity of this argument is a result of this intertwined construction. The function of this arrangement could be described as mutual substantiation: in fact the author of *Tang Yu zhi dao*, by means of what appears to be an unbreakable argument chain, belies those who argue that the choice of a worthy successor instead of the first-born son goes against ideas of filiality, brotherly love, and especially concern of parents for their offspring. Instead, these are precisely the qualities for which Yao chose an outsider as successor. The above narrative further serves to prepare the reader for the later argument of Yao's and Shun's care for their kin.

The following sentences mirror the stages of the development of Shun towards becoming a ruler with a generalizing account of the stages of the life of sages adding the dimension of old age:

古者聖人{二十}而 25 冠, {三十}而有家, 五十而治天下, 七十而致政。四肢倦惰, 耳目聰明衰, 禪天下而 26 授賢, 退而養其生。此以知其弗利也。

In ancient times sagacious men were capped at the age of twenty, they had [their own] families at the age of thirty, they ruled all under heaven at the age of fifty, and they handed over government at the age of seventy. Their four limbs became indolent, the perception of their ears and eyes deteriorated, [making them] cede all-under-heaven to confer it to worthies, and retreat to cultivate their [own] lives. From this we know that they did not benefit from it.

It appears to have been the sages' awareness of the physical limitations of their bodies at the age of 70 that made them cede their thrones and confer them to those they deemed worthy. This and the fact that they retired to nourish their aging bodies serves as further proof for the claim that they did not benefit from it. The concluding sentence refers the reader back to the opening statement that made this point. The generalised form of the argument about the stages in the lives of sages develops on the generalisation, again from the first section, about the humaneness and sagacity of worthies in ancient times.

The following move of the author of *Tang Yu zhi dao* is remarkable. Keep in mind that the marks left by the binding strings confirm the correctness of the sequence of the following six strips. The author uses a citation attributed to Shun to shift the perspective from Yao to the latter. Citations in early Chinese texts are very commonly used as proof for the correctness of a claim.[17] Here instead, in an implicitly

[17] Here may lie the reason why the editors initially suggested putting the citation at the end of the text (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 158).

“verbatim quote”, the sage ruler Shun personally proclaims the reason for coming forward:

> 《虞志》曰:「大明不出, 萬物皆暗。聖 27 者不在上, 天下必壞。」治之至, 養不肖。亂之至, 滅賢。仁者為此進 28。

> The “Record of Yu [Shun]” says: “If the great luminary does not come out, all the myriad things are left in gloom. If a sagely one is not on top, all-under-heaven will certainly be spoiled.”[18] The ultimate point of order is [reached] when the unworthy are sustained. The ultimate point of chaos is [reached] when worthies are exterminated. The humane ones come forward for this.

Shun compares the effect of the absence of the sagely ruler on the realm to the impact a sun that does not shine has on all things. Phonetic reconstructions indicate that the statement rhymed (Cook 2012: 557). This rhythm is kept up by the following statement that proclaims the effects of complete order and chaos culminating in the final statement that this is the pretext for humane ones, i.e. sagacious rulers of old, to act. It is a strong statement interspersed between two generalizing tracts about sages, made authoritative through the legendary ruler who presumably made it. The author positioned it between the section about the age and the space of time sages serve, along with their insight into the limits of their powers and the consequence of ceding the throne to the most able, and the following part that introduces us to the techniques of their rule:

> 夫聖人上事天, 教民有尊也; 下事地, 教民有親也; 時事山川, 教民 4 有敬也; 親事祖廟, 教民孝也; 太學[19]之中, 天子親齒, 教民弟也。先聖 5 與後聖, 考後而甄先, 教民大順之道也。

> As a general principle sagacious men above serve heaven to teach the people to have those whom they honour, below serve earth to teach the people to have those to whom they show affection, timely serve mountains and rivers to teach the people to have those to whom they show respect. Within their family they serve the temple of their ancestors to teach the people to be filial; within the grand academy they treat the son of heaven’s immediate family members according to their age to teach the people to show their brotherly love. Regarding the former and the latter sages, they examine the latter to discriminate between their predecessors to teach the people the principle (way) of great compliance.

Note the initial *fu* 夫 that I take here as a phrase status marker of the general nature of the section.[20] Accordingly, sages appear to teach by example on all levels. The crucial point of the section, however, seems to be the behaviours their example triggers in their subjects: honour (*zun* 尊), affection (*qin* 親), respect (*jing* 敬), filiality (*xiao* 孝), brotherly love (*ti* 悌). All six appear to be sub-qualities of “the principle of great compliance” (*da shun zhi dao* 大順之道) even though the sages generate this principle out of the sequence of former and latter sages. It seems to be no accident that the author of *Tang Yu zhi dao* uses a generalizing statement to link the

[18] For sources on the debate of the origin of this citation see Cook (2012: 557n80).

[19] Follows Qiu Xigui (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998:158n8).

[20] Wagner underlines that such statements can appear in parallel segments, that the sentences are completed with *ye* 也, and that the statements of principle are stated, not argued (Wagner 2015: 63).

sages' educational impact with a range of human qualities held especially dear by adherents of Ruist (*ru* 儒) ideas at the time. In doing this he prepares the following argument in which he attempts to offset the idea of cession as subverting the principles of family and hierarchy:

> 堯舜之行, 愛親尊賢。愛 6 親故孝, 尊賢故禪。孝之方, 愛天下之民。禪之流, 世亡隐德。孝, 仁之冕也。7 禪, 義之至也。六帝興于古, 咸由此也。愛親忘賢, 仁而未義也。尊賢 8 遺親, 義而未仁也。古者虞舜篤事瞽叟, 乃試其孝; 忠事帝堯, 乃試其臣。9 愛親尊賢, 虞舜其人也。[21]

> The conduct of Yao and Shun consisted in caring for their immediate family and honouring worthies. They cared for their immediate family, for this reason they were filial; they honoured worthies, for this reason they ceded [their throne]. The domain of filiality lies in caring for the people of all-under-heaven. The tradition of cession lies [in attracting] those with hidden virtue forgotten in their [own] era. Filiality is the crown of humaneness. Cession is the perfection of righteousness. The six emperors' rise [to power] in ancient times all derived from these. To care for one's immediate family but neglect worthies is being humane without being righteous yet. To honour worthies but to leave one's immediate family behind is being righteous without being humane yet. In ancient times Yu Shun devotedly served [his father] Gu Sou manifesting his filiality; he loyally served emperor Yao manifesting his ministerial qualities. Who cared both for his immediate family and honoured worthies, Yu Shun was this man.

To drive his point home the author once again avails himself of a set of strictly intertwined arguments that aim at letting filiality and cession appear as inseparable. Caring for their immediate family they must be filial. Honouring worthies they must cede their throne. Both qualities entail care for the people, one time as care *per se*, one time as letting those with hidden virtues come forward. In addition, filiality and cession are the epitomes of humaneness (*ren* 仁) and righteousness (*yi* 義), so much so that the rise of the six emperors of old depended on them. The author reaffirms this point by reversing the argument into a lack of either *ren* or *yi* if "care for the family" or "honour of worthies" is disregarded, to conclude by stating how Shun demonstrated both qualities.

While the author smoothly moves the focus once again from both Yao and Shun to Shun alone, the argument of the final sentence of this passage appears to contain a small glitch. Does the author really imply that loyal service to Yao is a kind of veneration of worthies? The following section answers this question:

> 禹治水, 益治火, 后稷治土, 足民養 10 口禮、虁守樂, 遜民教也。咎(繇)内用五刑, 出試兵革, 罪輕法 12用威, 夏用戈, 正不服也。愛而正之, 虞夏之治也。

> Yu tamed the waters, Yi tamed the fires, Hou Ji tamed the soil so as to suffice the peoples' nurture … [Bo Yi illuminated?] ritual, Kui abided by music so that they made the people complaisant in regard to education. Gao Yao applied the Five Punishments within, going out he displayed troops and armour, the punishments were light and the laws were (?) Yu [Shun] used majestic awe and Xia [Yu] used halberds to bring the un-submissive into line. To care and yet correct them such was the rule of Yu [Shun] and Xia [Yu].

[21] The reading *fang*方 follows the editors; 流 *liu* follows Cook; 亡 *wang* and *mian* 冕 follow the editors (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 157; Cook 2012: 550n34; Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 157).

The section actually presents a list of eminent worthies and their impact on order and welfare of the people. The six ministers mentioned are all known to have served, and consequently to have been selected by Shun. Unfortunately the damaged ends of slips 10 and 12 leave quite some room for interpretation. Following the emendations by the editors, the second half makes the point that though Shun operated with majestic might while his minister availed himself of punishments and warfare, both set things right by means of care (*ai* 愛).

The prominence of Yu in this part probably has to do with his becoming the successor of Shun and founder of the Xia. At the same time we may wonder whether such prominence should be given to the founder of the Xia, who supposedly introduced primogeniture. The scenario described by *Tang Yu zhi dao* is obviously different. It appears that the actions of Shun's worthies led to the establishment of what has already been defined as the perfection of righteousness above—abdication as a standard for government:

> 禪而不傳義恆□□ 13年不弋(戴), 君民而不驕, 卒王天下而不疑。方在下位, 不以匹夫為18輕; 及其有天下也, 不以天下為重。有天下弗能益, 亡天下弗能損。極仁19之至, 利天下而弗利也。

> When the righteousness of ceding the throne instead of transferring [rule] became permanent … the [ruling?] years were not carried forward, those who acted as lords over the people did not become recalcitrant, and they ended their kingly rule over all-under-heaven without question. When positioned at low rank, they did not take commoners to be insignificant; yet when it came to them possessing all-under-heaven, they did not take all-under-heaven to be vital. To possess all-under-heaven was unable to add something to them, to lose all-under-heaven was unable to take something from them. The perfection of ultimate humaneness was to benefit all-under-heaven instead of benefiting from it.

Once abdication as a principle for rulers persisted, rulers did not follow the pattern of clinging to the throne any longer. Permanence of abdication, accordingly, caused a fundamental change in attitudes towards rank and power with questions of gain and loss becoming irrelevant. The final sentence is both a recourse to the text's beginning and its amplification. Benefitting your subjects instead of yourself becomes the epitome of humaneness.

The subsequent definition of abdication would appear to be in the wrong place, were it not marked as an emphatic recourse:

> 禪也者, 上德授賢之謂也。上德則天下有君而 20 世明, 授賢則民興教而化乎道。不禪而能化民者, 自生民未之有也, 21 並於大時, 神明均(将)從, 天地佑之。

> Cession [as understood here] is the designation of regarding the virtue of conferring [the throne] to worthy men as supreme. If this virtue is regarded as supreme then all-under-heaven will be in the hands of [true] lords and the era will be luminous. If [thrones] are conferred to worthy men then the people will thrive on teaching to transform towards the way. That someone did not cede [the throne] and yet was able to transform the people is without precedent since the birth of our people. Who sides with a great age, the spirits and luminous apparitions will follow [him], and heaven and earth will assist him.

With this recourse the author of *Tang Yu zhi dao* once more stresses the necessity of ceding the rule to men of worth to achieve a transformation of the people towards the way (*dao* 道) through encouragement to learn. Yet he ramps up his recourse in

arguing that, firstly, the transformation of people by a ruler who did not cede his rule has never occurred and, secondly, that only those that find their bearings in great ages receive the support of heaven, earth, and the spirits, implying that those opposed to this position lack this support.

The arrangement of the final slips of *Tang Yu zhi dao* is controversial. Slip 29 with only three characters is marked by a horizontal line as the end of the text and thus must be the final slip (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 41). The first editors of the text decided that *Tang Yu zhi dao* ended with the citation of Shun and that therefore "… the coming forward of the humane ones was like this …" (仁者為此進 28如此也29) (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 158). Cook chose to let slip 29 follow slip 11, suggesting that the text would end with a statement about the sages' preservation of life techniques (Cook 2012: 564). Though, with slip 21 preceding slip 11 in his arrangement of the text, slip 11, due to this particular content, hangs in the air. Cook's choice already indicates that its content is hard to reconcile with the rest of the text (Cook 2012: 563). Allan's rearrangement of the slips led to an entirely different but much more convincing ending since in her version the text concludes by comparing its description with the current state of affairs. Less convincing, however, is her idea to let the troublesome slip 11 about preservation of life techniques follow slip 21, the slip that states the impossibility of transforming people without governance by way of cession. This connection forces her to introduce a new subject of "the superior ruler" (Allan 2015: 129). My own re-arrangement suggests moving slip 15 before slip 11, leading to another example of a pattern used in the text before, that of a general statement followed by one on Yao and Shun. The principal question to be answered, however, is why the text introduces the topic of life preservation at all. I do suspect this has to do with the notion of *ming* 命 that appears to be used here in the meaning of "allotted life span" but also as "heavenly ordained fate":

> 縱仁聖可與, 時弗可及嘻(矣?)。夫古者 15 順乎脂(肌)膚血氣之情, 養性命之正, 安命而弗夭, 養生而弗傷, 智□□ 11 治也。古者堯生為天子而有天下, 聖以遇命, 仁以逢時, 未嘗遇□□。14 舜居於草茅之中而不憂, 升為天子而不驕。居草茅之中而不憂,知命 16 也。升為天子而不驕, 不流也。求乎大人之興, 美也。今之弋(戴)於德者, 未 17 如此也29。[22]

> With [Yao's and Shun's] unbridled humaneness and sagacity we can ally, their era, alas, it can no longer be reached. As a principle those in ancient times went along with the [natural] dispositions of skin, flesh, blood and vital breath, nurtured the right alignment between their physical nature and [what heaven] ordained, avoided their premature death by securing [fulfilment] of [what heaven] ordained, and avoided bodily harm through fostering life, they knew … to bring about order. Among those in ancient times Yao was born as son of heaven to possess all-under-heaven, his sagacity conformed to what was [heavenly] ordained, his humaneness conformed to the age, and he never encountered … Shun dwelled amidst the countryside but was untroubled [by that]. When he himself became the son of heaven, he was not recalcitrant. Dwelling amidst the countryside and yet being untroubled means he knew what [heaven] ordained. Being made son of heaven himself and not being recalcitrant,

[22] The reading of *an* 安 follows the editors; *sheng* 升 follows Cook (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 157; Cook 2012: 560). The reading of *dai* 戴 follows Li Ling (2002: 277). Li Ling's reconstruction appears to be consistent with the other occurrence of the character *yi* 弋 two sections above.

> means he did not transfer [his rule]. Commendable is the search for the rise of a great man! Those who are presently carried forward by virtue are not yet like this.

The passage opens with another reference to the humaneness and sagacity of Yao and Shun that can be emulated even though their era can no longer be reached. A generalised statement follows on how the sages in ancient times sought to achieve a balance between their physical nature and what heaven had allotted them. This is paralleled with the emergence of Yao and Shun in ancient times. Yao as a born sage naturally aligned with that which heaven ordained. Shun, as a worthy *in spe*, was different. The author demonstrates this by pointing out that his behaviour proved his awareness (*zhi* 知) of what heaven ordained, and the lack of recalcitrance showed when he did not cling to succession.

To understand the significance of this point we have to remember that one of the criticisms brought forward against, among others, the later adherents of Confucius by followers of Mozi 墨子 was that "the Learned" (*ru* 儒) of the time were so preoccupied with ideas of fate that they became stifled and almost incapable of acting.[23] Seen against this background, the author of *Tang Yu zhi dao* made a final strong point by insinuating that a world in which cession and the elevation of worthies became the norm could lead to a different kind of awareness of potential men of worth that entailed the behaviour but also the qualities Shun stood for, an awareness of what fate had in store.

Provided this arrangement of the slips is correct, the text concludes with an appeal and an exhortation. The appeal to look for great man evokes the expression "great age" (*da shi* 大時) from the previous section. The exhortation states that those presently carried forward in their striving for virtue are no match for the great man that should be looked for.

Though the immediate addressee of this final reprimand is not known, *Tang Yu zhi dao* as a whole presents itself as a complex, tightly constructed and well-argued political tract. Its author uses a range of topics to drive home his point about the necessity to replace the current practice of primogeniture by the idea of cession of the throne to the most able or worthy one. His target audience appears to be a clientele that adheres to values of hierarchy and family relations, and that must conceive ideas of cession and selection on the basis of merit as undermining these values and possibly their own power. The author consequently employs a strategy that aims to demonstrate that appreciation for the family and the selection of non-family members for office due to their merits are two sides of the same coin. The appraisal of candidates for office not only starts from focusing on values of hierarchy and family relations, but the embodiment of these values is the mark of someone deemed capable of ruling.

As has been demonstrated, the author quite ingeniously builds this argument into a narrative about what would have been known among his audience as Yao's cession of his throne to Shun. A particular quality of his text is that he aligns and embel-

[23] Compare the "Against Fate" (*Fei ming* 非命) chapters 35–37 in *Mozi* (Sun [1895] 1986: 163–76). For a translation see Johnston 2010: 318–49.

lishes his argument by embedding it into a detailed narrative of Shun's ascent to rule, the enormous consequences of his choice of worthies, and his apparent indifference to power and its possession. In a final twist the author even addresses his audience's belief in the power of heavenly ordained fate, suggesting that rule by selection of the most able would hold the promise of a better knowledge of heaven's intentions. In addition to that, the author succeeds in defining the sages and, implicitly, their potential followers' actions as the perfection of behaviours associated with core conceptions of humaneness (*ren*) and righteousness (*yi*). This further supports the suggestion that the target audience of the text may be found among adherents of the Ru.

If we try once to read the arguments of the author of *Tang Yu zhi dao* conversely against the backdrop of the late fourth century BCE, a vivid picture of the dismal state of power relations during the late Warring States period arises. The following text to be examined differs not only in this aspect.

2 *Zhong xin zhi dao*

Zhong xin zhi dao 忠信之道 (The Ways of Uprightness and Reliability) is a short text consisting of about 250 characters written on 9 strips of bamboo with only the end of strip 5 broken off (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 45). A particular feature of the manuscript is the regular organisation of the text. From the beginning the sentences are arranged in parallel constructions, one string addressing *zhong* 忠, the other *xin* 信. Almost immediately after its publication *Zhong xin zhi dao* was lauded by various scholars as being the first pre-Qin example of systematic exposition of the ideas of *zhong* and *xin*.[24] With regard to the frequency with which both notions appear in other pre-Qin texts, the excitement in finding a systematic exposition of these ideas was understandable. As can be seen from the titles of the translations that have meanwhile appeared, scholars assumed that the text addressed the subject of loyalty and trustworthiness.[25] This has prompted one of its earliest translators, Dirk Meyer, to hypothesize about a particular form of argument structure in a specific group of ancient Chinese texts (Meyer 2003, 2008). He proposed that *Zhong xin zhi dao* consists of six sections with a sequence of arguments built upon one another.[26] He further proposed that the parallel sequence of this argument structure of the text is systematic to such a degree that it leads to conclusions, and even to a

[24] An early example of this viewpoint can be found in Pines (2002: 8). Also see Wang (1999), Meyer (2003), (2008), and Sato (2010).

[25] The translations of the "title of the manuscript" are "The Way of Loyalty and Trustworthiness" and similar (Wong 2006: 125–55; Cook 2012: 565–82). Further "The Way of Fidelity and Trustworthiness" (Meyer 2012: 31–52). A more recent attempt with a different rendering for *zhong* is "The Way of Conscientiousness and Trustworthiness" (Chung 2015: 1–115).

[26] This is quite a step from Li Ling, who suggested that the text consisted of paragraphs that introduced four different aspects of *zhong* 忠 and *xin* 信 (Li 2002: 100)

sort of final conclusion.[27] I have shown elsewhere that Meyer's reading seems constrained since his strong focus on formal aspects of the text is detrimental to his reconstruction and his idea of the text's scope (Schimmelpfennig 2018: 76ff). What struck me when looking at *Zhong xin zhi dao* were its repeated references to speech in connection with *zhong*. This discovery matched my findings in various pre-Qin and Han sources where the ideas connected with *zhong* and *xin* are more often than not related to language, the ways of expressing it and—in extension—the conduct that can be gleaned from the way it is expressed.[28] Since another meaning of *zhong* is "being honest" or "being upright", I suggest that uprightness instead of loyalty is one central idea addressed in *Zhong xin zhi dao*.[29] The ideas associated with *zhong* and *xin* in pre-Qin texts and beyond are quite diverse. Some of these ideas resonate within *Zhong xin zhi dao*, making it almost impossible to represent them in any one-word rendering. My point in replacing "loyalty" with "uprightness" and "trustworthiness" with "reliability" is not to maintain that *zhong* and *xin* mean just that. It is rather that the main aspect of both ideas as touched upon in *Zhong xin zhi dao* would be best represented by these translations, and that the validity of this view is confirmed by the context, and ultimately through the argument clarity and consistency achieved in translation.

The following chart lists the kind of terms used to describe actions considered to be either *zhong* and *xin* or un-*zhong* or un-*xin* in *Zhong xin zhi dao*:

	忠	信
1	不訛 not to spread false rumours	不欺 not to deceive
2	不發 without being caused to do so	不結 without being bound to do so
2	亡誑 let false rumours perish	不背 not turn away
3	不渝 by not blurring it	諸常 by regarding it as enduring
4	不說 does not persuade	不期 sets no time limits
5	口惠 letting the mouth utter kind words	心{疏} in mind being distant
6	其施也忠 what he enacts is upright	其言爾信 what he says is reliable

The words in the left-hand column are those used in the text to describe what characterizes the qualities of someone being *zhong*, those in the right-hand column the qualities of someone being *xin*. The relation of the verbs in sections 1, 2 (second example), 3, and 5 to speech will be evident. The example from section 5 is not

[27] Meyer adds that in most cases within *Zhong xin zhi dao* the structure is doubled, leading to a 1ab-2ab-c scheme: "The second ab group fulfils two functions. First, it further refines and so concludes the information given in the first ab group (1ab). As such it functions as the c component to the first ab group. Second, it continues the argument, which then is concluded by the final component c" (Meyer 2012: 35).

[28] I am in the process completing a study of *zhong* 忠 (Schimmelpfennig in preparation).

[29] I do not really question the rendering of the second central idea of *xin* as "trustworthiness". Since this rendering of *xin* implies a range of meanings like credibility, reliability, plausibility, authenticity, or believability, I prefer the more plain translation of "being reliable" in the sense of doing what one has promised to do.

explicitly linked to *zhong*, but it appears that two statements in section 5 about the noble man's behaviour continue the parallel arrangement of the preceding arguments. The words in the right-hand column do broadly refer to the realm of "actions" that do not involve speaking with the exception of those in sections 1 and 2 that may refer to both. Only the expression in section 6 clearly refers to language. As will be addressed later, for the concluding argument of *Zhong xin zhi dao* it appears that the author of the text deliberately reversed the references of both expressions.

My re-translation follows the arrangement of the text into six sections as suggested by Meyer with the difference that the final sentence is considered to be part of the sixth section (Meyer 2012: 260–67). The transcription follows the reconstruction by Cook, indicating where I deviate from his choices.[30] Some of my reasoning for the differences of my rendering are given in the note following the transcription of each section:

> 不訛不容, 忠之至也; 不欺弗知, 信之至也。忠積則可親也; 信積則可信也。忠 1 信積而民弗親信者, 未之有也。[31]

> Not to spread false rumour about those who are unbearable is the perfection of uprightness; not to deceive those who are entirely ignorant is the perfection of reliability. To those whose uprightness accumulates [to such a degree] you can relate closely. On those whose reliability accumulates [to such a degree] you can rely. There has never been such a case that the people did not relate closely and relied on those whose uprightness and reliability accumulated [to such a degree].

In his rendering Scott Cook noted the difference of the fourth negation in the first sentence that led him to render *fu zhi* 弗知 as "the uninformed", making it an object of the verb *qi* 欺 (to deceive) (Cook 2012: 577).[32] The strict parallel construction of the first two phrases would suggest considering the expression rendered here as "those who are unbearable" (*bu rong* 不容) as another object of the verb "to spread false rumours".[33] Though the rendering depends on the correctness of Wang Zijin's reconstruction of *rong* 容, the opening sentences now make a clear and general first argument that ultimately also relates to the barbarous people mentioned at the end

[30] With one exception all choices of disputed characters for my own translation have been made on the basis of existing options that have been suggested by specialists. References to these suggestions can be found in the notes that accompany Meyer's or Cook's translation (Meyer 2012: 260–67; Cook 2012: 575–81).

[31] For the understanding of *e* 訛 compare its use in the poem "Mian shui" 沔水 in the *Book of Songs* (Karlgren 1950: 127). Wang Zijin reads the fourth character as *rong* 容 instead of *hai* 害 (Wang 1999: 47). The source of Wang's reconstruction is unclear but a look at the bamboo strip itself reveals that the character in question is written with only two horizontal strokes instead of three strokes between the character for "roof" above and for "mouth" below (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 21, 139).

[32] That the expression is even stronger is suggested by Confucius' distinction of the worries of the nobleman preserved in *External Tradition of the Han Family to the Book of Songs* (Hanshi waizhuan 韓詩外傳) between the completely ignorant (*fu zhi* 弗知), those who know but do not learn (*zhi er bu xue* 知而不學), and those who are learned but do not put their learning into practice (*xue er bu xing* 學而不行) (Lau 1992: 4).

[33] This expression can be found in various texts of the time in the meaning of "someone that does not fit [into a certain group]" or who is "intolerable".

of *Zhong xin zhi dao*: those who are excluded due to their looks or their unbearable behaviour are the most vulnerable regarding blackmail. So are those who are entirely ignorant when facing deceit. It is the culmination of uprightness and reliability not to take advantage even of persons in such a situation or in their state of mind. I may not take my argument too far when I suggest that barbarians or native tribes within or at the fringes of kingdoms of the time might have suited this description, at least from the perspective of educated men.

The second argument of the first section extends the first argument by formulating a rule based on “historical experience” concerning the impact uprightness and reliability were thought to have on human relations, especially those between overlords and their people. Rendered thus, the first section becomes a consistent opening statement on the subject of the entire text, uprightness and reliability, with the following paragraphs serving as its elaboration:

> 至忠如土, 化物而不發; 至信如時, 必至而不結。忠人亡 2 譌(訛); 信人不背。君子如此, 故不誑生、不背死也。[34]
>
> Perfect uprightness is like the earth [in the respect that] it transforms [all] things without being caused to do so; perfect reliability is like the seasons [in the respect that] they necessarily arrive without being bound to do so. Upright men let false rumour perish; Reliable men do not turn away. The noble man is like these, and therefore [he] neither cheats the living, nor turns away from the dead.

This second section bears a variety of problems that are not only related to decisions about characters but also to the connection between the statements about heaven and earth with the rest. The parallels between the qualities of heaven and earth and uprightness and reliability that the initial statements appear to insinuate are about a constancy of processes that run automatically without any need of interference or initiation. Understood thus, the images illustrate the qualities humans may gain by striving to be *zhong* and *xin*, namely to dispel rumours and to boost reliance through their relentless pursuit of uprightness and reliability. A plain rendering of *xinren bu bei* 信人不背 would be: “Reliable men do not turn their back [on someone]”. The parallel argument of upright men letting false rumours perish (*zhongren wang e* 忠人亡訛), however, suggests that both phrases speak about the impact that *zhong* and *xin* have on others. The noble man is added as further proof and as a model. His uprightness is defined by not cheating those alive, his reliability by not turning away even from those who have died. This last statement that can be found mentioned in the context of warnings against the neglect of ancestor rituals appears to anticipate the relations of those who have achieved uprightness and reliability in relation with the past, as addressed in the following section:

> 大舊而不渝, 忠之至也; 大古而睹常, 信 3 之至也。至忠亡訛, 至信不背, 夫此之謂此。[35]

[34] The reading of *fa* 發 is suggested as a possibility in Cook (2012: 575). The reading of the first character of slip 2 as *hua* 訛 follows Cook (2012: 575n2). The reading of *kuang* 誑 follows the editors (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 163n5).

[35] Meaning of *yu* 渝 based on the *Shuowen jiezi* which explains its meaning as “to become impure”, as originally suggested by Meyer (Duan and Xu 1981: 571; Meyer 2003: 62). The reading of *du* 睹 follows the suggestion of Li Ling (2002).

> To hold in high esteem what remains by not blurring it is the perfection of uprightness; to hold in high esteem what is ancient by regarding it as enduring is the perfection of reliability. [Since] perfect uprightness eradicates false rumour and perfect reliability does not turn away, these are an illustration of those.

The third section offers two further definitions of the properties of those that have perfected *zhong* and *xin*. These properties are afterwards set in relation to the effects from section 2, with a concluding statement that underlines that these properties illustrate these effects. The definitions distinguish between *jiu* 舊 and *gu* 古. Based on explanations contained in *Shuowen jiezi* the first term seems to refer to a past within reach, while the latter term points to an ancient past that is gone but is revered for the principles it set up.[36]

> 大忠不說, 大信不 4 期; 不說而足養者, 地也; 不期而可歸者, 天也。配天地也者, 忠信之謂此。

> Who holds uprightness in high esteem does not persuade; who holds reliability in high esteem sets no time limits. To not persuade and yet provide sufficiently, such is earth; to set no time limits and yet be able to be adhered to, such is heaven. Correlates of heaven and earth, uprightness and reliability are an illustration of these.

Section 4 takes up the analogy between *zhong* and *xin* and heaven and earth from paragraph 2. This time, though, in reversed order of the argument, beginning with the notions of *zhong* and *xin*. The initial character is translated in the same way as in the preceding section. The reasoning behind this is the fact of the similarity of ideas like uprightness or reliability as well as loyalty and trustworthiness with laws. We can either be upright or liars, as we can only be loyal or disloyal. There are no degrees of uprightness or trustworthiness.[37] The beginning character should consequently be conceived as a verb. Once we translate it as such, the argument in comparison to section 2 changes since now the text does not describe the state of achievement but rather the necessary behaviour of those on the way to that achievement.

The point that "those who esteem uprightness do not persuade" can be understood in two ways, either that persuasion is principally conceived as deviating from the truth, or that an upright person has no need of further elaboration due to her already speaking the truth. Not to set time limits in relation to reliable behaviour points to a reliability without conditions. It should be evident that the expectations on those who tried to achieve these qualities and act according to them were enormous. This is consistent with the behavioural requirements described in other texts that mention *zhong* and *xin*.[38] The final statement of section 4 concludes the association of the properties of heaven and earth with *zhong* and *xin*, putting them on one

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[36] The translation is based on the explanation contained in the *Shuowen jiezi* (Duan and Xu 1981: 144). The synonym groups for *jiu* and *gu* provided in the Thesaurus Linguae Sericae TLS database appear to point in a similar direction (Harbsmeier 1989).

[37] For this relationship cf. Fletcher (1993: 62). This should not be confused with possible degrees of how uprightness and reliability are put into practice by those trying to adhere to the requirements suggested by these notions.

[38] Cf. *Analects* 1.4; 1.8; 5.19; 14.7; 16.10.

level by means of an emphatic recourse. Contrary to earlier interpretations the text seems not to insinuate an immediate relation between heaven and earth with *zhong* and *xin*, or some kind of empowerment of the follower of these ideas, but rather to stress that those who achieve personification of these ideas share qualities or patterns inherent in these celestial entities.

The following section 5, though problematic due to missing characters, makes a rather clear statement about three conducts that are unacceptable to the noble man:

> 口惠而實弗從, 君子弗言爾; 心 5 疋(疏)而貌親, 君子弗申爾; 古行而爭悅民, 君子弗由也; 三者, 忠人弗作, 信人弗為也。

> Letting the mouth utter kind words but factually not follow them, the noble man does not speak [in this manner] at all; in mind being distant but intimate in [one's] appearance, the noble man does not set forth [such demeanour] at all; acting in accord with the ancients but vie to please the people, the noble man does not start out from that. Regarding those three [fallacies], the upright man does not do them and the reliable man does not practice them.

These are combined with the additional argument that an upright or a reliable person does not behave thus either. The noble man's behaviours, i.e. to suit action to words, to match feelings with appearance, and not to loosen standards to ingratiate oneself, appear to be enhancements of demeanours associated with *zhong* and *xin* in the paragraphs before. At the same time all three conducts are related to both notions of uprightness and reliability. The possibility of relating both ideas with this set of behaviours, however, tends to blur the distinction between both. This last observation is confirmed once more in the final sixth section and will be addressed there:

> 忠之為 6 道也, 百工不楛而人養皆足; 信之為道也, 群物皆成而百善皆立。君子, 其施也 7 忠, 故蠻親附也; 其言爾信, 故亶而可受也。忠, 仁之實也; 信, 義之基也。是故古之所 8 以行乎蠻貉者, 如此也 9 。[39]

> When uprightness is made a principle [of action], the nourishment of man will be sufficient for all [due to the fact] that every kind of craft will not decay; When reliability is made a principle [of action], every good deed will be fulfilled [due to the fact] that all things are completed entirely. Regarding the noble man—what he enacts is upright and therefore [even] the Man barbarians closely relate to and depend on him;—what he says is reliable and therefore what is transmitted will be accepted [by them]. Uprightness is the essence of humaneness. Reliability is the foundation of righteousness. For this reason, [it has been stated] that whereby those of former times acted among the Man and Mo barbarians equalled these.

The order of the arguments is somewhat puzzling though it clearly is intended to lead to a climax at the end of the section. It opens by addressing the effects of *zhong* and *xin* being made principles followed by the noble man's successes among barbarous people, grounded in his virtuosity in both behaviours.

Most translators use "way" as the standard rendering for *dao* 道 (Wong 2006: 203; Cook 2012: 581; Meyer 2008: 260).[40] Judging from the content of *Zhong xin zhi dao*, however, the entire text is an introduction to two principles of action. "Methods" as an optional rendering for *dao* would be inadequate since methods can

[39] The reading of *dan* 亶 follows the editors (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 164n19).

[40] Chung uses the variant rendering "fundamental principle" for *dao* (Chung 2015: 115).

be applied at will. It is the nature of *zhong* and *xin* that someone who has achieved these qualities cannot but apply them. Thus "principles of action" appears to be the most adequate rendering.

Two glosses follow that relate *zhong* and *xin* to *ren* 仁 and *yi* 義. What is striking though is that these glosses define *zhong* and *xin* as the core and substance of these paramount virtues, a fact that may have triggered the idea of the doctrinal nature of the text and its relation with Zi Si 子思 and his school (Li 1999: 75–79). The glosses' definitions are indeed unique. Within the sixth section, however, their rhetorical function is to give even more weight to the final statement. By referring back to the successes of the noble man mentioned at the beginning, the final phrase discloses the secret of the ancients' success in dealing with barbarous people, namely the achievement of uprightness and reliability, principles that lie at the heart of the virtues of humaneness and righteousness.

We can only guess why uprightness and reliability of those in charge lead to perfect rule as described in the beginning of the sixth section. Yet there are some indications: crafts may not wither since they are held in high esteem, and all things are completed due to the reliability of the people responsible for crafting them. What is noteworthy, though, is that barbarous people relate to the noble man due to his upright actions, and they rely on him due to the reliability of his statements. This change from predominantly relating *zhong* to speech and *xin* to action can be explained by the text itself. Section 5 in fact refers to the relation between word and action, or state of mind and outward appearance. Whether someone is saying the truth or is reliable can often only be confirmed by the actions that follow. On another level reliability seems also to be conceived as a congruence of inner disposition and outward demeanour, implying that deportment can tell you something about inner qualities.

The reference of the last sentence to what is now *Analects* 15.6 is evident since, including the terms defined by the preceding glosses, the end of *Zhong xin zhi dao* contains five characters that are central to the argument made there.[41] It remains unclear, though, whether a kind of predecessor to the *Analects* already existed in 300 BCE. I would not therefore go so far as ZHOU Feng-wu to consider the entire text to be an elaboration on Confucius' answer to his disciple (Zhou 1998: 127). Zhou's idea is also marred by the fact that the passage in the *Analects* distinguishes between *zhong* and *xin* as virtues of speech, and generosity (*du* 篤) and respect (*jing* 敬) as virtues of action. Still, I do agree with Zhou that the last sentence refers to another text, and that the degree of agreement with *Analects* 15.6 is no accident. Zhou's observation is also in line with the common habit of strengthening an argument with a concluding reference to another text. Judging from this somewhat loose connec-

[41] 子張問行。子曰: 言忠信, 行篤敬, 雖蠻貊之邦行矣; 言不忠信, 行不篤敬, 雖州里行乎哉? Zi Zhang asked about getting by in the world. The Master replied: "In your speech be upright and reliable, and in your conduct be sincere and respectful. In this way, you will always get by in the world, even if you find yourself in some barbarian state. If your words are not upright and reliable, and your conduct is not sincere and respectful, how can you possibly get along, even in your own region?" (Slingerland 2003: 176). I only changed Slingerland's renderings of *zhong* and *xin* as "dutiful" and "trustworthy" into those used here.

tion between Confucius' statement and the final sentence of *Zhong xin zhi dao*, what we have before us rather appears to be a standard example of a concluding proof of an argument. The function of the preceding glosses is to strengthen the reference by suggesting that *Zhong xin zhi dao* discloses what actually is the true essence of the powers attributed to the ancients, uprightness and reliability.

Looking at the entire work in its present rendering, *Zhong xin zhi dao* could be regarded as an instruction text of the principles of uprightness and reliability and the potential for those who attempt to embody them. The text's repeated references to the noble man serve to stress the importance and the veracity of the claims made. The beginning of the text already implies that the thrust of the overall argument is the efficaciousness of employing *zhong* and *xin* even in hostile surroundings. Whether this argument was made to present a more precise elaboration of Confucius' point in what later became the *Analects* or with the more practical aim of equipping those attempting to govern in such surroundings with the appropriate tools is difficult to say. What should be evident, though, is that judging from its structure *Zhong xin zhi dao* presents an argument that focuses exclusively on the nature of two ideas, uprightness and reliability, and the exceptional effect that will be achieved once these ideas have been transformed into personal qualities, as tools of good governance, in the sense of the influence a person imbued with them has, even on foreign people.

3 Comparison

As will be obvious from the preceding analysis, both manuscripts can be conceived as examples of the extensive body of pre-Qin argumentation texts that present ideas of good governance or at least what their respective authors would have regarded as good governance.

Similarities rather appear on the level of syntax or the construction of arguments. Noticeable aside from parallel or intertwining arguments are concluding formulas like "are an illustration of these" (*wei ci* 謂此) or "where like these or equalled these" (*ru ci* 如此) serving as links to subjects treated before, or the frequent use of the comparative "the perfection of" (*zhi zhi* 之至) or variants thereof. Both texts once employ the formula "it has never been the case" (*wei zhi you* 未之有). In comparison to *Zhong xin zhi dao* the *Tang Yu zhi dao* manuscript uses a flurry of conceptual terms. Remarkable is the association of *ren* and *yi* with key concepts discussed in the manuscripts (孝, 仁之冕也。禪, 義之至也。忠, 仁之實也; 信, 義之基也。). Judging from the deliberate positioning of the statements within section 6 of *Tang Yu zhi dao* and the final section of *Zhong xin zhi dao*, it is evident that the authors of both manuscripts conceive the relation of their key ideas to *ren* and *yi* within their argument as central. While these shared characteristics may point to a connection between both manuscripts or the ideas maintained by their respective authors, they hardly set the stage for suggesting a similar origin, let alone a particular school of thought without further research.

The differences are more pronounced. While both texts appeal to political ideals they can be immediately distinguished by their references. *Tang Yu zhi dao* employs the most famous example of abdication in the attempt to make a strong case against the idea and possibly—depending on the use of the text—the existing practice of hereditary rule. *Zhong xin zhi dao*, on the contrary, makes an argument about the seemingly mandatory importance of the two ideas of uprightness and reliability.

The author of *Tang Yu zhi dao* challenges established positions. To achieve that he employs a complex argument structure that switches between the use of meticulously construed depictions of the legendary history of Shun's succession to Yao and generalizing statements about the nature and the behaviour of sages, using complex parallel and intertwined syntactical structures, interim conclusions, and recourses. The manuscript even concludes with an appeal followed by admonition. The text goes to enormous lengths to challenge the position of the incommensurability of filiality or parental love in their relation to hereditary succession with the idea of the selection of the most gifted person as successor. We can almost sense the stubbornness of the implied listeners or readers.

The author of *Zhong xin zhi dao* does not need to fear such confrontation. He appears to trade in ideas. As Meyer has demonstrated, the text is constructed very tightly though probably not in a systematic degree as he would have us believe (Meyer 2012: 31–52). My different understanding of the meaning of the key concepts *zhong* and *xin* applied in the present translation appears to confirm the high degree of interrelatedness of the six sections. We should bear in mind though the brevity of most sections of this text. On average, one section of *Zhong xin zhi dao* fits on 1.5 bamboo strips while one section of *Tang Yu zhi dao* covers 2.9 bamboo strips of similar length, almost double the amount of characters. While the division of *Tang Yu zhi dao* into ten sections ultimately rests on assumptions of Allan's and my own modifications, there are reasons for this division. There are syntactical and grammatical indicators but most important is the interrelatedness of sentences and recurring expressions. The same is true for *Zhong xin zhi dao*, indicating that its sections are more compact.

One more significant difference between both texts is their use of real and codified citations (Oraić Tolić and Dronske 1995: 31–75). As has been demonstrated above, the author of *Tang Yu zhi dao* places a real citation at the centre of his disquisition, using it as a record of a proclamation of the text's main protagonist. The codified citation at the end of *Zhong xin zhi dao* is a far more common way of early Chinese texts to give final proof for the correctness of the argument that precedes it. Scholars like Zhou Fengwu turned this point around, arguing that the purpose of *Zhong xin zhi dao* is to illustrate the meaning of the reference to what later became the *Analects* (Zhou 1998). But would such a reference hinge on essentially two, though obviously prominent, characters? Judging, for example, from later commentaries like the *Wuxing pian* 五行篇, we cannot exclude such a possibility (Riegel 1997: 150–53).

With the results of the present analysis, especially of *Zhong xin zhi dao*, an intellectual relation between both texts becomes even harder to grasp. *Zhong xin zhi dao* focuses on the principles of uprightness and reliability in the sense of being honest in one's speech and actions. Aside from illustrating the impact of these qualities this

brief text defines them as the essence of humaneness and the foundation of righteousness respectively, and ultimately as keys to establishing good governance even among alien peoples. *Tang Yu zhi dao* appears to be a contribution to an ongoing discussion about the role of the ideas of filiality and loyalty in governance though with the important twist of cession of the throne being entered into the mix. What has been rendered as “loyalty” for lack of a better expression for the subservience of a son towards his father transposed into the servility of a minister towards his ruler, here only appears as a precondition for an acceptable servant in government. Shun’s filiality signals future loyalty. The more important question is the de facto incommensurateness of filiality with cession. The author of *Tang Yu zhi dao* essentially extends the definition of filiality to mean to care for all people under heaven. He does this to make plausible his claim of the necessity to venerate worthies and the search for persons of hidden virtue and, further to that, to make it acceptable from the customary standpoint of the veneration of elders. It is this particular idea of filiality that is defined as the crown of humaneness with the consequence that cession becomes the epitome of righteousness. Still, the author of *Tang Yu zhi dao* does not stop there. He adds the culmination of ultimate humaneness on top and defines it as Yao’s and Shun’s model behaviour, namely the attitude of a ruler to benefit all under heaven and not benefitting from it by himself, as the key to achieve good governance.

If we want to begin to circumscribe an intellectual common ground of both texts aside from addressing the question of good governance, it would thus be that particular forms of actions are conceived by both texts as being the utmost expressions of humaneness and righteousness. Still, the way the author of *Zhong xin zhi dao* constructs his text almost by necessity leads to defining uprightness and reliability as constituent fundamentals of humaneness and righteousness. For the author of *Tang Yu zhi dao* instead, filiality and cession crown and perfect humaneness and righteousness, and the attitude needed by a ruler to cede his throne even becomes the expression of the culmination of ultimate humaneness. These differences seem related to the fact that the author of *Tang Yu zhi dao* avails himself of venerable exemplary rulers to make his case while the author of *Zhong xin zhi dao* proceeds by expounding the efficacy of uprightness and reliability as such. It is precisely these different purposes and the different ways in which the authors consequently construct their texts that thwart any attempt to identify any intellectual relation, if it existed, more clearly.

This brings us, finally, back to the multi-chapter hypothesis of Sarah Allan. Following her idea, could *Zhong xin zhi dao* be conceived as a passage that would be part of a “collection of similar units” that “tended to be open ended” with the passages not having “a definite sequence” (Allan 2015: 28)? Possible, but if the text is conceived as illustrating a certain expression from another text, it seems that further expressions from this respective text would be the common denominator for a collection of such units. If we conceive the text as a discrete piece of political thought about *zhong* and *xin* it is perfectly collectable but again for what purpose? The text is already part of a collection entombed with the occupant of Guodian M1, however, its connection to *Tang Yu zhi dao*, let alone to the other discovered texts, is not really obvious.

Theoretically, *Tang Yu zhi dao* could be regarded, at least to a large extent, as a collection of similar units on a similar topic. In light of *Zhong xin zhi dao* some sections of the manuscript could be regarded as discrete statements. The present contribution attempted to demonstrate that *Tang Yu zhi dao* is not such an amalgamation of "similar units" but a complex and meticulously laid out argument with a high degree of consistency.[42] The reconstruction of this argument gives a better idea of the function of the document and its probable addressees, though Yuri Pines still holds the prize for stating its main target first (Pines 2005: 257–263).

Allan's hypothesis, however, also allows for conceiving *Tang Yu zhi dao* as one complete unit, circulated as a discrete text as defined by the material of the bamboo strips it was written on. That said, it is evident that her hypothesis is in great need of refinement. To enhance her significant idea and make it applicable to texts from the pre-Qin era, there need to be clear distinctions regarding the nature of the material under examination, its generic affiliation tentatively judged on the basis of transmitted examples, and close examinations of "complete" examples with a focus on forms of argument and consistency in argument of the reconstructions.

Whether the practice of open "collections of similar units" as a consequence of the limitations of writing materials is not a backward projection of the results of Han editorial processes still remains an open question.

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[42] This does not, however, rule out, theoretically speaking, that *Tang Yu zhi dao* could have had a place in a larger compilation.

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Chapter 6
Which Comes First? *Dao* 道 or *De* 德: Evidence from the Guodian Manuscripts



Constance A. Cook

The terms *Dao* 道 and *De* 德 make up the name of the transmitted Daoist classic the *Daodejing* 道德經. The Han era Mawangdui 馬王堆 and Beida 北大 manuscript versions of the classic (distinguished by the title *Laozi*) famously reverse the transmitted order of the terms, placing sections 38–81 "Classic of *De*" (*Dejing* 德經) before sections 1–37 "Classic of *Dao*" (*Daojing* 道經). In the fourth-century BCE Guodian versions of the *Laozi*, the sections are all mixed up and fragmentary. It is clear from the *Laozi* texts and from most philosophical texts dating from the second half of the Warring States that the concepts of *Dao* and *De* were both essential to becoming an enlightened or accomplished man (a *chengren* 成人, first, and then a *junzi* 君子). This was the goal of an individual separate from the goals of a royal lineage, a phenomenon unknown in the Western Zhou and reflective of radical social structural change.[1] As Sarah Allan has shown, the term *Dao* emerged out of a Western Zhou past where it indicated only a general sense of "movement," into a Warring States society where it indicated a metaphorical channel that people followed as a guide (Allan 1997: 68–70). *De*, from the earliest Zhou bronze inscription evidence, was a fluid inner force available only to those who participated in the Zhou ancestral worship system. *De* in that system was gifted by Heaven through the king and then through the branches of the royal cult to deserving individuals.[2] By Warring States time, it was a force that "grew" inside an educated individual, available to anyone with the proper education (Allan 1997: 104–07; Cook 2017). By the

[1] For documentation of this evolution, see Cook (2017). For the role of Mohism and other "conformist ideologies" in the definition of individual agency after the fall of the Zhou, see Brindley (2009: 29 *passim*).

[2] This is explored fully in Cook (2017). For some examples, see Cook and Goldin (2016: nos. 11, 29, 33, 39, 44, 62, 63, 64, 66, 69, 72, 74).

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Han period, *Dao* represented what the Zhou Heaven, Sky (*Tian* 天), once did and *De* was a natural force within it. That is the totality of cosmic understanding at each particular time and the pantheon of forces representing it shifted.[3] This is obvious from the records and manuals preserved from diviners whom the elite employed to determine the influence of the spiritual agencies on all aspects of their daily life. The focus moved from ancestral spirits to calendrical astrology.

Western Zhou and later bronze inscriptions use *De* in a way that can be directly connected to later Ru self-cultivation practices. By the time of the first *Laozi* manuscript, sometime before the fragments were buried in the Guodian tomb, possibly during the fourth century BCE in the Warring States, *De* had already begun to evolve in meaning away from its original Western Zhou context, a context which involved *Tian* and *Shangdi* 上帝 but *never Dao*. The metaphorical use of *Dao* (versus its concrete meaning as anything other than a road or course) did not appear until the Warring States period. *De* was a very old term and *Dao* relatively new. In the Guodian texts, the term *Dao* appears much more often than the term *De* and has a range of meanings (everything from the cosmic *Dao* to various methodologies or rules of behaviour to be followed), whereas *De* was understood as an inner force associated with Heaven—just as it was during the Western Zhou period.[4]

This chapter will look at the dynamic tension between the two terms as defined by the texts preserved at Guodian, regardless of the ideological—Daoist or Confucian (Ru)—differences in the texts. The distribution and contexts of use in the 16 texts reveal less a debate over definitions, but more on which perspective to emphasize in practice.[5] The comparison of the usages of the terms tests the sensitivity of textual boundaries among the subsets of Guodian texts as defined by material and calligraphic standards (Cook 2012: 1:47–54). For example, *Cheng zhi* 成之 and *Liu de* 六德, while seemingly copied by different hands, are complementary in content. Some texts focus on cosmic principles of *De* and *Dao*, some on social principles, and others reveal a nested combination of the two. It is not surprising to see the Daoist texts emphasize the cosmic principles, the *Dao* of Heaven (*Tian Dao* 天道) and the Confucian or Ru texts the human social principles, the *Dao* of Man (*Ren Dao* 人道). What are interesting are the more subtle variations, the attempts to reconcile the two perspectives, and the fact that the definitions of the terms do not really conflict. Generally, *De* is an inner force associated with Heaven that has to be cultivated, either as a function of the natural cosmic *Dao* or through *Dao* as a

[3] Jinhua Jia argues that historically the concept of *De* was secondary to *Dao,* claiming a Han style knowledge of the Sky going back to the Shang or earlier, which she understands as *Dao* (Jia 2009: 459–88). Jia equates *Dao* with beliefs in the High God (*Shangdi* 上帝, *Tiandi* 天帝), the cosmic agencies of Great One (*Da* 大, *Yi* 一, *Tai Yi* 太乙), and the Pole Star (*Taiji* 太極) and the orientation of king and state as the perceptual centre (Jia 2009: 460–65; based on her reading of Allan 2003: 237–85; Pankenier 2004: 211–36). Her explanations of the root words for *Dao* and *De* are unconvincing for the Shang and ignore essential evidence from the bronze inscriptions.

[4] *Dao* is used more often than *De* generally, although in some instances it must be read verbally as in "to guide" (*dao* 導). These latter cases are not considered in the analysis although one could argue that rulers follow a *Dao* "to guide" their people.

[5] Numbering will follow Cook's translation; my translations are adapted from his Cook (2012).

particular methodology or law of human behaviour. In this Warring States sense, *Dao* comes first.

In the following chart we look at which texts preferentially use which terms. Following the chart is a detailed analysis of the use of each term in each of the 16 texts. The symbol < is used when the term appears less often than the other term. The symbol X is used when the term appears more often. In some texts the terms are used about equally. Zero means the term never appears. The symbol – means that the term appears but the contexts are difficult to discern.

Preference	*De*	*Dao*	Notes on *De*	Notes on *Dao*
1 *Laozi* 老子	<	X	Inner force	Cyclic cosmic entity
2 *Taiyi shengshui* 太一生水	0	X		Defending the name *Dao*
3 *Ziyi* 緇衣	X	<	Achieved through imitation	Method of behaviour
4 *Lu Mu Gong wen Zisi* 鲁穆公問子思	0	0		
5 *Qiong da yi shi* 窮達以時	X	0	Revealed through behaviour	
6 *Wuxing* 五行	X	X	Behaviours; *De* associated with *Dao* of Heaven; ritual music; enacting *De* according to the right times	*Dao* of Heaven; *Dao* of Man; *Dao* of the *junzi*; timeliness
7 *Tang Yu zhi dao* 唐虞之道	X	X	"hidden *De*"; timeliness	Sage's *Dao*
8 *Zhong xin zhi dao* 忠信之道	0	X		Methodology (of behaviour)
9 *Cheng zhi* 成之	X	X	Heaven's *De*; behaviour enforced by *junzi*; modelled by Sages; "urgency" (timeliness)	Methodology of behaviour; Great *Dao* = Heaven as modelled by the *junzi*
10 *Zun deyi* 尊德義	<	X	Force that "flows" from the ruler to the people; ritual music	*Dao* of Man/the People/Water/Horses/Earth; only the *Dao* of Man appropriate for *junzi* = guide for behaviour
11 *Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出	<	X	Force nurtured through education/performance of ritual music	Guidelines/methodology for proper education and self-cultivation; the *Dao* of *Yi* 義; *Dao* of Man. Hints of Western Zhou ritual
12 *Liu de* 六德	X	<	Behaviours and hierarchy	*Dao* of Man; hints of *Zhouyi*
13 *Yucong* I 語叢一	<	X	Ritual music	*Dao* of Man + *Dao* of Heaven = *Zhouyi*
Yucong II 語叢二	–	–		
Yucong III 語叢三	X	<	Self-cultivation; behaviour; ritual music	*Dao* of Ruler & Minister; *Dao* of Food Service 食
Yucong IV 語叢四	0	–		Methodology; *Dao* of Persuasion

Basically we see that the texts *Laozi*, *Taiyi shengshui*, *Zhong xin zhi dao*, *Zun deyi*, *Xing zi ming chu*, and *Yucong* I use *Dao* more often than *De*, and that the texts *Ziyi*, *Qiong da yi shi*, *Liu de*, and *Yucong 3* use *De* more often than *Dao*. The texts *Wuxing*, *Tang Yu zhi dao*, and *Cheng zhi* use the two terms about equally. In some cases, the texts are so short or fragmented that the frequency of use is not particularly significant. In the analysis below, we examine the context for each use.

Many of the texts reflect shadows of the earlier Western Zhou ritual, particularly those that mention modelling oneself on the sages through the performance of ritual music. The texts with the most complex integration of *De* and *Dao* usages are the *Wuxing* and *Xing zi ming chu*, both texts with a Ru orientation. The latter while acknowledging the *Dao* of all things also—surprisingly—includes the most specific rhetorical reflection of the ancient ritual. Other surprises include subtle or not-so-subtle links in Ru texts, such as the *Liu de*, to the rhetoric of divination, which naturally subscribes to a cosmic *Dao*—although the text itself only mentions the *Dao* of Man.

1 Text 1: *Laozi* A, B, and C

The word *De* appears in *Laozi* A and B. The word *Dao* in Laozi A, B, and C.

1.1 De

In *Laozi* A, strip 33 (*Daodejing* 55) *De* is a quality that when "abundant" is equivalent to a healthy "ruddy infant" (*chizi* 赤子).

In *Laozi* B, *De* is one graph assumed to be part of a missing phrase on strip 2 that refers to a heavily accumulated *De*, an inner force that allows one to overcome obstacles. On strip 11, *De* appears three times in a section describing the illusory and contrary nature of types of *De*. There is a High *De* (*shang de* 上德), which is ironically like a valley, a Broad or Vast *De* (*guang de* 廣德), which seems insufficient, and a Firm or Vigorous *De* (*jian de* 建德), whose seeming quality is missing from the text but, if filled in from the transmitted version, would be "lax" or "indolent." On strips 16–18, *De* appears multiple times, each with different qualities, in a section describing different social levels of "cultivation" (*xiu* 修). The first level is self, where *De* is pure (*zhen* 貞>真); the second is the home, where *De* is in a surplus (*yu* 餘); for the hometown, *De* is long lasting (*chang* 長); and for the world, *De* is pervasive (*bo* 薄, missing from manuscript but filled in from transmitted texts).

1.2 Summary and Discussion

In the Guodian *Laozi* A and B, *De* is recognized as an inner force that when cultivated can empower one and spread from the self outward into the world. The practice of accumulating inner *De* in a "broad" or "vast" manner inside the heart can be traced to Western Zhou ritual performances. But during the Western Zhou *De* was accumulated by lineage heirs and limited in power to the lineage. It did not obviously spread from an individual outward into the world. There is some hint in Spring and Autumn inscriptions that the accumulation of *De* during performance results in a healthy visage, but the image of a "ruddy infant," so important to later Daoist self-cultivation rituals, never appears in the bronze inscriptions (Cook and Goldin 2016: 74).

1.3 **Dao**

Laozi A, strip 6, the use of *Dao* to assist a ruler means that upon military success there will be no bragging. Strip 10, those with *Dao* try not to overdo it. Strip 13, the *Dao* is constant in its non-action. Strip 18, *Dao* is constant in being without a name. However, once names do proliferate in the world, then on strip 20 *Dao* can be imagined as many small streams pouring into the sea. On strips 21–23, *Dao* is named and defined as a mother–infant dichotomy; turbulence becomes a form that pre-existed the division of the cosmos into Heaven and Earth. This form is something born out of nothing but called also the mother. *Dao* is not only the form, but the principle of a cyclical flow of movement. It is equal in status to Heaven and Earth and to the king of the realm. These four aspects of the realm were connected as a series of relationships. The highest model was *Dao*. Heaven modelled (*fa* 法) itself on *Dao*, Earth on Heaven, Man on Earth, for whom the king is representative. This section defines this scheme "of itself, natural" (*ziran* 自然). Strip 24 calls the cyclical process (into and out of emptiness) Heaven's Way (*tiandao* 天道). On strip 35, the concept of a negating *Dao* (*budao* 不道) is introduced in the context of defining human life stages: the stage of physical decline is the negating *Dao* part of the life cycle that begins as a "ruddy infant" body full of *De* (see *De*, strip 33 above). In strip 37, the reversion and weakening half of the cycle is called the "movement of *Dao*" (*dao dong* 道動) or the "utility of *Dao*" (*dao yong* 道用), that is Dao in its negating part of the life process. Strip 39 reaffirms that this cyclical process is the Way of Heaven (*tian zhi dao* 天之道).

Laozi B, strip 3, refers to a *Dao* that enables long life and perspicuity. Someone who understands the *Dao* is the opposite of one who is educated. Instead, he appears to be daily less and less engaged until he is totally inactive. Strips 9–12 refer to the interactions of three levels of a literate man (*shi* 士) with the *Dao*. The highest

among them focuses his behaviour according to it, the middling forgets about it, and the lowest just laughs it off. The author of this section of *Laozi* B feels that the laughing at it is what makes the man's behaviour an expression of *Dao*. He cites an earlier text to the effect that three levels of *Dao*, the "enlightened" (*ming* 明), the "levelled" (*yi* 夷), and the "progressed" (*jin* 進) all appear as their opposites.

Laozi C, strip 3, refers to how, if one behaves in a Humane and Proper (*ren yi* 仁義) manner, it is equivalent to abandoning the *Dao*. Strips 4–5 refer to how speaking, seeing, or listening to words about the *Dao* are not as much fun as attending a musical banquet, but they are longer lasting.

1.4 Summary and Discussion

Laozi A examples focus on the definition of the *Dao* of Heaven and how it represents a recursive cycle of growth and decline, and the fact that everything and its opposite (mother and infant, action and non-action) represent this *Dao*. *Laozi* B examples focus on how true recognition of *Dao* is more associated with ignorance than education (a Ru virtue); what in fact might seem to be *Dao* was in fact its opposite. *Laozi* C also talks about the *Dao* of Heaven, but specifically attacks Ru social behaviours.

From the *Laozi*, we see that *De* (a Ru virtue) was categorized as part of the growth trajectory of the recursive cycle of rise and fall called *Dao*.

2 Text 2: *Taiyi shengshui*

De does not appear in this text. In strips 9–11, the Way of Heaven as a cyclical process is again introduced. The use of the name *Dao* is affirmed as necessary because sages use it and it is equivalent in stature to the names Heaven and Earth.

3 Text 3: *Ziyi*

The term *De* appears in this Ru-approved text three times more often than the term *Dao*.

3.1 De

In strip 5, it appears attributed to a quote from a lost text, the "Yi gao" 伊誥 or the "Yin gao" 尹誥 (伊>尹誥). *De* in the quote is a quality achieved by Yi Yin 伊尹and Cheng Tang 成湯, two characters (a shaman minister and his king, the founder of

the Shang) that appear in many fourth-century BCE bamboo texts preserved by Tsinghua University.[6] In strip 12, it appears in another quote, this time from the *Book of Odes* (the *Shi* 詩). The quote, from the Da Ya 大雅 ode "Yi" 抑, affirms the need for a king to have *De* in order to influence the Four Regions, the Western Zhou term referring to the world. *De*, in strip 16, appears in a statement by the Master, presumably Confucius, concerning the nature of the *De* of the people (*min* 民) being dependent upon the ruler's "constancy" (*chang* 常). The Master in strip 24 again discusses how the behaviour of the people is dependent on the behaviour of the king. In this case, *De* is displayed by the king through the performance of ritual. In strip 37, *De* appears in a quote from the "Jun Shi" 君奭 chapter of the *Book of Documents* (the *Shu* 書). Although the context is about how one's behaviour should accord with one's speech, the specific reference to *De* reflects the Western Zhou practice of founder worship based on *Shangdi*'s reward of Zhou founder King Wen's *De* with the ultimate symbol of political authority, Heaven's Mandate. Finally, on strip 41, the Master discusses the need to "embrace *De*" (*huai de* 懷德) in order to be considered worthy by a *junzi*. The rhetoric of "embracing *De*" can be traced back to the Western Zhou ritual performance of "grasping of the *De*" (*bing de* 秉德) through a process of "broadening and opening the heart" (*guang pi xin* 廣辟心) (Cook 2017: 3).

3.2 Summary and Discussion

Contrary to the *Laozi*, the *Ziyi* does not emphasize the meaning of *De* as a natural force symbolizing the growth stage of life. Instead it is a quality that must be earned through proper behaviour modelled on certain sages, such as a wise minister or the Zhou founder king associated with instituting civil codes. Aspects of old Zhou court rituals performed by lineage heirs to celebrate their change of status, usually into an ancestral position, are preserved as the ritual codes of behaviour.

3.3 Dao

On strip 12 the Master comments on the reign of sage king Yu that the people after 3 years followed his "humane *Dao*" (*ren dao* 仁道).

[6] See for example, Allan (2015: 1–20).

3.4 Summary and Discussion

Dao here is less a "cosmic way" than simple "method" or "way of public performance." The word *Dao* never appears in the older layers of the texts, those represented by the ample quotes from the *Shi* and *Shu*. Instead, the older Zhou rhetoric of *De* as a quality one earns through imitating the Former Kings is privileged.

4 Text 4: *Lu Mu Gong wen Zisi*

Neither *Dao* nor *De* appear in this eight-strip text.

5 Text 5: *Qiong da yi shi*

There are two mentions of *De* on a single strip in this 15-strip text and no mentions of *Dao*.

Beginning on strip 9 *De* is equated to a quality integral to a person no matter whether they are famous or not. External circumstances can seem to award or punish a person and this has nothing to do with the innate quality of a person's *De*. This ideology reflects the late Warring States notion that *De* is nurtured inside a worthy individual and not a result of external behaviours, as during the Western Zhou era.

6 Text 6: *Wuxing*

Dao and *De* are mentioned an almost equal number of multiple times.

6.1 De

The text begins with a discussion of "*De* behaviour" (*de xing* 德行) explaining throughout strips 1–9 that it is "modelled, shaped" (*xing* 型>形) inwardly (*nei* 內) through the performance of five types of behaviour: "humanness" (*ren* 仁), "propriety, decorum" (*yi* 義), "ritual" (*li* 禮), "knowledge" (*zhi* 智), "sagacity" (*sheng* 聖). The five "*De* behaviours" as a totality define the *Dao* of Heaven and can be distinguished from the four behaviours simply resulting in "goodness" (*shan* 善) as in the *Dao* of Man (*ren dao* 人道). Inner cultivation involved a trajectory in which inner anxiety is turned into knowledge, which is turned into joy (*yue* 悅), which is turned into a feeling of safety (*an* 安), which through the practice of happiness (derived

from performance to ritual music) completes (*cheng* 成), the inner state of *De*. This process then proceeds to a visualization of a jade-like *junzi* who enacts goodness and *De* (strips 18–19) through the sounds of chime stones and chime bells.[7] In strips 20–21 the earlier message regarding the trajectory of behaviours leading to *De* is re-affirmed. In strip 24, a man of knowledge should be recognized as having *De*. In strip 27, a sage is defined as someone who knows the proper timing of enacting *De*. The concern with "timing" (*shi* 時) reflects a Warring States obsession with the influence of the seasons and natural cycles eventually defined as *Yin* and *Yang* (and the Five Agents, *wuxing*) (Csikszentmihalyi 2004: 164–65; Cook 2012: 1:466–71). In strip 29, five behaviours (*wuxing*) mentioned above are explained as a trajectory for achieving *De* and praise from others in the home and in the state. In the last line of the text, in strip 50, the state of *De* is achieved through the practice of music while "listening to the *Dao*."

6.2 Summary and Discussion

The writer of this text uses the vocabulary popular among philosophers of natural sciences, who advocated following the rules of Day Books (*rishu* 日書). The writer imbued the metaphors of natural cycles advocated by the Daoists with Ru terms grounded in social and political duties. The writer also adapted the old Zhou terminology of "modelling" oneself on the Former Kings to a self-cultivation practice geared to training oneself to serve sages if one could not be a sage oneself. King Wen is mentioned and quotes also found in the *Shi* included. The social behaviour of "humanness" and enacting "decorum" (displayed in the Western Zhou in performance at court) was the basis of increasing inner states of harmony, all stages to becoming sage-like. Mention of how the senses must serve the "heart" reaffirms that this text enforced a self-cultivation practice.

6.3 Dao

In strip 5 (and in strips 19–20), two types of *Dao* are distinguished: the *Dao* of Heaven and the *Dao* of Man. *De*, the highest state, is associated with the former, and simply "goodness" with the latter. In strip 7, *Dao* is linked to the *junzi*. The *Dao* of a *junzi* is drawn out through rhyming puns: it is called the "intent" (*zhi* 志) of the "educated man" (*shi* 士), which must accord with "timeliness" (*shi* 時). We know from other texts that there was some question in the Warring States as to whether the

[7] For a full study of the *Wuxing* (based on the similar manuscript found at Mawangdui) and the transcendent body of the *junzi*, see Csikszentmihalyi (2004: Chapter 4). See also Brindley's study of the role of music in early China (Brindley 2012).

zhi one was born with was evil, good, or simply unsettled.[8] In any case, the Ru advocated training the *zhi* through enacting model behaviours.[9] The *Dao* of the *junzi* is mentioned again on strip 15 in the context of visualizing and hearing of the worthy jade-like man. On strips 23–24, the hearing and visualizing of the *Dao* of the *junzi* is necessary, in order to follow it, to achieve a state of "knowledge," essential to achieving *De*. On strips 26–27, it is essential to follow it to achieve a state of "sagacity" (*sheng* 聖). Only a sage (*shengren* 聖人) has knowledge of the Way of Heaven and how to behave properly at the right times. On strips 35–39, the writer notes that adherence to a minor *Dao* may harm the greater *Dao* (the analogy for this type of behaviour would be not matching the punishment to the crime). On strip 43, adherence to the *Dao* of the *junzi*, particularly the method of "assembling (*De*) to great completion" (*ji da cheng* 集大成)—a metaphor for completing nine stages of a musical performance—leads to a state of worthiness (*xian* 賢).[10] Hearing of this *Dao* (strips 49–50) leads to the fulfilment of the five behaviours (the Ruist *wuxing*) and the state of *De*.

6.4 Summary and Discussion

Dao is definitely subservient to *De* in this text. The focus on self-cultivation by means of the *Dao* of the *junzi* reflects Warring States concerns. Only the mention of King Wen and the emphasis of inner completion by means of musical performance hints almost metaphorically at the earlier Zhou tradition.

7 Text 7: *Tang Yu zhi dao*

De and *Dao* appear in almost equal numbers in this 29 strip text.

7.1 De

On strip 7, the term "hidden *De*" (*yin de* 隱德) is used. It refers to when worthy people are not employed as ministers or rulers. Rulers are encouraged to abdicate in favour of worthy ministers so that *De* is not hidden. Prehistorical sage kings are presented as models. On strips 17–21, timeliness is an issue. People with *De* can

[8] See Text 11, *Xing zi ming chu*.

[9] See discussion in Cook (2013).

[10] See discussion in Cook (2012: 1:514n186) and Cook (2017). Erica Brindley translates *xian* as "achieved" (Brindley 2009: 11–13).

only be employed at the right times. When *De* is held in the highest esteem and abdication results, only then will the world and its people be transformed.

7.2 Summary and Discussion

This text does not explain how to achieve a state of *De*. It focuses on political policy and how to get men who already have *De* into government.

7.3 Dao

At the very beginning of the text, on strip 1, the writer begins with the *Dao* of two prehistoric states, Tang and Yu, ruled by sage kings Yao and Shun, models of abdication and worthiness. On strip 3, it is referred to as the sages' *Dao* (*sheng dao* 聖道). And on strip 6, it is their *Dao* that the people must be taught to obey absolutely[11] and, on strip 21, for them to be transformed into a more enlightened state.

7.4 Summary and Discussion

As with the *Dao* of the *junzi* in the previous text, the *Dao* of Tang and Yu is a specific political methodology.

8 Text 8: *Zhong xin zhi dao*

Although this is a text advocating Ruist virtues, the word *De* never appears in its nine strips. On strip 7, the word *Dao* is used twice in terms of the methodology used to enact the Ruist behaviours of "loyalty" (*zhong* 忠) and "trustworthiness" (*xin* 信). The *Dao* of loyalty and the *Dao* of trustworthiness are those of the *junzi* whose behaviour matches his words.

9 Text 9: *Cheng zhi*

Dao and *De* are mentioned almost equally in this text on "completion."

[11] Scott Cook notes that the term *da shun*, which he translates as "greatly accord", also appears in the *Daodejing* and the *Zhuangzi* (Cook 2012).

9.1 De

At the beginning of the text (strip 6), a bad ruler, one who goes to war and resorts to excessive punishments, “falls from *De*” (*zhui de* 墜德). In Western Zhou bronze inscriptions, bad rulers caused the Heavenly Mandate to fall. Later (strip 22), a quote from “Jun shi” in the *Shu* advocates that in order to institute *De*, “urgency” (*ji* 疾) is required. In other words, things must be brought to completion and not to be allowed to fester or rot. Then (strips 2, 25–26), the text explains the need for a ruler to gain the trust of the people in order to instil *De* in them. A quote from an unknown chapter, the “Lü ming” 呂命 is included. On strip 33, the term Heaven’s *De* (*tian de* 天德) is explained as the divine law (*tian chang* 天常) of proper social relations between people, which a *junzi* must enforce.[12] On strip 37, the term Sage’s Heavenly *De* (*shengren tian de* 聖人天德) is attributed to a *junzi* of long ago, who advocated modelling oneself on the idealized behaviour of King Wen and thus being able to mete out proper punishments and enforce the “six positions” of the social hierarchy.[13]

9.2 *Summary and Discussion*

De is used in the Ru sense of being the result of a ruler properly modelling his behaviour on the sages. There is a clear Warring States concern with proper punishments and effective government.

9.3 Dao

On strip 15, *Dao* refers to the proper methodology for ruling: a ruler must practice what he preaches if he expects the people to obey. On strip 29, the word *Dao* is used to refer to a quote from “Jun shi” in the sense of “what was said” or perhaps as “the methodology of what was said.” On strip 27, the term *Dao* of “goodness” (*shan dao* 善道) is mentioned as the urgent pursuit of anyone who desires to be like a sage. This accords with the message regarding proper self-cultivation methodology in Text 6 *Wuxing* above. On strip 32, the Great *Dao* (*da dao* 大道) is equated to the “constancy” (*chang* 常) or law of Heaven. Unlike the “constancy” of the cyclic *Dao* in the *Daodejing*, the constancy sent down by Heaven in this text is the hierarchy of human relations advocated by the Ru; it is also called Heaven’s *De*, a concept embraced by sages and the essential principle of becoming the *junzi* (strip 37).

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[12] Brindley describes it as “eternal patterns” which form “the single source for all order, meaningful standards, and types of relationships among people” (Brindley 2009: 33).

[13] Outlined in another text, Text 12 *Liu de* below.

9.4 Summary and Discussion

The text's discussion of seeking the roots (behaviour) rather than the branches (words)[14] takes key metaphors mentioned in the *Daodejing* (roots = quiet, branches = noise) and replaces them with Ru ideals. As seen in Ru texts above, *Dao* is not a cosmic way but a methodology defined by rules of behaviour modelled on earlier *junzi* or sage kings. The idea of "completion" of self through education or self-cultivation is implied but not specified.

10 Text 10: *Zun deyi*

De appears about half as often as *Dao*.

10.1 De

On strip 1, *De* and "propriety, decorum" (*yi* 義) are combined, as two virtues which a ruler must value in order to instil the proper relationships among the people. On strip 13, *De* is nurtured among the people through ritual musical performance. And on strip 16, if the ruler enacts *De* then the people will progress in "goodness" (*shan* 善). On strips 28–29, *De* is depicted as a strong and invisible force that "flows" (*liu* 流) from the ruler throughout the realm guiding the people. On strip 37, *De* is depicted as a transformative power that is initiated through the ruler's behaviour (in contrast to his words). The passage warns against losing sight of the larger goal while pursuing smaller advantages.[15]

10.2 Summary and Discussion

The focus on proper relationships and the behaviour of the ruler are themes familiar from the Ru texts above. The "flowing" of *De* and emphasis on ritual music is also seen in the Tsinghua text *Zhou Gong zhi qin wu* 周公之琴舞, but in that text *De* flows from Heaven directly to the performers and not via a king.[16]

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[14] Section 7–18, see Cook (2012: 2:601–06).

[15] See a similar warning in Text 6 *Wuxing*.

[16] See Heli (2013). For the full discussion and translation, see Cook (2017: 208–19).

10.3 Dao

Dao appears on strips 3–9. It represents the proper order of society and government based on the hierarchy of relationships and the proper use of rewards and punishments. Education follows this *Dao*. It is the *Dao* of Man (*ren dao* 人道) established by prehistorical sage kings, such as Yu. Such sages governed the people according to this *Dao* of the People (*min zhi dao* 民道), which is as orderly as Yu's *Dao* of Water (*shui zhi dao* 水之道), Zao Fu's *Dao* of Horses (*ma zhi dao* 馬之道), or Houji's *Dao* of the earth (*di zhi dao* 地之道). Every system has its own *Dao* and it just so happens that the *Dao* of Man is relevant to ordering humans and thus chosen by *junzi*. Understanding *Dao* requires first understanding oneself and then others. This leads to understanding one's role in life (*ming* 命) and to the proper *Dao* one must use as a guide for behaviour (*xing* 行). On strips 21–22, the *Dao* of the People is defined. It is a mode of governing in which the people, though ignorant, are guided and encouraged, rather than coerced, to obey by an engaged ruler.

10.4 Summary and Discussion

The *Dao* of Man and the *Dao* of the People are essentially rules for government contextualized within the many *Dao* of larger systems all ordered by sages. Unlike the natural cycles of *Dao*, these *Dao* are rules innate to systems imposed on nature by men (Yu's rivers, Houji's agriculture, etc). *De* was viewed as a natural force that flowed by means of the *Dao* of Man or of the People. *De* was a tool for governing according to these *Dao*. The ability to use this tool was created by the ruler's own inner training with ritual music and enacted through his proper behaviour.

11 Text 11: *Xing zi ming chu*

De is mentioned a third as much as *Dao*.

11.1 De

On strip 18, *De* rises naturally within oneself through education. On strip 27, it is given order through listening to, or the performance of, ritual music, which channels emotions properly (in contrast to dance and musical performances not linked to prehistorical or Zhou sages). On strip 53, *De* is a quality possible in all men no matter their socio-political status. It becomes obvious in a person when others display respect for him. And, on strip 58, it is a quality shared among like-minded men.

11.2 Summary and Discussion

De is a force nurtured in the heart through self-cultivation and education. Humans are born with an unformed *zhi* which must be directed through proper stimulation of the affective states (*qing* 情) of their inner nature, the *xing* 性. The use of ritual music associated with Zhou sages can be documented in the Western Zhou bronze inscriptions. That association with prehistorical sages is a later manifestation, as is the focus on inner states of the self.

11.3 Dao

At the beginning of the text, on strip 3, *Dao* is defined as being based inside a person's inner nature (*xing*). The platform was the heart, and the mode of self-cultivation advocated refining emotional responses to external stimuli into a prescribed "decorum" or "proper behaviour, propriety" (*yi*).[17] Human nature came from Heaven as a "life-allotment" or "mandate" (*ming*).[18] On strip 12, *Dao* is the state of *chang xing* 長性, essentially the grown-up or long-lasting inner human nature, after it has been tempered and nurtured through education. This *Dao* is further defined on strip 14 as the *Dao* of all things (*qun wu zhi dao* 群物之道). It is, according to the text on strips 15–22, the "master, base, lord" (*zhu* 主) of the heart and operates according to four "techniques" (*shu* 術). These are techniques for self-cultivation and are embodied by Ru texts: the *Shi* 詩, the *Shu* 書, the *Li* 禮 (short for a collection of ritual texts, such as the *Ritual Records*, the *Liji* 禮記), and the *Yue* 樂 (probably the lost *Records of Music* 樂記). The *Shi* and *Shu* represent "action" (*wei* 為) and "speech" (*yan* 言), and *Li* and *Yue* together represent "elevation" (*ju* 舉). These texts then were the guidelines for Ru-style self-cultivation methodology. The feeling of elevation connects the performance of ritual to man's inner nature, giving rise to a state of "arousal" (*xing* 興), a state associated with the use of imagery in the odes of the *Shi*. This state is described as the *Dao* of "propriety, demeanour" (*yi*). This is likely a reflection of the performance of "awesome decorum" (*weiyi* 威儀) in the Western Zhou ritual of "grasping (the ancestral) *De*" (*bing de* 秉德) through one's "opened" heart.

The Western Zhou ritual affirmed the legacy of an elite lineage and celebrated the ascension of an heir into an ancestral position. Worship of the Zhou founder sages (Wen and Wu) reflected the larger political framework in which this ritual, most likely performed to music associated with the sages, represented the transmission of authority and the king's Mandate (*ming* 命), itself a smaller version of Heaven's Mandate.[19] The reflection of this ritual in the *Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出 is typical

[17] In Guodian Fragment 7, *yi* is linked with the Way of Heaven (Cook 2012: 2:943).

[18] Csikszentmihalyi (2011).

[19] Cook (2017).

of the Warring States. The ultimate goal of serving in government remains the same, but kings—theoretical individuals, not specified lineage heirs— performed ritual music and derived their *De* directly (as a *ming*) from Heaven without the intervention of the Zhou king or their ancestors. The court performance space during the Western Zhou was clearly defined with a required bureaucratic framework; not so in the Warring States. Few details of the dance are recorded in the bronze inscriptions, but the *Xing zi ming chu* describes orderly lines in front and back that depict certain patterns in which the *junzi* "beautifies" (*mei* 美) his inner nature and "countenance" (*rong* 容). Curiously, both rituals ended with bowing in gratitude (*bai* 拜) and awards. The Western Zhou period heir received bronze, fine wines, special clothing and tools of their trades (weapons, musical instruments, etc) and the *junzi* was awarded silk and coins. The Warring States version of this old performance was called the *Dao* of "propriety, decorum" (*yi*).

Overall, the internal emotion-processing human-based *Dao* is the *Dao* of Man (*ren dao*) (strip 41). The refinement of base human emotions into Ru-valued behaviours (*ren*, etc.) define someone who understands the *Dao* (strips 53–55), no matter their social position. They garner the trust and attention of the populace, and are able to reflect their knowledge upward, downward, or inward in the service of the ruler, governing the people, or cultivating the self. The ability to communicate the *Dao* within the socio-political realm was key to performing the Ru *Dao*.

11.4 Summary and Discussion

Text 11 focuses on defining the *Dao* of Man as the training of an unstable *zhi* to be able to govern one's household and state, a typical Ru goal. This text emphasizes a ritual of performance that functions as an inner cultivation or refinement of base emotions into higher quality Ru values. *De* is a force that flows as part of the process, but the emphasis of this manuscript is on process, the *Dao* as method. Notably, this *Dao* is a reflection of a very ancient ritual of "grasping (ancestral) *De*" recorded in Western Zhou bronze inscriptions. The training through the performance of ritual music associated with certain sages is also reflected in Warring States coming-of-age rituals, such as the capping ritual.[20] In each case, the practitioner refines himself to qualify to rule a household or a state.

12 Text 12: *Liu de*

The term *De* is use more often than *Dao*.

[20] Cook (2017).

12.1 De

The Six *De* (strips 10, 1) are Ru virtues that are linked to six standard Ru-approved human relationships, each with specific duties. Scott Cook usefully graphed these out and discussed them in his introduction to this text (Cook 2012: 2:751–57). On strips 15–13, these six *De* are further defined. The *De* of a ruler (*jun* 君) is "propriety, decorum" (*yi*). That of his servant, the minister (*chen* 臣), is "loyalty" (*zhong* 忠), of a householder is "knowledge" (*zhi* 知), of his wife "trustworthiness" (*xin* 信), of the father "sagacity" (*sheng* 聖), of the son "humanness" (*ren* 仁). Nevertheless, despite these six *De*, the most sacred relationships are those of blood kinship in the patriarchal lineage (strip 30). These are the "internal" positions of father, son, and householder. Of lesser importance are the "external" positions of ruler, minister, and wife.

12.2 Summary and Discussion

De is not presented as a natural force or even a quality to be cultivated internally over time. It is an established mode of behaviour linked to the Ru enforcement of social hierarchy.

12.3 Dao

Dao on strip 5 is the *Dao* of Man; the *Dao* of Man is the social law *junzi* must obey. This text emphasizes behaviour as defined by the six relationships. On strips 6–7, the *junzi* is admonished to follow the *Dao* of Man and no other. The writer traced the organization of society into the six relationships, called the "six positions" (*liu wei* 六位), back to prehistoric sage king Yao. This language borrows from the technical terminology used by stalk diviners. The term "six positions" could refer to the six lines made up by two trigrams in vertical order or to a single hexagram as in the *Zhouyi* 周易 (the *Zhou Changes*). Each position would have a value of *Yang* or *Yin*. The six positions in Text 12 from top to bottom would be: ruler > minister; householder > wife; father > son. The six positions are divided, like hexagrams are, into trigrams, into two groups of three by the boundary of being "inside" or "outside" the core patriarchal group. "Inside" consisted of the householder, the father, and the son. External to this core were the positions of wife, minister and ruler. Two other levels of *Dao* are distinguished among the six positions (strip 47), others and self; it could be followed to govern the people and/or be a guide for self-cultivation. Therefore *Dao* had public and private spheres of practice. On strip 26, *Dao* is described as being without end (*dao wang zhi* 道亡止), hinting at a larger cosmic

Dao.[21] Maintaining the six positions requires knowledge of the six classics. These include the same four mentioned in Text 11 above plus two more—the *Changes* (Zhouyi) and *Spring and Autumn Annals* (Chunqiu 春秋). The use of these classics to practice the two modes of *Dao* (in government and in self-cultivation) leads to awareness of an eternal *Dao*, suggesting recognition of a *Dao* larger than the *Dao* of Man. This *Dao* begins with the self as son, at the bottom position of the stack, and moves up through the core "inner" positions from self to father and householder. Using the Daoist metaphor of the "root" (*ben* 本) (strip 40), the son is positioned as the foundation of all relationships that move upward into the highest realm of ruler and minister. The dominant positions (ruler, householder, father) each require a type of loyalty and obedience from the positions subordinate to them (minister, wife, son). The earliest and most intense of these would be the father–son relationship, the basis of the core. *Dao* (strip 43) is a single undivided entity if the six positions and their interrelationships are viewed holistically. When properly maintained, this entity allows society to run smoothly.

12.4 Summary and Discussion

While it is clearly the *Dao* of Man and *Dao* as social glue that is being emphasized, there are hints of awareness of a more cosmic *Dao*. The mere fact that the writer employed stalk divination terminology and *Zhouyi* 周易 spatial conceptualization of the binary forces of *Yin* and *Yang* is suggestive. On strip 34, the writer notes that life begins with the separation into male and female of what readers must assume was the undifferentiated cosmic *Dao*. The core relationship of the *Dao* of Man was father to son wherein the *De* of "humanity" (*ren* 仁) evolved from the son's need to serve the father. The relationship from self as householder or husband to a wife was outside the core. The relationship between males and females belong to the separation of the cosmos into *Yin* and *Yang* forces. In one recently discovered trigram divination text, the *Shifa* 筮法, the gendered concepts of male and female and husband and wife were technical terms to describe the relationships of trigrams set up in "four positions" (*siwei* 四位), in two stacks of two trigrams each—similar in spatial conception to two hexagrams side-by-side but interpreted in an entirely unique fashion.[22] The *Shifa* describes its methodology as the *Dao* of Heaven. The *Liu De* text does not use this term but it seems to subtly acknowledge its existence.

[21] Cf. Cook (2012: 2:785n83).

[22] This is fully explored in Cook and Zhao 2017.

13 Text 13: *Yucong* I, II, III, IV

Overall, *Dao* appears more often than *De*. *Dao* is more prominent in *Yucong* I and *De* in *Yucong* III.

13.1 Yucong *I*

13.1.1 *De*

In the section Scott Cook titles "Ritual, Music, and the Six Arts," *De* (strip 24) is the result of a generative process (*sheng* 生), which in turn generates ritual (*li*) and then generates music (*yue*). Music is the crucible for knowledge.

13.2 Summary and Discussion

This is a Ru adaption of language (X generates Y) used in Daoist texts to describe the evolution of the cosmos. But here the purpose is self-cultivation through musical performance.

13.2.1 *Dao*

In strip 19, *Dao* is the *Dao* of Man. It is the product of inner and outer relationships and of self-cultivation. The writer uses generative language again explaining that Heaven generated all things. But, the writer notes, man is the most important. On strip 22, *Dao* is the source of "propriety, decorum" (*yi*) as determined by the person's inner and outer relationships. A core relationship, described as the *Dao* of "kinship" (*qin dao* 親道) (strip 80), is between an older and younger brother. Strip 68 seems to come from an entirely different text. It talks about how "examining" (*cha* 察) the *Dao* of Heaven can transform a person's vital energy (*qi* 氣). This could easily refer to using a particular divination text to determine the source of an illness or other misfortune or to using a particular self-cultivation method. On strip 30, again the *Dao* of Heaven seems to have primacy. The actions of Heaven must be understood first in order to understand the human condition, another possible reference to the divinatory arts. This *Dao* determines one's life allotment (*ming* 命). On strip 36, we learn that it is the divination text, the *Zhouyi*, which unites the *Dao* of Heaven with the *Dao* of Man. *Dao* on strip 75 is used in its oldest most literal meaning, a road.

13.3 Summary and Discussion

Yucong I is clearly a random collection of strips from different texts, some advocating the old-fashioned training by musical performance, some advocating human relationships, and some a more cosmic view of the *Dao*.

13.4 Yucong *II*

13.4.1 *De*

Strip 48 mentions the lack of "wavering" (*yi* 移) in a person with *De*.

13.4.2 *Dao*

None of the examples are clear.

13.5 Summary and Discussion

The emphasis of the text is to outline the cycle of emotional states using the generative mode of X generates (*sheng*) Y.

13.6 Yucong *III*

Both *Dao* and *De* appear in strip 50, but the meaning is slightly obscure. A person's *zhi* comes from *Dao* and he nurtures it somehow with his *De*, which like "humanness" comes from "playing" or "roaming around" (*you* 遊) with the Arts.

13.6.1 *De*

On strip 54, *De* is associated with music. On strip 26, *De* is pivotal to governing. On strip 24, the progress of *De* is displayed in "propriety, decorum" (*yi*).

13.6.2 *Dao*

The *Dao* of Ruler and Minister is described as "friendship" (*you* 友) (strip 6).

Strip 56 mentions a *Dao* of “serving food” (*shi* 食).

13.7 Summary and Discussion

Generally, the sayings collected in this group seem Ruist in nature.

13.8 Yucong *IV*

Only the word *Dao* is mentioned. It is the *Dao* of “persuasion” (*shui* 説). This collection seems to be a lesson on the tactics of argumentation.

14 Conclusion

During the Warring States period, the terms *Dao* and *De* were multivalent. *Dao* could refer to a method used to nurture innate *De*. Or *De* could simply be a life force within a cosmic *Dao*. The Guodian texts reflect these layered connotations but vary in their level of emphasis of one over the other. The struggle to define these terms between advocates of ideologies we associate with Daoism and Confucianism is evident, but so too is the cross-fertilization and the general acceptance of a cosmic *Dao* as a unified natural system of expanding and contracting energy, a concept unknown in earlier texts. For the *Ru*, human agency required adherence to a social pattern that once sustained the transmission of *De* through ancestor worship from Heaven to a King to his heirs and by extension to other members of the ruling elite.[23] But it is evident that the *Ru* represented in the Guodian corpus were concerned with redefining that hierarchy to include more detailed relationships within the natal family, reflecting Warring States social reality. Kingship was an ideal but not necessary for nurturing the vital inner force of individual *De*. Kinship, on the other hand, provided essential social support and identity.

The Guodian texts reveal a time and literary culture just before the rise in popularity of such books on cosmic energies as the *Xing De* 刑德 in which *De* represents the rise of Yang *qi* and *xing* the “cutting down” of it down (Major 1987). With the rise of the early imperial era, *Dao* became linked as to calendrical astrology, which was becoming increasingly complex. Hemerological divination methods became popular resources for calculating the effect of the changing positive and negative energies on every aspect of human behaviour (Harper and Kalinowski 2017). During the early imperial age, *Dao* was paramount.

[23] For a study of “human agency” in early China, see Brindley (2009).

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Chapter 7
Reading *Heng cheng* 恆稱 in the Guodian Bamboo Text *Lu Mu Gong wen Zisi* 魯穆公問子思 (*Duke Mu of Lu Asked Zisi*)



Liao Mingchun

In the winter of 1993, a cache of bamboo texts was excavated from the No. 1 Guodian Tomb in Jingmen City, Hubei province. In it was an important Confucian manuscript that had never been seen before about Zisi, Confucius' grandson. The editors of the manuscript had given it the title *Duke Mu of Lu Asked Zisi* (*Lu Mu Gong wen Zisi* 魯穆公問子思) (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 141). The manuscript comprised eight slips, some of which had been damaged. However, editors and researchers have restored the manuscript and the re-constructed text runs as follows[1]:

> 魯穆公問於子思曰: "何如而可謂忠臣?" 子思曰: "恆稱其君之惡者,可謂忠臣矣。" 公不悅, 揖而退之。城孫弋見。公曰: "嚮者吾問忠臣於子思。子思曰: 亙稱其君之惡者, 可謂忠臣矣。寡人惑焉, 而未之得也。" 城孫弋曰: "噫,善哉言乎! 夫為其君之故殺其身者, 嘗有之矣。亙稱其君之惡者, 未之有也。夫為其[君]之故殺其身者, 效祿爵者也。亙 [稱其君] 之惡 [者, 遠] 祿爵者也。[為]義而遠祿爵, 非子思, 吾惡聞之矣。"

> Lord Mu of Lu asked Zisi, "What kind of person may be called a 'loyal minister?'" Zisi replied, "One who consistently mentions his ruler's flaws may be called a 'loyal minister.'" Lord Mu was displeased, and dismissed him with a hand-clasped bow. Chengsun Yi was given an audience, and Lord Mu said to him: "Just now I asked Zisi about the [nature of a] 'loyal minister,' and Zisi replied: 'One who consistently mentions his ruler's flaws maybe called a "loyal minister."' I am perplexed by this and fail to understand it." Chengsun Yi replied: "Ah, how great those words are! For there have been those who have sacrificed themselves for the sake of their ruler, but there has never before been one who consistently mentioned his ruler's flaws. Those who would sacrifice themselves for the sake of their ruler are those who devote themselves [on behalf of] salary and rank, whereas 【those who】 consistently 【mention their ruler's】 flaws 【are】 those who 【distance themselves from】 salary and rank. 【To act out of humanity (?) and】 propriety and hold salary

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> and rank at a distance—who but Zisi have I ever heard of [acting thus]?" (Cook 2012: 425–27)[2]

In the above text, the graph 恆 appears once and 亙 appears three times. The editor of the manuscript read them all as "consistent" (*heng* 恆). According to the *Shuowen jiezi* 說文解字, 恆 means "forever." It is made up of the heart-mind radical (*xin* 心), with the component "boat" (*zhou* 舟) between the graph for "two" (*er* 二), signifying the heart-mind steering a boat. The graph 𠀨, as its ancient form, embeds the moon radical (*yue* 月); as it is said in Mao Ode 166 "Tian bao" of the *Shijing* 詩經: "as consistent as the moon" (*ru yue zhi heng* 如月之恆). In his study of ancient graphs in the *Shuowen jiezi*, Shang Chengzuo 商承祚 (1902–1991) had this to say about this word: "[In oracle bone script and bronze inscriptions] the word embeds 月 as the component, a notion supported by a verse in the *Shijing*. Originally it should have been 亙. The component "outside" (*wai* 外) is a transcription error" (Shang 1983: 114). The popular form of 恆 is 恒.[3] *Heng cheng* 恆稱 therefore means "consistently mentioning" (*chang cheng* 常稱). Earlier scholarship on this text has generally taken this view, reading 恆 and 亙 as interchangeable.

Chen Wei holds a different view on this generally accepted reading:

> Phrases such as *ji cheng* 亟 (極) 稱 and *ji yan* 亟 (極) 言 can be found in pre-Qin texts: "The ancestral temple has fallen into disrepair … It should be seriously pointed out, and be noted as disrespectful" (大室屋壞 … 極稱之, 志不敏也) ("The 13th Year of Wen Gong" in the *Guliang zhuan* 穀梁傳·文公十三年). Another example can be found in *Mencius* IV.B.18: "More than once Confucius expressed his admiration for water by saying 'Water! Oh, water!'[4] (仲尼亟稱於水曰: "水哉, 水哉!"). Sun Shi 孫奭 glosses 亟稱 as "repeatedly saying" (*shu shu cheng dao* 數數稱道). Also found in "The 21st Year of Duke Zhao" in the *Zuozhuan* 左傳·昭公二十一年 is this: "Hua Feisui of Song had three sons: Hua Chu, Hua Duoliao and Hua Deng. Hua Chu became Assistant War Minister and Hua Duoliao became the ruler's charioteer. As they were at odds with each other, Hua Duoliao slandered Hua Chu before the ruler of Song, saying 'Hua Chu intends to receive the fugitives.' This was repeated from time to time"[5] (宋華費遂生華貙、華多僚、華登。貙為少司馬, 多僚為御士, 與貙相惡, 乃譖諸公曰: '貙將納亡人。' 亟言之). In his commentary of this passage Kong Yingda 孔穎達 quotes Fu Qian 服虔 to read 亟 as "urgent" (*ji* 疾), thus "urgently mentioning [a topic]" (*ji yan zhi* 疾言之) in order to convince his audience. Alternatively, Kong explains that 亟言 can also be read as "repeatedly saying". Therefore, there are two possible readings of 亟言: "frequently mentioning" or "urgently mentioning". It seems that the latter reading is more appropriate. The initial reading of the graph 恆 as *chang* 常 in the bamboo text is considered less fitting in its context. Furthermore, examples of 恆稱 are rarely found in ancient texts. (Chen 1998: 68)

That is to say, 亟 has been misread as 恆 or 亙. We can find examples of 亟 (極) 稱 and 亟 (極) 言 from pre-Qin texts but not 恆稱. Chen Wei's opinion has gained currency in academia. As Qiu Xigui has rightly commented: "[Chen's] gloss is

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[2] Translations of Chinese texts cited are referenced; otherwise they have been rendered by the translator.

[3] *Hanyu da zidian* 漢語大字典, 2nd ed., 2010, s.v. 恆.

[4] 孟子·離婁下; for translation see Lau (2003: 177).

[5] For translation see Hu and Chen (1996: 1267).

correct. What we can see from many Chu bamboo texts are examples of 亙 as a loan word of 亟. Other scholars have already pointed out that the Chu graphs 亟 and 亙 not only look alike in form, but are also similar in pronunciation: phonetically they are of the same *jian* 見 initial, and their finals of *zhi* 職 and *zheng* 蒸 are often interchangeable. Therefore, in Chu script 亟 was written as 亙" (Qiu 2012: 326–29). This analysis is factual and correct.

Chen Wei prefers to gloss 極 (亟) 稱 as "urgently pointing out". On the other hand, Li Rui takes it to mean "repeatedly pointing out" (quoted in Deng 2013: 12). Li affirms that the bamboo graph 亟 means "repeatedly", as in the "Fitting Rewards" (Dang shang 當賞) chapter of the *Lüshi Chunqiu* 呂氏春秋: "Those who opposed my wishes and who repeatedly showed me the errors of my ways, I rewarded last" 拂吾所欲, 數舉吾過者, 吾以為末賞 (Knoblock and Riegel 2000: 615). Here *shu ju wu guo* 數舉吾過 is equivalent to the bamboo text's "repeatedly mentioning the king's faults" (*ji cheng qi jun zhi e* 亟稱其君之惡). As it were, 極 (亟) 稱 would have little difference in meaning from 恆 稱, as 恆 means *chang* 常, *jing chang* 經常, *chang chang* 常常 and *lü lü* 屢屢, *lü ci* 屢次 (which are all synonymous, meaning "frequently" or "often").

Huang Ren'er asserts that 亟稱 means "to be outspoken and to remonstrate forthrightly" (*zhi yan ji jian* 直言極諫). A good king makes few mistakes; a bad king tends to make a lot more. In either case, it is the remonstrators' duty to be outspoken and remonstrate with the king seriously. A good king would correct his mistakes, but a bad king would feel offended. Thus, the text continues that those who are outspoken about the king's mistakes would distance themselves from salary and rank (*yuan lu jue zhe ye* 遠祿爵者也) (Huang 1999: 298). I endorse Huang's analysis, which appears to be more convincing than those of Chen and Li. However, Huang has not fully argued the point; I will expand on his argument here.

The term 極 (亟) 稱 stands for 極言 (*ji yan*). As recorded in *Analects* XVII.24:

> 子貢曰: "君子亦有惡乎?" 子曰: "有惡: 惡稱人之惡者, 惡居下流而訕上者, 惡勇而無禮者, 惡果敢而窒者。"
>
> Tzu-kung [Zigong] said, "Does even the gentleman have dislikes?" The Master said, "Yes. The gentleman has his dislikes. He dislikes those who proclaim the evil in others. He dislikes those who, being in inferior positions, slander their superiors. He dislikes those who, while possessing courage, lack the spirit of the rites. He dislikes those whose resoluteness is not tempered by understanding." (Lau 1979:148)

Here *Cheng ren zhi e* 稱人之惡 is *yan ren zhi e* 言人之惡, both meaning "to speak of (or proclaim) other people's faults (evil)". Quoting Bo Xian 包咸, He Yan 何晏 glosses this phrase as "likes to point out other people's flaws" (*hao cheng shuo ren zhi e* 好稱說人之惡) (quoted in Zhu 2000: 278). Thus *cheng shuo* 稱說 is equivalent to "to speak of" (*yan shuo* 言說). As in the "She yi" 射義 chapter of the *Liji* 禮記: "[those of] old age expound the way of virtue without confusion or error" (*mao qi cheng dao bu luan* 旄期稱道不亂). Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 glosses *cheng* 稱 as "to speak" (*yan* 言) (quoted in Gong 2000: 1920). We can thus take 極 (亟) 稱 as *ji yan* 極言, which means "to admonish frankly, in unambiguous words" (*zhi yan gui quan*

直言規勸). This meaning is clearly seen in “Forthright Remonstrance” (*Zhi jian* 直諫) of the *Lüshi Chunqiu*:

> 言極則怒, 怒則說者危, 非賢者孰肯犯危? 而非賢者也將以要利矣。要利之人, 犯危何益? 故不肖主無賢者。無賢則不聞極言, 不聞極言則奸人比周、百邪悉起, 若此則無以存矣。凡國之存也主之安也, 必有以也。不知所以, 雖存必亡, 雖安必危, 所以不可不論也。(Chen 2002: 1554–55)

> When words are extremely frank, they incite anger in the listener. When the listener is angered, the speaker is threatened. If not the worthy, who would be willing to face the threat? And if it is not the worthy, then it is going to be someone after profit. But if a man is after profit, how will putting himself in danger increase his profit? Therefore, incompetent leaders lack worthies. Lacking worthies, they never hear frank advice, and every kind of evil practice arises, all at the same time. In such circumstances, the ruler has no way to preserve himself. As a general rule, where a state survives and its ruler is safe, there is certain to be a reason. If a ruler does not know what this is, then although he might survive for a while, he will surely perish; and although he might be safe for now, he will surely be threatened. The means of ensuring survival and safety cannot be assessed. (Knoblock and Riegel 2000: 590)

In the above text *yan ji ze nu* 言極則怒 means “becoming angry when admonished frankly”; *bu wen ji yan* 不聞極言 means “not hearing frank advice”. The passage that follows in the same chapter says:

> 齊桓公、管仲、鮑叔、甯戚相與飲酒酣, 桓公謂鮑叔曰: “何不起為壽?” 鮑叔奉杯而進曰: “使公毋忘出奔在於莒也, 使管仲毋忘束縛而在於魯也, 使甯戚毋忘其飯牛而居於車下。” 桓公避席再拜曰: “寡人與大夫能皆毋忘夫子之言, 則齊國之社稷幸於不殆矣。” 當此時也, 桓公可與言極言矣。可與言極言, 故可與為霸。(Chen 2002: 1554–55)

> Duke Huan of Qi, GUAN Zhong, BAO Shu, and NING Qi were together for a drink party. When they had become intoxicated, Duke Huan said to BAO Shu, “Why do you not rise and drink to my long life?” BAO Shu raised his cup and approached. “May your grace never forget that he was forced to flee his home and live in Ju. May GUAN Zhong never forget that he was tied and bound when he was in Lu. May NING Qi never forget that he once fed oxen and lived beneath a cart.” Duke Huan left his mat and, bowing twice, said, “I, the Orphaned Man, and these two grand gentlemen will never forget your words, master. And with luck, the altars of soil and grain of Qi will not be imperiled.” At that time it was still possible to speak frankly to Duke Huan, and because he could be talked to frankly, it was possible for him to become lord-protector. (Knoblock and Riegel 2000: 590–91)

The sentence *Huan Gong ke yu yan ji yan yi* 桓公可與言極言矣 is translated as “Lord Huan of Qi can be talked to frankly” in which *ji yan* subsumes words of admonishment.

Found in the same chapter is the following:

> 王乃變更, 召葆申, 殺茹黃之狗, 析宛路之矰, 放丹[陽]之姬。後荊國兼國三十九。令荊國廣大至於此者, 葆申之力也, 極言之功也。(Chen 2002: 1554–55)

> The king then changed his ways, summoned Grand Protector Shen, killed the Ruhuang dog, broke the arrow made of Yuan lu bamboo, and sent away the beauty from Dan Yang. He devoted himself to governing the state of Chu to grow so large was the efficacy of Grand Protector Shen’s frank speech. (Knoblock and Riegel 2000: 591–92)

Ji yan zhi gong 極言之功—the efficacy of frank speech—includes unreserved admonition, as can be seen in the context of the above passage. A similar passage can be found in the "Zheng jian" 正諫 chapter of the *Shuo yuan* 說苑. Noteworthy is the chapter title "Forthright Remonstrance" in the *Lüshi Chunqiu*, in which the term 極言 is prevalent; 極言 is unequivocally 直諫—to admonish frankly.

A passage in the "Foreknowledge" (*Xian shi* 先識) chapter of the *Lüshi Chunqiu* reads:

> 臣聞之: 國之興也, 天遺之賢人與極言之士; 國之亡也, 天遺之亂人與善諛之士。(Chen 2002: 956)

> Your subject has heard that when a state is going to rise, Heaven sends it worthy men and scholar-knights who will impart to it all their wise advice. When a state is going to fall, Heaven sends it rebellious men and scholar-knights who are good at flattery. (Knoblock and Riegel 2000: 176)

Here "a state is going to rise" (*guo zhi xing ye* 國之興也) is the opposite of "a state is going to fall" (*guo zhi wang ye* 國之亡也); "worthy men and scholar-knights" (*xian ren* 賢人) is the opposite of "rebellious men and scholar-knights" (*luan ren* 亂人); "men who will impart to it all their wise advice" (*ji yan zhi shi* 極言之士) is the opposite of "rebellious men and scholar-knights" (*shan yu zhi shi* 善諛之士), who are sycophants. Countering them are the men who will impart to it all their wise advice, those who have the courage to be outspoken in admonishing the ruler.

The term 極言 appears four times in the *Lun heng* 論衡 of Wang Chong 王充 of the Later Han. We find in the "Criticism of Confucius" (*Wen kong* 問孔) chapter the following:

> … 違周公之志。攻懿子之短, 失道理之宜, 弟子不難, 何哉? 如以懿子權尊, 不敢極言, 則其對武伯, 亦宜但言 "毋憂" 而已 … 使孔子對懿子極言 "毋違禮", 何害之有?… 不懼季氏增邑不隱諱之害, 獨畏答懿子極言之罪, 何哉? (Huang 1990: 2:399–400)

> … Thus he did not fall in with Chou Kung's views. Reproving the shortcomings of Meng I Tse, he lost the right principle. How was that none of his disciples took exception? If he did not dare to speak too openly owing to the high position held by Meng I Tse, he likewise ought to have said to Meng Wu Po nothing more than 'not to cause sorrow (is filial piety)' … Had Confucius freely told Meng I Tse not to disregard propriety, what harm would there have been? … He was not afraid of the evil consequences, which this lack of reserve in regard to the usurpation of territorial rights from a straightforward answer given to Meng I Tse? (Forke 1962: 1:395)

And in the "The display of Energy" (*Xiao li* 效力) chapter of the *Lun heng*:

> 谷子云、唐子高章奏百上, 筆有餘力, 極言不諱, 文不折乏, 非夫才知之人不能為也。(Huang 1990: 2:582)

> The memorials of Ku Tse Yun and Tang Tse Kao number more than a hundred, all written in a most vigorous style. They speak out what they think, conceal nothing, and are never at a loss how to express their ideas. Only men of genius can do that. (Forke 1962: 2:88)

Though commentators have not specifically glossed the term 極言, it clearly means "to speak openly, in frank, forthright, vigorous words" (*zhiyan gui quan* 直言規勸).

The *Yi Zhou shu* 逸周書—in the ilk of the *Shang shu* 尚書—expounds in the "Bao dian" 寶典 chapter the notion of ten failures (*shi san* 十散), the sixth of which

is *ji yan bu du, qi mou nai fei* 極言不度, 其謀乃費. Lu Wenchao 盧文弨 comments "over-statements are desultory and vacuous words" (*ji yan bu du, yan han man ye* 極言不度, 言汗漫也). Pan Zhen 潘振 states "unreserved talks would render the advice ineffective." Chen Fengheng 陳逢衡 affirms "Vehement talk is undisciplined. Such words do not follow the ways of the sage kings and do not therefore achieve any purpose" (quoted in Huang et al. 2007: 290). Huang Huaixin 黄懷信 glosses 極言 as "logorrheic speech … words without rhyme or reason are bound to fail" (Huang 2006: 142). Similarly, Zhang Wenyu explains that overstatements or unchecked words mean one lacks rationality (Zhang 2000: 155–56). I am afraid these commentaries are problematic. Here 極言 means "straight talk or non-evasive words" (*zhi yan* 直言) and "without hesitation" (*bu du* 不度). That is why such words will not achieve any purpose.

How then can we gloss 極言 as 直言? In his commentary to the "Foreknowledge" chapter of the *Lüshi Chunqiu,* Gao You 高誘 explains clearly that 極 means "without reservation" (*jin* 盡) (Chen 2002: 963). It follows that 極言 means "to speak without reservation, to admonish without reserve, without hesitation, without fear, calling a spade a spade" (*jin yan* 盡言). In this context 極言 is 直言; 極稱 is 直稱.

We find the term 直稱 in other texts, for instance in "Questions Part 2" of the Inner Chapters 内篇問下 of the *Spring and Autumn Annals of Master Yan* (Yanzi Chunqiu 晏子春秋):

> 晏子使于晉, 晉平公問曰: "吾子之君, 德行高下如何?" 晏子對以"小善"。公曰: "否, 吾非問小善, 問子之君德行高下也。" 晏子蹴然曰: "諸侯之交, 紹而相見, 辭之有所隱也。君之命質, 臣無所隱, 嬰之君無稱焉。" 平公蹴然而辭送, 再拜而反, 曰: "殆哉吾過! 誰曰齊君不肖! 直稱之士, 正在本朝也。" (Wu 1962: 267)
>
> Master Yan went on a diplomatic mission to Jin. Lord Ping of Jin asked him: "Is your ruler virtuous or not?" Master Yan replied: "He has performed some good deeds." His lordship said: "No. I did not ask you if he had performed some good deeds. I asked whether your ruler is virtuous or not." Master Yan looked uncomfortable and said: "In dealing with other feudal lords, audience is given only after a ceremony of introduction has been performed, and at that time there should be circumspection in what you speak of. You have commanded me to speak the truth and I have no reason to refuse [to answer]. My ruler has no [virtue] to speak of." Lord Ping looked uncomfortable and said goodbye, after which he was escorted on his way. [Before he left, Lord Ping] bowed twice and said: "Lacking [ministers capable of offering remonstrance], I have behaved rudely to you. Who can say that the ruler of Qi is a bad one? He has a knight who can *remonstrate forthrightly with him* right there in his court!" (Milburn 2016: 288–89; modification in italics)

Here *zhi cheng zi shi* 直稱之士 is *zhi yan zhi shi* 直言之士 and is synonymous with *ji yan zhi shi* 極言之士 in the "Foreknowledge" chapter of the *Lüshi Chunqiu.* The phrase 極稱其君之惡 appears four times in *Duke Mu of Lu Asked Zisi* where 極稱 is no different in meaning from 極言 in the *Lüshi Chunqiu* and 直稱 in the *Spring and Autumn Annals of Master Yan*. Clearly all of these terms mean forthright remonstrance.

Let us re-visit the passage in "The 13th year of Wen Gong" in *Guliang zhuan* that Chen Wei mentioned earlier: 大室屋壞 … 極稱之, 志不敏也. How should we interpret the term 極稱? According to the *Hanyu da cidian* the term means "strongly pointing out" (*ji li cheng shu* 極力稱述), the same as Cheng Zai's gloss (Cheng

2004: 358). In glossing this term, Feng Ning 范寧 says "*ji cheng* is saying the building is beyond repair, the matter is ambiguously recorded" (極稱, 言屋壞不復, 依違其文) (quoted in Xia 2000: 5). The Qing scholar Zhong Wenzheng's 鐘文烝 annotation is similar (Zhong et al. 2009: 402). These readings are problematic, as the *Guliang zhuan* continues with "to record it as disrespectful [to the ancestors]" (*zhi bu min ye* 志不敏 [敬]也). To record this as disrespectful is contradictory to ambiguous recording. In contrast, Bai Bensong reads Feng Ning's annotation as "*ji cheng* is saying the building has fallen into disrepair; the matter is *unambiguously* recorded" (極稱, 言屋壞, 不復依違其文) (Bai 1998: 286–87). In other words, the *Chunqiu* has recorded without reservation and ambiguity the disrespectful act of Wen Gong of letting the ancestral temple fall into disrepair. A parallel passage can be found in "The 13th year of Wen Gong" in the *Zuo zhuan*: "In the seventh month, in autumn, the royal ancestral temple collapsed. The Annals record this and ascribe it to carelessness on the part of Wen Gong" (秋, 七月, 大室之屋壞, 書不共也) (Hu and Chen 1996: 394–95, translation modified). The *Gongyang zhuan* 公羊傳 echoes this: "The royal ancestral temple has collapsed, how should it be recorded? It should be derided. What should be derided? The act of not repairing [the temple] in time" (世室屋壞, 何以書? 譏。何譏爾? 久不脩也) (Pu 2000: 353). The derision and the unambiguous recording meant a serious, forthright criticism of Wen Gong's disrespectful negligence, rather than an urgent mention of the event. Thus the term 極稱 means frank and forthright admonition; it should likewise be so read in *Duke Mu of Lu Asked Zisi*.

In reading 亙 as 亟 in *Duke Mu of Lu Asked Zisi* now I recall an anecdote from over two decades ago. In the International Conference on Mawangdui Han Texts hosted by Hunan Museum in August 1992, I submitted a paper entitled "A Supplementary Exegesis on the *Xici* Silk Text" (帛書繫辭釋文校補) in which I argued that the graph 恆 is a transcription error for 極. Thus *da ji* 大亟 has been mistaken as *da heng* 大恆. Jao Tsung-I 饒宗頤 disagreed and commented:

> 頃見馬王堆會議論文, 廖名春提出《〈帛書繫辭釋文〉校補》, 他強調大恒的"恒"字, 乃是"極"字的誤寫, 他認為《莊子》已經出現"太極"一詞,《繫辭上傳》必依據之, 故大恒乃是大亟形近之訛。他說帛書寫得很隨便, 不免有誤筆。案亟字從 在=中, 與恒之作 (子彈庫帛書此字三見)、亙(金文)全不一樣。《繫辭上傳》大恒的恒字, 和《陰陽五行》的《天一圖》均作亟, 是漢初的字體, 與篆文的恒非常接近, 決非隨意寫錯。(Jao 1993: 18)
>
> [I have] just read Liao Mingchun's paper "A Supplementary Exegesis on the *Xici* Silk Text" in which he emphasized that the word 恒 as in 大恒 is a transcription error for 極. He argues that as the term 太極 has already appeared in the *Zhuangzi*, the *Xici shanzhuan* 繫辭上傳 should have followed, thus 大亟 has been misread as 大恒 as the graphs look very similar. He also said that copying errors are often found in silk texts as the scribes were remiss in their copying. The graph 亟 is made up of between =, and is different to (seen three times in the silk texts of Zidan ku), and 亙 (found in bronze inscriptions). The graph *heng* 恒 as in *da heng* in the *Xici shanzhuan,* and in the *Tian yi* 天一 diagram of the *Yinyang wuxing* is written as 亟, which was the graphic form during early Han. Such is not a negligent copying error.

My paper was recommended by Professor CHEUNG Kwong Yue 張光裕 for publication in the Chinese University of Hong Kong's *Journal of Chinese Studies* (中國文化研究所學報) in 1993, with the amended title "A Revised Exegesis on the *Xici* Silk Text" (帛書繫辭釋文補正). However, I have deleted the argument in my article concerning 恒 being a copying error for 極. In retrospect, the view I expressed during the conference was not necessarily wrong, as supported by my findings here in reading *Duke Mu of Lu Asked Zisi*.

Rectifying the reading of *heng cheng* as *ji cheng* has significant implications for the study of the political doctrines of the Zisi-Mencius school (*Si meng xue pai* 思孟學派). If we read 恆稱 as 常稱, then 恆稱其君之惡 means "frequently or often mentioning the ruler's flaws." If we read 極稱其君之惡, it means "to be outspoken and to remonstrate with a ruler for his faults without reservation" (*zhi yan ji jian*直言極諫). In a sense, *heng cheng* is quantitative and *ji cheng* is qualitative: it is more probable for the ruler to accept frequent cautions against minor flaws than direct, candid admonitions, even though fewer, against serious mistakes.

To caution a ruler is to remonstrate with him. According to the "Zheng jian" 正諫 chapter of the *Shuo yuan* 說苑, "There are five kinds of remonstrance: honest remonstrance, compliant remonstrance, loyal remonstrance, brave remonstrance, and gentle remonstrance" (諫有五: 一曰正諫, 二曰降諫, 三曰忠諫, 四曰戇諫, 五曰諷諫) (Xiang 1997: 206). Likewise, according to the "Jian zheng" 諫諍 chapter of the *Bai hu tong* 白虎通, "[There are] five kinds of remonstrance: gentle remonstrance, compliant remonstrance, obsequious remonstrance, honest remonstrance, and brave remonstrance" (五諫: 謂諷諫、順諫、窺諫、指諫、陷諫) (Chen 1994: 235). Also found in HE Xiu's 何休 commentary on "The 24th Year of Zhuang Gong" in the *Gongyang zhuan* is "There are five kinds of remonstrance: gentle remonstrance, compliant remonstrance, forthright remonstrance, outspoken remonstrance, and brave remonstrance" (諫有五: 一曰諷諫, 二曰順諫, 三曰直諫, 四曰爭諫, 五曰贛諫) (Pu 2000: 197). By extrapolation, *gan jian* 贛諫 is equivalent to *xian jian* 陷諫 (to remonstrate bravely); *jiang jian* 降諫 and *jue jian* 譎諫 mean to remonstrate tactfully, and *shun jian* 順諫 means to remonstrate gently. *Gui jian* 窺諫 refers to remonstrating with the ruler whilst observing his countenance to see if he is displeased or not. It is reasonable to posit, from the mildness or harshness of the approach to remonstration, that rulers would accept more readily mild modes of remonstrance than harsh ones. This is not only a matter of approach, it is also a matter of interests. Forthright remonstrance offends the ruler as it goes against his interests.

In his reply to Lord Mu of Lu, CHENGSUN Yi admitted that he had never seen any minister who would remonstrate forthrightly with his ruler and hold salary and rank at a distance for upholding propriety and justice. However, the bamboo text does not tell us more about what actually happened.

In annotating the *Gongyang zhuan*, HE Xiu uses historical figures and events to illustrate the different types of remonstrance: "forthright remonstrance" (*zhi jian* 直諫) was practised by Zi jia ju子家駒; *zheng jian* 爭諫 by Zi Fan 子反; *gan jian* 贛諫 by Boli zi 百里子 and Jianshu zi 蹇叔子 (Pu 2000: 197). In the case of Zisi,

his forthright remonstrance of Duke Mu of Lu was by far more controversial, and had certainly surpassed the aforementioned historical figures in terms of audacity in challenging the ruler, from which we can postulate the context.

In the "Tan gong" 檀弓 chapter of *Li ji*禮記:

> 穆公問於子思曰: "為舊君反服, 古與?" 子思曰: "古之君子, 進人以禮, 退人以禮, 故有舊君反服之禮也; 今之君子, 進人若將加諸膝, 退人若將隊諸淵, 毋為戎首, 不亦善乎! 又何反服之禮之有?"

> Duke Mu asked Zi-si: "whether it was the way of antiquity for a retired officer still to wear the mourning for his old ruler". "Princes of old," was the reply, "advanced men and dismissed them equally according to the rules of propriety; and hence there was that rule about still wearing mourning for the old ruler. But nowadays princes advance men as if they were going to take them on their knees and dismiss them as if they were going to push them into an abyss. Is it not good if (men so treated) do not head rebellion? How should there be the observance of that rule about still wearing mourning (for old rulers)?" (Legge 1885: 173)

Zisi's reply confronted Lord Mu of Lu, as he dared to say things that other ministers would not say. His discourse was unprecedented; his action, recalcitrant. No wonder Chengsun Yi said he had never seen anyone like Zisi.

In the "Fei shi er zi" chapter of the *Xunzi* 荀子 we read "Zisi provided the tune for them, and Mencius harmonized it" (子思唱之, 孟軻和之), hence the nomenclature Zisi-Mencius School (Knoblock 1988: 1:224). We also read in the "Biographies of Mencius and Xun Qing" (孟子荀卿列傳) in the *Shi ji* that Mencius studied under Zisi's disciple(s). Whether these statements are historically true or not, the fact is that Zisi's ideology had a strong influence on Mencius. This can be seen in the "Li lou B" chapter (離婁下) chapter of the *Mencius* 孟子 in which Mencius discussed with King Xuan of Qi the topic of wearing mourning for former rulers (為舊君反服):

> 孟子告齊宣王曰: "君之視臣如手足, 則臣視君如腹心; 君之視臣如犬馬, 則臣視君如國人; 君之視臣如土芥, 則臣視君如寇讎。" 王曰: "禮, 為舊君有服, 何如斯可為服矣?" 曰: "諫行言聽, 膏澤下於民; 有故而去, 則君使人導之出疆, 又先於其所往; 去三年不反, 然後收其田里。此之謂三有禮焉。如此, 則為之服矣。今也為臣。諫則不行, 言則不聽; 膏澤不下於民; 有故而去, 則君搏執之, 又極之於其所往; 去之日, 遂收其田里。此之謂寇讎。寇讎何服之有?"

> Mencius said to King Hsüan of Ch'i [King Xuan of Qi], "If a prince treats his subjects as his hands and feet, they will treat him as their belly and heart. If he treats them as his horses and hounds, they will treat him as a mere fellow-countryman. If he treats them as mud and weeds, they will treat him as an enemy."
>
> "According to the rites,' said the King, "there is provision for wearing mourning for a prince one has once served. Under what circumstances will this be observed?"
>
> "When a subject whose advice has been adopted to the benefit of the people has occasion to leave the country, the prince sends someone to conduct him beyond the border, and a messenger is sent ahead to prepare the way. Only if, after three years, he decides not to return does the prince take over his land. This is known as the three courtesies. If the prince behaves in this way then it is the subject's duty to wear mourning for him. Today when a subject whose advice has been rejected to the detriment of the people has occasion to leave, the prince has him arrested and put in chains, makes things difficult for him in the state he is going to and appropriates his land the day he leaves. This is what is meant by 'enemy'. What mourning is there for an enemy?" (Lau 2003: 175)

Obviously, Mencius inherited the idea of equality between a monarch and his minister from Zisi. Also found in the “Liang hui wang” (梁惠王下) chapter of the *Mencius* is the following:

> 孟子謂齊宣王曰: “王之臣有託其妻子於其友, 而之楚遊者。比其反也, 則凍餒其妻子, 則如之何?” 王曰: “棄之。” 曰: “士師不能治士, 則如之何?” 王曰: “已之。” 曰: “四境之內不治, 則如之何?” 王顧左右而言他。

> Mencius said to King Hsüan of Ch’i [King Xuan of Qi], “Suppose a subject of your Majesty’s, having entrusted his wife and children to the care of a friend, were to go on a trip to Ch’u [Chu], only to find, upon his return, that his friend had allowed his wife and children to suffer cold and hunger, then what should he do about it?”
> “Break with his friend.”
> “If the Marshal of the Guards was unable to keep his guards in order, then what should be done about it?”
> “Remove him from office.”
> “If the whole realm within the four borders was ill-governed, then what should be done about it?”
> The King turned to his attendants and changed the subject. (Lau 2003: 41)

The above episode is very similar to the Guodian text describing Zisi remonstrating with Lord Mu of Lu in a forthright manner (極稱其君之惡): the Lord “was displeased, and dismissed him with a hand-clasped bow” (公不悅, 揖而退之。).

Based on the above, it can be postulated that “to remonstrate forthrightly” stems from the concept of “abiding by the *dao* and not the ruler” (從道不從君). The rulers were displeased with such an idea, whilst the Confucians at that time shied away from the issue. Such candidness of opinion was truly the precious spirit of pre-Qin Confucian scholarship. Until now, we have only focussed on Mencius as the pioneer of the precepts of anti-despotism and equality between ruler and civilians, although we have seen the idea of remonstrance in such early texts as the *Zuo zhuan*, the *Yi Zhou shu*, the *Yan Zi Chunqiu* and the *Lüshi Chunqiu*. With the discovery of this Guodian text and the clarification of reading *heng cheng*, we are able to retrace such precepts to Zisi, although one could suggest that the text could well be an imagined construct later than Zisi, with the argued points simply attributed to him. Put in his mouth, the words have acquired an increased ring of authority.

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Part II
Philosophical Concepts and Arguments in the Guodian Manuscripts

Chapter 8
The *Taiyi shengshui* 太一生水 Cosmogony and Its Role in Early Chinese Thought



Erica Brindley

The *Taiyi shengshui* 太一生水 (*TYSS* from now on) is one of only a few texts in the early Chinese corpus to present a detailed cosmogony—a genesis story of sorts—one that traces the beginnings of the cosmos back to a variety of spiritual and natural forces, such as the divinity Taiyi and water. The role of Taiyi as a divinity in ancient China is well attested in the literature, even though the precise nature of its connections to what later become categorized as "Daoist thought" (i.e., the Lao–Zhuang tradition in early China) is still murky (Li and Harper [1995] 2013).[1] In fact, the *TYSS* helps support a case that there was a larger movement afoot in early China, one that viewed and defined an idealized Dao (Path/Way) based on natural cycles and operations of a spiritual and ever-creative cosmos. While the details of the cosmogony in the *TYSS* may differ from accounts provided in other naturalistic texts of the early period, the manner in which the author of this text refers to and discusses the notion of the Dao gives us reason to think that it very much belongs to the same kind of naturalistic tradition as texts such as *Laozi* 老子, *Zhuangzi* 莊子, *Huainanzi* 淮南子, and others.

[1] While the text of the TYSS had not been previously known or transmitted before the Guodian find, the fact that it was attached to the *Laozi* C version of the Guodian corpus has had many scholars musing about its relationship to the Laozian texts and traditions (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998). In a volume on the proceedings of a conference on the Guodian *Laozi*, for example, Sarah Allan contended that, given that the bamboo slips of the TYSS are physically identical to those of the *Laozi* C, the former should be read as the same text (Allan and Williams 2000: 168). Li Xueqin was more inclined to take the *TYSS* as a commentary to the *Laozi* (Allan and Williams 2000: 168–69). Allan's proposal speaks to the issue of the unity of the strips that should be taken as the *TYSS*. She is the most prominent spokesperson for the claim that these strips do not constitute a separate text on their own.

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In this chapter I introduce the basic cosmogony of the *TYSS* and present an interpretation of the relationship between generative creation at the beginning of the cosmos and the ongoing processes associated with the Dao in the text. My discussion of the Dao in the *TYSS* provides a linchpin for further elaboration of the Dao as it is couched in cosmogonic schemes in other texts of the period. By comparing early Chinese cosmogonic texts, we can ask why a cosmogonic text such as the *TYSS* might have been written in the first place. Why in particular did authors in Warring States China deem it necessary to go all the way back to the very beginning of everything to try to situate their thought and recommendations for human action? Our analysis will impart interesting insights into both the overarching moral agenda of the *TYSS,* as well as its specific contributions to cosmological thinking in early China.

Let's begin with a brief translation and examination of the structure of the cosmogony laid out for us in the beginning of the *TYSS*:[2]

> 大(太)一生水，水反䥽(輔)大(太)一，是以成天。天反䥽(輔)大(太)一，是以成䢀(地)。天䢀(地)【復相輔】也，是以成神明。神明復相䥽(輔)也，是以成侌(陰)䁂(陽)。侌(陰)昜(陽)復相䥽(輔)也, 是以成四時。復【相】䥽(輔)也, 是以成倉(滄)然(熱)。倉(滄)然(熱)復相䥽(輔)也, 是以成溼澡(燥)。溼澡(燥)復相䥽(輔)也, 成凶(歲)而𦁊(止)。

> Taiyi gives birth to water, which returns to assist it. In this manner it completes Heaven. Heaven returns and assists Taiyi and thereby completes Earth. Heaven and Earth then mutually assist each other, and in this manner they thereby complete the numinous and bright. The numinous and bright then mutually assist each other, and in this manner they thereby complete *Yin* and *Yang*. *Yin* and *Yang* then mutually assist each other, and in this manner they thereby complete the Four Seasons. The Four Seasons then mutually assist each other, and in this manner they thereby complete coldness and hotness. Coldness and hotness then mutually assist each other, and in this manner they thereby complete moisture and dryness. Moisture and dryness then mutually assist each other, and in this manner they thereby complete the year, after which [this process] comes to a halt.[3]

This cosmogony is at once clear and straightforward, yet subtle. It starts with the birth of water *ex nihilo* by the cosmic force or divinity, Taiyi. Once water has been generated, the process of creation proceeds along a sequence involving the efforts of at least two cosmic entities. So while Taiyi is the single source that stands alone at the beginning of cosmic generation, a complementary process of assistance (sometimes specified as mutual assistance) quickly takes over and carries the process forward to create the natural cycles and forces of the world. Henceforth and in this manner, we have Heaven and Earth, the numinous and bright, *Yin* and *Yang*, the Four Seasons, coldness and hotness, moisture and dryness, and the year.

It is noteworthy that this is not a cosmogonic account of the birth of all things in the world. We do not learn about the creation of the "myriad things," humans, animals, or even *qi*-material force. Rather, we learn about the creation of a cycle of forces or cosmic processes that help propel creation forward along a set, natural

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[2] This translation is my own from 2001. I have since consulted Scott Cook's published translation and included a few of his terms or phrases here (Cook 2012).

[3] Referring implicitly to the mutually and reciprocally dependent, sequential process of completion.

path. The creation described in this cosmogonic account focuses therefore not on the manifold things and organisms of the world, but on the emergence of a “live set,” or the motivational underpinnings of natural cycles in our environment, of which we humans are inextricably a part. Movement, change, and dynamism, therefore, are stressed, and a picture of the cosmos as an ever-changing, unfixed, yet patterned process emerges.

Note, too, the subtle aspects of early creation and how creative processes are variously depicted in the text: after Heaven is formed, it does not merely work with water to create Earth. Just as water had done before with Taiyi, Heaven reverts (*fan* 反) to assist (*fu* 輔) Taiyi itself to create or complete (*cheng* 成) Earth. While such actions are active and seem to involve effort, they do not necessarily conflict with *wu-wei* methods of engaged effortlessness. There are many instances in texts like the *Laozi*, *Zhuangzi*, and *Huainanzi*, for instance, that recommend engaged (one might even call them “active”) responses to one’s environment that are efficacious precisely because such responses are processed through the unblocked spaces of both one’s mind and exterior reality. For this reason, Heaven and water’s active involvement in the process of creation should not be considered to be willful acts of creation but responsive acts of creation, “*wu-wei* style,” which are characterized here by verbs such as reverting and assisting.[4] Indeed, it is due to the constraints of our own, common definitions of “creation” that we run into problems understanding the nature of creation and creativity in these early Chinese contexts.

Intriguingly, the creation of both Heaven and Earth stem from Taiyi most directly and, in the case of the creation of Earth, from water only indirectly via Heaven and Taiyi. Taiyi thus has a hand in the creation of the cosmos’ two, main fixtures of the sky and earth. And Heaven, as Taiyi’s co-creator of Earth, occupies a more primordial position than Earth, with water, of course, still intrinsic to the process. This hierarchy of creation is especially interesting because the creation of the Heaven–Earth duality is usually considered to be simultaneous and of equal primordial value. Here, on the contrary, the author reveals the slight priority of Heaven, reflecting the author’s understandings of the hierarchies and differences implicit in nature.

Other types of descriptive language give clues to the distinctive features of early creative processes. While Taiyi “gives birth to” water, all subsequent natural processes are *cheng*-ed (completed, fulfilled, formed). The word used to describe the initial act of creating water is *sheng* 生, also meaning “to produce,” “to generate.” While we do not have much information from the text on how the author conceived of Taiyi, the fact that later in the text it is referred to as “the mother of the myriad things” suggests that it could have been a female deity. Given the relative lack of anthropomorphic elements mentioned in the text in association with Taiyi, it may be enough to consider Taiyi to have been thought of as a female being associated with birthing processes. For this reason, the translation of *sheng* as “to birth,” as opposed to “to produce,” here may be justified. Indeed, the process of birthing underscores a

[4] It is worth noting that this responsiveness is notably missing from the first act of creation, that of Taiyi before the birth of water. So there is still a sense in the text of initial generation that does not respond to anything outside of itself.

sense of organic creation associated with the annual cycle and agricultural season (one that heavily relies on such a cycle), which are all discussed in the text as part of the process of creation.

Lest we become smug in our perceived understanding of a difference between the *sheng*-ing (giving birth to) that Taiyi does and the *cheng*-ing (responsive completing) that Taiyi and other cosmic entities perform, we should consider the next part of the text, which basically repeats the creation process in reverse order:

> 古(故)凶(歲)者，　溼澡(燥)之所生也。溼澡(燥)者，　倉(滄)然(熱)之所生也。倉(滄)然(熱)者,【四時之所生也】。四時者，䇓(陰)䁈(陽)之所生。䇓(陰)䁈(陽)者，神明之所生也。神明者, 天隆(地)之所生也。天隆(地)者, 大(太)一之所生也。

> Therefore the year is born from moisture and dryness, which are born from hotness and coldness, which are born from the Four Seasons, which are born from *Yin* and *Yang*, which are born from the numinous and the bright, which are born from Heaven and Earth, which are born from Taiyi.[5]

Here, the act of *sheng*-ing (birthing) is brought back into the discussion, suggesting that the distinction between birthing and completing might not be so significant after all. Rather, we might view the process of *cheng*-ing as one aspect of a larger generative process that is intrinsic to all creation in this cosmogonic account. Such a generative, "birthing" process is dictated by cycles of proceeding, reverting, mutually assisting, and completing. Indeed, this appears to be the meaning behind the very next statement in the text:

> 是古(故)大(太)一僴(藏)於水, 行於時, 猕(周)而或[始, 以己為] 冨(萬)勿(物)母。

> For this reason Taiyi hides in water, proceeds with the seasons, cycles back around and starts again … [it takes itself as] the mother of the myriad things.

We see from both this passage and the preceding cosmogonic description that what is being celebrated and emphasized in this text is not a single act of creation but a beginning and continued processes of creation as a generative, reproductive cycle of birth and completion, using verbs such as proceeding (*xing* 行), cycling back (*zhou* 周), reverting, mutually assisting, and completing.

Now that we have examined the nature of creation, as well as the basic logic and structure of the cosmogony in the *TYSS*, we might ask how the concept of the Dao fits in. Fortunately, the text mentions the term *dao* (道) explicitly at least three times, possibly four, if one is to accept a conjecture on the part of most scholars to fill a certain lacunae with the graph *dao*.

> 軀(一)锒(缺)軀(一)浧(盈)，以忌(紀/己)為冨(萬)勿(物)經。此天之所不能殺，隆(地)之所 不能嘣⟨埋⟩, 䇓(陰)䁈(陽)之所不能成。君子智(知)此之胃(謂)…

> In alternations of deficiency and fullness, it serves as the warp and weft of all things. This cannot be taken away from by Heaven, cannot be added to by Earth, and cannot be completed by *yin–yang*. The gentleman knows that this is called "…" ["Heaven's Way," "Dao"?].[6]

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[5] Note that water is not mentioned here.

[6] There is a very unfortunate lacuna in the text here. Given that the text goes on to speak of "Heaven's Way (Dao)" and "Dao" in the next statement, it is likely that one or the other of these terms could constitute the missing phrase/term.

This passage introduces the notion that complementary qualities such as deficiency and fullness might alternate to achieve a balance between themselves so that the net effect of adding the two components completes a whole. Intriguingly, such a balancing act is not attributed to the outside work or assistance of such forces as Heaven, Earth, or *yin–yang*. Given what we have just learned about cosmic creation, it may seem odd that the author now asserts that the ultimate balance of nature is not achieved through such forces. But if we remember that the very description of how creation works involves complementary qualities mutually assisting each other to complete a cyclical pattern of nature, then it becomes apparent that the real motivational force for change is intrinsic to the process itself. Here, the author intimates that there is a word for this agency of change other than Taiyi, but due to the most unfortunate of lacunae in the text, we can only guess at the term(s) he might have used: "Heaven's Way," or "Dao"?

It is at this point in the text that we start to see some very obvious parallels with themes found in the *Laozi*. The term "Heaven's Dao" is brought in in the next bamboo strip (nine), "Heaven's Dao values the weak. It is that which attenuates and completes so as to benefit all living things" (天道貴溺(弱), 雀(爵)成者以益生者). While the larger meaning of this passage is obscured because what follows on this strip is fragmented, we gain enough clues to know that Heaven's Dao is, as is the *Dao* in the *Laozi*, associated with weakness, and that it is indeed the agency mentioned above that works to achieve a natural balance in the forces of the cosmos. Indeed, Heaven's Dao in this text seems to stand in as a substitute for Taiyi, who, hiding in water, serves as both the "mother of the myriad things" and the "warp and weft of all things."

Having argued for the equivalence of Taiyi to Dao in the text, and having shown that the natural agency for all creative change in the text is undergirded by such a Dao (or "Taiyi hidden in water"), we might read even further in the text to uncover yet another aspect of this Dao, also similar to that found in the *Daodejing*. The *TYSS* states:

> 下, 土也, 而胃(謂)之壄(地)。上, 寈(氣)也, 而胃(謂)之天。道亦其瞓(字)也。青(請)昏(問)其名。道從事者必瘴(託)其名, 古(故)事成而身長。
>
> Below, there is earth, and [this region] is called Earth. Above, there is *qi*, and [this region] is called Heaven. The Dao is also its familiar appellation. I beg to ask for its name.[7] When following through with affairs by way of the Dao, one must rely on its name. Thus, affairs of the world are completed and one's body develops.

Here, Daoist agency lies not in a simple label or bounded appellation such as "Dao," but, rather, in "its name." The distinction drawn here between an appellation (*zi* 字) and a name (*ming* 名) is noteworthy, insofar as the semantic use of a name to refer to something is not highlighted at all. Rather, the author states that "its name" is not something that labels or even signifies any given entity; it is an ongoing process,

[7] I believe the author is distinguishing between the spoken name, a mere linguistic device, and its signifying name, a deeper, operational or modal element associated with the ritual invocation of the name. The distinction in Chinese is between *zi* 字and *ming* 名.

operation, or force that helps bring human affairs and natural cycles of development to fruition. Indeed, the "name" discussed in this context gains meaning as something akin to the "Constant Name" of the Dao, referred to in the acclaimed first passage of the *Daodejing* (i.e., the *Laozi*): "The Dao that can be spoken is not the Constant Dao. The name that can be named is not the Constant Name." In the *Daodejing*, as in the *TYSS*, the [Constant] Name is described in terms of ongoing processes and inexhaustible creative powers. It is the "beginning of Heaven and Earth," the "mystery upon mystery," and "the gateway of the manifold secrets."

While much more could be said about what "relying on its Name" signifies and why the early Chinese conceptualized their Dao in terms of language and, in fact, the actual word for a linguistic referent (i.e., "name"), suffice to say here that the author of the *TYSS* seems to be familiar with the discourse on language that implicated the conception of the Dao in the *Daodejing*. He even goes so far as to discuss the Dao openly in the *TYSS* in connection with *qi* and the realms of Heaven and Earth, thereby linking Dao more securely to both the cosmogonic account provided at the beginning of the text and other teachings deriving from the *Daodejing*.

When one compares cosmogonic accounts in various texts of the Warring States period, one need not dig too deeply to see that while authors might have found the activity of imagining and describing the early universe exciting in and of itself, they were also motivated to write cosmogonic accounts for what they could tell us about human life in the here and now. As with Chinese poetry, where the vivid description of a moment in the natural world serves as a parallel to a particular image, thought, feeling, or sensation in one's personal world, the cosmogonic account in ancient Chinese texts—often placed at the beginning of a text, but not necessarily so—functions to further reveal some aspect of the human world. Whereas in poetry the psychological and emotional realms of an individual are targeted, in cosmogonic accounts both the individual and socio-political realms are strongly implicated. And whereas in poetry the association between nature and individual is often based in metaphor rather than a real, physical link between the two, the handful of cosmogonic accounts in ancient China all seem to suggest a stronger link. Indeed, the cosmogonic writers in ancient China wanted to demonstrate a tangible connection between the fundamental agency of the cosmos and the idealized acts and behaviours of sages or humans rooted in the cosmic Dao.

It is perhaps helpful to think of the genre of cosmogony in early China as a way of introducing the pure activities of the Dao, first in the cosmos at large, then on the smaller scale of society and human life. Why go back to the very beginning of the cosmos? Perhaps because it was precisely during such a time that the fundamental agency of the cosmos—the Dao—began expressing itself in the world. By first demonstrating how such a Dao acted to create and fulfill the celestial bodies and most basic aspects of the world, one establishes a clear argument for the sacrosanct nature of the Dao in the world.

In the *TYSS* text, the link between early cosmic phenomena and the human world is only just touched upon towards the end of the received fragment. As seen above, the author moves from a generative account of the cosmos to a discussion of the balance in natural phenomena and the need for humans to rely in their actions on an

idealized "Name" of the Dao. The results of such action are beneficial both for the social realm and the health of the individual: "Thus, the affairs of the world are completed and one's body develops" (古(故)事成而身長). That one's body should develop healthfully along a natural cycle is nothing out of the ordinary, as it is the course of all living things if everything goes right. But to claim that the affairs of the world would also be completed—assuming here a perfected and idealized type of completion—is where such early naturalistic authors were on shakier ground.

Not surprisingly, cosmogonic thinkers strategically used the same verbs describing the specific type of creativity, cyclical fulfilment, and mutual assistance generated in the early cosmos to talk about idealized action in the social world. They could thereby argue more persuasively for the efficacy of the Dao in the social world of humans. In the example above in the *TYSS*, the author speaks of the affairs of the human world "being completed," or "coming to fruition." The verb used to describe this ideal social outcome is *cheng*, precisely the same verb the author used repeatedly at the beginning of the text to describe the creation and coming into existence of most of the celestial bodies and natural cycles of the cosmos. That authors consciously carried over a few, key verbs from their cosmogonic account to their account of the human realm is also bolstered by the fact that the first iteration of creation in the *TYSS* focuses on *cheng* (completing) rather than *sheng* (generating), the verb that is used in recapitulating the cycle from moisture and dryness back to the beginning. This suggests the conscious prioritization of *cheng* as a key aspect of both cosmogonic creativity and human action.

Other cosmogonic texts in early China attest to this continuity between Dao-creativity in the beginning of the cosmos and Dao-creativity or Dao-fulfillment in the human realm. In the *Heng xian* (The Primordial State of Constancy), an excavated text written in the Chu-script that is unprovenanced but believed to be contemporaneous with the Guodian texts, the operative verb is "to arise" (*zuo* 作). The initial generative act is described intriguingly as "[bounded] space arises" (*yu zuo* 域作),[8] and the term *zuo* is repeated in the second part of the text describing the Dao in the human realm as well. While the *Heng xian* does not emphasize cycles of completion and fulfilment quite as much as the *TYSS*, it does see the Dao working through natural processes and cycles in fulfilling ways. These are characterized in terms of the initial and fundamental creativity of arising or giving birth (*sheng*) to something, as well as a kind of spontaneous reproduction (*zi fu* 自復) to proliferate and fill Heaven and Earth (Brindley et al. 2013: 147).

Even in the *Daodejing*, although in the ideal state of things every entity and organism is constantly changing in natural ways, or "so of itself" (*zi ran* 自然), there is one constant, which is ineffable and cannot possibly be described through a mere label. Chapter 25 of the *Daodejing* joins the *TYSS* in conveniently labeling (*zi* 字) this constant as "Dao," further describing it in terms that are reminiscent of descriptions used in cosmogonic texts such as the *Heng xian*: quiet, unchanging,

[8] The manuscript has *huo* 或 for the first graph, but this is frequently used for *yu* 域 in both received and paleographic literature.

and cycling around untiringly.[9] It is in this passage on the Dao that we vividly gain a sense of the deep connections among the *TYSS*, *Heng xian*, and the *Daodejing*; it is as though they were all trying to describe not a discrete entity or thing, but a divine process characterized by Constancy:

> 有物混成, 先天地生。寂兮寥兮, 獨立不改, 周行而不殆, 可以為天下母。吾不知其名, 字之曰道, 強為之名曰大。大曰逝, 逝曰遠, 遠曰反。故道大, 天大, 地大, 王亦大。域中有四大, 而王居其一焉。人法地, 地法天, 天法道, 道法自然。
>
> Being (having) and material mingle together productively before the birth of Heaven and Earth. Still and empty! Standing alone without alteration, circling around without a beginning, it can act as the mother of all under Heaven. I do not know its name, but refer to its appellation as 'Dao.' If I had to give it a name, it would be called 'Great.' For 'great' we say 'extinguished,' for 'extinguished' we say 'distant,' for 'distant' we say 'returning.' For this reason, 'great' refers to the greatness of the Dao, the greatness of Heaven, the greatness of Earth, and the greatness of the king. In the realm there are four "Greats,' and the king is one of them. Humans model themselves on Earth, Earth models itself on Heaven, Heaven models itself on the Dao, and the Dao models itself on 'that which is so.'

Here, the author speaks of humans modeling themselves on a series of cosmic processes, which ultimately end with the divine process of the Dao through "so of itself." This process is also conveniently given the name (*ming* 名) "Grand" (*da* 大), which is interchangeable with the first logograph used in the name "Grand One" (*taiyi* 太一), or Taiyi. Intriguingly, in this passage of the *Laozi*, we see how the author tries to lead the reader through a cyclical journey in which the term "grand" morphs into the act of "passing away," which becomes "distancing," and then finally morphs into the process of returning (*fan* 反). What began as a descriptive term thus takes on ontological meaning as a process, and not a mere name. This interpretation echoes the interpretation I presented for the *TYSS* passage in which the author proclaims the necessity of "relying on its Name"—i.e., relying on the process of the Dao, rather than relying on some simple, bounded entity like a *zi* 字 (appellation).

This leads us to our last question, which is why authors in early China would want to describe the beginnings of the cosmos in the first place. By now, it should be clear that certain authors turned to natural models to outline and explain sources of idealized human action, creativity, integration, and fulfilment in the world. And what better source to refer to than the birth or genesis of the entire cosmos? Cosmogonies and accounts of cosmic genesis make sense as a way of justifying certain natural models and processes as sources of authority in human life. Descriptive of the very beginning stages and birth of the entire universe, such accounts have the virtue not just of outlining sources of authority relevant for the here and now, but of directing us towards sources that are relevant for eternity, as they have always been and always will be. By pointing back to the very beginning of a pure and unadulterated divine process—indeed, of divine agency and creation in the world, such accounts imply that the original process of creation is our key to understanding and accessing divine agency in our everyday lives.

[9] Unlike in the *TYSS*, the *Daodejing* often speaks of such a Dao as the "mother of all under Heaven," (chapter 25), or the "mother of all things" (chapter 1).

1 Conclusion

In the *TYSS*, as in other cosmogonic accounts in early China, the author provides readers with a vivid picture of primordial and therefore utterly pristine, divine processes of creation associated with a natural Dao, personified through the divinity Taiyi. Such an account underscores the act of giving birth, returning, mutual assistance, and the fulfilling of natural cycles in the cosmos. In addition to this description of the birth of important cosmic agencies, the author includes references to the human world by talking about *junzi* (gentlemen) and those who "follow through with affairs by way of the Dao." By talking about pristine cosmic processes and accomplished humans in the same context, the author suggests that it is desirable to tap into the true agency of the Dao, which, in the text, is intriguingly referred to as "its name." In other words, the true, cosmic activities that were fundamental to the birth and production of the cosmos are the same ones that humans might ideally harness to act in the world and be successful in one's affairs. Cosmogonic texts like the *TYSS* describe the beginnings of the universe so that they might outline the most ideal and favourable motivations for and forms of action in human life. The Dao, as the ultimate divine process in the cosmos, is essentially timeless in its constancy, so that its doings at the very beginning—at the beginning of all space-time—and its doings in the present are essentially the same.[10]

Cosmogonic descriptions like the few mentioned in this chapter help lay the foundation for a Daoist ethics of divinely motivated action. The *TYSS*, as with all early Chinese cosmogonic accounts, was not written merely to describe the natural laws, agencies, and processes of the early universe. They are always linked to the social, political, familial, and personal realms through the assumption that such divine, natural agencies as those present in the early cosmos are equivalent to idealized human action. It is the discussion of divine process that links the two realms and makes cosmogenesis a necessary prelude to any discussion of the Dao in this world.

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[10]This "fall from grace," while not a common theme in the Chinese textual record as we know it, is nonetheless present in the comment from the *Heng xian* cosmogonic text, another excavated text of unknown provenance that likely dates to around the same period as the *TYSS* and *Daodejing*: "Primordially, there is good, order, and no disorder. Once there are humans, there is not-good. Disorder emerges from human beings" (先者有善,有治無亂；有人焉有不善，亂出於人) (Brindley et al. 2013: 148).

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Chapter 9
Daoist Philosophy as Viewed from the Guodian Manuscripts



Barbara Hendrischke

1 Introduction

All texts in the Guodian corpus are, in a broad sense of the word, philosophical. While they use contrasting methodological approaches and pronounce a range of views, many of their topics and concepts became central to what has been termed the Confucian tradition. "Daoist" here points to ideas that with a few exceptions are exclusive to the *Laozi* 老子 and the *Zhuangzi* 莊子.[1] In the Guodian corpus such ideas play a minor role. The three bundles of strips that contain *Laozi* A, B, and C and the *Taiyi shengshui* 太一生水 amount to a little over one-eighth of the Guodian corpus.[2] As for all manuscripts that were excavated in Guodian, titles originated

[1] Keeping in mind Hansen's sketch of the facets of Daoism and the fact that this paper deals with a historical period when Daoist religious communities had not yet come to the fore (Hansen 2012). I am grateful for the advice of the two anonymous reviewers of this paper and for the support of the editor and her staff.

[2] Sarah Allan argues that the bundle of strips that consists of *Laozi* C (14 strips) and *Taiyi shengshui* (14 strips) is actually one identical text (Allan 2003). Meyer and others have refuted this with good reasons (Meyer 2011: 210–13). As Wang has pointed out, there are other Guodian manuscripts that contain several titles (Wang 2000: 248–50). As discussed in some detail by Cook, *Yucong* 4 shares a couple of proverb-like sayings with the *Zhuangzi* (Cook 2012: 909). Therefore, Li Ling sees it as a Daoist text (Li 2007). However, the sayings collected in *Yucong* 4 go in many directions, for instance towards the *Guanzi* 管子 (*Ban fa*) in regard to the relationship between ruler and people and towards Confucian texts in the advice to search for worthy men and their counsel (Li Xiangfeng 2004: 127). Remarks on verbal communication touch on passages in the *Shuo nan* of the *Hanfeizi* 韓非子 and there are some parallels to phrases in the *Bing lüe*, *Shuo lin* and *Mou cheng* of the *Huainanzi* 淮南子 (Cook 2012: 921, 934 and 936). There is no sign of *Yucong* 4 sharing any of the principles of the two major Daoist texts. The reading of the *Laozi* texts and all other Guodian

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with the editors. Boltz has observed that the three *Laozi* manuscripts do not contain any passages that are not part of the transmitted *Laozi* (Boltz 1999). It is of historical significance that the Guodian corpus includes a major text of the Daoist tradition. This fact points to an early distribution of the central Daoist teachings in their direct, original voice. The limited presence of classical scriptures does not allow the same conclusion for the Confucian tradition (Shaughnessy 2006: 60).

It is intended here to document that the message of the three *Laozi* texts, with some help from *Taiyi shengshui*, is in distinct contrast to that of the rest of the Guodian corpus. The *Laozi* texts do not differ in regard to the problems they raise and promise to solve. Their striking otherness lies in the approach to these problems. They start from different premises and use different methods of philosophical investigation, a difference that becomes easily manifest in their style of writing. The meaning of the texts relies more closely than is customary for philosophical texts on how it is expressed, which is grounded in the authors' premise that language, as used in general, prevents rather than furthers understanding. This paper will therefore start with the *Laozi* texts' style of writing and methods of argumentation and will then move on to their themes. It will be argued that the texts deal with principles of human action as they appear within the social constraints of the state and, as a minor line, within one's personal existence. What these principles are has become the topic of an energetic discussion among Chinese scholars which can only be hinted at here. It concerns how the *Laozi* texts and their message relate to the bulk of the Guodian corpus. It will be argued that this relationship enhances the impression of the otherness of Daoist thought.

2 The Three *Laozi* Texts

We will start by briefly discussing the themes and possible compositional structure of the three *Laozi* texts. In length—39, 18, 14 strips—these texts agree with the other texts of the Guodian corpus and are of a convenient, transportable size, which the received text of the *Laozi* is not (Chen 1999a). They also resemble other texts, if we include the four *Yucong* 語叢 texts and the *Ziyi* 緇衣, in regard to inner coherence. As a group, the three texts share terms and philosophical intention.[3] They support each other. It has therefore been proposed that they are individual sections

materials is based on Cook in almost complete dependence (Cook 2012). So with the added information that A6 represents the second part of section 64 of the received text, in the Wang Bi recension, *Laozi* A6 (R64b) refers to Cook (2012): 242–45. Translations, although my own, also owe much to Cook (2012), Lau (1989), Henricks (1990), Henricks (2000), Ames and Hall (2003) and Ryden (2008). Unless he sees a need to depart from it, Cook in turn relies on the *Wenwu* publication of the Guodian corpus (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998).

[3] Such identity is not suggested by the manuscripts' physical characteristics. The three bundles differ in length of the strips and the identity of the scribes.

adapted from one larger identical bulk of materials.[4] That they each focus on different topics is easy to make out. As Wang Bo puts it, *Laozi* B deals with the self and its cultivation, *Laozi* C with government, and *Laozi* A combines both topics (Wang 2000). Other differences, for instance those regarding their date of origin, are much more difficult to establish.[5] It is assumed here that their production was the work of editors. When considering the texts' stylistic coherence with each other and the received text, it seems advisable to speak of editorial rather than authorial responsibility and, additionally, to transfer Baxter's proposition that the language of the received *Laozi* points to around 400 bce, also to the materials that appear in the Guodian texts (Baxter 1998). In other words, the three texts are here tentatively read as deliberate selections from the same set of materials from which the received *Laozi* originated. It is assumed that these materials convey ideas that were put forth by one author, or a group of anonymous authors.

Laozi A consists of five blocks within which "there is no ambiguity in strip order" (Cook 2012: 220).[6] However, views differ in regard to the sequence of these blocks. Li Ling and others start in what they call a systematic fashion with sections on the cosmos (Li 2007).[7] Cook follows the editors of the Wenwu edition and starts the text with social and political issues, which are indeed *Laozi* A's major topic (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998). This begins with how not to rule: knowledge, skills, profit, dominant position, the issuing of commands, decisive action and military employment are all shown to be detrimental. Instead, when leading others, one must turn to images like the artlessness of a chunk of wood, or the lowliness of waterways that other waters flow into. These images add strength to the repeated warnings against ambition and passion that pervade the *Laozi* texts as well as many other Guodian materials. In the second block, *dao* is called "mother of the world" (*tianxia mu* 天下母) and is attributed a place: the king takes earth as model, earth takes heaven as model, heaven takes *dao* as model and *dao* takes as model "that which is so of itself" (*ziran* 自然). This is followed by comparing the space between heaven and earth where men live to "bellows" that function by means of being empty, which the next section takes up when praising emptiness and, with it, the idea that according to heaven's *dao* everything naturally returns to its root. The fourth block deals

[4] Different possibilities of how the received text and the Guodian versions can be related, for instance, are discussed by Li Ling and Scott Cook (Li 2007: 35–38; Cook 2012: 199–205). Shaughnessy concludes that, despite the Guodian and other manuscript versions, the origin of the *Laozi* and the figure of Laozi remain as enigmatic as they were in the 1920s and 1930s (Shaughnessy 2005). In a general discussion on the production of manuscripts Richter points out that the three *Laozi* texts can only be understood as three individual texts (Richter 2011: 214–16).

[5] From Zhu Xinyi's overview it is clear that scholars often link the discussion of the three texts with a search for their author that remains futile (Zhu 2004: chapter 2; Shaughnessy 2005). For a purely text-based analysis, see Wang (2001b).

[6] The blocks are A1–11 (R19, 66, 46b, 30, 15, 64b, 37, 63, 2, 32a, 32b), A12–13 (R25 and 5b), A14 (R24), A15–17 (R64a, 56, 57), and A18–21 (R55, 44, 40, 9).

[7] So *Laozi* A starts with cosmogonic and almost ontological issues (A12–14; A18–21), then moves to social and political questions (A1–7) and finishes with methods of thinking and of acting (A8–11; A15–17). This arrangement has been popular and is followed by Li Jian and others (Li 2014).

with methods of doing things: its readers or listeners are warned to engage with things so long as they are small and easy to stir, to avoid personal entanglements, and to resent projects for economic and cultural development. At the end comes more advice on how to remain secure and in control: retain the vitality of a babe and prevent loss by knowing what is enough. In the midst of this, almost as a reminder of the grounds for practical success are the lines in A20 (R40): "Returning is the movement of *dao*; being weak is how it functions. The things of this world are born of being, [which in turn] is born of nothingness", which we will get back to.

Laozi A is addressed to a leader and his entourage. For them, society is something to be managed rather than to be experienced by being part of it. A leader's sovereignty and independence stem from his awareness of processes that are not under human control. This is clear from the text's vocabulary, which consists of very few markers of social status, a couple of concepts of high theoretical rank, words for concrete objects and processes, and only a select set of ordinary terms for human involvement and interest.

The manuscript of *Laozi* B consists of three internally contiguous blocks.[8] There are hardly any grounds on which to fix their sequence (Cook 2012: 221). The overriding topic is the cultivation of *dao* in regard to one's own person and the supreme strength one can expect to gain from it. To cultivate *dao* means to store one's own energy, to avoid taking action, to retain purity and tranquillity and to shun all means of entanglement. This includes learning, which is further criticised when favour extended by a superior—often in response to someone's learning—is called disgraceful, because it creates dependency. This line of thought culminates in the proposition that prioritising one's own self is the condition for political success. What we must expect such a self to look like appears from certain unexpected attributes of *dao*, of its virtue (*de* 德), and other great things. These attributes include that "when *dao* is in the light it seems shadowy" (明道如昧), that "the highest virtue is like a valley" (大德如谷) and that "great squareness lacks corners" (大方亡隅) (B5; R41).

This short text is coherent and rather well structured. Positions that are proposed in *Laozi* A are not repeated, they are presupposed. The tenor of the text is aggressive. When Confucian thinkers point to the social skills of Emperor Shun that make him an ideal ruler, *Laozi* B proposes that someone who can handle himself is best qualified for this task. Also, there is opposition to the assumption that concern for one's family has a transformative effect on one's country. Educated men (*shi* 士) of different rank are shown to be hapless in their attempts at practising *dao*. The use of the term "cultivation" (*xiu* 修) reverberates and at the same time refutes Confucian ideas on self-cultivation. Here, cultivation involves not learning but a decrease of engagement, an interest in nothingness and also the search for longevity. The text adopts ideas that are pronounced in Yang Zhu-oriented chapters of the *Zhuangzi* and

[8] B1–4 (R59, 48a, 20a, 13), B5 (R41), and B6–9 (R52b, 45a, 45b, 54). Within the blocks, the lack of section markers means that B1–4 can be read as one entity, as can B8–9. Marks between B7 and B8 divide into two what in the received text is section 45.

integrates them in the process of empire building as outlined in *Laozi* A. The *Zhuangzi*'s contempt for ruling a state is completely ignored.

Laozi C consists of four blocks.[9] Their order is not defined. Their topic is the political and social situation. When at its best, "great *dao*" (*da dao* 大道) is in place, a situation that is far superior to Confucian suggestions for reform. An ideal ruler rarely speaks but gets things done and remains so much in the background that people hardly know he is there. This is the "great paragon" (*da xiang* 大象) that is of enduring benefit but hardly noticeable, as opposed to the music and refreshments that passers-by may stop for, and in which we may see a metaphor for the well-advertised norms of humaneness, rightness, filial piety, paternal affection and an official's uprightness. These norms can play a constructive role only when the great paragon is not maintained. Rituals may be in place but one must make sure that the rituals performed while fighting and winning a war are those used in mourning. There is a final passage on acting by not taking action, which is said to allow the sage "to assist in the spontaneity of the myriad things" (能輔萬物之自然 C4; R64b), which we will get back to. Compact as it is, *Laozi* C well documents the otherness of Daoist views on good government and proper personal conduct.

Nothing has emerged in this brief overview that would contradict LIU Xiaogan, who has suggested that the philosophical identity of the *Laozi* texts discovered in Guodian is roughly that of the received text (Liu 2003: 371–73).[10] This however, does not make *Laozi* A, B and C identical with the received text. It must be considered that they amount in length to only one-third of the received text or 32 of its 81 sections and therefore do not have the same range of vocabulary and themes (Cook 2012: 197; Boltz 2007: 477). This narrows the intensity of their argument. The *Laozi* texts argue by means of images and examples that put a very limited number of premises to an ongoing test. By these means, by moving from section to section, the authors continue to assure the validity and relevance of their premises. The comparative brevity of the Guodian texts therefore makes a difference. Moreover, the Guodian texts confront their readers with far fewer mysteries, riddles or seeming absurdities than does the received text. Based on contents only and irrespective of the many unresolved philological problems, it is tempting to read *Laozi* A, B and C as handy, somewhat simplified textbook-type materials drawn from a more comprehensive and more complex corpus of texts.[11]

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[9] They are C1 (R17 and 18), C2 (R35), C3 (R31), and C4 (R64). Opinions differ on the arrangement of these blocks (Cook 2012: 222).

[10] Others differ. ZHU Xinyi proposes that in the Guodian texts, the transcendent and absolute nature of *dao* is sidelined while the focus is on how it appears in human affairs (Zhu 2004: chapter 3). SHEN Qingsong's arguments go in the same direction (Shen 2000: 149). TANG Mingban argues that the Guodian texts do not reach the received text in depth and quality of argumentation (Tang 2000: 430).

[11] Boltz lists some of these philological problems (Boltz 2007: 477f.). For the way of reading the Guodian texts that is suggested here, see also Wang (2001b).

3 An Alternative Way of Writing

The *Laozi* texts consist mainly of brief poems of great concentration that lack all narrative content.[12] Their density and thematic limitation agree with the authors' doctrinal objection to verbosity. Stylistic ingredients are mixed. In Baxter's words, "the rhymed passages of the *Lao-tzu* are often closely integrated with unrhymed portions of the text", and semantic parallelism or antithesis serve as a major poetic advice (Baxter 1998: 236). The three texts are mainly written in the tetrasyllabic style that Schaberg sees as symptomatic of the received text of the *Laozi* (Schaberg 2015).[13] In Warring States China, philosophically relevant texts existed in various forms and this variety reflects differences in the intent of the authors' argument and the intended usage of a text. Within the parameters of the Guodian corpus, a well-constructed essay like *Liu de* 六德, that deals with a limited topic, demands another level of attention and involves other consequences for the reader than do the *Laozi* texts that, in contrast to their brevity and concrete language, deal with principles of knowing and acting. When interpreting the received text, Graham offers his "analysis with the same kind of reservations as one would for any other poem" (Graham 1989: 220). This is a caveat that remains in place, although it does not prevent Graham from offering a perfectly rational and reasonable outline of Laozi's thought. The proposed ineffability of "the Way" (*dao*) that often finds expression in paradoxical statements adds to the perplexity that the *Laozi*, as many other poems, may induce in its readers.

A new approach to the poetic form of the texts stems from a comparative perspective that takes the full corpus of Guodian texts into consideration. Meyer sees the *Laozi* texts as consisting of short self-contained units that do "not seek to establish argumentative force by virtue of reason" (Meyer 2011: 11). They therefore gain philosophical life only with the help of a spokesperson or commentator who mediates between the text and its audience.[14] Meyer thereby chooses to ignore the informal reference systems with which the *Laozi* authors structure units of thought by terminological identity, metaphorical relations and analytic purpose.[15] In the *Laozi*,

[12] Baxter shows that in the *Laozi* verses are composed both by rhyme and by semantic patternings and that the *Laozi*'s poetic genre differs from both *Shijing* and *Chuci* (Baxter 1998: 234–37).

[13] Schaberg also sees the text as characterised by an unusually reduced choice of words and argues that this reduction agrees with a "remarkably constrained" range of investigative themes (Schaberg 2015: 101). Although he calls the result dull, he has a point. It can be argued that it befits a philosophical text to avoid doctrinally unwarranted detours. Neither the literary nor the philosophical quality of *Laozi* A, B and C is as such impeded by the fact that other, and probably later, versions of *Laozi* sections add some aplomb when they clarify thematic connections by adding repetitions, intensifying parallelism, and highlighting philosophical points by terminological focusing (Liu 2003).

[14] Meyer's other example of a context-dependent Guodian text is the *Ziyi*, whose format resembles that of the *Analects*.

[15] Section 25 that is quoted below is a good example of how a proposition, here that the ruler is most efficient when attentive to how things unfold on their own, is advanced. The argument is based on a largely metaphorical description of the power of *dao* and is carried forward by sketching

philosophical investigation proceeds primarily by means of images and everyday observations, which often results in a formula that, although not abstract, has, by means of comprehensiveness and generality, the argumentation purpose of a concept. That these formulas are not those of other texts agrees with the time-honoured privilege of philosophers to coin their own terms. The sections of *Laozi* A, for instance, are drawn together by an interest in the term *wei* 爲 (to take action) and the understanding that, for it to succeed, it must be accompanied by manifestations of "knowing what is enough" (*zhi zu* 知足). If one were to place the *Laozi* in Richter's Guodian-related framework where active and argumentation texts are distinguished from passive and mnemonic texts, it seems clear that the *Laozi* texts are carefully constructed units of thought rather than repositories of didactic materials (Richter 2013: chapter 14).

The *Laozi* texts are read here following Wagner's supposition that its sections (*zhang* 章) are, in the main, well-structured short arguments (Wagner 2000: chapter 3). There is enough agreement about the identity of sections between Guodian materials, the set of sections that appears in Han Fei's commentary "Explaining the *Laozi*" and the received text, to conclude that sections were designed to be read as meaningful units. In describing their "interlocking parallel style", Wagner helps to explain the *Laozi*'s persuasive force (Wagner 1999). It may be particularly strong in the three Guodian manuscripts that are relatively short and do not contain the puzzling formulas and images of the first sections of the received text of the *Laozi*, or the concrete policy advice of its last sections.[16] In the received text the order of sections lacks a cohesive argument, although rhetorical and thematic considerations may play a role in their sequence. This is not much different in the Guodian texts, despite their shortness.[17] With some interpretative input, it has been attempted here to read *Laozi* A, *Laozi* B and *Laozi* C as compositions that each has a thematic thread. A similar attempt can be made for the sections that appear in Han Fei's "Explaining the Laozi". However, a "thematic thread" is not the same as a line of argument. There is a contrast between the fairly tight construction of sections and the fluid shape of their composition that is characteristic of the received *Laozi* as well as of the Guodian texts, although, due to their limited size, it may be less pronounced in the Guodian versions than in the received text. It must still be considered when attempting to present the contents of the texts. There is necessarily a wider variety of possible interpretations than is the case where a text is a thoughtfully structured essay or dialogue.

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the order of the world in a minimalist fashion that is familiar to readers of the *Laozi*. This order ties *dao* to the ruler. The section finishes by pointing to being of oneself as source of *dao*'s power. Wang Bi's commentary to the section is instructive (Wagner 2003: 198–205).

[16] Perkins has argued that sections 67–81, which do not appear in the Guodian texts, take positions that are in some conflict with other sections of the *Laozi* (Perkins 2014).

[17] For *Laozi* A, B and C, the sequence of sections, although completely different from the received *Laozi*, appears to rely on the same organisational model as does the received text. Certain subsequent sections, for instance *Laozi* A8 and 9 (R63 and 2), may share a topic but there is no sign of any overarching organisational principle.

4 Alternative Means of Thinking and Arguing

The idiosyncrasy of the texts' vocabulary and structure is matched by argumentation devices and analytical principles. The authors never rely on historical figures or events, or on the authority of teachers and their textbooks, to prove their point. All other texts of the Guodian corpus link their insights to historical figures for inspiration or proof. A historian's observation or, considering Confucius' dual professions, the philosopher's own historiographic knowledge, may be the starting point for moral and political thought. Since the authors ignore the fundus of knowledge that thinkers who cherish historical lessons and learned discussion have at their command, they are left with a large void. Partly for this reason, their starting point is often not a positive statement and its active defence. They tend not to take the initiative by proclaiming their opinions. Instead, they react on theoretical grounds to a position held by others or to an attitude that historical or anecdotal evidence stamps as general practice (Denecke 2010: 217–19). While this appears to be a stylistic device, it is grounded in the principle of negation and its theoretical and practical priority, as will be discussed below.

The authors argue that instruction cannot be gained from knowledge that is learnable and from concepts that are defined. They propose that any augmentation gained by learning is opposed to the benefit that comes from practising *dao*, that is, from decreasing personal rigidity, fixation, possessions and entanglement (B2; R48a). This is formulated as if in opposition to the passage "Learning is for the sake of being able to augment" (學爲可益也) in the Guodian text *Zun deyi* 尊德義 (Cook 2012: 644–45). In stark contrast, the authors of *Laozi* texts accept only a small range of premises and these do not lie in the realm of academic knowledge. This makes their texts brief and fills them with negative formulas. That concepts (*ming* 名) do not provide access to what men need to be aware of, is signified by the fact that there is no concept that points to *dao* or to a chunk of wood.[18] That the authors attempt to create meaning while showing their contempt for concepts isolates their own intellectual endeavours, since other Warring States thinkers saw fit to start their investigations with an analysis of how concepts are situated in regard to each other. It also reduces the authors' chance to get their point across, which they seem to be aware of. Although they do not equal *Zhuangzi*'s highly sophisticated approach to language, they signal some understanding of the limitations faced by someone who tries to talk to people at the same time as he objects to the language those people use. This comes out in *Laozi* A1 (R19), which starts with the assurance that three good things will happen when, in a threefold manner, intellectual and technical skills are abandoned. The authors continue:

三言以為事不足, 又命之有所樹。示素保樸, 少私寡欲。

[18] Warnings against coming under the spell of language are as pronounced in the Guodian texts as in the received text. See *Laozi* A8 (R63), 10 (R32a) and 11 (R32b), and also A16 (R56): "Who knows of it does not speak of it, and who speaks of it does not know of it" 知之者弗言, 言之者弗知.

> To get something done, the three things [here said] are not enough. Add to them injunctions that are constructive: put undyed silk on show and keep hold of the [artless] chunk of wood, lessen self-interest and decrease desires.

The "constructive" message has as its focus two concrete images of things whose unprocessed state is in contrast to the skills mentioned earlier. It is followed by two behavioural guidelines that are again expressed in a negative, reductionist manner. Occasionally the authors express themselves as if reaching beyond their own insight and drawing from anonymous wisdom, but even this wisdom appears to be as far removed from the world of learning as are their own writings.[19]

It is essential to the essence of their message that the authors appear more devoted to dismantling what not to rely on, than to explicating their own basis. However, in section A12 (R25) they make an attempt at doing just that. The section is here quoted in full in order to show where the weight of its last, almost programmatic, lines is derived from:

> 有狀混成, 先天地生: 脱寥, 獨立不改, 可以爲天下母。未知其名, 字之曰道。吾强爲之名曰大。大曰逝, 逝曰轉, 轉曰返。天大, 地大, 道大, 王亦大。域中有四大焉, 王處一焉。人法地, 地法天, 天法道, 道法自然。

> There is form that has turbulently taken shape.
> It was born before heaven and earth.
> Detached and isolated,
> it stands alone, does not change,
> and is able to serve as mother of the world;
> not yet knowing its name, we label it *dao*.
> When forced to name it, we call it "great";
> its greatness, we call "flowing forth";
> its flowing forth we call "changing course";
> its changing course we call "returning".
> Heaven is great; earth is great; *dao* is great; the king is also great.
> Within the realm, the great number four and the king is one of them.
> Human beings take earth as model; earth takes heaven as model;
> heaven takes *dao* as model; *dao* takes being of itself as model.

The topic of this section is *dao*. This term is generally understood to be a human being's main source of orientation.[20] For the *Laozi* authors, it is simultaneously an entity and a way of acting. Its creative impact precedes the world as a mother precedes her children, while this impact remains in place, as may a mother, after the world has taken form. *Dao* unfolds in a continuous motion that can only be understood as circular, reaching from taking form to returning to the root. All the world partakes in it, as, noticeably, does the "king", here to be understood as the institution of kingship and government. The four are called great because they are too vague to

[19] Examples can be found in A17 (R57) and B4 (R13).

[20] Examples in the Guodian corpus are "Only after knowing *dao* will one know how to act" (知道而後知行) (*Zun deyi*) and "Someone whom it makes happy to hear of *dao* is fond of humaneness" 聞道而悦者, 好仁者也。(*Wuxing* 五行) (Cook 2012: 646; Cook 2012: 519f.; Cook 2012: 146–50).

be described or defined.[21] *Dao*'s active presence signifies the ongoing togetherness of all that is. Whether as mother of the world or as being part of and acting within it, *dao* is in a mode of self-reliance and said to emulate "being of itself". As a mode of action, this self-reliance becomes manifest in letting things happen.

The term "being of itself" (*ziran* 自然) is almost as focal in the Guodian texts as it is in the received text of the *Laozi*.[22] In C1 (R17) it is used as if embedded in everyday language:

> 成事遂功, 而百姓曰我自然也。
>
> [The ideal ruler] accomplishes affairs and brings achievements to fruition, yet the people will all say: I did this of myself.

It is characteristic of the authors' language that, despite its high philosophical rank as model for *dao*, *ziran* is used here to signify the people's contentment. It occurs more formally but with similar intent in the following passage, which A6 and C4 (R64) have in common:

> 是以[聖]人欲不欲, 不貴難得之貨; 學不學, 復衆之所過。是以能輔萬物之自然, 而弗敢爲。[23]
>
> Thus [the sage] desires not to desire, placing no value on hard-to-obtain goods. He learns not to be learned, turning back to where the masses pass by.
> Thus he can assist the myriad things to be of themselves but dares not act upon them.

Cook's translation—"Thus he can assist in the spontaneity of the myriad things"—takes account of the term's role in the *Zhuangzi* and Graham's reading of it: "Although it is not easy to offer a definition of Taoism, thinkers classed as philosophical Taoists do share one basic insight—that, while all other things move spontaneously on the course proper to them, man has stunted and maimed his spontaneous aptitude by the habit of distinguishing alternatives, the right and the wrong, benefit and harm, self and others, and reasoning in order to judge between them" (Cook 2012: 242–45; Graham 1986: 6). A good example for what the term stands for in the *Laozi* texts, as well as in the *Zhuangzi*, is a passage in the *Zhuangzi*: "When the

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[21] Cf. Ames and Hall 2003: 30–33.

[22] Perkins sees *ziran* in the *Laozi* as a "key metaphysical concept" although it did not become a widely used term before the Han dynasty (Perkins 2015). The received text's "To be sparing with words is in accordance with being of oneself" (希言自然) (section 23) and "Respecting *dao* and honouring virtue are always so of themselves without anyone commanding [people] to do so" (道之尊, 德之貴, 夫莫之命而常自然) (section 51) shed no more light on the term's meaning than do the passages of the Guodian texts (Chen 1984: 157; Liu 2014: 79; Chen 1984: 261). For other ways of reading the passage at hand see, for instance, Wang who proposes that "self-being [*ziran*] expresses the particular way of being, attitude and behaviour of the myriad beings, the hundred clans, or the people in general" (Wang 2015: 414). There does not seem to be any parallel for the expression *wo ziran* as used in C1. Liu therefore sees the need to render the passage as "Then the common people all say that I [(the sage) have realized] the principle of *ziran*" and thereby attributes unusual insight to the people (Liu 2014: 78).

[23] This is the wording of C4. It is closer to section 64 of the received text than is the wording of A6, where the last phrase reads "but is unable to act upon them" (而弗能爲), meaning that the sage refrains from common action (*wuwei*) and thereby makes things be of themselves, as explained in Liu 2014: 80.

water murmurs it does nothing, the capacity is spontaneous" 夫水之於汋也, 無爲而才自然矣 (Guo 1989: 21.716; Graham 1986: 131). This is followed in the *Zhuangzi* by the observation that heaven is high of itself and earth solid of itself. In neither case is training involved. This is what is meant in *Laozi* A12. By taking *ziran* as model, *dao* remains independent. It becomes active by being itself, in creating as well as in maintaining things.[24] In this dual function, it serves as model for everyone and everything else. Irrespective of how we must imagine its creative impact, what is important is that its ongoing role is more that of a model than an agent. This, as we will see, is also understood to be the impact of a person who acts from an awareness of *dao*.

The grounds where the authors of the *Laozi* texts see suitable and reliable parables for human action lie in the sphere of things that are not man-made. This is exemplified in images: the vitality of a babe (A18; R55), bellows that document the power of emptiness (A13; R5b), or the simile of waters naturally flowing into other lower-lying waters (A2; R66 and A10; R32a). The authors show that reasoning must not take its clue from the realms of cultural achievement and transmission. This is evident when they describe the ideal conduct of "those of old skilled at being men of service" (古之善爲士者) (A5; R15). While this conduct is customarily linked to ritual traditions and historical awareness, *Laozi* A uses the following terms:

> 豫乎如冬涉川, 猶乎其如畏四鄰; 嚴乎其如客, 遠乎其如釋; 純乎其如樸, 沌乎其如濁。
>
> Tentative—as though crossing a stream in winter.
> Vigilant—as though in fear of surrounding neighbours.
> Dignified—as if a guest.
> Distant—as if breaking away.
> Genuine—like a chunk of wood.
> Undifferentiated—like muddy water.

The qualities listed are those that a public servant, and thereby the text's reader, was from experience conscious of being in need of.[25] They are made concrete by images of men in naturally difficult situations or of objects that have no value and draw little attention.

In another case the simile of the downhill flow of water initiates a full description of how government is to be set up and maintained. The outcome of what is said here is not novel or unique. The rulers who are depicted in the *Documents* know the importance of being humble.[26] The Guodian text *Cheng zhi* says almost the same thing.[27] What is new and not repeated anywhere else is the idea that tactical political

[24] In a comparative discussion of Chinese "metaphysics", Perkins seems to slightly oversimplify matters: "The role of *ziran* (self-so) is similar to the role of *causa sui* (self-caused) in European philosophy" (Perkins 2015). This assumes that both traditions share the concept of causality.

[25] From the Mawangdui B manuscript on, the major reading has been *wei dao* 爲道 "to practise *dao*" instead of *wei shi* 爲士 (cf. Henricks 1990: 216 f.; Wagner 2003: 164).

[26] See, for instance, "He who says that others are not equal to himself comes to ruin" (謂人莫己若者亡) ("Zhonghui zhi gao 仲虺之誥") (Legge 1961: 182).

[27] "The noble man does not strive to outdo others in [terms of] ritual status" (君子不逞人於禮) (Cook 2012: 608f.). In the *Cheng zhi* these ideas are based on the view that men are all born with the same nature and that moral goodness has a powerful social impact.

advice can be derived from the observation of natural processes. This thought is enhanced in *Laozi* A2 (R66):

> 江海所以爲百谷王，以其能爲百谷下，是以能爲百谷王。聖人之在民前也，以身後之; 其在民上也, 以言下之。其在民上也, 民弗厚也; 其在民前也, 民弗害也。天下樂進而弗厭。以其不争也, 故天下莫能與之争。
>
> The reason why the rivers and seas rule as king of the hundred streams is because they are able to lie below the hundred streams. This is why they are able to rule as kings of the hundred streams. That the sage is situated before the people is because he puts his self behind them; that he is situated above the people is because he places [himself in] his words below them. [Although] situated above the people, the people do not think him heavy. [Although] situated before the people, the people do not see him as a threat. The world delights in advancing him, never tiring of him. Because he does not contend, no one in the world is able to contend with him.

The simile is easy: rivers and seas end up containing much of the water that a region contains. This makes them king, just as a ruler succeeds by his control of the people's labour power and possessions. Rivers and seas succeed due to their geographic situation. A ruler is expected to emulate this in social terms by his conduct and language. If he thereby avoids antagonizing his subjects they will "naturally" submit, as do the smaller rivers and streams. This will leave the ruler in easy and uncontested control. The strength of the simile is enhanced when held against the image of Great Yu and his tortured life. He was seen to qualify as an efficient ruler by incessantly controlling the flow of waters (*Tang Yu zhi dao* 唐虞之道, Cook 2012: 553).

5 Ways of Action

All Guodian texts deal with the question of how to act with success.[28] The foremost realm of action is the state, where the person who acts is in a leadership position. When there is success, the people are harmonious and content and the person of the ruler is safe and well. Up to this point the *Laozi* texts are in agreement with the rest of the Guodian corpus. The big difference lies in their vision of how to achieve such a good result. They start from the premise that the human condition is exactly the same as that of all other living beings.[29] For them, the people are not much different from the myriad things: "I undertake no action and the people transform of themselves" 我無爲而民自化 (A17; R57) or "Therefore the sage can assist the myriad things to be of themselves but cannot act upon them" 是故聖人能輔萬物之自然, 而弗能爲 (A6; R64b). The idea just cited, that the people's motivation resembles

[28] A term for such action is *cheng* 成 "to complete", as in *Laozi* A9 (R2), A12 (R25), and B7 (R45a).

[29] This agrees with the *Zhuangzi*: "As a term for the number of things we call them 'myriad', and man amounts to one of them . . . If you compare him to the myriad things, is he not like the tip of a hair on the body of a horse?" 號物之數謂之萬, 人處一焉 . . . 此其比萬物也, 不似豪末之在於馬體乎? (Guo 1989: 17.564; Graham 1986: 145, modified).

that of streams and rivulets, goes in the same direction (A2; R66). This makes men things that are stuck in a process between being born and dying, as is everything else:

> 萬物方作, 居以顧復也。天道云云, 各復其根。(A14; R16a)
>
> As the myriad things arise together,
> stay where you are and watch their return.
> With heaven's *dao* in circular motion.
> everything returns to its root.

In a world where humans blend into the myriad things, the sage leads because he understands this to be the case.

This is very evident in *Taiyi shengshui*, the short essay that forms one roll of strips with *Laozi* C. It shows how, starting with Great Unity (*taiyi* 太一), water, heaven, earth, spirits and other numinous beings, Yin and Yang, the four seasons, cold and heat and wet and dry and finally the year come into being. Great Unity is termed "mother of the myriad things", as *dao* is called in *Laozi* A12 (R25). After giving birth it remains present in all processes of growth and decay, or, more precisely, of birth and return (*sheng fu* 生復). From the start these two movements are joined: "The Great Unity gives birth to water, and water returns to join with the Great Unity" just as A12 depicts *dao* as remaining interwoven with its "children" (Cook 2012: 345–48). By means of such cooperation the cosmos is not only initiated but kept in motion: "*Dao* that advances seems to retreat" [進]道若退 (B5; R41) (Xing 2014). Perkins shows that images of the world's beginnings can be loaded with metaphysical and religious weight (Perkins 2015). In the materials considered here, this weight is light. The authors appear to draft diverse cosmogonic beginnings with the intention of enhancing particular social values. Their interest is not in any cosmogonic truth, but in a cosmogonic construct's possible consequences. Wang Bo argues convincingly that, by ending the first part of *Taiyi shengshui* with the year, the authors intend to show that cosmic and social order and regularity are the aim of the cosmogonic process (Wang 2001a). By concentrating on the second part of the essay, Roger Ames shows that its authors mean to explain and advocate the value of harmony (Ames 2014). This is also the intention of section 42 of the received text, with its highly formalised account of the world's origin that is not in the Guodian texts: "The Way gives birth to unity; unity gives birth to two; two gives birth to three; three gives birth to the myriad things" (道生一, 一生二, 二生三, 三生萬物). The focus is the intense togetherness of the myriad things. This leads to the conclusion that "the violent do not die a [natural] death" 强梁者不得其死 (Chen 1984: 232). Between the values thus promoted, there is some conflict. The orderly year envisaged in the first part of the *Taiyi shengshui* and the formalism of section 42 are alien to *dao* being of itself, as suggested in A12 (R25).

The authors of *Taiyi shengshui* propose that only someone who understands cosmogonic processes may be called a sage (君子知此之謂[聖]) (Cook 2012: 348).[30]

[30] For supplying *sheng* 聖 as the first of several missing graphs, see also Meyer 2011: 218–20.

In a similar vein, *Laozi* A12 as quoted above has the king participate in the *dao*'s power to originate and maintain things. Both passages suggest that an awareness of the origin of things is a condition for managing them. Thereby the authors extend and intensify their proposition that someone's insight and practical success is geared to their attitude to the natural processes around and within them.[31] Here lies the background of the phrase that the empire must be trusted only to a person who shows more concern for himself than for the world (*Laozi* B4; R13). Self-cultivation amounts to increasing and maintaining one's energy:

> 治人事天, 莫若嗇。夫唯嗇, 是以早備。[早備,] 是謂[重積德]。(B1; R59).[32]
>
> In putting people in order and serving [one's own] nature, there is nothing better than storing up. For only by storing up can you be prepared in advance. [Advance preparation] is what is known as repeatedly accumulating virtue.

The authors' interest is in the psychosomatic rather than the agronomic aspects of such "storage", but not in its technical details. Their topic is the social conduct that is its precondition. They suggest a chain of avoidances, from contempt for sensual stimulation, to disregard for career opportunities, that are all psychologically linked and are all meant to cut off outside impact and thus dependence. Some of this is customary, as for instance, are warnings against giving in to likes and dislikes and the proposition that efficient leadership centres on the reduction of personal ambition (*Zun deyi,* Cook 2012: 649; *Ziyi*, Cook 2012: 390–91; Cook 2012: 395–99). In the *Laozi* texts, this advice is grounded in the understanding that one needs enough independence "to be what one is" (*ziran*) if one wants to succeed. For the authors, social and political hierarchy, family relations and one's position in regard to friends and peers are no issue, since they all signify entanglements that are to be avoided.[33] The same fundamental disapprobation extends to the relationship between ruler and ministers. The only relationship that deserves attention is that between ruler or sage and the people. For the question whether an action is appropriate and "successful",

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[31] This proposition is in direct opposition to what other Guodian authors suggest, as can be seen for instance in the following statement: "In general, as for *dao*, techniques of the heart are the main thing. Regarding *dao*'s four techniques it is only the human *dao* that can be deemed *dao* . . . *Odes*, *Documents*, *Rituals* and *Music* were all originally born of men." 凡道, 心術爲主。道四術, 唯人道爲可道也 . . . 詩, 書, 禮, 樂, 其始出皆生於人。(*Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出) (Cook 2012: 708–11; Middendorf 2008: 153). The identity of *dao*'s "four techniques" remains unclear.

[32] The strip is damaged and the last three characters are interpolated on the basis of the received text (Cook 2012: 285). Cook's translation for *shitian* "serving heaven" is followed here. It is well suited to the context of *Laozi* B and in complete agreement with HanFei's reading of the passage (in Queen's translation, modified): "'Serving heaven' means not pressing to the limit the strength of your hearing and eyesight, and not exhausting the faculties of your knowledge and understanding" 所謂事天者, 不極聰明之力, 不盡智識之任。(Chen 1974: 20.349; Queen 2013: 234). The phrase "accumulating virtue" agrees with the mention of virtue (*de* 德) in B8 (R54) where it is said to result from self-cultivation, in other words to emanate from practising *dao* (Chan 2013: 20). The term *de* is rarely used in *Laozi* A, B and C.

[33] This does not mean that the authors ignore the existence of institutions that structure social life. The contrast between civil and military affairs is well observed, as is the distinction that exists between household, village, state and empire or "all-under-heaven".

the reaction of the people is decisive. The people figure here, as elsewhere in pre-Qin texts, as the testing ground for social thought and are the same difficult and hard-to-predict entity. For taming them, the *Laozi* authors take the important step of stressing their similarity to the myriad things, as we have seen. The person who leads them is, in the *Laozi* texts' diction, a "sage". While this term quietly includes the disregard for social status that is expressed in the *Zhuangzi*, a sage is in a non-ostentatious manner as reluctantly self-confident as is the Confucius of the *Analects*. The sage knows how the myriad things function and thereby knows how to motivate the people. On this basis he can rule them.

From this account of how to act, it is clear that the *Laozi* texts have no space for moral norms. In the discourse of pre-Qin times, these norms are situated in the world of learning and skilful argument differentiation, as is well observed in the *Zhuangzi*. This discourse is grounded in the assumption of the radical superiority of human beings over all other living things and leads to the conclusion that men who make the most of this superiority by cherishing humaneness can expect to prosper (*Ziyi*, Cook 2012: 387f.). For the authors of the *Laozi* texts, this proposition is based on mistaken principles:

> 天下皆知美之爲美也, 惡已; 皆知善, 此其不善已。有亡之相生也, 難易之相成也, 長短之相形也, 高下之相盈也, 音聲之相和也, 先後之相隨也。是以聖人居亡爲之事, 行不言之教。萬物作而弗始也, 爲而弗恃也, 成而弗居。夫唯弗居也, 是以弗去也。(A9; R2)
>
> When everyone in the world knows the beautiful as beautiful, ugliness comes into being. When everyone knows the good, non-good comes into being. Such is the mutual generation of being and nothingness, the mutual completion of difficult and easy, the mutual formation of long and short, the mutual fulfilment of high and low, the mutual harmonizing of tones and voices, the mutual pursuit of what precedes and follows. Therefore the sage engages in matters that do not entail doing anything, imparts instruction without uttering words. As for the myriad things he is active but does not originate them; has an impact but lays no claim on them; He finishes something but does not dwell on it. For only because he does not dwell on it, does it not go away.

This section is as basic on the question of how to act as section A12, quoted above, is on the question of how to know. The first two lines show that when we start differentiating things, for instance by supplying them with names, we create a reality that is in complete opposition to our intention. By choosing value judgements as initial examples, the authors direct their argument against the majority of the Guodian authors, whose intention is precisely to name the good. The next six phrases give concrete examples for the mutual dependence of polar positions. Once something is set up, it entails its opposite, just as the birth of something entails its death. This dependence is a decisive factor of human action. It can hamper the course of an action or push it forward, depending on how those who act situate themselves. That is why the sage "refrains from doing anything" (*wuwei* 無爲) or, with Hansen, from "deeming", which is another word for fixing things (Hansen 1992: 213). As Liu Xiaogan puts it: "Numerous sentences and phrases indicate that Laozi aims to promote the effectual act and behaviour in an irregular way" (Liu 2014: 85). Examples cover a range of possibilities, from "The best thing is to achieve success and then cease" (善者果而已) (A4; R30) to "Thus the sage refrains

from doing anything and so brings no ruin; clings to nothing and so has no loss" (是以聖人亡爲, 故亡敗; 亡執, 故亡失) (A6; R64b). The expression "to refrain from doing anything" points to a way of acting that is as close to spontaneity as an action can be. In the *Laozi*'s vocabulary, the two expressions *wuwei* and *ziran* are intimate partners, one more situated in the realm of human action, the other more in the *dao*-given state of things.[34] There is even a passage that may create the impression that the two are linked as cause and effect (A7; R37 Cook 2012: 245–47):

道恆亡爲也; 侯王能守之, 而萬物將自化.[35]

Dao constantly refrains from doing anything. Were lords and kings able to uphold *dao*, the myriad things would transform of themselves.

This impression is mistaken, since *dao* itself is said to emulate spontaneity. Concepts, if one wants to use the term, are in circular arrangement and signify mutual impact. The authors' interest is not what the world is, but how it works.[36]

6 The Guodian Connection

It has been attempted here to show that the philosophical core of *Laozi* A, B, and C is fully identical with that of the received text of the *Laozi*. This entails that what the three texts propagate is substantially and systematically different from what is in the rest of the Guodian corpus. This point has been under intense discussion. That the Guodian texts use less aggressive expressions than the received text when dismissing ideas of moral philosophy has attracted much attention.[37] An example is *Laozi* A1:

絕智棄辯, 民利百倍。絕巧棄利, 盜賊亡有。絕偽棄詐, 民復季子。[38]

Abolish knowledge and discard the setting of distinctions and the people will benefit a hundred fold. Abolish skills and discard profit, and there will be no robbers and bandits.

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[34] Lai views the two terms as correlated ethical concepts (Lai 2007).

[35] The first line in section 37 of the received text reads more fully: "*Dao* constantly refrains from doing anything and yet there is nothing that does not get done" 道常無爲而無不爲 (Chen 1984: 209). The full formula is contained in B2 in roughly the same form as in section 48 of the received text, as has been explained in Henricks 2000: 87f. Liao Mingchun and others have maintained that only Legalist impact at a later stage added the full formula to the *Laozi* (Liao 1999). Should other contrasts between *Laozi* A and B be revealed the omission may prove more meaningful. As it stands, the two *Laozi* texts seem to supplement rather than contradict each other.

[36] Ames and Hall call the framework for the interdependency of binaries and things in general "process cosmology"and thereby avoid the assumption that the *Laozi* authors deal with ontological categories (Ames and Hall 2003: 80f. and 14f.). This drastically reinterprets the term "cosmology".

[37] Cui Renyi sees changes in content between the Guodian and the Mawangdui manuscripts of the *Laozi* (Cui 1998: 31 f.). Guo Yi, Ding Sixin and others propose that *Laozi* A, B and C do not oppose morality (Guo 1999; Ding 2000: 69).

[38] Cook persuasively defends his reading of the last two characters (Cook 2012: 227). The editors of the Wenwu edition read *xiao zi* 孝慈 "filial piety and paternal affection", as does the received text.

> Abolish artfulness and discard deception and the people will again [become as] young children.

Section 19 of the received text reads (Chen 1984: 136):

> 絕聖棄智, 民利百倍。絕仁棄義, 民復孝慈。絕巧棄利, 盜賊無有。

> Abolish wisdom and discard knowledge and the people will benefit a hundred fold. Abolish humaneness and discard rightness and the people will again show filial piety and paternal affection. Abolish skills and discard profit and there will be no robbers and bandits.

The received text pointedly puts the norms of humaneness and rightness on the same level as skills and profit, adding that they prevent proper family coherence, which is another cherished Confucian value. The wording of *Laozi* 19 is indeed more polemical than that of *Laozi* A1, which objects only to "knowledge" and "setting distinctions". Still, Confucian thinkers consider these two intellectual disciplines to be valuable, while throughout the *Laozi* they are not seen as such. Moreover, the hope that the people will become like young children reveals some antagonism against education, which is another Confucian value.

In the Guodian texts of the *Laozi*, humaneness and rightness occur only in *Laozi* C1 (R18):

> 故大道廢, 焉有仁義。六親不和, 焉有孝慈。邦家昏 [亂, 焉]有正臣。[39]

> Therefore, when great *dao* is abandoned, humaneness and rightness come into being. When the six relations are not in harmony, filial piety and paternal affection come into being. When state and household [are in turmoil], upright ministers come into being.

Section 18 of the received text has the additional line "when perception and knowledge appear, great artfulness comes into being" and does not have the particle *yan* 焉. With Lɪ Ruohui and others, Cook convincingly argues that *yan* is to be understood as a conjunction (Lɪ Ruohui 2004; Cook 2012: 311). Other scholars understand *yan* as marking a question, which would give this reading of the first sentence: "If great *dao* were abandoned, where would humaneness and rightness be?" (Ding 2000: 71 and cf. Lɪ Ruohui 2004: 47). The problem with this reading of the passage is not only linguistic. A positive evaluation of these moral norms contradicts the *Laozi*'s premises and principles.[40] However, from a Confucian perspective, the wording of C1 is less offensive, just as that of A1 is. Suggestions as to why this is the case are necessarily geared to a scholar's view on the origin and early history of the various *Laozi* texts. It seems plausible that polemics used in defence of a position play a bigger role once this position has been established and is criticized than

[39] Section 18 of the received text reads: 大道廢,有仁義; 慧智出, 有大僞; 六親不和, 有孝慈; 國家昏亂, 有正臣。(Chen 1984: 134).

[40] A third frequently quoted passage documents the same moderation that is in place in the first example. Section 5 of the received text starts with saying that neither heaven and earth nor the sage are humane, since both treat the myriad things and the people as if they were straw dogs. This is not contained in *Laozi* A16, which begins with the second half of section 5 and the observation that heaven and earth that contain much empty space between them are like bellows.

when it is set up, that is, after the late fourth century BCE when the Guodian manuscripts were written.

For scholars like CHEN Guying, who sees the propagation of morality and culture as a project in which Daoists and Confucians did and must join forces, the more conciliatory wording of A1 and C1 is of particular importance (Chen 1999a). He also pays much attention to the wording of A20:

> 返也者, 道動也。弱也者, 道之用也。天下之物生於有, [有]生於亡。[41]
>
> Returning is the movement of *dao*; being weak is how it functions. The things of this world are born from something [which in turn] is born from nothing.

The character *you* 有 in the last sentence is an interpolation based on the wording of the received text of Sect. 40, starting with the Mawangdui versions. The Guodian manuscript has no sign of a repetition mark. CHEN Guying argues that there is no reason to add this mark (Chen 1999a). In his view, the text proposes that both being and nothingness are attributes of *dao* without one taking priority, as would necessarily be the consequence were one born of the other. Cook and others point to the syntactic awkwardness that would result if the two sentences were left unconnected (Cook 2012: 282).[42] As in the previous examples from the realm of moral philosophy, the reading established by the Wenwu editors and retained by Cook concurs in content with the rest of *Laozi* A and the other *Laozi* texts. The passage vibrates with the dynamic strength of nothingness and, in consequence, with that of negation, as do all versions of the *Laozi* texts.[43] To approach "being" from the angle of "nothingness" is as central to the authors' method of thinking and principles of analysis as it is to the way of expressing their thoughts. It is apparent in nearly all sections of the three Guodian texts and is part and parcel of "the Daoist theory of the reversal of opposites" (Hansen 1992: 223).

Interpretative details notwithstanding, there seems to be wide-ranging agreement among Chinese scholars that, in the Guodian corpus, Confucians and Daoists practise a cooperative approach to solving issues. This thesis is also defended when scholars argue that there are distinctly Daoist trends in the supposedly Confucian texts of the corpus. The *Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出 has been at the centre of detecting non-Confucian elements, led by CHEN Guying, who sees a resemblance to the

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[41] Section 40 reads 反者道之動; 弱者道之用。天下萬物生於有, 有生於無。(Chen 1984: 223).

[42] CHEN Wei discusses the linguistic and conceptual difficulties of the manuscript's wording. He reads the last phrase as "they are also born of nothingness" [又]生於無 (Chen 2010: 245–49). For translating *you* and *wu* Graham's rendering of "something" and "nothing", or "presence and absence" in Cook's translation, are other options (Graham 1989: 225). "Being" and "nothingness" have here been chosen to hint at the terms' ontological potential and the strength of their dynamic component.

[43] This emerges in ways of action, as we have seen above, and is for example expressed in the following passage: "Serve no end and you will take over the world" (以亡事取天下) (A17; R57). A mode of nothingness is also manifest in the sage's personal excellence: "Thus it will be impossible to either hold you dear or hold you distant, impossible to either profit you or harm you; impossible to either esteem you or disparage you" (故不可得而親, 亦不可得而疏; 不可得而利, 亦不可得而害; 不可得而貴, 亦不可得而賤)(*Laozi* A16; R56).

Zhuangzi in the text's positive concept of *qing* (affection) (Chen 1999b).[44] For *Laozi* A, B and C, he argues that a historical Laozi was in basic agreement with the historical figure of Confucius and that therefore the Daoist concept of *dao* contains moral norms like humaneness and rightness (Chen 1999a).[45] This argument is closely geared to fault lines in late Warring States intellectual history and the rivalry between adherents and opponents of a social and political order that relied on the personal excellence and responsible conduct of the men in charge. From this perspective, the togetherness of the corpus is easy to detect. All Guodian texts want a ruler to behave in an exemplary fashion and intend to bring this about. Some texts, the three *Laozi* texts among them, take a larger run-up than do others and therefore cover much more philosophical ground. However, all philosophical attempts result in advising the person in charge and his staff on how to govern. The coherence of the corpus stems from the fact that its texts see the person of the ruler as crucial and suggest that the people will submit once they are impressed by his conduct.[46] Confucians see the need to enhance this impact by institutions that for the Daoists are just more man-made things that prevent spontaneity from unfolding. They trust that the ruler who intensely models himself along the lines of natural processes will, with the same intensity, induce the people to do likewise. However, Confucians and Daoist agree that, for any ruler or person of authority, self-cultivation is the key to success and part company only on the question of what this cultivation entails.

[44] Chen Guying quotes Zhuangzi's advice "to rely only on the affections of the disposition that one has been given" 任其性命之情而已矣 (Guo 1989: 8.327). Xiao Hanming also sees hints in the *Xing zi ming chu* of Zhuangzi's proposition that all beings, not just humans, have obtained their disposition from heaven (Xiao 2000). Gao Huaping detects traces of the *Laozi* texts' disregard for morality in the *Xing zi ming chu*, despite the fact that this text analyses the human disposition in preparation for suggesting that everyone must be rigidly educated by scriptures, music and ritual (Gao 2000).

[45] Guo Yi also arrives at the conclusion that the Guodian *Laozi* texts take a positive attitude towards the behavioural norms that Confucian thinkers have propagated and that controversies between Daoists and Confucians are not original but a later historical development (Guo 1999: 130, 144). In the same vein, Ding Sixin proposes that the *Laozi* texts found in Guodian are derived from Confucian thought and that the later antagonism between the two schools is only the result of teachings by Mengzi and Zhuangzi (Ding 2000: 69–72). Li Cunshan sees much mutual impact between the two schools and argues that all Guodian manuscripts were the product of Chu Confucians (Li 2000–2001). Xie Junzhi proposes that there is a special relationship between the Confucians and Daoists present in the Guodian corpus (Xie 2008: 1–5). Slingerland adds a new perspective by arguing that a search for "moral spontaneity" is present in many Guodian texts: "I believe that the *Laozi* was included in the reading material that the Guodian tomb occupant was to ponder in the afterlife because it takes a fairly clear position on the problem [of moral spontaneity], arguing that striving itself should be done away with" (Slingerland 2008: 249).

[46] For more ways of reading the *Laozi*'s political philosophy, see Csikszentmihalyi 2014.

7 Conclusion

We may conclude that Daoist thought as it appears in the Guodian corpus shuns the detailed analysis of human relations and the concepts that were developed for this purpose. Instead, thinkers use terms and images taken from experiencing, observing and analysing the power manifest in natural processes. For conveying their insights, they choose poetic modes of expression where words play various roles and have a more versatile presence than in learned discussions. This choice is programmatic. The authors of the *Laozi* texts not only express themselves in a language of their own creation, they attack the dangerous misrepresentations that are conveyed by educated language and, with it, by the fundus of traditional knowledge. This leaves the authors with a seemingly narrow platform for constructing their own thoughts and consequently much of their philosophical activity lies in deconstructing the thoughts of others. However, in the empty space that is thus achieved, they set up a few principles of lasting importance. They start from the thesis that reliable—in other words practical—knowledge stems only from experiencing one's existence and with this from an awareness of the inner nexus between one's own vitality and surrounding things and processes. The authors of the *Laozi* texts share this insight with Zhuangzi. They experiment with radically new ways of expression to conceptualise this experience. As a result they manage to clarify two points. The first is that to act by means of intentional steering that remains outside of the things acted on is necessarily futile. Actions can only succeed when guided by "being of oneself" (*ziran*) in regard to one's own person and simultaneously in regard to the things or people one acts on. While this insight may be of proverbial provenance and was often seen as a regular factor of everyday life, the Daoists placed it squarely within the realm of social philosophy and thereby in continuous constructive competition with the highly sophisticated moral or utilitarian demands of other thinkers. Secondly, from the perspective of natural processes, human beings are primarily things that were born and will die, like all other beings. Simple as it seems, this view of the world was a distinctive contribution to philosophical argumentation and had considerable repercussions. When seen as primarily embedded in their own natural life cycle, the life of human beings follows different rules from the life of those whose course is defined by a web of social contacts and expectations. Social and gender distinctions are lessened, cultural achievements become irrelevant, political institutions superfluous and attention to one's own body and soul become fully justified.

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Chapter 10
"Sagacity" and the Heaven–Human Relationship in the *Wuxing* 五行



Erica Brindley

The Guodian texts that appear to follow a Ruist line of thought are noteworthy in their special emphasis on the link between the divine world of Heaven and the world of humans. The *Wuxing* text is one of the main Guodian texts that clearly emphasizes the divine–human connection, attempting to weave human behaviour into the larger fabric of a cosmos that is at once spiritual and ethical (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998). This chapter examines the way in which the author of the Guodian *Wuxing* outlines the *wuxing* (or five virtues) in terms of internal, psychological sources of realization, especially those that he links to the divine realm of Heaven. I focus in particular on the concept of sagacity (*sheng* 聖) as an ethical ideal associated with an individual's moral psychology and connection to the Divine. Sagacity gains meaning precisely by merging human, mundane realms of knowledge and morality with the subtle characteristics of the spiritual realm (i.e., "Heaven's Way" *tian dao* 天道). This analysis of sagacity and the human–divine relationship demonstrates how some early Chinese Ruist thinkers rationalized their ethics in terms of a larger cosmology that could be accessed through every individual's psyche, inner resources, and inward-oriented practice.

The *Wuxing* text of the Guodian corpus provides insight into the ways in which Ruist thinkers tried to spiritualize and ground their approaches in a fundamentally religious orientation, centered on an inward-oriented practice in addition to the Ruist mainstays of ritual and music. *Wuxing*, which might be translated as The Five Conducts is a short text (relative to the transmitted corpus) that outlines and describes the relevance of the following five conducts of excellence and signs of cultivation: benevolence (*ren* 仁), justice (*yi* 義), propriety (*li* 禮), wisdom (*zhi* 智),

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and sagacity (*sheng* 聖).[1] The title, *Five Conducts*, is important because it immediately challenges the reader to think about virtues, such as the five attributes and traits just listed, in terms of conducts (*xing*), at once linking outer manifestations of behaviour (conducts) with inner attitudes and characteristics. The fifth conduct, sagacity (*sheng*), seems to be an addition or innovation to the traditional *ren-yi* (*ren* benevolence, *yi* justice), *li-zhi* (*li* propriety, *zhi* wisdom) pairings we find in the *Mencius* and other texts of the Warring States period. Not coincidentally, it serves as the central, key element of the five, thus altering the more common pairings and fitting them into a cosmological context and array of five, rather than four. This effectively begs comparison with other, contemporaneous Five Phases schemes, in which a fifth attribute—earth—holds the most esteemed position at the center.

In texts like the *Mozi*, *Mencius*, *Zhuangzi* and *Laozi*, which all contain moral claims, some of which may have predated or been contemporaneous with the compilation of the *Wuxing* during the Warring States period, the usual pairings of moral principles and cultural practices is *ren-yi* and *li-zhi*. These mostly only occur in pairs but sometimes more rarely as a list of four.[2] I will show that the fifth virtue outlined in the *Wuxing* text—sagacity—represents an alternative approach to an emerging pantheon of virtues, elevating and imbuing value into the process of self-cultivation by linking humans to Heaven and its divine, moral realm. By highlighting sagacity, I argue, the author of the text presents an interesting theory of cosmic harmony associated with the net musical effect of all five virtues interacting together. When the interaction is harmonious, the noble man (*junzi* 君子) might create a live axis linking the human realm perfectly to the divine realm. Moreover, given that harmonies in pentatonic music are often grounded in a perfect fifth, this Ruist formulation on the harmonization of moral values reveals an appreciation of ritualistic, salubrious forms of court music (based in the pentatonic scale) as a chief metaphor for the divine potential of the human experience.[3]

[1] The standard, academic translation for *wuxing* in Warring States thought is "five phases," referring to a particular ca. fourth to third centuries BCE development in cosmology that explains all natural phenomena in terms of set relationships among the five primary elements water, earth, metal, wood, and fire. The Guodian *Wuxing* text, however, is an exception to this, perhaps because at the time of its composition the concept of *wuxing* was still being debated and developed, and was not at all settled. We might therefore wish to view the Guodian concept of *wuxing* as a challenge to contemporary concepts of *wuxing*, in which the author consciously attempts to redefine *xing* in terms of moral attributes, and not amoral natural processes. Scott Cook has translated the title as "Five Conducts," showing how the text defines *xing* by referencing the "Virtuous Conducts" (*de zhi xing* 德之行).

[2] Intriguingly, the *Analects* does not once contain the pairings *ren-yi* or *li-zhi*, let alone the four listed together. We see all four together as a list in *Mencius* 6A6 and 7A21 and once in the *Liji*'s "Sangfu" 喪服 chapter. Most of the focus in the *Mencius*, however, is more exclusively on the pairing *ren-yi*, which occurs over twenty times in the text. In *Mozi* and *Zhuangzi* as well, *ren-yi* occurs over twenty times in each text, while *li-zhi* makes no appearance. Of the texts in the Guodian corpus, however, Five Conducts is not the only one to highlight the term *sheng* 聖. In *Tang Yu zhi Dao* the author often makes parallel statements using the terms *sheng* and *ren* 仁 as a philosophical pair.

[3] I am not the first to talk about the text's links to music, which are certainly not subtle and pervade the text. Cook relates "happiness" to "musical contentment" (*le* 樂) and also translates *ji da cheng* 集大成 as "assembled the great symphony" (Cook 2012: 1:467, 469–70).

It is important to note that as an attribute and conduct, sagacity does not represent earth, the central phase of the non-anthropomorphic five phases as represented by what we have come to know as the standard five-phase cosmology of the later Warring States and early imperial periods. Rather, it refers to a human–Heaven connection and the divinity within individuals. Let us therefore begin our discussion by analyzing the role of sagacity as an attribute of Heaven that affirms the human–divine connection. This distinction is most clearly articulated in the text through its statements contrasting the human way (*ren dao* 人道) with the Heavenly Way (*tian dao* 天道).

The text begins by enumerating the Five Conducts in light of a special distinction between types of conduct: A conduct is considered to be virtuous only if it first takes shape from within a person.

> 仁形於內謂之德之行， 不形於內謂之行。義形於內謂之德之1行， 不形於內謂之行。禮形於內謂之德之行，不形於內謂之2行。智形內謂之德之行，不形於內謂之行。聖形於內謂之德3之行, 不形於內謂之(德之)行。

> If benevolence takes shape from within, we call it a "virtuous conduct"; if it does not take shape from within, we [simply] call it a "conduct." If propriety takes shape from within, we call it a "virtuous conduct"; if it does not take shape from within, we [simply] call it a "conduct." If ritual takes shape from within, we call it a "virtuous conduct"; if it does not take shape from within, we [simply] call it a "conduct." If knowledge takes shape from within, we call it a "virtuous conduct"; if it does not take shape from within, we [simply] call it a "conduct."

I stop here, even though the text goes on to define the fifth conduct of Sagacity, to make a quick point. While "one's central heart" (*zhong xin* 中心) is not the phrase used at this point in the text, it is used very shortly later in reference to thoughts, emotions, and moral inclinations. The reader might therefore be justified to assume that when something "takes shape from within" (*xing yu nei* 形於內), this refers specifically to its "taking shape from within one's central heart" (*xing yu zhong xin* 形於中心).

Also, in these first few phrases, we note an important distinction between virtuous conducts that stem from an internalized source of moral motivation within, and conducts that do not stem from such a source of moral virtue within.[4] The latter might be understood in the contemporary world as "behaviouristic," insofar as only the external form of one's behaviour is what is being discussed. Conduct that is not first shaped in one's heart is merely "conduct," without a deeper, moral and psychological element to it. What is special regarding the distinction between virtuous conduct and mere, behaviouristic conduct, then, is the inner or psychological aspect

[4] In the fourth century BCE, we see the development of debates concerning morality in relation to inner and outer sources of the self. The language of *nei/wai* (inner/outer) becomes prevalent throughout in the literature, and differences in opinion arise about whether something like sagacity counts as a virtuous conduct when it does not take shape from within. The Mawangdui version of this text differs from the Guodian version on sagacity taking shape within, which might suggest that various people thought differently on this point (Csikszentmihalyi 2004: 312–14).

of the former, which, the author clearly states, is deserving of the adjectival modifier virtuous (*de* 德).

When individuals in ancient China attained *De*-virtue, this involved much more than just simple virtuous conduct; there were deeply spiritual aspects as well. The use of *De*-virtue/virtuous in the Guodian *Wuxing* reflects this spiritual meaning as well. Indeed, as the most important individual conduct, sagacity gains value precisely because of its special connection to *De*-virtue and the spiritual realm. This becomes clear immediately after the above comments on the formation of the four virtuous conducts.

The first section of the text provides the definitive theme of the entire text. A fifth attribute, namely, Sagacity, defies the dichotomy of inner/outer by always remaining the same: “If sagacity takes shape from within, we call it a ‘virtuous conduct’; if it does not take shape from within, we [nevertheless] call it a ‘virtuous conduct’” (聖形於內謂之德3之行, 不形於內謂之[德之]行). Unlike the other four conducts, Sagacity maintains a unique, intrinsic connection to virtuous behaviour, whether or not it takes shape from within an individual. But why? In the very next line of the text, we learn that it is because Sagacity is an attribute belonging to the spiritual realm—a supernatural attribute, so to speak, that is associated with Heaven’s Way: “The virtuous conducts are five in number, when all are in harmony with each other, this is called ‘*De*-virtue’; when four conducts are in harmony with each other, this is called ‘goodness.’ Goodness is the human way; Virtue is the Heavenly Way” (德之行五, 和謂之德, 四行和謂之善。善, 人4道也。德, 天道也).

In the very first section of the text, the author proclaims the central theme of the *Wuxing* through the distinction between the human way 人道 and the Heavenly Way 天道. Of note is the fact that while the first four virtuous conducts mentioned are indeed virtuous when taken in and of itself (*de* 德), they do not constitute *De*-virtue as a whole when harmonized together as four. Rather, as the above statement makes clear, “when all are in harmony with each other, this is called ‘*De*-virtue’” (德之行五, 和謂之德).[5] In other words, all Five Conducts must harmonize together to create a perfect whole, and only then is the human–divine gap breached and *De*-virtue manifested.

The distinction between the human way and the Heavenly Way seems to drive the author to discuss Five Conducts, rather than four, in the first place. Given that the Five Virtuous Conducts are what define the Heavenly Way, and that the four virtuous conducts, even when harmonized together, do not make the cut, there should be something very special not just about the number five, but about the particular trait that defines the Fifth Virtuous Conduct: Sagacity. But what is Sagacity in the text? What kind of position does it hold in relation to the other four? The following analysis demonstrates the specific ways that Sagacity is described in the text

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[5] It is helpful to differentiate the two types of *de* 德 in the text by referring to *de* of the human Way adjectivally, as a virtuous conduct, on the one hand, and *De*-virtue of Heaven’s Way, as a noun that describes a sacred way of being in the world. Similarly, in this chapter I will capitalize all letters that refer to the sacred realm in some way, so as to help clarify the crucial distinction between human and Heaven in the text.

that set it apart as not just the fifth in a series of five types of mental processes and their outward expressions in behaviour (conduct), but as a trait that occupies a separate, higher category of its own; that of the divine realm of Heaven.

1 Aurality, Musical Harmony, and the Divine

Sagacity represents the crown jewel of the virtues in this text. But it does not merely top the other virtues; it is what holds them together as a single harmony, infusing the entire package of five with an extraordinary, numinous quality and power. As many commentators have noted, the *Wuxing* draws upon an intriguing musical metaphor found in the *Odes* to explain this special status, thereby underscoring a fundamental difference between purely human vs. human–Heaven processes and ways of being (Cook 2012: 1:469–70; Csikszentmihalyi 2004). This metaphor involves the bronze bell and the jade chimestone. The text indicates that in certain forms of ritual music, the proper interplay of instruments involved the sounding of the bronze bell and the striking of the jade chimestones. While the text is unclear as to the exact sequence of this sounding, it does show that the two would have been struck so that there was an overlap of sound at some point. By overlapping the sound of the bronze bell with the jade stones, one would create not merely the sound of two distinct instruments playing together, but an intensified harmony of blended, deep reverberations and clear tones.

The author describes this process in the following terms:

> 金聲而玉振之, 有德者也。金聲, 善也。玉音, 聖也。善, 人道也 。德, 天道也。有德者, 然後能金聲而玉振之。[6]

> "A bronze bell and a jade chimestone causing it to resound"; this describes a virtuous person. A bronze bell is "goodness." A jade tone is "Sagacity." Goodness is the human way, and virtue is Heaven's Way. Only when there is a person of *De*-virtue will there be "A bronze bell and a jade chimestone causing it to resound."

This musical metaphor has much explanatory power. It artfully depicts how the morality of "person of *De*-virtue" expresses itself outwardly. In the musical interaction, the jade tone envelops the sound of a bronze bell with reverberations that magnify the sonic interaction between bell and chimestones. Unlike the metaphors for *De*-virtue used in the *Analects*, such as the Pole Star around which all planetary bodies naturally revolve or the wind that bends the grass below as it blows, this metaphor involves the clear agency of both interacting objects, the ringing bronze bell, and the jade stone that not only chimes but also enhances the very sound of the bell through its reverberations.[7]

If we follow the structure of this musical metaphor, we see that Sagacity (associated with the jade tone) harmonizes with goodness in such a manner that

[6] Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 149 (Slip 9). For a great discussion of this, see Csikszentmihalyi 2004: 81, 84–85.

[7] See *Analects* 2.1 and 12.19, respectively.

goodness reverberates and, along with Sagacity, produces that which is in tune with the basic Way of Heaven: *De*-virtue. The "person of *De*-virtue," then, is like the numinous agency of a jade tone, which embodies Sagacity. Such a person brings out the best in every interaction, magnifying what is "good" and turning it into something even more lustrous, he who has "*De*-virtue." Sagacity, Heaven, and *De*-virtue are therefore all implicated in the image of this Virtuous Person, who has departed from the purely human realm to cleave along an exceptional, divinely motivated path.

Since *De*-virtue is associated with Heaven, one might at this point ask why it is that the four virtuous conducts, each virtuous in its own way, might not count as also being divine and a part of the Way of Heaven. The answer to this seems to be that there are conducts and traits that can be described as "virtuous," and these might eventually be transformed into Heavenly *De*-virtue, but only sagacious conduct might be considered divinely virtuous from start to finish. In accordance with the text's statements about the four vs. Five Virtuous Conducts, then, it makes sense to think of Sagacity as the defining feature of that which belongs to Heaven, and sagacious conduct as something distinct from mere virtuous conduct.

The author's emphasis on the Heavenly Way is, I think, one of the more intriguing aspects of the message in the *Wuxing*. The author is not merely content to outline conducts and various sequences of emotional states that might help develop morality and a moral stance in the individual. Instead, he goes out of his way to distinguish between the human and Heavenly Way, and to show that the noble man goes beyond one to embrace the other. The text, which is replete with numerous chains of emotional and cognitive states, each leading to the next in a subtly changing series, does more than provide fun lists and sequences of the psychic realm. Indeed, the author very specifically shows how those aspects of our mundane, human psychology can be transformed along two tracks: that of the human, moral way, and that of the divinely inspired, moral Way. By revealing that moral psychology can be rooted in the divine (i.e., a Heavenly Way), the author legitimizes typical, Confucian virtues according to a moral and religious metaphysics of resonant harmony. Sagacity, no less, is the key to such a harmony.

Just as the jade tone helps create a reverberating harmony between musical instruments, Sagacity helps create an overall, moral, and perfectly resonant harmony between the human and numinous realms. Building on the notion of the divine harmony caused by jade chimestones, the author further accentuates the human–Heaven distinction via another metaphor, this time concerning our senses of sight and sound: the "appearance of jade" (*yu se* 玉色) vs. the "tone of jade" (*yu yin* 玉音). Yet again, it is Sagacity that represents the divine and numinous, which is perceived primarily through the ear via the tone of jade, rather than through the eye:

> 聖之思也徑, 徑則形, 形則不忘, 不忘則聰, 聰則聞君子道, 聞君子道則玉音, 玉音則形, 形則聖。
>
> The thinking of Sagacity is direct[8]; direct, it takes form; taking form, one does not forget; not forgetting, one is aurally attuned; aurally attuned, one hears the Way of the noble

[8]The graph in the Guodian manuscript has been transcribed, and hence translated, in many ways. In this paper I follow Csikszentmihalyi's understanding of the graph in question as *jing* 徑 (direct)

man. When one hears the Way of the noble man, jade intones. When jade intones, it takes form, taking form, then there is Sagacity.

This passage appears to be circuitous, starting with "the thinking of Sagacity" and ending again with "Sagacity," and in a crucial way it is. But instead of a circle leading back to the same exact point and phenomenon, what the author describes is more like a spiral progression from Point A to Point A1. Indeed, as time progresses the series of mental processes that began with a type of sagacious thinking (Point A) leads to a general state of being, also sagacious in quality (Point A1). Along the way, we move from thought processes to aural attunement and then, lastly, to a way of being, perhaps best described as one in which we embrace a certain, elevated, moral knowledge and awareness in the world.

There is something unique about jade as a material. In early China, jade disks and other objects were considered to have special, numinous properties, and they were often laid upon or placed inside the mouths of corpses during burial.[9] Although the exact purpose of such objects is still disputed, their association with the spiritual realm and the body is undeniable. The *Wuxing* verifies this special status of jade by linking the jade tone with Heaven, Sagacity, and sagacious *De*-virtue. The linkage of jade to tones and the sonic realm is special as well; its tones have ethereal power and impact, imbuing our bodies and mental worlds with a touch of the divine.

So far, it is clear from the musical metaphors invoked in the *Wuxing* text that the numinous and Heavenly qualities of jade are more exclusively associated with the aural aspects of its tone, as in the example of the jade chimestone above. In contrast to this, when the text refers to "the appearance of jade," this is but a visual cue and marker of human moral attainment, not an aural trace of Heavenly inspiration. This is especially apparent in the following statement from the text about knowing, in the sense of being able to recognize, the worthy man (*xian ren* 賢人) when you encounter him: "If you see and know it [i.e., that he is worthy], then this is wisdom. If you hear and know it, then this is Sagacity" (見而知之, 智也。聞而知之, 聖也).[10] Here, the faculties of sight and hearing are hierarchically arranged so that knowledge obtained through hearing is Sagacity, which is categorically different from and occupies a superior position to knowledge obtained through seeing, which is wisdom.

In another passage, the author of *Wuxing* suggests that divinity can only be apperceived through the psycho-spiritual, aural embodiment of "attunement" (*cong* 聰), and not the more visual understanding associated with "clarity" (*ming* 明), which is again relegated to the mundane realm of morality:

聞君子道聰也。聞而知之, 聖也。聖人知天道也。知而行之, 義也。行之而時, 德也。見賢人, 明也。見而知之,27 智也。知而安之, 仁也。安而敬之, 禮也。

To hear the Way of the noble man is to be attuned [in one's hearing]; to know it when one hears it is Sagacity. The Sage knows the Way of Heaven. To know it and put it into practice

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and not *qing* 輕 (light), as opposed to "heavy," which is the graph Cook uses in his translation (Csikszentmihalyi 2004: 73).

[9] For debates on beliefs in the immortality of the corpse, see Wu 1989; Brown 2002: 201–23.

[10] Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 150 (Strip 25).

> is righteousness. To practice it in a timely manner is *De*-virtue. To see the way of the worthy man is to be clear [in one's sight]; to know it when one sees it is wisdom. To know it and be at ease in it is benevolence. To be secure in it and respectful of it is ritual.[11]

The human–Heaven distinction is again brought to bear in this passage through the comparison between wisdom and Sagacity. Not only do these constitute two types of knowing, they are the results of two different paths to knowing as well: one via the eyes, the other via the ears.

Lastly, to further prove his point about visual knowledge as opposed to aural knowledge, the author mentions "the appearance of jade" with reference merely to the human virtue of benevolence (*ren* 仁), and not the divine virtue of Sagacity. For example, the text describes in the following manner the psychic evolution involving benevolent thoughts:

> 仁之思也清, 清則察, 察則安, 安則溫, 溫則悅, 悅則戚, 戚則親, 親則愛, 愛則玉色, 玉色形, 形則仁。

> The thinking of benevolence is pure; pure, it is observant; observant, it is at ease; at ease, it is warm; warm, it is pleased; pleased, it is affectionate; affectionate, it is attached; attached, it is loving; loving, it is the appearance of jade. Once the appearance of jade takes form, then one is benevolent.

This causal chain of thoughts and emotions leads us from specific thought processes to general states of being morally achieved. In this case, the end goal is to be benevolent. To arrive at such a goal, one must return to the root of benevolence inside oneself: benevolent thinking. By starting with, and possibly meditating on, such thinking, one will necessarily set into motion a slew of positive feelings of closeness and warmth that follow from it. And towards the end of this chain of moral and emotional thought-feelings, the appearance of jade takes shape in one's body. As a visual cue that reveals one's moral state of mind, such a jade-like appearance is not considered to be numinous or Heavenly in the same way that the jade tone is described. According to the hierarchy of 4 + 1 (four human and one Heavenly) conducts described above, benevolence belongs clearly to the human Way.

In each of these causal sequences in the text, the author describes a transformative process akin to the transformation of materials in cooking or even inner alchemy. What one begins with is allowed to simmer in the crucible of one's body, developing in slight increments till the starting material has evolved into a related but different product. Thus, in the example above, benevolent thinking cooks until it reaches the appearance of jade, at which point the final emotional-moral stew is prepared and the individual has achieved an overall state of benevolent responsiveness to the outside world. The appearance of jade, as distinct from the jade tone, is the penultimate product in the manufacturing of a human virtue, benevolence. So while jade is still referenced as a special material that represents a high level of cultivation, the manner in which jade expresses its properties, whether visually or aurally, constitutes the difference between its mundane and divine aspects.

[11] Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 150 (Strips 25–27).

Even the discussion of the human way in the text is undergirded by the overarching distinction between human and Heavenly moral attributes. It is precisely through such a distinction, in fact, that the fundamental dependence of the human way on the Heavenly Way gains meaning. One of the main virtues associated with the human way is goodness. In the following excerpt, we see how goodness is set apart from *De*-virtue in an intriguing way:

> 君子之爲善也，有與始有與終也。君子之爲德也，有與始無與終也。金聲而玉振之，有德者也 。[12]

> The noble man, in modelling goodness, has [goodness] with him in the beginning and [goodness] with him at the end. The noble man, modelling virtue, has [virtue] with him in the beginning but not need to end with it. When there is a person of virtue will there be "A bronze bell and a jade chimestone causing it to resound."

This is a very difficult passage to translate and to understand. I believe what is happening with the bronze bell and jade chimestone, used specifically to support the author's point here, helps explain the meaning. In the process of the evolution of moral qualities and thoughts, as outlined repeatedly in the text, we see certain traits moving through a transformative sequence, spiralling up from one point to a more refined point, often linked with the divine realm. Goodness as a trait is something that one can both start out with and end with in this transformative cycle. However, insofar as *De*-virtue is already a refined virtue of Heaven, it does not transform into a higher-order virtue but stays the same throughout. As in the case with the tone of jade, which starts out as a tone but eventually causes the other sounds to reverberate in a sacred harmony, it somehow loses its own identity in the process. As the transformative glue that helps everything reverberate harmoniously together, *De*-virtue is present in the beginning but not at the end of the process. Indeed, as the beginning of the text indicates, *De*-virtue is the harmony of all the Five Conducts, and not merely a single one.

2 Conclusion

Having examined the nature of Sagacity and its relationship to Heaven's Way, *De*-virtue, and the human way, we can better understand the manner in which the *Wuxing* links certain psychological traits with the sacred, thereby elevating the status of the noble man to that of a divine sage. The noble man "manifests all Five Conducts within and carries them out in a timely manner" (五行皆形於內而時行之, 謂之君子).[13] Furthermore, the Sagacity and wisdom he embodies is not merely in accord with the Heavenly Way, it is "the source from which ritual and music emerge, and that by which the Five Conducts are harmonized" (聖知禮樂之所由生也, 五行之所和也).[14] Two of the main textual strategies for depicting processes of

[12] Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 150 (Slips 18, 19).

[13] Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 149 (Strips 6, 7).

[14] Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 150 (Strip 28).

psychological transformation from normal, human emotions to Heavenly, divine attributes are inspired by music. One makes use of the metaphor of resonant interactions between bronze metal and jade chimestone, and the other discusses the limits of human moral insights by speaking of the appearance of jade and the tone of jade. Perhaps the author's reliance on music is well justified however, especially given the overarching goal for the Five Conducts taken together as a whole: a harmony that befits Heaven itself.

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Chapter 11
The *Qiong da yi shi* 窮達以時 (*Poverty or Success Is a Matter of Timing*) and the Concept of Heaven and Humans in Early Confucianism



Liang Tao

1 Introduction

For a long time scholars have held that ancient Chinese philosophy, especially Confucian philosophy, can be characterized by the basic doctrine of Heaven and Humans being one, and that the division between Heaven and Humans was engendered by Xunzi in the late Warring States period.[1] However, the manuscript *Qiong da yi shi* 窮達以時 (Poverty or Success Is a Matter of Timing), excavated in 1993 from Guodian, clearly addresses the division between Heaven and Humans (*tian ren zhi fen* 天人之分) (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998). According to the excavation report, the manuscript antedates Xunzi.[2] Thence, the division between Heaven and Humans did not originate from Xunzi but is a basic idea of early Confucianism. What, then, does the Guodian notion of the division between Heaven and Humans entail? How does it relate to Mencius and Xunzi? What is its status in intellectual history? What new perspectives can we form on the relation between Heaven and Humans in Confucianism? These questions are, without doubt, worthy of further study.

[1] This article previously appeared in Chinese and has been revised and updated (Liang 2003). This translation was provided by Rens Krijgsman, with editorial modifications by Daniel Lee and Shirley Chan.

[2] In this chapter personal names such as Xunzi and Mencius are used for ease of reference. As the context will indicate, they generally refer to the implied authors of, or the precepts as read in, their eponymous works, not necessarily the historical personages.

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2 Basic Thinking on the Division Between Heaven and Humans in the *Qiong da yi shi*

It is possible that *Qiong da yi shi* (hereafter "the manuscript") is related to Confucius being stranded between Chen and Cai. It clearly brings out the division between Heaven and Humans[3]:

> 有天有人，天人有分。察天人之分，而知所行矣。有其人，無其世，雖賢弗行矣。苟有其世，何難之哉?
>
> There is [that which is controlled by] Heaven, and there is [that which is within the power of] Man, and each has its separate lot. Once one has examined the division between Heaven and Man, one will know how to act. With the right person, but without the right age, even though he be worthy he will be unable to act. If given the right age, however, what difficulties would there be? (Cook 2012: 453–54)

Why are some people in dire straits and hapless, whilst others are rich and fortunate? When facing poverty or success, what attitude should one adopt? These are problems that countless wise people have pondered for thousands of years. According to the manuscript, what influences poverty and success lies not just in humans but also in Heaven, and both have their part in it. In the *Liyun* 禮運 (Book of Rites), Zheng Xuan notes, "'Part' can be likened to 'role'" (*fen you zhi ye* 分猶職也). Thus, the division between Heaven and Humans means that both have their distinct roles, influence and scope. Therefore, understanding which part is Humans' and which is Heaven's allows one to understand what one should and should not do, and how one should behave. The manuscript *Yucong* 1 語叢 (Thicket of Sayings 1) reads:

> 知天所為, 知人所為, 然後知道, 知道然後知命。
>
> Only when you know to what purposes Heaven acts and to what purposes Man [should] act will you know the Way, and only after you know the Way will you know [your] mandate. (Cook 2012: 831)

Here, what Heaven does and what Humans do denote the different roles and influences that underscore the division between Heaven and Humans.

Despite the manuscript drawing a distinction between Heaven and Humans, when it comes to success in the human world, it emphasizes Heaven as having a stronger influence than Humans. This, besides being the author's own position, is also closely related to his conceptualization of Heaven. The manuscript reads: "Whether or not [one] encountered [an appreciative lord] was [a matter controlled by] Heaven" (*yu buyu, tianye* 遇不遇, 天也) (Cook 2012: 463). This Heaven that controls one's encounters is different from the primordial theological Heaven (*shenxue tian* 神學天) which has its own will and goals. It is also different from the later concept of natural Heaven (*ziran tian* 自然天) that "does not survive because of the actions of a Yao; and does not perish because of the actions of a Jie" (Knoblock 1994: 3.14). Rather, it is some form of fatalistic Heaven (*mingyun tian* 命運天). For

[3] This idea was first advanced by Li Xueqin (Li 1999: 239–44).

an individual it can be called fate; taken together, it is called destiny. When Heaven's influence is so vast, does this then imply that Humans play no role at all, and can only obey what Heaven has arranged for them? The answer is no. This brings us back to the reading of the division between Heaven and Humans in the manuscript:

> 動非為達也, 故窮而不怨; 學非為名也, 故莫之知而不憐。[芷蘭生於林中, 不為人莫]嗅而不芳。無茖根於包山石, 不為[無人不]……善否己也, 窮達以時; 德行一也, 譽毀在旁; 聽之弋之, 母白不釐。窮達以時, 幽明不再。故君子敦於反己。[4]
>
> Their actions were not motivated by the prospect of success, and thus while impoverished they were not [upset]; [their learning was not] for the sake of fame, and thus while no one appreciated them they held no grudges. [Irises and orchids grow in the forest]; they do not fail to be fragrant [just because there is no one there] to smell them. Colorful gems and precious jades are concealed within mountain stones; they do not [fail to …]. The choice to excel or not lay within themselves, and poverty or success was a matter of timing. Their virtue and conduct were uniform throughout, and [all considerations of] praise or slander were set aside. [Some were listened to and others attacked, the mother and the white were not distinguished.] Poverty or success is a matter of timing, and whether in obscurity or prominence, one [should] not [act] twice (i.e., differently). Thus the noble man is earnest about returning to himself. (Adapted from Cook 2012: 460, 463–64)

The manuscript suggests that poverty and success are decided by the fortunes of the times; praise and blame come from others. These are all under the purview of Heaven and not of Humans. But the virtuous behaviour of a person is decided by oneself and has nothing to do with Heaven. As such, the perfection of one's virtuous behaviour is the only object that Humans should strive to attain. When one understands this division between Heaven and Humans, then one should no longer be anxious about the fortune of one's circumstances, but be earnest about returning to oneself, and fulfil affairs so as to wait upon the mandate of Heaven (盡人事以待天命).[5] As such, although the manuscript emphasizes the influence of Heaven on the fortune of individuals, it does not reject the position and influence of a human being having at least freewill in matters of virtue and conduct in the face of poverty or success, praise or slander. By making a distinction between Heaven and Humans, the manuscript in fact advocates the subjectivity of Humans and reveals the supreme worth and dignity of humanity.

From the standpoint of intellectual history, the manuscript's position on the division between Heaven and Humans is by no means accidental. It is a product derived over a long time from the ancient idea of destiny and is a reaction to the ancient idea of the unity of Heaven and Humans (*tian ren he yi* 天人合一). Since the Three Dynasties, and especially during the Zhou dynasty (1027?–256 BCE), the main belief has been in a theological Heaven which has its own will and goals. In developing the ancient idea of destiny during Zhou times, the notion of "complementing

[4] I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer who pointed out that the bamboo text here is seriously corrupted. Here I follow the majority view of scholars in reconstructing and interpreting the text. Textual stability, or lack of it, of the manuscript is beyond the scope of this chapter.

[5] My view presented here was published in 2003 and 2008. I thank the anonymous reviewer of this article who pointed out that a similar view can be found in Meyer (2011).

Heaven with virtue" (*yi de pei tian* 以德配天) was highly significant, reflecting a new stage in relation between Heaven and Humans. Zhou thinkers acknowledged the moral character of Heaven, and saw it as the establisher of moral guidelines, carrying the power to reward and punish. In addition, they thought that through "revering Heaven" (*jingtian* 敬天), "protecting the people" (*bao min* 保民), and "diligently cultivating the virtue of reverence" (*ji jing de* 疾敬德), they could accordingly "obtain the Heavenly Mandate" (*shou tianming* 受天命). This reflects the concept of the unity of Heaven and Humans, and at the same time it contemplates the problem of fate. This may be termed moral fatalism. However, the Heavenly Mandate of the Zhou reflects the attainments and failures of a political power governed by one clan or one kin group, and at the time it was still mostly a political concept. A perspective on fate that places the individual at the centre could possibly have arisen towards the end of the Zhou during the Spring and Autumn period (772–481 BCE). The development of that concept is closely related to the coeval emergence of the notions of "blaming Heaven" (*yuan tian* 怨天) and "cursing Heaven" (*ma tian* 罵天).

Originally, the Zhou conceptualized Heaven as having its own will and goals, and that it could punish and reward people based on their behaviour. However, in real life they discovered that Heaven was not nearly as fair as this. Instead, those who did good things were not necessarily rewarded, and those who did bad things were not necessarily punished. Accordingly, the idea of Heaven's justness and authority started to waver. Corresponding to the notions of blaming and doubting Heaven, a belief in destiny started to appear. People no longer believed that fate was a direct result of one's moral behaviour, but instead subsumed it under an uncontrollable external force. By doing so, a fatalistic Heaven was differentiated from the traditional ruling Heaven. At the same time, the concept of a naturalistic Heaven started to appear. Viewed from the context of the development of ancient theories of Heaven, the concept of the ruling Heaven appeared earlier, from which the notions of the natural Heaven and the fatalistic Heaven evolved. The latter two are closely related: the idea of a natural Heaven denies the traditional theory of the Heavenly Mandate, no longer subsuming fate under Heaven's ability to punish and reward. The idea of a fatalistic Heaven in turn tries to provide a new explanation of the workings of fate.

Originally, Heaven's power to reward and punish Humans occupied a central position in the Zhou notion of the unity of Heaven and Humans. When one's behaviour was righteous then one would be blessed; when it was not, then one would encounter disaster. The division in the manuscript between Heaven and Humans, however, separates behaviour and fortune. Doing good is no longer for avoiding punishment or seeking rewards, rather it is for fulfilling one's role as a human being. From a philosophical point of view, this separation is a distinction between one's outer limits and inner consciousness, a moral awakening and advancement in thinking.

3 The Relationship Between *Qiong da yi shi* and *Xingming zhi fen* in the Work of Mencius

After the discovery of *Qiong da yi shi* and because of its proposition regarding the division between Heaven and Humans, people often instantly identify the manuscript with Xunzi. Actually, in pre-Qin Confucianism it is Mencius, not Xunzi, who is more closely aligned with the manuscript's notion of the division between Heaven and Humans. The significance of the manuscript is that it has made people aware that Mencius also discussed the division between Heaven and Humans. Furthermore, it rectifies the simplistic opinion that Mencius and Xunzi hold diametrical views on the relationship between Heaven and Humans.

Although scholars in the past believed that Mencius' Heaven had multiple connotations, they mostly focused on his concept of moral Heaven (*daode tian* 道德天), arguing that Mencius' view of the unity of Heaven and Humans was based on the moral aspects of Heaven and Humans (and mind). In fact, Mencius does not just emphasize the moral Heaven, he also emphasizes the importance of the fatalistic Heaven. In "Liang hui wang II" of the *Mencius*, for example, Marquis Ping of Lu wanted to go and see Mencius, but his favourite courtier, Zang Cang, stopped him. Mencius comments on this, saying:

> [魯侯]行, 或使之, 止, 或尼之, 行止非人所能也。吾之不遇魯侯, 天也。臧氏之子, 焉能使予不遇哉!
>
> When [the Marquis of Lu] goes forward, there is something which urges him on: when he halts, there is something which holds him back. It is not in his power either to go forward or to halt. It is due to Heaven that I failed to meet the Marquis of Lu. How can this fellow Tsang [Zang] be responsible for my failure? (Lau 2003: 53, modified)

Here Heaven is clearly a type of fatalistic Heaven. Moreover, while Shun and Yu had both been the Son of Heaven, while Yi lost his position to Qi, Mencius explains ("Wanzhang I"):

> 舜、禹、益相去久遠, 其子之賢不肖, 皆天也, 非人之所能為也。
>
> Shun and Yu differed from Yi greatly in the length of time they assisted the Emperor, and their sons differed as radically in their moral character. All this was due to Heaven and could not have been brought about by man. (Lau 2003: 207)

Accordingly, Mencius defines Heaven and Fate:

> 莫之為而為者, 天也; 莫之致而至者, 命也。
>
> When something is brought about, though there is nothing that brings it about, then it is Heaven that does it. When something arrives, though there is nothing that makes it arrive, then it is Destiny that does it. (Lau 2003: 207–09)

Just as in the manuscript, when Mencius propounds a fatalistic Heaven it does not mean that Humans cannot do anything, but that through "examining the division between Heaven and Humans" (*cha tian ren zhi fen* 察天人之分) one can perform one's role even better. The difference is that Mencius does not stop at the division

between Heaven and Humans, he develops it one step further to advance the notion of the division between Nature and Fate (“Jinxin II”):

> 口之於味也, 目之於色也, 耳之於聲也, 鼻之於臭也, 四肢之於安佚也, 性也, 有命焉, 君子不謂性也; 仁之於父子也, 義之於君臣也, 禮之於賓主也, 知之於賢者也, 聖(人) 之於天道也, 命也, 有性焉, 君子不謂命也。
>
> Mencius said, “The way the mouth is disposed towards tastes, the eye towards colours, the ear towards sounds, the nose towards smells, and the four limbs towards ease is human nature, yet therein also lies destiny. That is why the gentleman does not ascribe it to nature. The way benevolence pertains to relation between father and son, duty to the relation between prince and subject, the rites to the relation between guest and host, wisdom to the good and wise man, the sage to the way of Heaven, is destiny, but therein also lies human nature. That is why the gentleman does not ascribe it to destiny.” (Lau 2003: 320–21, modified)

Mencius thinks that the mouth’s craving for sweet tastes, the eye’s desiring beauty, the ear’s taking pleasure in sounds, the nose’s delight in fragrant smells, and the limbs seeking relaxation are all human nature. But whether these can be gratified is generally decided by destiny and that is why the gentleman does not regard them as nature. Hence, Zhao Qi’s annotation:

> 仁者得以恩愛施於父子, 義者得以義理施於君臣, 好禮者得以禮敬施於賓主, 知者得以明知知賢達善, 聖人得以天道王於天下。
>
> The humane can effect care and affection between father and son, the righteous can effect propriety and order between ruler and minister, those fond of the rites can effect ritual propriety and respect between guest and host, the wise can with clear knowledge know worth and reach the good, the sage can reign over all under Heaven using the kingly way. (Jiao 1986: 583).

Even though humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are themselves rooted in human nature, their gratification depends in part on timeliness and the luck of the doer. Thus, the gentleman does not regard them as fate. It is not difficult to see that Mencius’ division between Nature and Fate is a further development of the manuscript’s division between Heaven and Humans. As the manuscript focuses on the relationship between Heaven and Humans, it only emphasizes virtuous behaviour as the role of Humans and relegates poverty and success to Heaven. Because Mencius advances the idea of nature and embodies Humans in nature, he cannot but admit that the needs of the senses and the resultant pursuit of success and riches that the manuscript relegates to Heaven are also part of human nature, hence another need of Humans. As such, the needs of the senses, and the needs of humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom which were originally divided between Heaven and Humans, are brought together by him under nature. He is obliged to explain clearly the relation between the two. Mencius thinks that while the needs of the senses and the needs of humaneness, etc. are all part of nature, the two are fundamentally distinct. This distinction is shown in how they are related to Heaven and Fate (“Jinxin I”):

孟子曰: "求則得之, 舍則失之, 是求有益於得也, 求在我者也。求之有道, 得之有命, 是求無益於得也, 求在外者也。"

Mencius said, "Seek and you will get it; let go and you will lose it. If this is the case, then seeking is of help to getting and what is sought is within yourself. But if there is a proper way to seek it and whether you get it or not depends on Destiny, then seeking is of no help to getting and what is sought lies outside yourself." (Lau 2003: 287)

Humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom are inherent in human nature, and because Humans have free will, these qualities are obtained by seeking and lost by neglect. Whether they are practised or not depends on our own determination, not fate, hence they are "in ourselves." On the other hand, the needs of the senses and the desire for prosperity and success likewise stem from nature, though "the seeking [has] a proper course, the getting is only as appointed." Whether they are realized or not depends on fate, hence they can only be viewed as "things sought … without ourselves." In this way, Mencius specifies the relation between Heaven and Humans as a relation between nature and fate, and advances the closely related notion of the division between Nature and Fate ("Jinxin I"):

孟子曰: "廣土眾民, 君子欲之, 所樂不存焉; 中天下而立, 定四海之民, 君子樂之, 所性不存焉。君子所性, 雖大行不加焉, 雖窮居不損焉, 分定故也。君子所性, 仁義禮智根於心, 其生色也睟然, 見於面, 盎於背, 施於四體, 四體不言而喻。

Mencius said, "An extensive territory and a huge population are things a gentleman desires, but what he delights in lies elsewhere. To stand in the centre of the Empire and bring peace to the people within the Four Seas is what a gentleman delights in, but that which he follows as his nature lies elsewhere. That which a gentleman follows as his nature is not added to when he holds sway over the Empire, nor is it detracted from when he is reduced to straitened circumstances. This is because he knows his allotted station. That which a gentleman follows as his nature, that is to say, benevolence, rightness, and the rites and wisdom, is rooted in his heart, and manifests itself in his face, giving it a sleek appearance. It also shows in his back and extends to his limbs, rendering their message intelligible without words." (Lau 2003: 295)

Even though the gentleman desires and delights in earthly wealth and success such as "an extensive territory and a huge population," and "bring[ing] peace to the people within the Four Seas," he certainly does not consider them his nature. What the gentleman takes as his nature are humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom; he will not easily change his nature because of personal poverty or success, because they are "his allotted station." The phrase "his allotted station" has previously been interpreted by scholars from the perspective of the unity of Heaven and Humans. Actually "his allotted station" is mainly conceptualized upon the division between Heaven and Humans or the division between Nature and Fate. The previous passage shows that both Heaven and Humans, or Nature and Fate, each have their own roles. Whether "an extensive territory and a huge population," and "bring[ing] peace to the people within the Four Seas" can be realized is decided by Heaven, this is where Heaven and Fate play their part. But that humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom are rooted within our mind, where a person

and his nature play their part. When this division between Heaven and Humans or Nature and Fate is established, then one should no longer feel controlled by external fortune, but should rather assiduously practice humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom, which are part of one's inner nature and own role. Therefore, Mencius' precepts actually include the notion of division between Heaven and Humans; the concept of "allotted station" and some of his other tenets can only be understood when explained in terms of the division between Heaven and Humans.

4 The Difference Between the *Qiong da yi shi* and the *Xunzi*'s Division Between Heaven and Humans

After the publication of the manuscript, an enthusiastic debate ensued on its relationship with Xunzi concerning the conceptualization of the division between Heaven and Humans. However, in discussing this problem scholars have often neglected the relatively complex nature of Xunzi's concept of division between Heaven and Humans. This is a problem that needs to be clarified first. In "Discourse on Heaven" Xunzi argues:

> 天行有常, 不為堯存, 不為桀亡。應之以治則吉, 應之以亂則凶。強本而節用, 則天不能貧。養備而動時, 則天不能病。修道而不貳, 則天不能禍。故水旱不能使之飢, 寒暑不能使之疾, 妖怪不能使之凶。本荒而用侈, 則天不能使之富。養略而動罕, 則天不能使之全。倍道而妄行, 則天不能使之吉。故水旱未至而飢, 寒暑未薄而疾, 妖怪未至而凶。受時與治世同, 而殃禍與治世異, 不可以怨天, 其道然也, 故明於天人之分, 則可謂至人矣。

> The course of Heaven is constant: it does not survive because of the actions of a Yao; it does not perish because of the actions of a Jie. If you respond to the constancy of Heaven's course with good government, there will be good fortune; if you respond to it with disorder, there will be misfortune. If you strengthen the basic undertakings and moderate expenditures, Heaven cannot impoverish you. If your nourishment is complete and your movements accord with the season, then Heaven cannot afflict you with illness. If you conform to the Way and are not of two minds, then Heaven cannot bring about calamity. Accordingly, flood and drought cannot cause famine, cold and heat cannot cause sickness, and inauspicious and freak events cannot cause misfortune. If you ignore the basic undertakings and spend extravagantly, then Heaven cannot enrich you. If your nourishment lacks essential elements and your movements accord with rare events, then Heaven cannot make you whole. If you turn your back on the Way and behave with foolish recklessness, then Heaven cannot bring good fortune. Accordingly, there will be famine when neither flood nor drought has come, there will be sickness when neither heat nor cold has reached you, and there will be misfortune even though inauspicious and freak events have not occurred. Although the seasons are received just the same as in an orderly age, the catastrophes and calamities will be of a different order [of magnitude] from those of an orderly age; yet you can have no cause to curse Heaven, for these things are the consequences of the way that you have followed. Accordingly, if you understand the division between Heaven and Man, then you can properly be called a "Perfect Man." (Knoblock 1994: 3.14–15)

In the past, scholars have often interpreted Xunzi's "Heavenly Principle" (*tianli* 天理) as referring to the natural world, and some thought that Xunzi's "Heavenly

Mandate" refers to the laws of nature. Despite the merit of these views, they do not fully or accurately reflect Xunzi's thinking on the division between Heaven and Humans. Xunzi continues from the above passage:

> 不為而成, 不求而得, 夫是之謂天職。如是者, 雖深, 其人不加慮焉; 雖大, 不加能焉; 雖精, 不加察焉; 夫是之謂不與天爭職 [……] 列星隨旋, 日月遞照, 四時代御, 陰陽大化, 風雨博施。萬物各得其和以生, 各得其養以成, 不見其事而見其功, 夫是之謂神。皆知其所以成, 莫知其無形, 夫是之謂天功。唯聖人為不求知天。

> Not to act, yet to bring to completion; not to seek, yet to obtain—this indeed may be described as the work of Heaven. In such a situation, the [Perfect] Man, however profound, does not apply any thought to the work of Heaven; however great, does not apply his abilities to it; and however shrewd, does not apply his acumen for inquiry to it. This indeed may be described as "not competing with Heaven in its work." … The constellation follows their revolutions; the sun and moon alternately shine; the four seasons present themselves in succession; the Yin and Yang enlarge and transform; and the wind and rain spread out everywhere. Each of the myriad things must be in a harmonious relation with Heaven in order to grow, and each must obtain from Heaven the proper nurture in order to become complete. We do not perceive the process, but we perceive the results—this indeed is why we call it "divine." All realize that Heaven has brought completion, but none realize its formlessness—this indeed is why we call it the functioning of Heaven. Only the sage acts not seeking to know Heaven. (Knoblock 1994: 3.15)

Here, "the work of Heaven" (*tianzhi* 天職) and "the functioning of Heaven" (*tiangong* 天功) refer to the influence and function of Heaven in generating the myriad things. For Xunzi, the way in which Heaven generates the myriad things does not manifest an act of God on High or providence, nor is it a result of human involvement. Rather, it is a natural development. He calls this the "work of Heaven". At the same time, he takes the revolution and changes of the stars, the alternating appearances of the sun and moon, the changes of the four seasons, the mutual influence between *Yin* and *Yang*, and the generation and growth of the myriad things from this process, calling them the "functioning of Heaven". If the working and the functioning of Heaven can be called a 'law' (*guilü* 規律), then Xunzi clearly does not advocate the recognition and use of these laws in order to control nature. This is because he says clearly that "only the sage acts not seeking to know Heaven". "Heaven" here should be understood through the concepts of the working and functioning of Heaven. Once the myriad things are formed, they tend to have some characteristics and regularities, for example ("Discourse on Heaven"):

> 財非其類以養其類, 夫是之謂天養。順其類者謂之福, 逆其類者謂之禍, 夫是之謂天政。

> The mind takes advantage of things not belonging to the human species and uses them for the nourishment of humans—these are termed "the nourishment provided by Heaven." The mind calls what conforms to the properties of its category "fortunate" and what rebels against the properties of its category "cursed"—this is called the "rule of order in Heaven." (Knoblock 1994: 3.16)

The reason for referring to "the nourishment provided by Heaven" (*tian yang* 天養) and the "rule of order in Heaven" (*tian zheng* 天政) is that they have the meaning of a natural rule and regularity. But this type of rule and regularity operates in relation to Humans, and Humans should respect them and carry them out. From this

perspective, it still refers to the unity of Heaven and Humans. Accordingly, Xunzi's concept of the division between Heaven and Humans includes different connotations: on the one hand, Xunzi argues that the "work of Heaven" and the "functioning of Heaven" are the role and occupation of Heaven, and that Humans have no way of understanding them and need not understand them. On the other hand, when it comes to the "nourishment provided by Heaven" and "the rule of order in Heaven," he proposes to actively use these regularities in order to enhance the human race. Xunzi's famous saying is uttered on this understanding:

> 大天而思之, 孰與物畜而制之! 從天而頌之, 孰與制天命而用之! 望時而待之, 孰與應時而使之!
>
> How can glorifying Heaven and contemplating it, be as good as tending its creatures and regulating them? How can obeying Heaven and singing it hymns of praise, be better than regulating what Heaven has mandated and using it? How can anxiously watching for the season and awaiting what it brings, be as good as responding to the season and exploiting it? (Knoblock 1994: 3.20–21)

In the former case, the division between Heaven and Humans emphasizes that Heaven and Humans are not involved in each other's affairs and that Humans do not need to ask Heaven for anything or understand Heaven. In the latter case, the actions of Heaven have their own regularity, which do not change according to the human will.

From the above analysis, Xunzi's Heaven is mostly a type of natural Heaven, his human being is mostly a social being, on which hangs his concept of the division between Heaven and Humans. It is markedly different from the division between Heaven and Humans seen in the *Qiong da yi shi* in that the bamboo manuscript explicates the relationship of Humans with a fatalistic Heaven. The reason for people equating the two is their reading of the following section from the "Discourse on Heaven":

> 楚王后車千乘, 非知也。君子啜菽飲水, 非愚也。是節然也。若夫(心)〔志〕意修, 德行厚, 知慮明, 生於今而志乎古, 則是其在我者也。故君子敬其在己者, 而不慕其在天者。小人錯其在己者, 而慕其在天者。君子敬其在己者而不慕其在天者, 是以日進也。小人錯其在己者而慕其在天者, 是以日退也。故君子之所以日進, 與小人之所以日退, 一也。君子小人之所以相懸者在此耳!
>
> That the King of Chu has a retinue of a thousand chariots is not due to his wisdom. That the gentleman must eat pulse and drink water is not due to his stupidity. Both are accidents of circumstance. As for being developed in will and purpose, substantial in behaviour springing from inner power, lucid in wisdom and thought, and, though born in the present generation, to fix the mind on the ancients—all these are within our power. Thus, the gentleman reveres what lies within his power and does not long for what lies with Heaven. The petty man forsakes what lies within his power and longs for what lies with Heaven. Because the gentleman reveres what lies within his power and does not long for what lies with Heaven, he progresses day by day. Because the petty man lays aside what lies within his power and longs for what lies with Heaven, he day by day retrogresses. Thus what impels the gentleman daily to progress and forces the petty man daily to retrogress is one and the same principle. What distinguishes the gentleman from the petty man lies precisely in this. (Knoblock 1994: 3.17–18)

These "accidents of circumstance" (節然也) can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, Yang Jing's annotation states that "circumstance refers to the fate of the times that one meets" (節謂所遇之時命也). Liu Taigong refers to the "Rectifying Theses" (*zhengming* 正名) in the *Xunzi*: "the accidents of circumstance are referred to as fate" (節遇謂之命). Secondly, Yu Yue considers that "circumstance is like happenstance; the accidents of circumstance are like saying that they are a product of happenstance" (節猶適也, 節然也, 猶曰是其適然也) (Wang 1997). If we follow the first interpretation, then this section aligns with the manuscript. They both take poverty and success as an accident of the times, and the *Xunzi* repeatedly stresses "[revering] what lies within one's power and not to long for what lies with Heaven" (敬其在己者而不慕其在天者), which is similar to the manuscript's "being earnest about returning to oneself" (敦於反己). It thus appears to be consistent with the division between Heaven and Humans that the manuscript advocates. Actually, this is a misinterpretation. Without a doubt, Xunzi does espouse the idea that "accidents of circumstance are referred to as fate" and notions of Heaven's timely fortune. The question remains, on what does Xunzi base his core thinking of the division between Heaven and Humans? Just before this section, Xunzi has already explained this clearly:

> 天不為人之惡寒也輟冬, 地不為人之惡遼遠也輟廣, 君子不為小人之匈匈也輟行。天有常道矣, 地有常數矣, 君子有常體矣。
>
> Heaven does not suspend the winter because men dislike cold weather. Earth does not reduce its broad expanse because men dislike long distances. The gentleman does not interrupt his pattern of conduct because petty men rant and rail. Heaven possesses a constant way; Earth has an invariable size; the gentleman has constancy of deportment. (Knoblock 1994: 3.16)

The Heaven here is clearly the "natural Heaven," a notion that is coherent throughout the above two passages regarding the division between Heaven and Humans.

5 The Division Between Heaven and Humans and the Unity of Heaven and Humans

Through discussing the ideologies expressed in the manuscript, as well as those of Mencius and Xunzi, we arrive at a new understanding of pre-Qin Confucian ideas of the relationship between Heaven and Humans. Firstly, the pre-Qin Confucian Heaven is polysemic and, accordingly, the relationship between Heaven and Humans is diverse. For Mencius, the core notions in this respect are the fatalistic Heaven and the moral Heaven. His discussion of the relationship between Heaven and Humans revolves around these two conceptualizations of Heaven, but he likewise acknowledges the existence of a natural Heaven. According to Mencius ("Liang hui wang I"):

> 七八月之間旱, 則苗槁矣。天油然作雲, 沛然下雨, 則苗浡然興之矣。
>
> Should there be a drought in the seventh or eighth months, it will wilt. If clouds begin to gather in the sky and rain comes pouring down, then it will spring up again. (Lau 2003: 13)

Likewise, Xunzi ("Strengthening the State") emphasizes the natural Heaven and the moral Heaven, but he also talks about the fatalistic Heaven: "Thus, just as the fate of men lies with Heaven, so too does the fate of the state lie with its rituals" (故人之命在天, 國之命在禮) (Knoblock 1994: 2.239). And "Rectifying Theses": "the accidents of circumstance are referred to as fate" (節遇謂之命). In the *Xunzi* ("The Warning Vessel on the Right") there is a section similar to the manuscript:

> 孔子南適楚, 厄於陳蔡之間, 七日不火食, 藜羹不糝, 弟子皆有飢色。子路進而問之曰: "由聞之: 為善者天報之以福, 為不善者天報之以禍, 今夫子累德積義懷美, 行之日久矣, 奚居之隱也?" 孔子曰: "由不識, 吾語女 … 夫賢不肖者, 材也; 為不為者, 人也; 遇不遇者, 時也; 死生者, 命也。今有其人, 不遇其時, 雖賢, 其能行乎? 苟遇其時, 何難之有! 故君子博學深謀, 修身端行, 以俟其時。
>
> When Confucius was travelling southward toward Chu, he was reduced to straits between Chen and Cai. When after seven days he and his disciples had not eaten hot food, only a soup of goosefoot greens with not a single grain of rice, the disciples all had a hungry look. Zilu stepped forward and asked: "According to what I have been taught, Heaven bestows good fortune on those who do good and disasters on those who do what is not good. Now you, our Master, have for a long time augmented your inner power through your daily conduct, accumulated acts of moral good, and cherished the beautiful. Why, then, do you live in obscurity?" Confucius replied: Yu, you have not remembered what I told you … just as whether one is worthy depends on internal ability, whether one acts or not depends on the man; just as whether one meets with success depends on the right time, so too matters of death and life depend on fate. Now if a man has not met with the right time, even though he is worthy, how would he be able to put [his ideas] in practice? If he should chance to meet with the right time, what difficulties would he have? Thus the gentleman broadens his studies, deepens his plans, reforms his person, and corrects his conduct in order to await the right time." (Knoblock 1994: 3.249)

Here, Xunzi draws a distinction between "whether one acts" and "whether one meets with success" and advocates that the gentleman "reforms his person, and corrects his conduct in order to await the right time." This is undoubtedly close to the idea expressed in the manuscript. From this we can say that Xunzi's thought holds the kernel of the manuscript's ideas on the division between Heaven and Humans. However, this division between Heaven and Humans merely occupies a subordinate, secondary position in Xunzi's thought, and cannot be discussed in the same breath with that of Mencius. In the above passage there is a difference between the manuscript and other materials, as Zilu says, "Heaven bestows good fortune on those who do good and disasters on those who do what is not good"—the traditional thought of morality determining fate. Xunzi's notion of a natural Heaven, and his belief that "the course of Nature is constant; it does not survive because of the actions of a Yao; it does not perish because of the actions of a Jie" is precisely criticizing and negating that position. But at the same time as Xunzi negates the wilful Heaven (*yizhitian* 意志天), he also cannot but add an explanation regarding Human fate. That is why he advances the notion that "accidents of circumstance are referred to as fate" and uses a blind notion of fate to replace traditional moral determinism.

Just as we have analysed previously, Xunzi's division between Heaven and Humans is mostly grounded in the relation between Heaven and nature. The notion of "accidents of circumstance being referred to as fate" is merely a supplemental explanation to this effect and does not constitute a major component of his thought.

Secondly, corresponding to the manifold relationship between Heaven and Humans, Mencius and Xunzi espouse the division between Heaven and Humans on the one hand and the unity of Heaven and Humans on the other; they differ in matters of specificity only. Because of the many connotations inherent in the Confucian Heaven, the relationship between Heaven and Humans can at least be divided into Humans and fatalistic Heaven, Humans and natural Heaven, and Humans and moral Heaven. These different aspects can at the same time represent the division and the unity of Heaven and Humans. As mentioned earlier, when Mencius discusses Humans and fatalistic Heaven, he propounds a division between Heaven and Humans or between nature and fate. By promoting the distinction between nature and fate, he asks that humans should not be mindful of external fortune and calamity, and gains and losses, but instead focus on the humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom inherent in one's nature, stressing the moral subjectivity of Humans. On this basis, he further connects humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom with the way of Heaven ("Jinxin I"):

> 孟子曰: "盡其心者, 知其性也。知其性, 則知天矣。存其心, 養其性, 所以事天也, 夭壽不貳, 修身以俟之, 所以立命也。"
>
> Mencius said, "For a man to give full realization to his heart is for him to understand his own nature, and a man who knows his own nature will know Heaven. The retention of his heart and the nurturing of his nature are the means by which he serves Heaven. Whether he is going to die young or to live to a ripe old age makes no difference to his steadfastness of purpose. It is through awaiting whatever is to befall him with a perfected character that he stands firm on his proper Destiny." (Lau 2003: 287)

The Heaven in "he knows Heaven" is a kind of moral Heaven. "Giv[ing] full realization to his heart," "[k]nowing his nature," and "know[ing] Heaven" are about knowing that humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom come from Heaven. But they should be uplifted to be the Heavenly Way and be regarded as the essence of the universe. In this way, mind, nature and Heaven are brought together. "The retention of his heart" and "the nourishing of his nature" thus become "to know Heaven" and, as such, they show the unity of Heaven and Humans. But this unity of Heaven and Humans is closely related to the division between nature and fate. So he continues to say that "[w]hether he is going to die young or to live to a ripe old age makes no difference to his steadfastness of purpose. It is through awaiting whatever is to befall him with a perfected character that he stands firm on his proper Destiny." The growth and cultivation of humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are not changed by the length of life, fortune or calamity. Cultivating oneself in order to wait for the arrival of fate is exactly "stand[ing] firm on [one's] proper Destiny." Mencius' "stand[ing] firm on [one's] proper Destiny" and knowing fate are both about establishing the correct attitude in awaiting fate. As discussed previously, this attitude is premised on the division between nature and fate. As such,

Mencius proceeds from the division between nature and fate towards the unity of Heaven and Humans, and the two together form the logos of his thinking.

Similarly, Xunzi advances the division between Heaven and Humans from the aspect of Humans and natural Heaven and expands its meaning. But as we have analysed before, despite being very important the division between Heaven and Humans is but a single aspect of Xunzi's views on the relationship between Heaven and Humans and cannot represent the whole of Xunzi's thought. When discussing other aspects, Xunzi can be said to propound the unity of Heaven and Humans. For example, in advocating the rites, Xunzi often perceives the rites as a means of communicating between Heaven and Humans, and the fundamental principle and reason for bringing the two together. Xunzi says ("Discourse on Ritual Principles"):

> 天地以合, 日月以明, 四時以序, 星辰以行, 江河以流, 萬物以昌, 好惡以節, 喜怒以當, 以為下則順, 以為上則明, 萬變不亂, 貳之則喪也。禮豈不至矣哉!

> Through rites, Heaven and Earth are conjoined, the sun and moon shine brightly, the four seasons observe their natural precedence, the stars and planets move in ranks, the rivers and streams flow, and the myriad things prosper. Through them, love and hate are tempered, and joy and anger made to fit the occasion. They are used to make inferiors obedient and to make superiors enlightened. Through a myriad transformations nothing becomes disorderly; but if one is divided in his loyalty to them, he will be brought to ruin. Surely it is true that the rites are indeed perfection! (Knoblock 1994: 3. 60)

Heaven and Humans follow the rites to exist and change, manifesting a type of common order and regularity, thence the unity of Heaven and Humans. Therefore, Xunzi on the one hand talks about the division between Heaven and Humans, and on the other hand their unity—the two together form an integral part of his thought.

For a long time, scholars have held that the unity of Heaven and Humans was a basic characteristic of ancient Chinese philosophy, particularly Confucianism. The division between Heaven and Humans has long been neglected and has not been a current strong enough to counter the idea of the unity of Heaven and Humans. But based on the *Qiong da yi shi*, the division between Heaven and Humans has profound historical origins. Considering the development of intellectual history, the division between Heaven and Humans, and the unity of Heaven and Humans have evolved together. There is no unity of Heaven and Humans that does not talk about its division, and likewise there is no division between Heaven and Humans that does not talk about its unity.

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Chapter 12
Xing 性 and *Qing* 情: Human Nature and Moral Cultivation in the Guodian Text *Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出 (*Nature Derives from Endowment*)



Shirley Chan

1 Introduction

Nature Derives from Endowment (Xing zi ming chu 性自命出; hereafter XZMC),[1] a text from the cache of Guodian bamboo slips excavated in 1993 in Hubei province, has attracted the attention of scholars and generated new insights into some of the Chinese philosophical issues of the Warring States period.[2] In recent years, a number of English-language articles have been devoted to specific topics ranging from the possible affiliation of the text with a particular intellectual camp, the function of music, and the concept of spontaneity in human responsiveness to external stimuli.[3] Some focus on a few passages from the XZMC, others consider the

[1] A similar style of reference will be used for other texts: MZ for the *Mengzi* (Works of Mencius), LY for the *Lunyu* (the Analects), XZ for the *Xunzi*, and LJ for the *Liji* (Book of Rites).

[2] An earlier version of this article appeared as "Human Nature and Moral Cultivation in the Guodian Text of the *Xing Zi Ming Chu*," in *Dao: Journal of Comparative Philosophy* 8 (2009): 361–82. I thank the editor of the *Dao* journal for allowing me to republish the article. In this updated version, I re-examine the relationships between *xing* and *qing*, in particular, the connotation of *qing* as manifested human nature *xing* in response to external stimuli. This understanding is consistent with the Chinese term *xing qing* 性情 and emphasizes how *qing* is part of *xing* and is manifestation of *xing*. The essay is retitled as shown in the heading above. I thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful and constructive comments that contributed to improving this version.

[3] Subsequent to the discovery of the bamboo texts, scholars looked at the possible association of the texts with schools or different branches of schools, in particular the Confucian school, given their different views on human nature. Most Chinese scholars believe the cache represents works from the Zisi-Mencian lineage. Both Tao Lei and Zhou Fengwu believe that the discussion of human nature in the *Xing zi ming chu* is closer to Gaozi's view (Tao 2001; Zhou 2004). It has been

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Guodian corpus as a whole. In this paper, I intend to provide a broader account of the text by looking at the key concepts of [human] nature (*xing* 性), heart-mind (*xin* 心), and human emotions or feelings, manifested *xing* as affective response to stimuli (*qing* 情). What is human *xing*? How is it related to *qing*? Why and how does *qing* play a role in moral cultivation? By looking at these questions, I will explore the concept of moral cultivation as presented in the XZMC.[4] I will also relate my discussion to the debate on human nature and self-cultivation among early thinkers in the Warring States period.[5]

Before the discovery of the Guodian texts, which date to the fourth century BCE, we had little material providing detailed discussion on *xing*, *qing*, and *xin* for the period between Confucius (551–479 BCE) and Mencius (390?–305? BCE). This text points out that *qing* is derived from *xing*. This means that *qing* is a manifestation of *xing* as a response to external stimuli. It further suggests that *xing* can be manifested only through induction by *xin*, which does not have an inherently fixed intention or commitment but is influenced by other factors, namely, external things (*wu* 物), pleasure (*yue* 悅), and practice (*xi* 習). The above assumptions set the background for arguing both the necessity for education (through rituals and music) as a way of cultivating *xin* and the importance of habitual practice. The discussion of *xing* and *qing* in the Guodian text draws on a notion that recognizes both the biological basis of human nature and the part that social construction plays in it.

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argued that both the *Xing zi ming chu* and the *Liu de* in the Guodian corpus have traces of Gaozi's and others' views. For example the *Liu de* contains the concept similar to Gaozi's "humaneness comes from within and appropriateness acquired from without" *ren nei yi wai* 仁內義外, and that it takes *xing* as what is born. This was the thinking prevailing in the pre-Qin period as were the views of Gaozi and Shi Shuo 世碩. Western scholars such as Paul Goldin and Michael Puett have argued that the XZMC is closest to the Xunzi (Goldin 2005; Puett 2004). Slingerland tends to follow Brindley in suggesting the association with Gaozi, though he provides no detailed discussion in this regard; Brindley discusses the function of music, Slingerland spontaneity, and Andreini and Puett human emotions (Brindley 2006; Slingerland 2008; Andreini 2006; Puett 2004).

[4] My interpretations are primarily based on the text of the XZMC, although for our discussion they will draw comparisons with such Confucian texts as the *Analects*, the *Works ofMencius*, and *Xunzi*, as well as Daoist texts such as the *Zhuangzi* when necessary in order to shed light on the development of related concepts. Similarities between the Guodian text and concepts of other thinkers are pointed out more for analytical purposes rather than for trying to suggest a causal influence on later philosophers' writings; further studies are required before such claims can be made. Throughout, I place the transcribed Chinese texts based on Guodian Chumu zhujian 郭店楚墓竹簡 (*Bamboo Slip Manuscripts from the Chu Tomb at Guodian*) (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998) and Guodian Chujian jiaodu ji 郭店楚簡校讀記 (*A Collation of the Guodian Manuscripts*) (Li 2002) next to my translation as well as the strip numbers. Given the nature of the Guodian texts, my translations and interpretations are necessarily tentative.

[5] It seems to me that the XZMC has revealed an intellectual landscape that is much more dynamic, and its position on human nature and moral cultivation is more diverse, than one would represent as a single tradition (for example, Gaozi, Mencius, or Xunzi).

2 Nature (*Xing* 性)

Xing is a key concept to understanding the text of the XZMC. It appears in the first line of the XZMC and serves as the title of the other version of the text contained in the bamboo manuscripts of the Shanghai Museum collections, the *Discourse of xing and qing* (Xingqing lun 性情論).

Originally derived from *sheng* 生, a character meaning life or to grow, *xing* 性 is closely related to the inborn nature, growth, and direction of development that a thing will realize if unobstructed. The disagreement among early thinkers such as Gaozi, Mencius, and Xunzi was due largely to their different ideas on human development in relation to *xing*. Mencius believed that human beings shared certain inherent moral inclinations that could be fully realized. *Xing* was constituted by the direction in which such inclinations developed, which tended towards "good." This led him to the conclusion that people were originally born good or, more specifically, that we were born with a tendency to become good and that badness in a person was a result of external influences. In the willow-and-bowl debate, Gaozi's theory was that original human nature was like the willow and this goodness resembled what was derived from it. In other words, willow cups and bowls were created by craftsmanship from the inherent essence of the willow. Likewise, goodness was not the original human nature, and self-cultivation is a process of crafting or modifying human nature. Gaozi further compared human nature to how water flows, as its tendency (towards goodness or badness) depended on the external environment. A lesser-known figure, Shi Shuo 世碩 (dates uncertain, probably living around the mid-Warring States period as possibly a second- or third-generation disciple of Confucius), claimed that there was both good and bad in human nature. If we selected the good and nurture it, the good would develop; if we did the same with the bad, the bad growed (Graham 1989: 118). Xunzi, on the other hand, believed that *xing* meant "what is so by birth" (*sheng zhi suoyi ran zhe* 生之所以然者) and that our original nature was a manifestation of self-regarding desires inherent from birth, which, if not regulated, could lead to conflict and disorder. While Mencius believed that the rules of propriety (*li* 禮) made possible the full realization of humans' shared incipient (inherent) moral quality, Xunzi argued that *li* helped transform and regulate humans' pursuit of the satisfaction of desires, thereby creating a stable society.

Let us begin with a brief account of the concept of *xing* as presented in the XZMC. The following passage is relevant to our discussion:

> 牛生而長, 雁生而伸, 其性 (使然), (?) 而學或使之也。[6] 凡物無不異也者。剛之樹也, 剛取之也。柔之約, 柔取之也。

[6] It is unfortunate that the strip is damaged following the character 性. Various insertions have been suggested: most scholars follow the version that inserts *shiran* 使然, *ren* 人, which makes the whole sentence read "[an ox is born and grows large, a goose is born and stretches up]—their *xing* (makes them so; people) learn and this is how it makes them so" (其性使然, 人而學或使之也); Tu Zongliu and Liu Zuxin, on the other hand, insert only *shiran* 使然 (Tu and Liu 2001: 148). It seems to me that the first translation is abrupt, particularly if we take 之 at the end of the sentence to be referring to the characteristic tendencies of an ox and a wild goose. The insertion of two

> An ox is born and grows large, a wild goose is born and stretches upwards; their nature makes them so but (?) learning may (also) make them so. (On this,) all things in general all are the same. Hard things' standing upright is explained by (elements contributing to) hardness's laying hold of them. The bending of what is soft is explained by (elements contributing to) softness's laying hold of them. (XZMC, strips 7–8)

Here, the different concepts of *xing* are illustrated by the example of an ox and a wild goose. An ox's *xing* is what contributes to its life (*sheng*) and growth. Moreover, an ox's *xing* is what makes an ox different from a wild goose, that is, its *xing* is its inborn biological or genetically predisposed distinctiveness, as well as its natural course of development. In a broader sense, the term *xing* denotes the instinctive characteristics of all things explained by their form and functionalities. In this respect, the concept of *xing* in the XZMC, as in some other early texts, refers not just to an inborn or predetermined quality, as proposed by Gaozi and Xunzi,[7] but includes what Mencius refers to as natural characteristic tendencies.[8] Whether this text was based on this understanding of these words or not, we are not sure. But we do know that Mencius asserted that the nature of man was distinct from the nature of animals, particularly the natural inclination and (possible) developing capability for moral practice (Shun 1997: 210–26).[9]

Yet, the capability for development is one thing; how a species really engages in the process of development is another. The XZMC suggests that *xing* only partly explains how things come into being. The predetermined characteristics or essential

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characters may risk missing one character, as there seems to be enough space for three characters, yet, even if we accept the common view that the spacing in the bamboo strips looks more likely to have accommodated three characters instead of two, we cannot be certain it would be the character *ren* 人. It may still be grammatically correct to say, for example, "their nature causes them; it may also be that how they were born for learning causes them to be so" (其性使然, 生而學或使之也). This kind of grammatical structure is common and can be compared to, for example, *sheng er zhi zhi* 生而知之 in the *Lunyu*. While the reconstruction is uncertain—and I have put the (?) to allow the possibilities of different readings—it seems to make sense to suggest that both *xing* and the learning or practice of a particular species, be they animal or human, are crucial in shaping what they are, though it is clear that there are differences in their learning and ability to learn and these should be understood as part of their *xing*.

[7] Goldin proposes that "*xing* refers to what is inborn in an organism and thus to the features that all members of a certain species hold in common rather than the features that distinguish a certain species from all other species" (Goldin 2005: 57). My interpretation suggests that what is inborn by *xing*, together with acquired knowledge and learning, determine the characteristic features shared by a certain species, and the features that distinguish a certain group of species from all other species.

[8] The XZMC supports the concept of *xing* that includes the course of development when it states "the *xing* has caused and contributed to the growth and development of the ox and the wild goose as shown in their characteristic tendencies" (其性使然). This notion of *xing* also appears in such early texts as the *Zuozhuan* and *Guoyu*. For a detailed discussion of the concepts of *xing* in early Chinese texts, see Shun (1997: 37–40).

[9] In his precept "there is little difference between man and animals" (MZ, 8.19), Mencius is asserting that humans should be differentiated from other animals by their natural tendency to acknowledge ethical obligations. Moreover, fulfilling these obligations means following heaven (*tian*). Also see Shun (1997: 210–26) and Perkins (2005: 327–40).

nature of human beings or other species like the ox and the wild goose, does not automatically complete the process of development.[10] The passage quoted indicates that the process of "being" and "becoming" is also the result of actual learning and practice (*xue* 學)—acquiring and attaining information and knowledge from the outside world. This can be regarded as external influence and for Gaozi and Xunzi it is the key factor in reshaping human nature. The text is suggesting that *xing* and *xue* are two separate and complementary components of a whole: "Their nature makes them so. But (?) learning may (also) make them so (that is to say, grow large and/or stretch upwards)." Thus, what we have here is the view that learning or practice and one's environment (*xue*) itself is as important as, if not more important than, *xing* in the process of the effective development of an individual.

Combining *xing* and *xue* may be taken to signify the interplay of the inner being and the outer world working toward the full development of a thing. In 剛之樹也, 剛取之也。柔之約, 柔取之也, we are told that what causes the nature or characteristics of a thing to appear on the outside, or its functionalities to become manifest, is that the elements contributing to their nature have taken hold of them; the second hardness (*gang* 剛) and softness (*rou* 柔) may infer the elements, as a result of *xing* and *xue*, that cause the distinctive attributes of hardness and softness. Hence, factors other than inborn nature, such as habitual practice and related environmental factors, influence how things function or behave. This view is further articulated in respect of human nature when the matter of human *xing* and *qing* in relation to the concept of external things (*wu*), which I will discuss further, arises in the text.

What, then, is a human's *xing*?

> 凡人雖有性，心亡定志，待物而後作，待悦而後行，待習而後定。喜怒哀悲之氣，性也。及其見於外, 則物取之也。性自命出, 命從天降。道始於情, 情生於性 … 好惡, 性也。所好所惡, 物也。善不 (善, 性也) 所善所不善, 勢也。凡性為主, 物取之也 … (人) 雖有性, 心弗取不出 … 四海之内其性一也。其用心各異, 教使然也。

> While in general all human beings possess *xing* (an inborn nature), their *xin* (heart-minds) do not have fixed intentions. They (that is, the heart-mind) await things and only then become active; they depend on pleasure to become functioning; they depend on practice to become fixed. The *qi* of happiness, anger, sadness, and grief is (called) none other than nature. When it (that is, the *qi*) appears on the outside, it is because (external) things have laid hold of it. Human nature derives from the endowment; the endowment descends from Heaven. The *dao* begins in *qing*; *qing* (natural disposition) is derived from *xing* (human nature) … Liking and disliking is one's nature; what is liked and disliked are (external) things. Being good (or not good is nature); what makes one good or not good are circumstances. For all things of which

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[10] This can be seen in the case of the feral child, which may pose a problem for Mencius' claim. The feral child observed by an educational psychologist lived with a pack of dogs and acted like them: "When we're talking about how a child learns to live with dogs, there's obviously no deal, as such. There's give and take, the dogs give their love, attention, and acceptance in a sense, while the child has to adapt to the dogs' situation. If that means eating raw meat and scavenging the rubbish tip, then that's what has to be done in order to survive." The author of the XZMC would probably see the feral children's condition as due to lack of a conducive environment (for example, neglect and abuse), rather than inborn inclination. In fact, these poor creatures were sub-human and could no longer be regarded as human beings: they could not walk, talk, or socialize; they could not show empathy with others (Touhey 1973: 396–97).

> nature is master, external things (can) lay hold of them … Although human beings have [inborn] nature, it cannot be manifested outside without the heart having laid hold of it … All within the four seas share the one nature. That they are different in applying their hearts is brought about by teaching. (XZMC, strips 1–6, 9)

The author does not immediately pursue the discussion of whether human *xing* is good or bad. Instead, we are directed to another concept, *xin*: "While all human beings possess *xing*, their *xin* lack a fixed intention." In order to understand what human *xing* refers to here and how it relates to the concept of *xin*, it is useful to go back to the concept of *xing* derived from the ox and wild goose example. If we follow the ox and wild goose illustration, human *xing* in the XZMC should refer to both inborn nature and developing characteristic tendencies that contribute to the growth or life process of human beings and to their distinctive attributes. These could be the desires aroused through the *xin*, as well as other human tendencies, in response to external things, and the potential and developing ability to carry out habitual practices. One can see that a dynamic connotation like this leaves room for such subsequent debate as that between Mencius, Gaozi and Xunzi. In this particular line, I favour reading the word *xing* as referring to that human nature which includes the "inborn or potential functioning capability" that enables humans to practise morality, a distinctively human attribute.[11]

This understanding fits the context, particularly with the appearance in the next line of the word "although" (*sui* 雖): "while all human beings possess *xing*, their *xin* lack a fixed intention/commitment" (凡人雖有性, 心亡定志). If we take that the word *zhi* 志 (intention or commitment) is about being intent on learning, the *dao*, and moral practice—this usage of *zhi* appears frequently in the *Analects* as, for example, setting one's mind on learning (*zhi yu xue* 志于學); setting one's mind on the Way (*zhi yu dao* 志于道)—then the sentence would make sense if it read something like "although (*sui*) men are born with the potential ability to attain moral practice, their *xin* do not have a fixed intention toward that purpose." Without a fixed purpose, the *xin* is simply moved by external stimuli, becoming activated by pleasure or the anticipation of satisfaction (which probably can be morally positive or negative). It is through repeated practice that it becomes part of *xing*, when the *xin* has reached a state in which it will not be disturbed by distractions, but rather has developed a particular affective tendency that corresponds naturally with the subject's action or movement.[12]

Three major concepts are mentioned in the above passage—*xing*, *xin*, and *qing*—and it is not difficult to see that *xing* needs to be understood through its relationship

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[11] By potential, I am highlighting the point that proper guidance is required in order for this moral sense or ability to develop. External influence would refer to proper human practice and social norms. It is equally crucial to recognize that men have the responsibility to enlarge and alone among beings are capable of enlarging this human way—人能弘道 as the *Analects* states. Confucius indeed pointed out that we should always follow human, as opposed to animal, practice (鳥獸不可與同群) (LY, 18.6). I say "includes" to echo the dynamism of the term *xing*, and suggest that there are elements that can or cannot be morally desirable in the *xing*.

[12] This is close to Confucius' expression "following what the heart-mind desires" (*cong xin suo yu* 從心所欲) (LY, 2.4).

with the other two: human *xing*, in the above discussion, refers specifically to the (human) *qi* of happiness, anger, sadness, and grief. Our shared tendencies to like and dislike are to be drawn out from *xin* by external things (*wu* 物), which are then referred to as *qing*.[13] In other words, *qing* is an affective response to external stimuli, as manifestation (*chu* 出) of *xing*, human nature. The basic emotional repertoire is an integral part of human *xing*, which provides the foundation and natural capability (for example, the ability to perceive and respond) for cultivation. Here, *wu* can be understood as the sum of external factors, whereas pleasure (*yue* 悅) seems to refer to the subjective satisfaction felt when an intrinsic need or desire is met. *Yue* is the cause of and the ultimate reason for the action and functioning of the subject (*dai yue er hou xing* 待悅而後行).[14] It is not difficult to see from this that *xing* itself is non-active, and that it awaits (*dai* 待) induction by external stimuli in the *xin*, since *xing* cannot be made manifest outside or actualized without *xin* having taken hold of it (*xin fu qu bu chu* 心弗取不出).[15]

If this proposed reading is correct—*shan bu shan, xing ye, suo shan suo bu shan, shi ye* 善不善, 性也, 所善所不善, 勢也—then human *xing* can be good ("morally desirable" *shan*) or not being good ("morally undesirable" *bu shan*); then again, it can refer to both the inborn and the developed nature of *xing*.[16] Whether one's nature will become good or bad depends very much on external influences, as well as on the cultivation of *xin*, the faculty capable of receiving external stimuli and making the innate state manifest. In 所善所不善, 勢也, the concept *shi* 勢 (forces

[13] Philosophers have called these a natural or basic repertoire of emotions constituting human nature (Solomon 1995).

[14] However, *yue* 悅 could refer to emotional, biological, sensorial, etc. satisfaction and is subjective; again, it could be morally desirable or the opposite.

[15] The early texts such as the *Liji* also claim that human nature as imparted by heaven is inactive at birth; it is activated by external objects as stimuli, and expressed as human desire as part of human nature.

[16] In this line, the Jingmenshi Bowuguan editors have followed the Shanghai Museum collection's *Xingqing Lun* 性情論 and inserted the characters 善性也 after 善不, which makes the whole line read 善不善性也. There are three possible ways of reading this. If we take *shan* as a verb, the sentence can mean "to become good or not good," which focuses more on factors other than the inborn *xing* that determine the direction of development. This usage of *shan* can be found in the *Analects*—just desire the good yourself and the common people will be good (子欲善而民善矣) (LY, 12.19)—and in the *Liji*—[it could be used] to make the hearts of the people good (而可以善民心) (LJ, 19.10). It can also be interpreted as meaning that there are both good or bad elements in human nature where the emphasis is on predetermined or inborn quality. When this paper was presented at the "Virtue: East and West" conference, CHENG Chung-ying suggested a third way of reading the sentence: "making good of what is not good is *xing*." This reading, similar to the second reading, assumes that there are morally unfavourable (不善) element(s) in human *xing*, yet humans' *xing* enables them to improve it. I am inclined to the first reading, which would make 善不善性也 similar to 性可以善可以不善 (*xing* can be made good or it can be made bad), a view that is closer to the theme of the whole text. This reading does not exclude the possibility of the second and third readings; it also parallels the idea that *xing* refers to both inborn nature and natural tendencies over the course of one's life. One can probably argue that these connotational complexities of the nature of *xing* are what caused Gaozi, Mencius, Xunzi, and SHIShuo to have different ideas about human *xing*.

or circumstances) appears to resemble Gaozi's water analogy. Nevertheless, it acknowledges that for the purpose of moral cultivation *xing* can be good or not good, and hence to achieve the best balance or appropriateness requires proper external influences and habitual practice. That "not being good" (不善) is used instead of "being bad" (惡) may mean the author's view of *xing* is not as negative as Xunzi's; nor is it as optimistic as Mencius'. Here, *xing* is what is endowed (*ming* 命) by Heaven (*tian* 天). *Tian* and *ming*, then, seem in this context to contain both prescriptive and normative dimensions: we were endowed at birth with the features and functionalities of humans, but it is by following the human Way that we develop as complete beings, by fully maximizing our ability and potentialities through unceasing practice.[17]

It is assumed that all humans share the same inborn *xing* (all within the four seas share the same nature 四海之内其性一也). However, in the course of development, our *xing* is subject to a combination of influences, namely, external things, internal feelings (for example, pleasure), circumstances, and habitual practices. The XZMC makes the following noteworthy comment on *xing*:

> 凡性, 或動之, 或逆之, 或節之, 或厲之, 或出之, 或養之, 或長之。
>
> Generally, *xing* (nature) can be activated, received, restrained, polished and disciplined, evoked/manifested, nourished, or extended.[18] (XZMC, strip 10)

The text continues:

> 凡動性者, 物也; 逆性者, 悅也; 節性者, 故也; 厲性者, 義也; 出性者, 勢也; 養性者, 習也; 長性者, 道也。凡見者之謂物; 快於己者之謂悅; 物之勢者之謂勢; 有爲也者之謂故。義也者, 群善之蕝也。習也者, 有以習其性也。
>
> What activate *xing* (nature) are external things; what receive nature are delights; what restrain nature are purposeful activities; what polishes nature is propriety; what draw the nature out are circumstances; what nourishes nature is practice; what makes nature grow is the Dao. What is visible is called "a material thing"; what make one happy are delights; circumstances of things are called circumstances; what is done through effort is called purposive activity. As for propriety, it is the criterion for the various types of goodness. As for practice, it provides the means for exercising one's nature.[19] (XZMC, strips 10–13)

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[17] Though it seems that *tian* and *ming* are important concepts in this text and appear at the outset—性自命出, 命从天降—neither is discussed extensively. I borrow the terms "normative" and "descriptive" from Shun, who has distinguished two major dimensions in the use of *tian* and *ming*: "a normative dimension that carries implications about what should be done or should happen, and a descriptive dimension implying that certain things are not due to human effort or not fully within human control" (Shun 1997: 17).

[18] 逆 is also read as 逢 (Liu and Long 2005: 57; Tu and Liu 2001: 150–51). Qiu Xigui has recently revised the reading of 或交之 to 或節之 (Qiu 2006: 2–3).

[19] Li Ling suggests that *gu* 故 implies purposeful activities such as cultural and social practice, a view similar to that held by Qiu Xigui and Liang Tao (Li 2002: 117–18; Qiu 2003; Liang 2004). As both Qiu and Liang point out, *gu* here refers to social or institutional practice, which gives the extended meaning of "the principles or rules" that provide the framework for social norms and values. More specifically, these are the practices enacted by the *Odes*, the *Book of History*, the *Rites*, and the *Music*, listed elsewhere in the text of the XZMC.

The above account is crucial in helping us understand human nature and self- cultivation to some extent. The most important implication of the passage is that *xing* is malleable. In XZMC, the natural *xing* shared by all men can be cultivated and refined, depending on the encouraging and discouraging factors in the environment—referred to in the XZMC as "circumstances" (*shi* 勢) and "external things" (*wu* 物)—as well as an individual's internal judgment. In some it will be provoked, supported, and excited; in others it will be suppressed or restrained. Confucius claimed in the *Analects* that it was through habitual practice that one's *xing* is differentiated[20]; the author of the XZMC has expanded his theory by introducing such factors as *wu* 物, *yue* 悅, and *shi* 勢 that play a role in activating and directing a person's *xing*. According to the text, *wu* 物, *yue* 悅, *shi* 勢, *dao* 道, and *xi* 習 are, respectively, "activating," "receiving," "nourishing," "growing," "evoking," "exercising," and "growing or extending" human *xing*. Because of the profound impact of these criteria on human *xing*, it is acceptable to say that the author here is arguing that they are significant in education. Here, where education is about cultivating and nourishing human *xing*, it makes sense that human *xing* should be understood in terms of functions and qualities that are considered necessary or desirable for full human development. Because of that, it should be cultivated, nurtured, and developed accordingly. On the other hand, we also see that human *xing* should be disciplined, restrained (*jie* 節), and polished (*li* 礪) through purposeful practice (*gu* 故) and rules of propriety *(yi* 義). If our interpretation is correct, when it says that some should be activated, nourished, and extended while others should be restrained and regulated, this particular passage seems to present a dimension of *xing* similar to Shi Shuo's, which suggests there are both good and bad elements for morality in human *xing*.

Drawing together what we have considered so far in regard to the concept of *xing* calls to mind the metaphor of a plant: there is a seed or sprout that needs to be nurtured with soil, water, and sunlight in order to grow, yet the plant also needs pruning and trimming for the better health and beauty of the plant itself and the garden as a whole.[21] To put it briefly, ideal moral cultivation completes the process of the effective development of human as human, both as an individual and as a member of society, by recognizing the importance of satisfying human needs while acquiring the knowledge of social patterns. This process requires proper feeling and attitude and should start with the cultivation of *xin*, the faculty responsible for perceiving and responding to external presentations.

[20] Unlike Mencius or Xunzi, Confucius did not make any straightforward comment on the state of human nature, asserting only that "people are close to one another by nature. They diverge as a result of practice" (LY, 17.2). Unless otherwise stated, I have used, with some modifications, D.C. Lau's translations of the *Analects* (Lau 1979).

[21] It is not difficult to see traces of Gaozi, Mencius, Xunzi, and even Shi Shuo's theories of human nature in this text when it focuses on different aspects of the arguments.

3 *Xin* 心 (Heart-Mind)

It is generally agreed that, instead of attributing a conceptual dichotomy to the roles of heart and mind or brain, early Chinese thinkers used the term *xin* 心, literally heart, to encapsulate both the affective and the cognitive dimensions; thus the term is normally translated as "heart-mind." *Xin* is described in the *XZMC* in relation to *qing*, and its affective dimension is emphasized. *Xin* is responsible for drawing out the emotional response when it is activated by external stimuli:

> (人) 雖有性, 心弗取不出。
>
> Although human beings have (inborn) nature (that is, the *qi* of happiness, anger, sadness, and grief), it cannot be made manifest outside without the heart having laid hold of it. (XZMC, strip 6)

And:

> 凡至樂必悲, 哭亦悲, 皆至其情也。哀、 樂, 其性相近也, 是故其心不遠。
>
> Extreme joy inevitably ends in sorrow. Tears also are sorrow. All are extremes of *qing*. Grief and joy in their nature are close to each other, and thus their (effect upon the) heart is not very different. (XZMC, strips 29–30)

The interaction between external things and inborn nature is completed in the *xin*. *Xin* is the receptor of external stimuli, such as sound and musical performance, as described in the XZMC*,* and the words "*xin* is moved" (*dongxin* 動心) are used when it is affected. At the same time, *xin* is also responsible for inducing true inner feelings and reflection as a result of responding to external objects, which are revealed by physiological reactions, such as a change of sound or voice:

> 哭之動心也, 浸殺, 其烈戀戀如也, 慼然以終。樂之動心也, 濬深鬱陶, 其烈則流如也以悲, 悠然以思。凡憂思而後悲, 凡樂思而後忻, 凡思之用心為甚。歎, 思之方也。其聲變, 則(心從之) 。其心變, 則其聲亦然。
>
> The way tears move the heart is penetrating and severe; its intensity continues in sorrow and ends in grief. The way music moves *xin* is deep, profound, and anxious; its intensity is flowing with sorrow, far-reaching with longing. All concern, when followed by reflection, becomes sorrow; all pleasure followed by contemplation becomes happiness, for all thinking employs the heart very deeply. Sighing is the way of (expressing) thought. When the voice changes, the heart follows. When *xin* changes, the voice also follows. (XZMC, strips 30–33)

In this context, human feelings and mental phenomena are not understood merely in terms of impulsive emotional responses to sensory stimuli, but are involved in forms of intelligent interpretation. It is not difficult to see here that when dealing with emotions, *xin* is involved in thinking, contemplating, and reflecting (*si* 思). If it is correct to suggest that the ability to feel emotions is a complex and sensitive mechanism that brings together thoughts, imagination, memories, intellectual understanding and analysis, and other aspects of ourselves into a single sensation, *xin* in this context carries both affective and cognitive capabilities.[22] In this particular process

[22] One may argue that human beings are well integrated systems, and any separation between the physical, emotional, mental, and spiritual is artificial, contrived merely for purposes of analysis.

of "deeply employing *xin*," the subject's mental state is constantly being affected by music as his perception and command of the musical data improves with deeper comprehension of their implications: one can say that *qing* has lent itself to moral sensibility when it naturally elicits the process of thinking and reflection, a process that directs one's attention to and engagement with moral goals or objectives.[23]

The importance of the role of *xin* in mediating between external representations and inborn nature suggests that moral cultivation means seeking and attaining *dao* through *xin*, which, as stated at the beginning of the XZMC, does not have an inherent fixed intention. *Xin* in the XZMC is something that attains morality if it is guided properly through education (*jiao* 教) and learning (*xue* 學).[24] In the XZMC the aim of teaching and learning is to cultivate a proper state of mind. In this context, "the art of *xin*" (*xinshu* 心術) is used to refer to the principle of the human Way, the way by which traditional cultural patterns, as in the *Odes*, the *Book of History*, the *Rites*, and the *Music*, were sifted by the sages and used as teachings to arouse and cultivate patterns of proper emotions and feelings in the people.[25] This indirectly relates the

[23] The opening line of the text, claiming that by pleasure *xin* can be stirred/activated and that through practice it can have an intention, implicitly acknowledges the cognitive and affective capacity of *xin*. Both Mencius and Xunzi shared the XZMC's view on this. Xunzi and Mencius, however, were emphasizing different dimensions of *xin* and thus its role in moral cultivation (see Lee 2004). Mencius used *xin* most of the time to refer to particular categories of feelings that he believed were the inborn sprouts of morality (Shun 1997: 153). For Mencius, moral cultivation meant nurturing and reinforcing the incipient moral emotion in *xin*. Xunzi, on the other hand, took *xin* as our cognitive ability to exert and direct ourselves to acquire and understand the ethical ideals that are imposed externally. In another Guodian text, this affective quality of *xin* that evokes the process of thinking and reflection (*si* 思) is shown as a step forward in developing virtue (Csikszentmilhalyi 2004: 73–74). A similar conception of *si* also appears in the *Analects* (Ivanhoe 2000: 2–3).

[24] A similar observation in relation to *xin* can be made about the *Analects*, where the word *xin* appears only six times. Nevertheless, this signals that Confucius was already shaping the concept of *xin* to play a role in attaining moral concepts or ideals. This can be seen in such terms as "employing one's mind" (*yongxin* 用心) (LY, 17.22) and "his *xin* did not deviate from *ren* for three months" (*qi xin san yue bu wei ren* 其心三月不違仁) (LY, 6.11), and in Confucius saying that when he came to a state that he was able to follow the rules of propriety without any apprehension—"following one's heart's desire without overstepping the line" (*cong xin suo yu bu yu ju* 從心所欲不逾矩) (LY, 2.4).

[25] 道者, 群物之道。凡道, 心術為主。道四術, 唯人道為可道也。其三術者, 道之而已。詩、書、禮、樂, 其始出, 皆生於人。詩, 有為為之也。書, 有為言之也。禮、樂, 有為舉之也。聖人比其類而論會之, 觀其之 (先) 後而逆順之, 體其義而節文之, 理其情而出入之, 然後復以教。教, 所以生德於中者也。禮作於情, 或興之也. (As for the *dao*, it is the way of various things. For any *dao*, the techniques of *xin* play the principal role. While the *dao* comprises four techniques, only the human *dao* can be *dao*ed. The other three arts simply guide it. The *Odes*, the *Documents*, the *Rites* and the *Music* were all initially produced by men. Through effort were the *Odes* composed; through effort were the *Documents* preached; through effort were the *Rites* and the *Music* promoted: the sage(s) compared the types, analysed them, and assembled them into categories. He observed their sequence and rearranged them; he comprehended their [ideas of] propriety and refined them. He sifted the emotions/feelings [expressed or inspired by them], and made them become manifest or remain within. He then used them again for teaching. Teaching is therefore the means by which *de* (virtue) is born within. Rituals arise in feelings, and sometimes to stimulate/arouse them.) (XZMC, strips 14–18) My own translation.

dao to *qing*—human *dao* is about cultivating proper feelings and emotions by training one's *xin*. In fact, the text states that *dao* starts in *qing* which involves *xin*.

Training *xin* is the process of integrating *qing* with the recognition of what is appropriate by establishing intention, cultivating the mind to bring it to a state of harmony, and consistency and sincerity in one's *xin* that is in unity with one's demeanour and behaviour. The states of *xin*, *zhi*, and *qing* are so closely related that these characters are sometimes used interchangeably in the text:

> 有其爲人之節節如也, 不有乎柬柬之心則采。有其爲人之柬柬如也, 不有夫恆始之志則縵。人之巧言利辭者, 不有夫詘詘之心則流。人之悅然可與和安者, 不有夫奮作之情則侮。有其為人之快如也, 弗牧不可。有其爲人之菉如也, 弗輔不足。
>
> For those who have a restrained countenance, if they lack sincerity at *xin*, they will become pretentious. For those who are sincere, if they lack steadfast will, they will become apathetic. An eloquent person lacking meekness at *xin* will become insincere. If a pleasant and amiable person is not motivated by aspirations, he will be insolent. Those who are impertinent cannot do without being restrained; those who are diffident cannot do without being guided.[26] (XZMC, strips 44–48)

Likewise, in the XZMC a *junzi* is described as someone who embodies emotion balanced with sincerity, reverence, magnanimity, and modesty, which are displayed naturally in public and private demeanour and behaviour:

> 身欲靜而勿, 慮欲淵而毋僞, 行欲勇而必至, 貌欲莊而毋伐, [心]欲柔齊而泊, 喜欲智而無末, 樂欲懌而有志, 憂欲斂而毋昏, 怒欲盈而毋希, 進欲遜而毋巧, 退欲肅而毋輕, 欲皆度而毋偽, 君子執志必有夫廣廣之心, 出言必有夫柬柬之信。賓客之禮必有夫齊齊之容, 祭祀之禮必有夫齊齊之敬, 居喪必有夫戀戀之哀。
>
> Regarding (his) body, he desires it to be tranquil without getting excited; regarding (his) thought, he desires it to be profound without being hypocritical; regarding (his) action, he desires it to be courageous with commitment; regarding (his) appearance, he desires it to be grave without being rude; regarding (his) feelings (in *xin*) he desires it to be gentle and earnest, and yet at ease. For joy, he desires it to be wise without being superficial; for pleasure, he desires it to be happy with an intention; for sorrow, he desires it to be restrained without being confused; for anger, he desires it to be intense without being trifling; in approaching a superior, he desires to be modest without being crafty; when retreating, he desires to be reverent without being slighting. Regarding his desires all should be measured and not artificial. In carrying out his intent, a *junzi* must have a boundless heart; when speaking, he must be earnestly sincere. In attending to the ritual for the visitor-guests he must adopt a grave, respectful appearance; in attending the sacrificial ceremony he must be serious and reverent. In mourning he must be in continuous grief. (XZMC, strips 62–67)

In the above passage, the word "desire" (*yu* 欲) is used frequently to describe the satisfaction the individual anticipates in terms of the body, thought, action, appearance, and emotions. This affirms that self-cultivation is accomplished through an integrative process. The desirable measures are met by a harmonious and natural correspondence of the whole, indicated by the repeated pattern 欲 … 而 … (desire [it] to be … and thus …). The question is how one should cultivate oneself. The text goes on:

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[26] Translation has been modified from the last version of my paper.

> 凡學者求其心為難, 從其所為, 近得之矣, 不如以樂之速也。雖能其事, 不能其心, 不貴。求其心有僞也, 弗得之矣。人之不能以偽也, 可知也。
>
> For all those who are learning, it is seeking *xin* that is difficult. Just following what one is trying (to attain) is close to attaining it, but it is not as fast as by using music. One who is capable of doing it, but is not able to attain it in *xin*, is not worthy of honour. Seeking *xin* but with artifice/hypocrisy, one will not be able to attain it. People should not (do it) with artifice/hypocrisy. This can be known. (XZMC, strips 36–38)

The above calls for two remarks. First, the author claims that seeking and attaining (what we learn) in *xin* is desirable yet difficult. Second, while it is difficult to seek morality in *xin*, the most effective way is through *yue* 樂 (the character carries the double connotation of music and happiness).[27] One may take the words "seeking" (*qiu* 求) and "attaining" (*de* 得) to indicate that knowledge or what we are learning (e.g., the way, moral principle) is something not readily possessed; it needs to be acquired, understood, and internalized, a process for which *xin* is responsible, presumably through learning and education. Without the heart understanding and attaining it, one cannot be said to be virtuous, even if one is able to carry out the task (*shi* 事). For Mencius, *qiu* does not mean acquiring something completely external, but retaining and enhancing our inherent moral quality within. If we relate this back to the earlier discussion of *xing* and *xin*, which does not have a fixed intent, *qiu* means to stabilize and hold fast to the morally desirable elements of what we are endowed with as well as through learning what is external. The result of *qiu* and *de* means a correspondence of actuality—a correlation of action and the true emotions and intent of *xin*. Moreover, this should preferably be done naturally and spontaneously. Here, the concept of *wei* 偽 is introduced. *Wei*, meaning artifice / hypocrisy / psychological exertion, which indicates rational effort, a striving, has negative connotations.[28] The XZMC believes the ideal in moral practice is not one with *wei* but with naturalness, genuineness, and spontaneity.

Naturalness, however, does not mean that no external guidance is required. In fact, music is believed to be most appropriate and efficient in that it will draw out proper *qing* naturally and spontaneously by moving one's *xin*. This is easily understood if we consider again the main point of our earlier discussion, where *xin* has been described as the seat of the feelings and emotions. I would like to discuss this by relating the concept of *qing* to music as an effective way of transforming innate

[27] "Music is happiness. The noble people find happiness in attaining their way (*dao* 道), while the petty people find happiness in attaining what they desire" (樂者, 樂也。君子樂得其道, 小人樂得其欲) (XZ, 20). One should note that the author of the XZMC did not suggest that self-cultivation cannot be accomplished without music. Instead, the text is arguing for a relative efficiency in the process of cultivation by using music.

[28] Here, *wei* 偽 denotes the unnatural, forced, mendacious, and hypocritical as opposed to the genuine and sincere. The character in the XZMC was originally written with the heart radical instead of the human radical, which leads Pang Pu 龐朴 to suggest that it denotes a kind of "psychologically hypocrisy" (*jiao qing* 矯情) (Tu and Liu 2001: 176). Slingerland has proposed the term "psychological exertion," believing that in the Guodian corpus striving is morally suspect (Slingerland 2008).

feelings. To do that, it is appropriate to turn to *qing*, the next key concept presented in the XZMC.

4 *Qing* 情

Qing 情 is a most complex and elusive term, its meaning shifting from period to period (Andreini 2006: 149–65). It has been suggested that, rather than "passions or emotions," in pre-Han literature *qing* meant "the facts," "genuine," "genuinely," or even "essence" or "essentially" (Graham 1990: 59). Another suggestion is that it meant something like "reality feedback" or "reality input" (Hansen 1995: 181–211).

Recent studies, including those of the Guodian material, have started to look at the emotional dimension of *qing* in terms of the human ability to respond to surrounding promptings. One scholar suggests, for example, that *qing* "refers to one's emotional disposition, to the way that one's emotions will be pulled out in particular circumstances" (Puett 2004: 46). Similarly, passages in the XZMC have led some to believe *qing* refers to humans' true inner feelings, and thus a genuine response to external promptings, so that the term *qing* can be defined thus: "on the one hand we have 'emotions, passions, feelings' and on the other the idea of 'real, true, genuineness'" (Andreini 2006: 151).

Many of the above interpretations have textual support in the XZMC. I would like to extend my discussion of *qing* by relating it to the concept of *xing*. Derived from human *xing*, *qing* certainly reflects the dimension of human nature and should form the basis for cultivation. To interpret *qing* in the context of the definition of *xing* we have arrived at from the XZMC, *xing* and *qing* are closely related on at least two levels. If we take *xing* as referring to both inborn or predetermined nature and the characteristic tendencies that designate the growth and life process of a thing, *qing* as part of human *xing* denotes (1) the natural emotional features or affective state, including the essential emotional repertoire, inborn emotional capacities, and hardwired temperament, and (2) the developing affective and psychological tendencies that are an expression of human nature, of those human needs, satisfactions, and desires that are a response to external stimuli in particular circumstances. Depending on the context, this can be rendered as natural affective responsiveness, natural/genuine feelings, and even moral sensibility.[29] *Xing* in terms of the *qi* of emotions is activated as a response to external stimuli, resulting in *qing*. This implies that *qing* is a variable depending on the nature of the external stimuli and on how the

[29] Eifring has pointed out that, while the term *qing* has been translated as "emotions," it has much wider connotations, including "feeling" (*ganjue* 感覺), "feeling, emotional response" (*gan* 感), "feelings; state of mind" (*huai* 懷),"emotion, mood, temper" (*qingxu* 情緒),"emotion, feeling" (*qinggan* 情感), "feeling, affection" (*ganqing* 感情),"emotional disposition, temperament, sensibility" (*xingqing* 性情) (Eifring 2004: 2–3). Similarly, in this paper, emotion/feeling" is used in a broad sense, referring to "state of mind" as well as to a particular (mental) response to situation(s).

subject responds to external presentations. *Qing* constitutes *xing* when it becomes a habitual feeling or an emotional tendency. My interpretation of the concept of *qing* in the XZMC and thus its role in moral cultivation will be built on this understanding of the term. As with most key Chinese philosophical terms that defy translation, in the main I will retain the Chinese form of the word *qing*, except where it becomes necessary to express some English-language connotations.

In our earlier discussion we showed that, in relation to *xing*, in the XZMC, *qing* is born out of *xing*, as it is the activation of our inborn *qi*. *Qing* is a result of genuine and natural responses to external stimuli (*wu* 物), induced by *xin*. *Qing*, or our ability to perceive and respond to our surroundings, is important in informing us how we really feel about something. Taking *qing* as "manifested human nature, *xing*, as affective response to external stimuli" is grounding *qing* as an expression of *xing* —this is consistent with the Chinese term *xing qing* 性情 as in the title of the *Xing qing lun* 性情論 (Discourse of Xing and Qing), the parallel version of the *Xing zi ming chu* in the Shanghai Museum collection. Therefore, to understand our *xing* is also about understanding our emotions, feelings and affective response (pre- or post-cognitive), and is essential to self-knowledge and social practice. We perceive the emotions, likes and dislikes of others through our understanding of their expressions and the situation in which we find ourselves. Being sensitive to feelings and emotions enables us to master consciousness effectively without repressing those feelings and emotions, instead of being enslaved by irrational and coarse reactions. Some argue that the core of human emotions and the basic emotional repertoire, as biological events, are the same the world over and do not vary with, nor are they influenced by, culture. Others suggest that they are largely learned and conceptualized and thus are cultural artefacts (Solomon 1995: 171–202). The discussion on *xing* and *qing* in the XZMC recognizes both the (inborn) basis and needs of human nature as well as human nature as a developmental constructs. Humans are born with and share similar core emotions and emotional capacities, which in the XZMC are the *qi* of happiness, anger, sadness, and grief (*xi nu ai bei zhi qi* 喜怒哀悲之氣), and our similar likes and dislikes out of our inborn nature (*hao wu, xing ye* 好惡, 性也), but how and why we feel and respond the way we do is also a learned experience, for example, through cultural practice and education. While we tend to like something and dislike others these affective tendencies in our *xing* can only be drawn out and concretized with the presence of what makes us feel this way. As the same passage in the XZMC continues: what is liked and disliked are (external) things. Being good (or not being good is nature); what makes one good or not good are circumstances (所好所惡, 物也。善不[善, 性也] 所善所不善, 勢也).[30]

The XZMC tends to recognize the importance of *qing*, its role in moral cultivation, and how one should learn to cultivate oneself properly through knowledge of propriety (*yi* 義). The following is relevant to our discussion:

[30] Xunzi made a contrast between *xing* and *xue*. Xunzi's understanding of human nature led him to the conclusion that achieving the right motivation and behaviour requires an exertion of force that he refers to as artifice (*wei* 偽); it is not part of our *xing* but something imposed from outside through learning (XZ, 23).

道始於情, 情生於性。始者近情, 終者近義。知情者能出之, 知義者能入之。

The *dao* begins in the *qing*; *qing* is born out of nature (*xing*). In its beginning (the *dao*) is close to true feelings; in its end, (the *dao* is) close to propriety (*yi*). Those who understand true feelings are able to express it (i.e.. *dao*) on the outside; those who understand propriety are able to internalize it (i.e.. *dao*). (XZMC, strips 3–4)

There is an imperative in this passage. Humans share the same natural tendencies that enable us to respond to the same external stimuli with similar affective response. The fact that *qing*, which denotes spontaneous and natural responsiveness/sensibilities, and *yi*, proper response, are being discussed in conjunction with each other, indicating their interlocking roles, suggests that *qing* is at the very least closely related to *yi* in terms of moral cultivation. The lines *dao shi yu qing* 道始於情 and *shi zhe jin qing* 始者近情 imply that *qing* is the starting point for cultivation and constitutes the essential base from which the human way is to be cultivated. One's natural emotional disposition (*qing*) as an intrinsic part of *xing* is essential but not sufficient on its own for facilitating and accomplishing the process of self-cultivation. One must also set one's will and intent to acquire proper social rules and guidance (*yi*)—this accumulative practice with the assumption that we will be able to acquire and internalize the same knowledge of appropriate response, provides the end result of *yi*. Realizing *yi* does not mean removing *qing*; rather, it is about patterning and manifesting proper *qing* in any given situation. *Xing* needs to be cultivated and expressed with the practice of *yi* for goodness and refinement, yet its genuineness, naturalness, sincerity, and spontaneity should be recognized.[31]

Combining and harmonizing internal and external moral sources is more explicit in the discussion of the relationship between *qing* and *yi*, which continues in the next lines, where the words exit (*chu* 出) and enter (*ru* 入) are used. It is stated that knowledge and understanding (*zhi* 知) of *qing* and *yi* will enable one properly to manifest or generate one's response and internalize the proper way of expression. The use of *chu* and *ru* for *qing* and *yi* may suggest, respectively, the internality of *qing* and the externality of *yi*. If we assume that *ren* is related to *qing*, in that both are derived from innate feelings or both come from human *xing*, then this polarity may have provided the basis for the argument put forward by Gaozi and his associates that "humanity is internal and propriety is external" (*ren nei yi wai* 仁內義外).[32] We do actually see such a connection elsewhere in the XZMC, where it states that "humanity is the expression of *xing*, or *xing* gives birth to it" (仁, 性之方也。性或生之) (XZMC, strip 39) and "there are seven kinds of love; only love derived

[31] This accords well with what Confucius proposed, that is, only a well-balanced admixture of native substance and acquired refinement can result in an ideal character (LY, 6.18).

[32] Confucius' view on the nature of this *ren* can be easily detected in the *Analects*. For example, the performance and practice of *li* must be coupled with proper attitude or mental state: What can a man who is not *ren* do with *li*? What can a man who is not *ren* do with music? (LY, 3.3). It is not clear from the text, but *chu* and *ru* might imply a kind of movement of *qi* in terms of moral sensibilities. The problem with using the words internal (*nei*) and external (*wai*) is that it overlooks the fact that both *ren* (or, to the same extent, *qing* in the XZMC) and *yi* as moral sensibilities involve internal or psychological activities. Strictly speaking, *qing* is similar to *yi* in that it is not mechanically internal, either.

from *xing* is close to humanity" (愛類七, 唯性愛為近仁) (strip 40).[33] Again, in a similar way to the previous statement, it is suggested that moral cultivation is a constituent and dynamic process that involves both *qing* and *yi*, and *qing* should here be understood as a kind of moral sensibility developing with the agent's improving awareness of and knowledge of *yi*.

As stated earlier, in the XZMC the significance of *qing* is naturalness and genuineness as opposed to *wei* 偽. This concept of genuineness or sincerity, which is referred to as *zhen* 真, is more explicit in a passage from the *Zhuangzi*:

> 真者, 精誠之至也。不精不誠, 不能動人。故強哭者, 雖悲不哀, 強怒者, 雖嚴不威, 強親者, 雖笑不和。真悲無聲而哀, 真怒未發而威, 真親未笑而和。真在內者, 神動於外, 是所以貴真也。
>
> *Zhen* is ultimate purity and sincerity; without purity and sincerity, one cannot move others. Hence if one forces oneself to wail, however sadly one might seem to be, it is not (real) sorrow. If one forces oneself to be angry, however severe one might seem to be, one inspires no awe. If one forces oneself to show affection, however one may smile, one imparts no comity. Genuine grief, though silent, is (real) sorrow; true anger, though no outburst, inspires awe; genuine affection, though no smile, conveys comity. Given this genuineness (*zhen*) within, it will move one to show spiritual efficacy without, and this is why we count it so valuable. (*Zhuangzi*, "The Old Fisherman")[34]

It is with a similar understanding that, because the core values of *qing* are sincerity, naturalness, and genuineness, the XZMC has related *qing* to the concept of trustworthiness (*xin* 信), one of the key Confucian ethical concepts. Typically, this *xin* is based on sincerity, reliability, and competence. We tend to associate trust with sincerity—the genuineness of someone in their engagement with us. *Xin* is therefore essential for building good and confident human relationships; it must be performed in order to be effectively accomplished as a true representation of one's feelings and emotional state, *qing*, and thus one's behaviour:

> 忠,信之方也。信, 情之方也,情出於性 …凡人情為可悅也。苟以其情, 雖過不惡。不以其情,雖難不貴。苟有其情,雖未之為, 斯人信之矣。未言而信,有美情者也 …
>
> Faithfulness (*zhong*) is the way of (expressing) sincerity; sincerity is the way of (expressing) *qing*, and *qing* arises from *xing* … For anyone, *qing* can be pleasing. One who has *qing* will not be despised even if he makes a mistake; one without *qing* will not be worthy of honour even if it is difficult. If someone has *qing*, even though he has not yet performed the task, indeed, people will trust him. Someone who is trustworthy without even speaking is one who esteems *qing* … (XZMC, strips 39–40, 50–51)

The evidence presented so far suggests that for the author of the XZMC both *qing* and *yi* are crucial for moral cultivation. The interaction between the two constitutes the basis of morality. *Qing* is the starting point of *dao* and the inspiration for the traditional rules of ritual behaviour. According to the XZMC, the sages used their understanding of human *qing* to work on the cultural traditions of poems, documents, ritual, and music and accomplish their aim of cultivating human emotions and feeling:

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[33] The other kinds are not listed elsewhere, so we do not know what they might be.

[34] I have provided my own translation for this passage of the *Zhuangzi*.

> 詩、書、禮、樂, 其始出, 皆生於人。詩, 有為為之也。書, 有為言之也。禮、樂, 有為擧也。聖人比其類而論會之, 觀其之 (先) 後而逆順之, 體其義而節文之, 理其情而出入之, 然後復以教。教, 所以生德於中者也。禮作於情, 或興之也。

> The *Odes*, the *Documents*, the *Rites*, and the *Music* were all initially produced by men. Through effort were the *Odes* composed; through effort were the *Documents* preached; through effort were the *Rites*, and the *Music* promoted.[35] The sage compared the types, analyzed them, and assembled them into categories. He observed their sequence and rearranged them; he comprehended their [ideas of] propriety and refined them. He sifted the emotions/feelings [expressed or inspired by them], and made them manifest or internalized. He then used them again for teaching. Teaching is therefore the means by which *de* is born within. Rituals arise in *qing*, and sometimes stimulate/arouse them. (XZMC, strips 15–19)

One can see from the above that this is not a simple defence of traditional culture (which certainly plays a role in social or cultural practice in shaping human character), but an argument for the discernment of *qing*. It shows that the significance of these cultural traditions is that they were created by men, for men, based on their best understanding of human *qing*. These cultural patterns embody the XZMC ideas of propriety and represent refinement and appropriateness of *qing*; if used for teaching they will enable the learner to cultivate *de* 德 within. The words *sheng de yu zhong* 生德於中 suggest that the purpose of education is the inner development of individuals in whom *de* will be formed or actualized. As mentioned earlier, the XZMC states explicitly that human *xing* itself is non-active; it is only through external stimuli or external objects (*wu* 物) that it becomes manifest. In this context, teaching and education are essential for helping one become intent on moral cultivation, utilizing the proper external stimuli, until one has developed the natural tendencies and abilities for actualizing an inherent, spontaneously functioning and effective power (*de*). Through *wu*—which includes the teaching embodied in the traditional culture—the *xin* will draw out proper *qing*. Music and ritual practice are effective as external stimuli or presentations for moral transformation because it is through the right emotions and feelings that one is enabled to cultivate virtue.

The XZMC provides a detailed account of how ritual, and music in particular, are effective in activating natural responsiveness:

> 笑, 禮之淺澤也。樂, 禮之深澤也。凡聲, 其出於情也信, 然後其入拔人之心也厚。聞笑聲, 則鮮如也斯喜。聞歌謠, 則陶如也斯奮。聽琴瑟之聲, 則悸如也斯歎。觀《賚》《武》, 則齊如也斯作。觀《韶》、《夏》, 則覞如也斯斂。詠思而動心, 如也。其居次也久, 其反善復始也慎, 其出入也順, 始其德也。鄭衛之樂, 則非其聲而從之也。凡古樂龍心, 益樂龍指, 皆教其人者也。《賚》、《武》樂取, 《韶》、《夏》樂情。凡至樂必悲, 哭亦悲, 皆至其情也。哀、樂, 其性相近也, 是故其心不遠。哭之動心也, 浸殺, 其烈戀戀如也, 慼然以終。樂之動心也, 濬深鬱陶, 其烈則流如也以悲, 悠然以思。凡憂思而後悲, 凡樂思而後忻, 凡思之用心為甚。歎, 思之方也。其聲變, 則 (心從之)。其心變, 則其聲亦然。吟, 遊哀也。噪, 遊樂也。啾, 遊聲也, 嘔, 遊心也。喜斯陶, 陶斯奮, 奮斯詠, 詠斯猶, 猶斯舞。舞, 喜之終也。慍斯憂, 憂斯慼, 慼斯歎, 歎斯辟, 辟斯踴。踴, 慍之終也。凡學者求其心為難, 從其所為, 近得之矣, 不如以樂之速也。

[35] For a discussion of the writing and manuscript culture of these ancient texts, see Chap. 3 by He and Nylan; and Chap. 4 by Meyer in this volume.

The smile is a superficial influence of *li*. Music is a deep influence of *li*. Any sound that emerges from one's true feelings is (a) sincere (token of those feelings). As such (that is, a sincere token of true feelings), it (the sound) then penetrates people's hearts, striking at the root in abundant measure. Upon hearing the sound of laughter, its clarity is truly joyous. Upon hearing a ballad, it is so happy and contented that (one) is stirred. Upon hearing the sounds of stringed instruments, one is moved to sigh. Upon observing *Lai* and *Wu*, it is so respectful that one is aroused.[36] Upon observing *Shao* and *Xia*, it is so uplifting that one becomes restrained.[37] Singing and thinking, one's heart is moved, and one sighs. (When) one follows the rhythmic motions for a long time,[38] returning to what is good and going back to the beginning is cautious; manifesting (*qing*, that is, real feelings) and internalizing (*yi*, that is, what is appropriate) is smooth—This is the beginning of *de* (virtue). (As for) the music of Zheng and Wei, its sound is not what one should follow.[39] For the ancient music, it brings harmony to (one's) heart; the good music harmonizes (one's) intention.[40] These are all for the purpose of teaching one's person. *Lai* and *Wu* sing of taking[41]; *Shao* and *Xia* sing of true human feelings.[42] Extreme happiness surely brings sorrow, as does tears—these are

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[36] *Lai* and *Wu*, from the "Zhousong" 周頌 of the *Odes*, are songs praising King Wu of Western Zhou. The musical performance is a combination of singing of the *Odes* and a dance performance of the sung poetry.

[37] *Shao* and *Xia* are music of the sage kings. Shao is the music of Shun 舜 (周禮春官·大司樂); *Xia* is also referred to as *Da Xia* from Yu 禹 (Ding 2002: 64).

[38] Scholars offer different suggestions for what *qi* 其 refers to in these sentences. Some Chinese scholars take it as the music itself. Liu Zhao, for example, explains 其出入也順 as music coming and going from the heart (Liu 2003). Others believe these passages are describing how one reacts to music, so that *qi* should refer to the individual who is morally trained through music: through music, the dancers and the aspiring *junzi* are able to enter a process of moral cultivation that combines internal feelings and ritual movements. Both readings are possible. However, it seems to me that the second reading is more agreeable. So far I have not come across music described in this way, whereas a similar structure—反古復始—has been used referring to the way of transforming people, for example, in the *Liji*: 教民反古復始 (LJ, 25.28).

[39] Li Xueqin suggests that *cong* 從 should be read *zhong* 縱: Thus, the music of Zheng and Wei is not the genuine sound of music but of sensual debauchery. So here the sentence can be taken as saying that the music of Zheng and Wei should not be followed (Ding 2002: 136–39). The music (or the sounds) of Zheng and Wei has been criticized in various early texts, including the *Liji* and the *Analects*, for indulging the passions (*yin* 淫). Another way of reading this sentence is "The music of Zheng and Wei is not the sound that one should follow and yet (people) follow it." The confusion probably results from the ambiguity of *zhi* 之. Either way, the primary message is that music like that of Zheng and Wei should not be listened to.

[40] Some scholars see *guyue* 古樂 and *yiyue* 益樂, used here to contrast good and bad music, since *yi* 益is read *yi* 溢, an alternative for *yin* 淫, meaning excessive or indulgent. Others take *yiyue* to refer to music with an accompaniment, which is not necessarily bad (see Ding 2002: 68). However, the following sentence—皆教其人者也—makes it clear that the music referred to is good. The *guyue* and *yiyue* are probably special references to, respectively, *Shao*, *Xia* and *Lai*, *Wu*. Thus, I translate *yi* as "good." *Zhi* 指 means "intention" (see 尚書·盤庚上: 王播告之脩, 不匿厥指, where *zhi* refers to the king's intention) (Ding 2002: 68). I read *long* 龍as *he* 和 (see 廣雅•釋詁三: 龍, 和也), whereas Li Ling reads it as *dong* 動 (Tu and Liu 2001: 164; Ding 2002: 68). I follow Tu and Liu.

[41] "Sing (that is, celebrate in musical form) of (military) capture" (樂取). Liu Zhao believes there is a military implication here (Liu 2003: 98).

[42] Confucius makes this comment on the *Shao* and *Wu*: 子謂《韶》: 韶盡美矣, 又盡善也。謂《武》: 盡美矣, 未盡善也 (LY, 3.25). It is generally accepted that the *Shao* is better than *Wu* because the former was the music of King Shun, who reigned by means of virtue, whereas the latter was the

> all the onset of their (that is, humans') *qing*. Grief and joy, their nature is close, and thus their (effects upon the) hearts are not very different. The way tears moves the heart, is penetrating and severe; its intensity is continuous in sorrow and ends in grief. The way pleasure moves the heart is deep, profound and anxious; its intensity is flowing with sorrow, far-reaching with longing. In general, all anxiety when followed by thought becomes sorrow; in general, all pleasure followed by thought becomes happiness, for all thinking uses the heart very deeply.[43] Sighing is the way of (expressing) thinking. When one's voice changes, one's heart follows. When one's heart changes, one's voice also follows.[44] Groaning proceeds from sorrow. Cheering proceeds from joy. Murmuring proceeds from the voice. Singing proceeds from the heart. Pleased and thus cheerful, cheerful and thus excited; excited and thus singing, singing and thus swaying, swaying and thus dancing. Dancing is the endpoint of joy. Angry and thus distressed, distressed and thus grieved, grieved and thus sighing, sighing and thus beating one's breast, beating one's breast and thus leaping. Leaping is the final outcome of anger. For all those who are learning, it is seeking *xin* that is difficult. Just following what one is trying (to attain) is close to attaining it, but it is not as fast as by using the music. (XZMC, strips 22–36)

This long passage depicts how ritual, particularly musical performance (combined with singing the lyrics of the *Odes* and dancing), is an effective communicative art in both content and form. The text maintains that music deeply influences emotionality on different levels. Music is, in this case, the ancient music of *Lai* and *Wu*, *Shao* and *Xia*, characterized by harmony and balance, as opposed to the music of Zheng and Wei. According to the text, the former is "arousing," whereas the latter "restrains" human emotions, and has the ability to move the heart and enable the subject to go through the various mental stages that correspond to physiological responses and physical movements. Along with the sensual experience of hearing (*wen* 聞), listening to (*ting* 聽), and observing (*guan* 觀) the musical performance, the listener is able to share emotions and feelings with the musical performer(s) and

music of King Wu who, even though he was a good king, conquered the Shang through violence. The results of teaching these different types of music were expected to be different. Here, 取 may imply the way in which King Wu took the world—through intention, desire, and ambition.

[43] These sentences explain how heart (*xin* 心), thinking (*si* 思), and *qing* are related (see MZ, 11.15).

[44] A similar description appears in the "Yueji" of the *Liji*, for example, 凡音之起, 由人心生也。人心之動, 物使之然也。感於物而動, 故形於聲。聲相應, 故生變, 變成方, 謂之音; 比音而樂之, 及干戚羽旄, 謂之樂 ... 是故其哀心感者, 其聲噍以殺。其樂聲感者, 其聲以緩 ... 凡音者, 生人心者也。情動於中, 故形於聲。聲成文, 謂之音。是故, 治世之音安於樂, 其政和。亂世之音怨以怒, 其政乖 ... All the modulations of the voice arise from the mind, and the various affections of the mind are produced by things (external) to it. The affections thus produced are manifested in the sounds that are uttered. Changes are produced by the way in which those sounds respond to one another; and those changes constitute what we call the modulations of the voice. The combination of those modulated sounds, so as to give pleasure, and the (direction in harmony with them of the) shields and axes, and of the plumes and ox-tails, constitutes what we call music . . . When the mind is moved to sorrow, the sound is sharp and fading away; when it is moved to pleasure, the sound is slow and gentle . . . All modulations of the voice shape the minds of men. When the feelings are moved within, they are manifested in the sounds of the voice; and when those sounds are combined so as to form compositions, we have what are called airs. Hence, the airs of an age of good order indicate composure and enjoyment, [Legge had omitted this sentence: and its government is in peace.] The airs of an age of disorder indicate dissatisfaction and anger, and its government is perversely bad . . . (Kongzi and Legge 1967: 92–93).

smoothly internalize what is proper. This stresses the relative ease with which progress can be made by natural and spontaneous activities, compared with psychological striving or mental exertion (also see Slingerland 2008: 22).[45] Furthermore, in a neutral sense, this process of sensual experience meets natural human sensual desires in relation to emotional aspirations, which if not satisfied will be detrimental to well-being.[46] In other words, music and ritual are significant because they elicit sincere moral emotions by directing our intention to moral engagement, while satisfying our sensual needs, which constitute an integral part of our *xing*. It can be seen from the text that music is the most effective tool for generating moral sentiments and, to the author of the XZMC, it very often involves arousing natural and genuine emotional responses.[47] Again, as mentioned earlier, this sentimental engagement of the heart-mind involves the process of thinking (*si* 思), which engages the subject more effectively with emotions and the knowledge acquired. What is more, the text claims that with the standard movements of the ancient, choreographed odes, one in effect "returns to the good and goes back to the origins cautiously." So, the performance of ancient rituals both enacts and turns into the process whereby we cultivate our original moral base or activate our pre-existing natural moral tendencies. The words *fan shan fu shi* 反善復始 have prompted scholars to argue these as evidence that humans were born with some good moral basis (see Guo 2001: 426).[48]

The musical practice, which starts with the effect on *xin*, leading to corresponding physical reactions such as bodily movement, explicitly asserts that moral cultivation is about the holistic engagement of the body, all of which, to use one term, is cultivating the body (*shen* 身). *Shen* is an all-purpose word embracing thinking, feeling, and acting.[49] To achieve a mastery of ritual practice, one undergoes

[45] Furthermore, the profound power of good music on the listener is not limited to the very moment of listening but is long lasting and can even overcome our basic desire for food. This is exemplified in the *Analects* where Confucius was described as "not being able to notice the taste of meat for three days" after hearing a musical performance of Shao (LY, 7.14).

[46] The original in the XZMC is "The eyes' love of beauty and the ears' love of sound is about the *qi* of anxiety [which if the desire is not satisfied] people have no trouble dying for these things" (目之好色, 耳之樂聲, 鬱陶之氣也, 人不難爲之死) (XZMC, strips 43–44). By "in a neutral sense" I relate back to the earlier discussion in this paper about how our natural sensual desire, which is part of our *xing*, may or may not be morally desirable. Which aspects of these elements are drawn out and affirmed depends on external stimuli. For example, good and bad music will have different impacts on the process of cultivation.

[47] The function of music in moral transformation has also been explicitly discussed in other early texts, for example, the "Records of Music" in the *Book of Rites*. Music for Xunzi is effective in moral transformation because it satisfies the natural human desire for sensual pleasure. The *Xunzi* says: "Music is joy; it is what humans cannot avoid in their *qing*." While recognizing *qing* as part of human nature, Xunzi tended to relate it to natural desire (*yu* 欲), which was based on self-interest and thus needed to be controlled.

[48] Obviously, since proper stimuli are required for the development of moral sensibility, it is only good music that should be used. This is pointed out in the passage about the music of *Zheng* and *Wei* not worthy of being followed.

[49] "[Therefore] a *junzi* would take [his] bodily engagement to command/regulate his heart/mind" (君子身以爲主心) (XZMC, strip 67). More literally, we may suggest: "(For) the *junzi*, it is the body that he uses to master his heart." I would take *shen* as meaning one's holistic engagement of

psycho-physical training in which one's sensory, mental, and physical capacities become honed to an extraordinary degree, indicating becoming attuned to the transformations of nature, and thus highly responsive to tendencies (*xing*). To the author of the XZMC this is a process of spontaneous correspondence of mind and body brought into harmony by the primordial influence of music. A true human harmony and happiness is thus achieved by establishing moral-aesthetic values that transform the human heart. As is well summed up in the XZMC, the designated process of cultivation involves the following:

> 君子美其情, 貴 (其義) , 善其節, 好其容, 樂其道, 悅其教, 是以敬焉。
>
> A *junzi* esteems his *qing* (natural dispositions), attaches importance to his propriety, cherishes his refinement, loves his good appearance, delights in his *dao*, and takes pleasure in his teachings. This is why people revere him (that is, the perfected gentleman). (XZMC, strips 20–21)

Thus, cultivation is a dynamic, all-embracing process that involves the unity of morality, physicality, and aesthetics. Moral practice develops a unique ensemble of dispositions, behaviours, and qualities that lead to human excellence; a process that recognizes both the biological basis and the necessity of social construction of personhood. The achievement of an ideal personality is both moral and aesthetic, because it results in the embodiment of the good and the personal creation of an elegant, harmonious, and balanced body and soul. It is noteworthy that the words *mei* 美, *gui* 貴, *shan* 善, *hao* 好, *yao* 樂, and *yue* 悅 are indicative of a *junzi*'s emotional or evaluative responses and attitudes to the various moral measures, which are closely related to and displayed in his own *qing*, character and mannerisms. These same attitudes and conduct, expressed in the cultivated individual, as implicitly suggested in the text, provide a medium for moral leadership as they elicit people's respect.[50] In this same passage, we can see that cultivation is a process in which one will take pleasure; here, the natural human desire for pleasure meets with the seeking and attainment of the way (*dao* 道)[51]: the subject has been able to attain such a

practical experience, a meaning that can be found in the *Mencius*—堯舜性之也, 湯武身之也, 五霸假之也. Through training the body, that is, the experience of the coherent whole through practice, one rectifies one's *xin*. This echoes the first line of the XZMC, where it is stated that *xin* does not have a fixed will (心無定志), and its function is subject to environmental influence, pleasure, and practice. The same sentence can also mean the *junzi*'s conduct is taken to rectify the hearts of the multitudes. One's outward appearance, voice, and mannerisms (that is, persona) can affect one's internal dispositions. Furthermore, once the proper dispositions have been acquired, these same appearances and mannerisms serve to express the cultivated individual's "moral power" (*de* 德), and provide a medium for moral leadership in regulating the hearts of the people.

[50] I thank Philip Ivanhoe for his generous comments and suggestions on my translations of the words *mei* 美, *gui* 貴, *shan* 善, *hao* 好, *yao* 樂, and *yue* 悅.

[51] When he drew a comparison between knowing (*zhi* 知), desiring (*hao* 好), and taking pleasure in (*yao* 樂), Confucius made it clear that taking pleasure in what we acquire is the greatest accomplishment: "To know it is not as good as to desire it, and to desire it is not as good as to take delight in it" (LY, 6.20).

heightened sense of propriety that he is inclined to seek propriety.[52] The concept of teaching (*jiao* 教) is about orienting the individual's sentiments or natural feelings toward moral practice. Moral cultivation does not mean being devoid of pleasure or living a barren life. Quite the contrary, the greatest achievement for humans is pursuing joy and happiness in seeking and attaining the *dao*, a happiness that an ox or a wild goose would never be able to share or comprehend.

5 Conclusion

The XZMC provides an account of how *xing*, *xin*, and *qing* were viewed in the late Warring States period, probably before Mencius' time. It allows us to re-examine the concept of *xing*, including the controversy over whether human nature is good (morally desirable) or bad, the role of human emotions/feelings in moral cultivation, the internalism and externalism of morality, and the importance of learning and habitual practice (also see Goldin 2005). *Xing* as inborn nature provides an essential base for the growth and development of things. The human *xin*g itself, specifically the *qi* of happiness, anger, sadness, and grief, are drawn out only with external stimuli and induction by *xin*, which then is referred to as *qing*. *Qing* is derived from *xing* and is a natural emotional tendency in response to external factors. Given that *xin* does not have a fixed intention, significant guidance is required to cause inner potentialities to develop and cultivate virtue within. *Qing* therefore also constitutes *xing* through cultural practice and moral cultivation, a process of activating and refining inborn nature through the external influences of learning and cultural practice—an ongoing cyclical and interactive process of the internal and external, the pre-determined and developmental, the natural and cultural features. If the (external) influences are positive—for example, ritual and music—the result will be a harmonious unity of nature and social practice.

The concept of *xing* and *qing* in relation to moral cultivation as presented in the XZMC is self-evident as a thesis emerging from an intellectual discourse that is more syncretic and dynamic than previously recognized. We have no substantive

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[52] In fact, the harmonious unity of moral virtuosity and bodily aesthetics is well captured in the *Analects* 7.6. This is further illuminated by the well-known story of Butcher Ding in the *Zhuangzi*. In this story we are told how Butcher Ding cut up an ox in a beautiful and skilful way. After many years of practice he had come to a state of mastery and freedom that was not just physically easy and aesthetic; he was also able to do it without looking at it, because he had internalized the Way, and his spirit went freely to where his blade should go. The rhythmic dancing and free mind of Butcher Ding when carving up the ox represents the total concordance of ritual restraints and harmonious freedom. Scott Cook has proposed that Zhuangzi's relation to the Confucian school needs to be re-examined, arguing that although Zhuangzi was fond of highlighting the absurdities of the Confucian enterprise, there is in his writings a great admiration for much of what constituted the central core of Confucius' image of "musical perfection," representing the total concordance of ritual restraints and harmonious freedom (Cook 1997: 521–54). For discussion on the relation between body and mind in the Guodian corpus, especially the *Xing zi ming chu, Wuxing* and *Ziyi*, please see Chap. 13 by Lisa Raphals.

evidence to say that the XZMC text, more precisely its tenets, are directly connected with such early thinkers as Shi Shuo, Gaozi, Mencius and Xunzi. If one accepts the hypothesis that the XZMC was composed in the time between Confucius and Mencius, then one may posit that the theories of Gaozi, Mencius, Xunzi, and even Shi Shuo were outgrowths of the different foci of the philosophical debate of the time. At the very least, the XZMC attests a rich combination of concepts not previously documented in any single form. In the XZMC we find the concept of *xing*, which enables us to distinguish between human and other animals (exemplified by the ox and the wild goose) in terms of the inborn and developing potentiality and capability to become morally competent, which Mencius would use to imply distinctive human qualities. The text presents a view of the coherence of the externalism and internalism of *qing* and *yi*, which shares similarities with the theory of "internal *ren* and external *yi*" (*ren nei yi wai*) attributed to Gaozi. Xunzi, on the other hand, might have emphasized the external influence of ritual in shaping moral character, whereas Shi Shuo believed that human nature had both good and bad aspects, and cultivation meant extending the good aspects, a view that can also be traced from the dynamism of the nature of *xing* as seen in the XZMC. Similarly, the emphasis on spontaneity and natural response suggests the possible blending of Daoist and Confucian practice, a theory that merits further study of the Guodian corpus.[53]

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[53] I have written on the Guodian *Yucong* 語叢 for this purpose in Chap. 14 of this volume.

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Chapter 13
Body and Mind in the Guodian Manuscripts



Lisa Raphals

This paper considers the relation between body and mind as described in the Guodian corpus. A significant body of research has already been done on moral psychology in the Guodian, and considerable scholarship on these texts investigates specifically their Confucian history (Chan 2009b, 2011, 2012; Csikszentmihalyi 2004; Pang 2000). Here I address the treatment in several Guodian texts of interrelations between body and mind, especially how they affect each other and the place of the Guodian material in the broader context of debates about mind-body dualism.

Debates about the relationship between mind and body are often described in terms of mind-body dualism and its opposite, monism or some kind of "holism." Monist or holist views agree on the unity of mind and body, but with much debate about what kind. For example, for materialists, mental states are simply physical states; for idealists, physical states are really mental states. On dualist accounts, mind and body are both real and both different: neither can be assimilated into the other (Raphals 2015; Slingerland 2008; Yu 2007).

The question of mind-body dualism is of contemporary importance for several reasons. First, several humanistic and scientific disciplines focus on embodiment as an important dimension of the human condition, and a view of the relations between body and mind, spirit or soul is central to any understanding of the self. Second, the question of mind-body dualism is of particular interest in Chinese and comparative philosophy because of a range of claims from both Western and Chinese sources that "Chinese thought" is "holist"—including claims that there was no mind-body dualism in early China—and contrasts between ostensive Chinese holism and "Western" dualism.

One set of arguments focuses on differences between Chinese and Western understandings of heart and mind. For example, the cognitive linguist Ning Yu has

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argued that Chinese cultural conceptualizations of the heart or mind differ fundamentally from Western dualism: the heart is understood as the central faculty of both affective and cognitive activity and the source of thought, feelings, emotions and guiding behaviour. Yu argues that this cultural conceptualization differs in fundamental ways from the dualism of modern Western philosophy, which asserts a dichotomy between reason and emotion, in which thoughts and ideas are linked to a largely disembodied "mind", and desires and emotions with an embodied "heart" (Yu 2007: 27–28).

Three important themes concerning body and mind recur in the Guodian manuscripts overall. First are accounts of the constituents of both humans and animals, specifically discussions of the nature of the body or physical person, basic emotions (*qing* 情), and the mind.[1] Second is a discussion of the nature of specifically human mental qualities, especially the heartmind (*xin* 心), spirit (*shen* 神) and intentions or will (*zhi* 志). *Shen* is discussed in *Taiyi shengshui* 太一生水 (The Great One Gives Birth to Water). A related and third important theme that recurs throughout the Guodian texts is accounts of mutual relations between mind and body: both how the body, and with it the emotions, affect the mind and how the heartmind directs or rules the body. Discussions of how the body affects the mind appear in *Zun deyi* 尊德義 (Honouring Virtue and Propriety, henceforward ZDY) and more extensively in *Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出 (Human Nature Comes from the Mandate, henceforward XZMC), which contains an extensive discussion of how the body and emotions affect the heartmind. Accounts of how the heartmind rules the body appear in *Ziyi* 緇衣 (Black Robes, henceforward ZY) and more extensively in *Wuxing* 五行 (Five Kinds of Action, henceforward WX). Additional relevant passages occur in *Qiong da yi shi* 窮達以時 (Poverty or Success is a Matter of Timing, henceforward QD), *Tang Yu zhi dao* 唐虞之道 (The Way of Tang and Yu, henceforward TYD), *Cheng zhi* 成之 (Bringing Things to Completion, henceforward CZ), *Liu de* 六德 (Six Virtues, henceforward LD) and four texts titled *Yucong* 語叢 1–4 (Thicket of Sayings, henceforward YC).[2] The XZMC, WX (discussed below) and other Guodian texts have equivalents in texts excavated from other Warring States and Han tombs, but these are beyond the scope of the present discussion.[3]

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[1] Due to an extensive debate about the meaning of the term *qing*情, I transliterate rather than translate this term throughout (e.g., Puett 2004; Middendorf 2008).

[2] Chinese quotations of the Guodian are from *Guodian Chumu zhujian* (henceforward *Guodian Chumu*) and Liu Zhao (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998; Liu 2003). Guodian slips are cited for both the entire corpus and specific text. For example, a passage in Guodian slip 483, YC 1, slip 45 would be cited as 483/YC1 45. For simplicity of transcription I have used the editors' emendations. For example, 凡又(有)血氣者 is simply transcribed as 凡有血氣者. Translations of the Guodian manuscripts are my own but are indebted to Cook's (2012) readings of the text, survey of the key scholarship and translations.

[3] The Shanghai Museum texts include a version of the XZMC titled "Discussion of *Qing* and *Xing*" (*Xingqing lun* 性情論) (Ma 2001; Ji 2004). Another version of the *Wuxing* was excavated from Mawangdui (Mawangdui Hanmu boshu zhengli xiaozu 1980: 17–27; Csikszentmihalyi 2004: 312–71).

I argue that we find a scale of views on the relation between mind and body in the Guodian texts. The XZMC in particular presents what could be called a weak mind-body dualism, in apparent differences between the body's passive response to sensation and emotion, and the capacity of the mind to use active agency to control those responses, especially through thinking or reflection (*si* 思).

At one end of the scale is a strong mind-body dualism in several passages in WX and ZY. These texts present metaphors that compare the heartmind to the ruler of a state, and the body or the senses to its ministers or officials, or to slaves. At the other end of the spectrum is a robustly holist view of *qi* 氣 as unifying body and mind. Here, similarities between the "flow" of *qi*, sound, and music are the conduits that make possible moral transformation through music.

The first section takes up several passages from the Guodian manuscripts that describe relations between body, mind and emotions as constituents of both humans and animals. These passages make it clear that animals, as well as human beings, have *qi, qing* and intentions. However, the potential ability of the heartmind to interact with *qing* and intentions seems to be unique to humans. For humans, our essential nature (*xing* 性) affects fundamental emotions (*qing*), which in turn move the heartmind. The next section takes up Guodian accounts of the constitution of a (human) person, including body or physical person and its relationship to the heartmind, virtue and self-cultivation. The third section takes up an extensive discussion of the relation between body and mind in the XZMC and WX. Section four turns to the strong dualism of ruler-ruled metaphors in the WX and ZY. Section five examines a strongly holist view of sound and music in the XZMC and elsewhere.

1 Body, Emotion and Heartmind in Humans and Animals

Several passages from the Guodian manuscripts describe relations between body, mind and emotions as constituents of both humans and animals. A passage from the *YC* (Thicket of Sayings) describes the constitution of humans and animals thus:

> 凡有血氣者, 皆有喜有怒, 有慎有莊; 其體有容有色, 有聲有嗅有味, 有氣有志。物有本有卯,[4] 有終有始。
>
> In general, all things that have blood and *qi* have happiness and anger, caution and gravity. Their bodies have appearance and colour, they have sounds, smells and flavours, they have *qi* and intentions. In all cases living things have roots and branches; they have ends and beginnings. (483–87/YC1 45–49)

The important reference to "all things that have blood and *qi*" (*you xue qi zhe* 有血氣者) makes it clear that the passage is not limiting itself to human beings, since "being composed of blood and *qi*" is common to humans and other animals (Raphals 2018; Sterckx 2007). The passage also makes it clear that, in addition to shared

[4] After Li Tianhong's and Scott Cook's reading of [illegible] as root (*ben*本) and 卯 as branches (*biao* 標) (Li 2003; Cook 2012: 814–15).

physical constitution, humans share three things with other animals. The first is fundamental emotions and desires: the basic emotions of joy and anger and the basic responses to desire of satisfaction (when desires are satisfied) and suffering (when they are not). Second, we share with animals the four sensory modalities of sight, hearing, smell and taste. Finally, both humans and animals have *qi* and intentions (*zhi*).

Although the above passages make clear that emotions and desires are common to "all things that have blood and *qi*," a passage in the XZMC suggests that a complex relation to the heartmind seems unique to humans:

> 道四術，唯人道為可道也。其三術者，道之而已。詩、書、禮、樂，其始出皆生於人。
>
> *Dao* has four arts, but only the human *dao* is worthy to take; as for the [other] three arts, if you take them, that is all. The beginning and emergence of the *Odes*, *Documents*, *Ritual*, and *Music* all were from the human. (336–38/XZMC 14–16)

This point is explicit in a second *YC* 1 passage that identifies the intentions with the heart or heartmind, presumably only in humans:

> 容色, 目也. 聲, 耳也。嗅, 鼻也。味, 口也。氣, 容也。志, 心也。
>
> Appearance and colour are [a matter of] the eyes, sound the ears, smell the nose, flavour the mouth. *Qi* is [a matter of] appearance, intentions of the heartmind. (488–90/XZMC 45–48)

It is important to note that this passage does not specifically refer to humans, insofar as animals also have intentions. However the reference to appearance or demeanour (*rong* 容) probably does make it clear that the passage is intended to describe humans, though the notion that animals can have demeanour will be instantly familiar to anyone who has ever had a cat.

A third passage from *YC* 3 emphasizes the specific importance of the heartmind:

> 嵩志, 益。在心, 益。
>
> To raise oneself by intentions is advantageous. To care for one's heartmind is advantageous (619/YC3 15).

Taken together, these passages suggest that it is the heartmind that can take charge of the perceptions, emotions and desires common to all animals, and to cultivate it is beneficial.

2 The Human Constitution

Several Guodian texts give passing accounts of the body or physical person (*shen* 身) and its relationship to the heartmind, virtue and self-cultivation.

A problem arises because body and mind are not neutral terms. They are culturally constructed, and are also subject to changes of meaning over time. An example is changing meanings of the interrelated English terms mind, spirit, soul, and heart

(Wierzbicka 1989). Classical Chinese has no near equivalents for terms such as "body," "mind" and "soul." Three major terms for "body" differ from the English notion in important ways. *Xing* 形 refers to form or shape of bodies but also of other things. *Shen* 身 refers to a body, person, "physical person" or personality. *Ti* 體 refers to the concrete physical body, including limbs and physical form, but also to the "embodiment" of other things, including spiritual, cosmic, and moral states (Lo 2003).

Several terms describe mind or soul. The seat of consciousness and thought is the heartmind (*xin*), which refers both to the mind and to the physical organ of the heart, and "spirit" (*shen* 神), which can also refer to gods and spirits, sages, ancestors, ghosts and monsters (Sterckx 2007). Other key terms are will or intentions (*zhi* 志), awareness, knowledge or consciousness (*zhi* 智), desires (*yu* 欲), thought or awareness (*yi* 意), and thinking or reflection (*si* 思).

Passages in several Guodian texts underscore the importance of the body. *ZY* makes it clear that a "person" is in some fundamental sense material and physical when it states that in antiquity the Lord in Heaven observed King Wen's virtue and concentrated the great mandate upon his person (*qi ji da ming yu jue shen* 其集大命于厥身, 121–22/ZY 36–37). According to *Taiyi shengshui*, those who use *dao* to carry things are successful in their tasks and long-lived in their persons (*shi cheng er shen chang* 事成而身長); and in the case of sages, their achievements are successful and their persons not injured (*gong cheng er shen bu shang* 功成而身不傷, 82–83/*Taiyi shengshui* 11–12). Another passage in *ZDY* describes how the body affects the mind, and the porosity of the two. According to this text, ritual and music "nurture the heartmind (*yang xin* 養心) in compassion and integrity, so that faithfulness and trust increase daily without any self-awareness" (*zi zhi* 自知, 304/ZDY 21).

That a "person" is both physical and psychological is made clear in a discussion of the virtue of benevolence (*ren* 仁). TYD 唐虞之道 concludes with the observation that "when one insists on rectifying one's person/self (*zheng qi shen* 正其身) before rectifying the world, the *dao* of sages is complete" (207–08/TYD 2–3). Used purely of a physical person, this passage could refer to straightening one's body, but that is clearly not the meaning here. Similarly, another passage from *CZ* describes the governance and instruction of a noble man who, before undertaking oversight of the people, first "submits his [physical] person to goodness" (*shen fu shan* 身服善, 246/CZ 3). The passage continues that if he "lacks it in his person" (*wang hu qi shen* 亡乎其身) and merely preserves it in words, the people will not follow him, no matter how much he piles up commands (245–46/CZ 4–5). This discussion opposed the use of punishments and penalties to government by virtue, and specifically by those who *embody* virtue in their persons.

The term *ti* is also applied to the bodies—and powers—of animals. For example, *QD* includes an argument that excellence—moral or physical—does not necessarily result in recognition. Thus the meritorious Wu Zixu (d. 484 BCE) was executed, but not because his wisdom had declined. The passage concludes with the bodies of two famous horses: "That Ji was hobbled at Mount Zhang and Jin was trapped in the Qiu

wilds was not because they had declined in the strength of their bodies" (*ti zhuang,* 149–50/QD 9–10).[5]

Several passages discuss the will or intentions, usually of a noble man or *junzi* 君子 (this term is transliterated throughout). For example, *ZY* attributes a saying to Confucius that a *junzi* "cannot be robbed of his intentions in life and cannot be robbed of his good name in death" (123/ZY 38). A passage in *WX* explicitly links intentions with correct mental attitudes:

> 士有志於君子道謂之志士。
>
> A scholar [*shi*] whose intentions are on the *dao* of a *junzi* can be called a scholar of intentions. (162/WX 7).

The passage continues by linking intentions to wisdom:

> 德弗志不成,智弗思不得。
>
> Virtue without intention will not be realized; wisdom without reflection will not get it. (162–63/WX 7–8).

Another passage from *LD* suggests that intentions transcend individual will and the individual person who "hides his own will and seeks to nourish the intentions of his family" (逸其志, 求養親之志 422/LD 33).

Spirit (*shen* 神) is a central term in *Taiyi shengshui* 太一生水. Here, spirit brilliance (*shen ming* 神明) is formed from the consecutive joinings of The Great One (*Taiyi* 太一), Heaven and Earth. Spirit brilliance in turn forms *yin* and *yang*, which in turn form the four seasons (73/*Taiyi shengshui* 2). Thus:

> 陰陽者, 神明之所生也。神明者, 天地之所生也。天地者, 太一之所生也。
>
> *Yin* and *yang* are that which is born of spirit brilliance; spirit brilliance is that which is born of Heaven and Earth; Heaven and Earth are that which is born of the Great One. (76–77/*Taiyi shengshui* 5–6)

Here, *shen* precedes even the creation of *yin* and *yang*. In other late Warring States texts it is also a major component of a person, especially in the *Huangdi neijing* 黃帝內經, where it is stored in the heart.

> 心藏神, 肺藏魄, 肝藏魂, 脾藏意, 腎藏志。
>
> The heart stores spirit [*shen*]; the lungs store *po*; the liver stores *hun*; the spleen stores thought [*yi*]; the kidneys store will [*zhi*].[6]

In the Guodian texts overall, *shen* is not a major element in relations between mind and body.

[5] 驥馰張山騹空於卲[illegible],非亡體壯也. Textual problems surround the names and provenance of these famous horses, but the context is clearly a comparison between their inherent strength and being subdued.

[6] *Huangdi neijing suwen* 23, 153 (*Xuanming wu qi* 宣明五氣), trans. after Unschuld and Tessenow 2011: 1:409. For the importance of form/body (*xing*) and spirit (*shen*) in the *Huangdi neijing* see Wong (2014: 25–29). For body and mind in the Guodian manuscripts see Guo (2000).

3 Heartmind and Body in the *Xing zi ming chu*

I now turn to how the body motivates the heartmind and how the heartmind rules the body. The XZMC is significant for any discussion of mind and body because it provides a detailed discussion of the relationship between human nature and self-cultivation. In this context it discusses and links several key concepts, including essential nature (*xing* 性), genuine emotions (*qing* 情), heartmind (*xin* 心), will, intentions (*zhi* 志), *qi* 氣, and the use of artifice (*qiao* 巧, *wei* 偽).

The XZMC includes both accounts of human motivation as a passive response to external forces and the active role of the heartmind in shaping responses to the world by forming stable intention that overrides the influence of external forces and emotional responses to them (Perkins 2009).

3.1 A "Body Moves Mind" Model of Human Motivation


The XZMC begins with a statement about clearly human (and not animal) nature and the importance of both environment and habit:

> 凡人雖有性，心亡奠志，待物而後作，待悅而後行，待習而後定。喜怒哀悲之氣，性也。及其見於外，則物取之也。性自命出，命自天降。
>
> In general people, although they have a nature, their heartminds do not have fixed intentions. They await things and only then act; they await pleasure and only then go; they await habit and only then stabilize. The *qi* of happiness, anger, grief, and sorrow is by nature. When it [the *qi*] arises and is visible externally, things take hold of it. Nature emerges from the mandate; the mandate descends from Heaven. (323–25/XZMC 1–3)

Here, fixed intentions emerge only when they are taken in hand, because it is the nature of the intentions of the heartmind (*xin zhi zhi*心之志) to only act when induced. In other words, on this account, the heartmind is passive. But the passage continues:

> 道始於情，情生於性。始者近情，終者近義。知【情者能】出之，知義者能納之。好惡，性也。所好所惡，物也。善不【善，性也】所善所不善，勢也。
>
> *Dao* begins in *qing*; *qing* is born from nature [*xing*]. Its beginning is close to *qing* but its ends are close to propriety. Those who understand [*qing* are able] to make it emerge; those who understand propriety are able to incorporate it. Liking and disliking are matters of nature; what is liked or disliked are matters of things. Approval and disapproval are matters of nature; what is approved and not approved are matters of situational power. (324–26/XZMC 3–5)

This passage indicates two ways in which mental dispositions potentially influence the body. First, *dao* is closely linked to basic emotions, which may be subject to intervention or control. Second, although what we like and dislike may be a matter of external objects (things), perceived through sensation, what we chose to approve and disapprove are matters of choice through situational power and advantage (*shi* 勢). The passage continues:



凡性為主，物取之也。金石之有聲，□□□□□□ 雖有性心，弗取不出。凡心有志也, 亡與不□□□□□獨行, 猶口之不可獨言也。

In general, human nature acts as lord, and things take hold of it. The sounds of bronze [bells] and stone [chimes] □□□□□□ [emerge only when they are struck.] Although [humans] have natures and heartminds, if nothing takes hold [of them] they do not emerge. In general, heartminds have intentions, but they forget them and do not □□□□□ [That the heartmind cannot] act alone is like the mouth alone being unable to speak. (327–29/XZMC 5–7)

This partially fragmentary passage clearly describes a heartmind that requires external stimulation through the body. The passage continues that people have a common nature (*qi xing yi* 其性一) but differ in how they use (*yong* 用) their heartminds:

四海之內其性一也。其用心各異，教使然也。凡性或動之，或逆[7] 之，或交之，或厲之, 或出之,或養之, 或長之。凡動性者, 物也; 逢/逆性者, 悅也; 交性者, 故也; 厲性者, 義也; 出性者, 勢也; 養性者, 習也; 長性者, 道也。.

Within the four seas their nature is one. But in their use of the heartmind each is different, and this is due to the direction of their education. As for inner nature in general, some things move it, some go against it, some restrain it, some sharpen it, some make it emerge, some nourish it, some grow it. In general, what causes inner nature to move is things; what goes against it is pleasure; what restrains it is causes/precedents; what sharpens it is rightness; what makes it emerge is situational power; what nourishes it is practice; what grows it is *dao* (331–34/XZMC 9–12).

In this scale, sages (*sheng ren* 聖人) have a key role because of their ability to literally embody correct values:

聖人比其類而論會之, 觀其先後而訓之, 體其義而節文之。

The sages compared their categories and arranged and assembled them; observed their precedence and deference and put them in conformity, embodied their propriety [*ti qi yi*] and gave it regularity and pattern. (338–39/XZMC 16–17)

Franklin Perkins describes this as a simple stimulus-response model of human psychology and motivation, but a somewhat different approach is to examine relations between body and mind, especially the XZMC's emphasis on sensation as the "stimulus" by which the body influences the heartmind (Perkins 2009: 119).

3.2 The Heartmind Takes Charge

The passages discussed above suggest an outer-inner porosity in which, without fixed nature or intentions, the complex of the body, sensations and emotions all move the heartmind, with no account of any agency in choosing how to respond to sensory and emotional stimuli. But other passages in the XZMC suggest the existence of a more authentic heartmind that is not at the mercy of these patterns.

[7] Reading ⿺辶圭 as *ni* 逆 (oppose), after Huang and Xu, Li Ling and others (Huang and Xu 1999; Li 2002). *Guodian Chumu* glosses it as 逢 (?). For further discussion see Cook 2012: 705n61.

One passage recommends the use of the heartmind in thinking (*si zhi yong xin* 思之用心) as an alternative to the heartmind being buffeted constantly by the inputs of the body and emotions, but even here its relation to thought is complex:

> 凡憂思而後悲，凡樂思而後忻。凡思之用心為甚。難，思之方也。其聲變,【則其心變】, 其心變則其聲亦然。[8]
>
> In general, it is only after thinking that worry becomes sorrow; in general, it is only after thinking that happiness becomes delight. In general, the use of the heartmind in thinking is deep. The difficulty is in the directions of thinking. When the sound changes [then the heartmind changes], when the heartmind changes then the sound also changes. (353–55/XZMC 31–33)

Here, dwelling on emotions intensifies them. The passage also presents something of a "chicken and egg" problem in that emotions (described in terms of sound, either music or the human voice) affect the heartmind, which affects them in return.

Other passages underscore the importance of the activity of the heartmind:

> 凡道, 心術為主。
>
> As for *dao* in general, the techniques of the heartmind rule. (336/XZMC 14).
>
> 凡學者求其心為難, 從其所為, 近得之矣, 不如以樂之速也。[9]
>
> As for learning in general, seeking the [genuine] heartmind is difficult. It is by following that which is done that one comes close to getting it, it is not like using the speed [immediacy] of music. (358/XZMC 36)

This passage clearly recommends a heartmind that, although difficult to access and less directly available than the influence of music, is more genuine and thus preferable. It draws on earlier accounts of the potential of music to elevate or degenerate the moral faculties, but does not pursue the issue at length. The passage continues:

> 雖能其事, 不能其心, 不貴。求其心有偽也, 弗得之矣。人之不能以偽也, 可知也。
>
> Although you may be able to [accomplish] an undertaking, if you cannot [attain] the heartmind, it is not valuable. If in searching for the heartmind there is artifice, you will not attain it. [Thus] that people cannot [attain it] by using artifice is [something] we can know. (359–60/XZMC 37–38)[10]

How then, according to the XZMC, is this difficult state to be attained? One passage gives a clearly negative recommendation: that artifice (*wei* 偽) is incompatible with the genuine heartmind.[11]

---

[8] Using the *Guodian Chumu* reading of *nan* 難. For other readings see Cook 2012: 723n211.

[9] For [illegible] or 求 see Qiu 1998: 183n35.

[10] Clear consensus reads 為 as *wei* 偽 (artifice). Slip 38 is broken after 可知也 and scholars disagree about what to interpolate. In reading *bu*, I follow Liu 2003: 90, 100; Cook 2012: 727–28nn241–44). Qiu interpolates *qi* 其 (if one commits the transgression ten times) (Qiu 1998: 183n39).

[11] The remainder of slip 360 contains several textual problems, but seems to indicate that, with no more than ten tries, the heartmind must lie therein (*qi xin bi zai yan* 其心必在焉), and its manifestations can be examined.

The passage continues by contrasting different components of a person on which one might rely in a descending scale that gives preference to the heartmind:

凡用心之躁者， 思為甚。用智之疾者， 患為甚。用情之至者， 哀樂為甚。用身之弁者, 悅為甚。用力之盡者, 利為甚。目之好色, 耳之樂聲, 鬱陶氣也, 人不難為之死。[12]

In general, for those who use the agitation of the heartmind, their thinking is deep. For those who use the speed of knowledge, their anxiety is deep. For those who use the extremity of their *qing*, their grief and happiness are deep. Of those who use the agitation of their physical persons, their satisfaction is deep. Of those who use the limit of their force, their benefit is deep. The eyes' love of colour and the ears' love of sound create unassuaged joy or anxiety [*yutao*]. It is not difficult for people to die of this. (364–66/XZMC 42–44)

The passage contrasts those who rely on thinking and knowledge with those who rely on emotion and the sensations and physical force of the body. There may be short-term satisfactions to the latter, but the consequences can be fatal.

So far, the argument seems to be that careful use of the heartmind and thinking can circumvent the dangers posed by the body and emotions. But self-regulation by means of the heartmind is not sufficient because even correct conduct—faced with distracting sensations and emotions—can still degenerate into ostentation or dissolute or degenerate behaviour if the heartmind does not have the right dispositions (366–69/XZMC 44–47). But how is it to get them?

The XZMC ends with a description of how a *junzi* can take charge of intentions (*zhi zhi* 執志). It starts by stressing the need for genuineness and the destructiveness of cunning and artifice:

進欲遜而毋巧, 退欲肅而毋輕, 欲皆文而毋偽。君子執志必有夫往往之心, 出言必有夫柬柬[簡簡]之信.[13]

In advancing one should be modest and not cunning; in withdrawing one should be sombre and not frivolous. In all cases one should be finely patterned but not artificial. The *junzi* in taking charge of his intentions must have a broad-minded heartmind; in speaking words he must have a straightforward trustworthiness. (386–388/XZMC 64–66)

The passage continues that he must display an appropriate appearance in guest ritual, a respectful appearance in sacrificial ritual, and he must have a grief-stricken appearance in mourning rituals (388–89/66–67).

The passage ends with a perplexing sentence, which does not occur in the Shanghai Museum version and which scholars construe in two entirely different ways. It reads:

君子身以為主心

(1) *Junzi* use their bodies to master their heartminds
(2) *Junzi* know their bodies are ruled by the heartmind. (389/XZMC 67)

---

[12] Qiu reads *bian* 弁 as *bian* 變 (erratic) (Qiu 1998: 183n42). Chen Wei reads *ji* 急 (agitated) (Chen 2002: 204). For discussion of other readings of *yutao* 鬱陶 see Cook 2012: 732n287.

[13] In reading *su* 肅 (solemn, sombre) I follow Li 2002: 108 and Cook 2012: 2:748. *Guodian Chumu* and Liu Zhao do not transcribe the graph [illegible] (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998; Liu 2003: 106). For readings of *wang* 往 and *jian* 柬[簡] see Cook (2012: 748nn402, 403).

At issue is whether the heartmind rules, guides or expresses itself through body, or whether the body shapes, forms or rules the heartmind. As written, the obvious construction of the sentence is (1), in which the phrase is read straightforwardly to mean "*Junzi* use their bodies to master their heartminds" and the body is clearly doing the ruling. Liu Xinlan and Pang Pu opt for the body as ruler. According to Liu Xinlan the phrase refers to the attention of *junzi*s to their own conduct to correct the heartmind (Liu Xinlan 2000: 354–55). According to Pang Pu, "The gentleman uses his self to master his heart" (Pang 2000: 53). Li Tianhong agrees with their readings and suggests that *zhu* 主 has the sense of "to preserve" or "to maintain" (Li 2003: 197). Chan takes it as "it is the body that he uses to master the heart" (Chan 2009a: 379n44). Perkins suggests "use their bodies to master their hearts" (Perkins 2009: 118–19, 128).[14]

Other scholars take the meaning to be (2), that the heartmind rules the body. This meaning requires some kind of emendation and several have been proposed. Liu Zhao thinks the phrase should read "for the *junzi* the body takes the heartmind as master" (*junzi shen yi xin wei zhu* 君子身以心為主) (Liu Zhao 2000: 89). In a later publication he translates it as: "The body of a *junzi* realizes/embodies the heart" (Liu 2003: 106). Chen Wei takes *wei* as "for the sake of" and *zhu* as "to maintain" and gets "the body is used to master the heart" (Chen 2002: 201). Guo Yi interpolates *yu* 於 between "ruler" (*zhu*) and "heart" (*xin)* to get *junzi shen yi wei zhu yu xin* 君子身以為主於心; here too the *junzi* takes the body to be under the control of the heart (Guo 2001: 264). Liao Mingchun takes the phrase to mean "using the body to express/reflect [*zhu*] the heart" (*yi shen wei zhu xin* 以身為主心), with *zhu* understood as "to express" or "to reflect," with the meaning "the *junzi* takes the body as an expression of the heart" (Liao 2001: 168–69).

3.3 Heartmind and Body in the Wuxing

Wuxing presents a different set of claims for porosity between body and mind, where the heartmind affects the body. A full account of that text is beyond the scope of the present discussion, but a few passages warrant mention.[15] The context in the WX is a discussion of whether "five kinds of action" take shape from within (*nei* 內) or without (*wai* 外). The five are the five virtues of benevolence (*ren*), propriety (*yi* 義), ritual propriety (*li* 禮), wisdom (*zhi* 智) and sagacity (*sheng* 聖). Those that take place from within are described as "virtuous action" (*de zhi xing* 德之行); those that arise from without are simply "action" (*xing* 行, 156–58/WX 1–3).

[14] For a summary of these views see Li 2003: 196–97. Other advocates of (1) include Liu Xinlan, who reads the passage in the sense that the solemnity of one's external deportment (*shen*) serves to mould the heartmind (Liu Xinlan 2000). Other advocates of (2) include Ding Yuanzhi and Zhao Jianwei (Ding Yuanzhi 2000: 119; Zhao 1999). For further discussion of this passage see Perkins 2009; Cook 2012: 749–50n408.

[15] The following WX translations are indebted to Csikszentmihalyi (2004: Appendix 2: 277–310).

It is in this context that WX discusses several states of the "inner heartmind" (*zhong xin* 中心):

君子亡中心之憂則亡中心之智, 亡中心之智則亡中心 【之悅】, 亡中心【之悅則不】安, 不安則不樂, 不樂則亡德。

If the *junzi* lacks the anxiety of the inner heartmind (*zhongxin zhi you*), he will also lack the wisdom of the inner heartmind (*zhong xin zhi zhi*). If he lacks the wisdom of the inner heartmind, he will lack the [joy of the] inner heartmind. If he lacks [the joy of] the inner heartmind [then he will not] be at peace; if he is not at peace then he will not be happy; if he is not happy then he will lack virtue. (160–61/WX 5–6)

The five conducts are also closely linked to reflection or contemplation (*si* 思). To be essential, contemplation requires the virtue of benevolence; to be extensive, it requires wisdom; to be effortless, it requires sagacity.[16] The WX also links different dispositions of the inner heartmind (*nei xin*) with different outward dispositions. To use one's inner heartmind in relating to others (*yi qi zhong xin yu ren jiao* 以其中心與人交) is joy. Transferring the joy of the inner heartmind to brothers results in closeness, which in turn extends to producing the feeling of kinship or familiality (*qin* 親). Kinship in turn extends to love (*ai* 愛), and love for fathers and then for others produces benevolence (*ren*). The passage concludes:

■中心辯然而正行之, 直也。

To make discriminations in the inner heartmind and then to orient it correctly in conduct is to be straightforward. (187–89/WX 32–34)

In summary, we find in both the XZMC and the WX not only an account of how the heartmind is motivated by sensation and emotion, but also an account of how the heartmind can use reflection to form stable intentions. Several scholars have stressed the importance and agency of the heartmind. Jiang Guanghui describes this agency as free will (Jiang Guanghui 2000: 34). Ding Sixin argues that it transcends the body (*chaoyue shenti* 超越身体) (Ding Sixin 2000: 303–04).[17] Perkins usefully characterizes them as concerned with avoiding what the Greeks called *akrasia*: weakness of the will (Perkins 2009: 130). For purposes of the present discussion, the important point is that there is a strong degree of interaction between the body and heartmind that resists classification as strongly dualist or strongly holist.

4 Mind-Body Dualism: The Heartmind as Ruler

Two Guodian texts present a strongly dualist political analogy in which the heartmind rules the body as a ruler rules a state:

[16] 不仁, 思不能清。不智 , 思不能長 … 【不】仁, 思不能清。不聖, 思不能輕。(164 and 166/WX 9 and 11).

[17] For other accounts see Andreini 2006: 162, and Perkins 2009: 127–28.

> 耳目鼻口手足六者, 心之役也。心曰唯, 莫敢不唯; 諾, 莫敢不諾; 進, 莫敢不進; 後, 莫敢不後。
>
> The ears, eyes, nose, mouth, hands, and feet—these six are the slaves of the heartmind. When the heartmind says "acquiesce," none dares not acquiesce; [when it says] "promise," none dares not promise; [when it says] "advance," none dares not advance; [when it says] "go back," none dares not go back. (200–01/WX 45–46)

For the important term "slaves" (literally corvee labour) I follow the gloss of Liu Zhao, which also accords with the Mawangdui version of this text.[18]

A similar passage occurs in *ZY*:

> ■子曰: 民以君為心, 君以民為體, 心好則體安之, 君好則民欲之。故心以體廢, 君以民亡。
>
> The Master said: The people take the ruler as their heartmind; the ruler takes the people as his body. When the heartmind is fond of something the body is at peace with it; when the ruler is fond of something the people desire it. Therefore the heartmind [may] be maimed by the body and the ruler [may] be destroyed by the people. (93–94/ZY 8–9)

Dualism is expressed in the clear qualitative difference between the ruler and his ministers or people.

5 Mind-Body Holism: *Qi*, Sound and Music

The XZMC also supports a strongly holist view of mind and body. As Pham has argued, the XZMC asserts that *qi*, sound and music all share a quality of "flowing and fulfilling" (*chongying liudong de tezhi* 充盈流動的特質) (Pham 2013: 54). This shared quality is what makes it possible for music to guide *qi* in passing through both body and mind in ways that ultimately further moral self-cultivation. According to Pham, the YC1 account of the common emotional endowment of humans and animals (YC1 45–49, discussed above) constructs a "body-mind-*qi* mode of discourse" (*shen xin qi de lunshu moshi* 身心氣的論述模式) which is common to the shared outlook of the Guodian texts. On this view, it is the very permeability between mind and body, expressed in the flow of *qi*, that makes it possible for music to be so fundamental to self-cultivation (Pham 2013: 62).

I present the logic of this argument as follows: (1) claims for the importance of stimulation via sensations and basic emotions, as a basic feature of human nature; (2) the special suitability of music to stimulate the emotions via sensation; (3) the ability of thought or reflection and other activities of the heartmind to produce emo-

[18] Liu Zhao reads the graph [illegible] as *yi* 役 (Liu 2003: 85–86). Zhang Jing takes the graph as a form of [illegible], glossed as *tuo* 託 in the sense of "delegates" or "subordinates" (Zhang 2004). By contrast, Yuan Guohua reads it as [illegible], understood as limited or curtailed by the heartmind (Yuan 2000). Cook also takes the graph as a variant of *yi*. For summary of this discussion see Cook (2012: 516–17n204).

tions and other affective states; and (4) the common grounding of body, *qing* and heartmind in *qi*.[19]

The argument begins with a set of claims for the importance of stimulation due to the setup of human nature. Humans' heartminds only develop intentions when stimulated in a positive way (*yue* 悅). Such stimulation leads to goal-directed action. These motivating stimuli include basic emotions (*qing*), which are described as constellations of *qi* (323–24/XZMC 1–2, quoted above). The XZMC compares human nature (*xing*) to "a vibrating system" in which resonance can occur as in musical instruments, which only emit sound when struck (Middendorf 2008: 146). So in order to stimulate *qi* to provoke emotional response, things in the external world must "grab" attention and thereby stimulate response and action (327–28/XZMC 5–6). Unlike other animals, humans need to learn (*xue*) in order for their heartminds to acquire a specific direction (327–30/XZMC 5–8). This is done by "using the heartmind" (331/XZMC 9).

5.1 Emotion, Agency and Music

In the XZMC, an important effect of sensation is the ability of sound—specifically music—to stimulate the basic emotions, which in turn move the heartmind. But is the original stimulus from sound or from emotions behind them? This passage seems to ground the original stimulus in the emotions that produce music:

> 凡聲, 其出於情也信, 然後其入拔人之心也厚。
>
> As for sounds in general, when the ones that emerge from the *qing* are trustworthy, and then enter and capture the human heartmind, it is profound. (345/XZMC 23)

The XZMC stresses the importance of music in educating the heartmind because music (both ancient and contemporary) affects the heartmind quickly and directly:

> 凡古樂龍心, 益樂龍指, 皆教其人者也。
>
> In general, ancient music stirs [lit., "makes a dragon of"] the heartmind; extravagant music stirs the desires [*long zhi*]; both are things that can instruct the people. (350/XZMC 28)

The passage continues that both extreme music (*yue* 樂) or happiness (*le* 樂, the same graph has both meanings) and extreme mourning or grief (*bei* 悲) bring out the utmost of their affections:

> 其性相近也, 是故其心不遠。
>
> Their natures are similar, therefore their heartminds are not far apart. (351–52/XZMC 29–30)

Middendorf makes four points about the influence of sound and music on *qing* (Middendorf 2008: 147–48). First, the XZMC considers "sound to be trustworthy" (*xin* 信), whether in the form of laughter, the singing voice, the sound of musical

[19] The first three steps of this analysis are indebted to Middendorf 2008.

instruments, or its symbiosis with vision in dance. It is this trustworthiness that makes sound able to influence its listeners so profoundly (335–48/XZMC 23–26). Second, music has a specific ability to change people's affective states and to teach moral (or immoral) values (348–50/XZMC 26–28). Third is the claim that strong emotions—grief (*ai*, *bei*) and joy (*le*) especially—tend to be followed by their opposites (351/XZMC 29). Fourth, thinking or reflection (*si*) also influences the quality of emotions; anxious thoughts lead to sadness, joyous thoughts to delight (354–55/XZMC 32–33). Musical education is especially facilitated by a "seeking of the heartmind" (*qiu qi xin* 求其心, slip 358/XZMC 36), aided by the "trustworthiness" of sound and the correct "orientation of *qing*" (*qing zhi fang* 情之方, 362/XZMC 40).

5.2 The Body Mind Qi *Loop*

The analysis to this point gives no explanation for interactions between body and mind beyond the specific case of the trustworthiness of sound. I now turn to a more systematically holist account of body and heartmind in the XZMC based on the nature of *qi* in constituting both. As Pham puts it, "the body's colouration and appearance is the container of the activity of the heart *qi (xin qi zuoyong de rongqi* 心氣作用的容器), and through the body, heartmind, intentions and *qi* affect each other reciprocally. Blood and *qi* (*xue qi*) guide the *qi* of virtuous intentions (*dao de zhi qi* 道德志氣), and complete the process of self-cultivation" (Pham 2013: 62).

Once we see body and mind as a continuum of *qi*, other passages admit of new interpretations. An example is XZMC 43–44 (discussed above), which compares the effects of relying on the heartmind, knowledge, *qing*, and the body. It concludes that the senses' love of colour and sound create a "*qi* of unassuaged joy or anxiety" (*yu tao zhi qi* 鬱陶之氣) that can be fatal. The passage continues:

> 有其為人之節節如也, 不有夫蹇蹇之心則采。有其為人之蹇蹇如也, 不有夫恆怡之志則縵[慢]。[20]
>
> For those who conduct themselves steadily (*jie jie*, "step by step"), if they do not have a straightforward (*jian jian*) heartmind, they become ostentatious [over-adorned]. For those who conduct themselves in a straightforward manner, if they do not have intentions of permanent joy, they become indolent. (366–67/XZMC 44–45)

Pham links the "*qi* of unassuaged joy or anxiety" (*yutao zhi qi*) to the account of body, mind and *qi* in the XZMC (Pham 2013: 74). This *qi* of joy or anxiety is present in the sensory organs, in the eyes' love of colour or the ears' love of sound. The heartmind moves and initiates the faculties of creatures composed of blood and *qi*,

[20] There are several readings for the binome *jian jian,* including 謇謇, 柬柬 and 蹇蹇 (Li 2002: 110; Cook 2012: 2: 732–34; Pham 2013: 67). Another textual problem concerns 采, which Pham reads as *nie* 餒, "dispirited." A third is 慢, which I follow Guo Yi in reading as 縵 (Guo 2001). Pham reads *ji zhi zhi zhi ze man* 亟治之志則慢 as "if they do not have intentions of urgent government, they become indolent."

but if there is an excess of *yutao zhi qi* pent up within the body, it cannot flow and circulate smoothly. As a result, people can easily die of it (365–66/XZMC 43–44, quoted above).

Similarly, an undisciplined (*fang zong* 放縱) heartmind, wisdom, *qing*, body and force lead to excess in reflection (*si*), anxiety (*huan* 患), grief and joy (*ai le* 哀樂), etc., and this accumulation results in agitation (*zao* 躁), illness (*ji* 疾) and other problems (364–66/XZMC 42–44, quoted above). These five so-called mental, emotional and physical forces, Pham argues, can be reduced to two: the heartmind and the body. It is the activity of the heartmind and body together that produce restlessness, illness, extreme anxiety and other extreme reactions which in turn stimulate excesses of blood and *qi* (in the medical senses of these terms) that lead to extreme physical reactions. It is in this sense that the eyes' love of colour and the ears' love of sound cause *yutao zhi qi*. Pham's point is that all these conditions are caused by (over) abundant *qi* (*qi sheng* 氣盛). Left alone in that state, it can be fatal. She concludes "body, heart and *q*i are equal to each other" (Pham 2013: 74).

The interest of this argument for the present discussion is its relatively holist account of body and heartmind. It is also noteworthy that this argument does not focus on any special trustworthiness of sound, but rather on the embodied nature of all sensation and the close interactions between body and mind.

6 Conclusions

In the above analysis I have attempted to read the Guodian corpus as a more or less unified text (rather than a collection of separate "Confucian" and "Daoist" writings) with a coherent account of problems of self-cultivation.[21] Indeed, as Middendorf points out, although none of its ideas are new or unique, the XZMC in particular presents a compact "review" of key Warring States positions on human nature and basic emotions (*xing* and *qing*), self-cultivation and virtue, and all these topics inherently involve the relation between body and mind (Middendorf 2008: 145).

Therefore it is perhaps surprising to see that the Guodian corpus does not present a unified position on the relation between *shenti* and *xin,* but rather presents a range of views on relations between them. Positions range from a strong dualism in some passages in the WX and ZY to a strong holism, on some readings of the XZMC. Other passages in the XZMC seem to present an intermediate position (which could be described as either weak mind-body dualism or weak mind-body holism).

Two passages in WX and ZY compare the heartmind to the ruler of a state and the body to his subordinates. In the ZY passage the subordinates are the people. In the more striking WX passage, the subordinates are slaves. This latter passage is especially striking—and indeed anomalous—in the light of a range of Warring

[21] On this point see, for example, Csikszentmihalyi (2004) and Slingerland (2008).

States heartmind–ruler comparisons that take the body as the ruler's ministers or officials.[22]

At the other end of the spectrum is a robustly holist view of *qi* unifying—and equalizing—body and mind. Here, similarities between the "flow" of *qi*, sound, and music are the conduits that makes possible moral transformation through music. A more conventional reading of the XZMC is also more dualist, by virtue of privileging the ability of the heartmind to create fixed intentions as part of the process of self-cultivation.

In conclusion, this range of positions shows the volatility of the question of the interrelations between body and mind, and their importance in the virtue-based strategies that are central to Guodian accounts of both self-cultivation and state organization.

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[22] For fuller discussion see Raphals (2015).

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Chapter 14
Daoist Nature or Confucian Nurture: Moral Development in the *Yucong* 語叢 (*Thicket of Sayings*)



Shirley Chan

1 Introduction

The relative importance of nature versus nurture on an individual's innate qualities as determined by birth, as compared to acquired learning after birth, has long been debated.[1] The *Yucong* 語叢 manuscripts that seem to have attracted less scholarly attention than their counterparts in the Guodian corpus can be read as one of the earliest responses to the question of human development and social advancement in terms of the heavenly way and the human way—notions that can be ascribed respectively to Daoist and Confucian thought as we know them today.[2] Based on the *Yucong*, we will be looking at these questions in the context of human development: are we able to draw a clear-cut distinction between nature and nurture? How do

[1] For example, John Locke in 1609 used the term *tabula rasa* ("blank slate") to describe the view that humans acquire all or almost all of their behavioural traits from "nurture." Locke argued that when humans are born the mind is like a blank piece of paper, void of all characters, without any innate knowledge or ideas. Our knowledge comes with experience. This view assumes that human behavioural traits develop almost exclusively from environmental factors. The debate between the denial of the influence of heritability, and the view admitting both environmental and heritable traits, has been referred to as the nature versus nurture debate. The two conflicting approaches to human development were at the core of an ideological dispute throughout the second half of the twentieth century (Locke 1997).

[2] In this chapter, all transcribed texts and strip reference numbers of the Guodian manuscripts are based on the *Guodian Chumu zhujian* 郭店楚墓竹簡 (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998). I have also made reference to Chen Wei (Chen et al. 2009). Most scholars have considered and studied them as Confucian texts; see, for example, Liao (1999) and Ding (2000). Given the nature of the Guodian texts, my translations and interpretations of the *Yucong* texts are necessarily tentative.

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nature and nurture work together? And, what can we learn from the *Yucong* about the shaping of human character in the nature versus nurture debate?

In this chapter I will employ the terms "Daoist nature" and "Confucian nurture" synchronically for the convenience of discussion. It should be noted that these epithets do not appear in the *Yucong* texts. The typology of *schools*—the likes of Daoist (*daojia* 道家) and Confucian (*rujia* 儒家)—was a Han dynasty neologism, although the terms *ru* and *dao* existed before the Han.[3] I nevertheless appropriate the Daoist and Confucian labels from the long-recognized streams of thought in the Chinese tradition, exploiting the dialectics for the purpose of differentiation in the general nature and nurture debate. The justifications for this are, firstly, that it is traditionally accepted that Daoists emphasize the cosmic principles, or the *dao* of heaven (*tian dao* 天道) based on the law or the way of nature, whereas Confucians advocate human social principles, the *dao,* the way of man (*ren dao* 人道) or human efforts in bringing forth morality and ethical society. Secondly, the Daoist approach towards human development and society has been characterized as "non-action" or "effortlessness" (*wuwei* 無為) and the Confucian, "action" or "effort-ness" (*youwei* 有為)—the human effort to create cultural patterns (*wen* 文). Thirdly, the Daoist concept of "nature" is more than the "inborn human nature" of the modern nature versus nurture debate; it embraces the natural principle or naturalness that applies to the operation of the universe, namely, the interrelation between heaven (*tian* 天), earth (*di* 地) and man (*ren* 人),[4] including spontaneous response to the environment and acting in accordance with Nature. Zhuangzi, for example, espouses the idea that when one's spiritual state of mind is freed from the ego-self then one can correspond with the *dao* of nature. By using these vocabularies and connotations in acknowledging the importance of the seemingly contradictory notions of Daoist

[3] The term "schools" was first seen in Sima Tan's 司馬談 (ca. 165–110 BCE) essay "On the Essential Teachings of the Six Schools" (論六家要旨) (Sima n.d.). Later Ban Gu 班固 (32–92 CE) expanded the six schools to ten (*ji liu shi jia* 九流十家) in "Treatise on Literature" in the *Han shu* (漢書.藝文志). *Rujia* and *Daojia* are on both lists. Among pre-Han texts, *ru* appears once in the *Analects* (VI.13) and twice in the *Mencius* (III.A.5 and VII.B.26) (Cheng 2008; Lau 2003). Some scholars, including D.C. Lau, interpret the *Mencius* VII.B.26 as categorizing schools of the "Mohist (墨) … Yang (楊) … and the Confucianist (儒)" (Lau 2003: 321). Xunzi mentioned *ru* and *mo* in "Discourse on Ritual Principles" (荀子.禮論), as did Hanfeizi in "Five Worms" (韓非子.五蠹) (Lau 1996b; Lau et al. 2000). Elsewhere the words *ru* and *dao* pervade pre-Han texts in different contexts with different meanings. Whilst Mencius, Xunzi and Hanfeizi may have alluded to a nascent concept of schools, they could have been referring to the milieu of practitioners, stopping short of calling their philosophies *jia* 家 (Jensen 2003: 159). In short, the late appearance of the term *jia* does not suggest the different streams of thought or intellectual camps did not exist before Han, as can be seen in the various debates and dialogues that appeared in the early texts. However, the intellectual scene then could have been more syncretic than we thought.

[4] As is well known from the *Daodejing* and the Guodian *Laozi A*: "Man follows the law from the earth; the earth follows its law from heaven; heaven follows its law from the *dao*. The law of the *dao* is its being what it is" (人法地, 地法天, 天法道, 道法自然) (GDCJ Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998). For Confucians who emphasize moral principles and the human obligation to advocate these principles for establishing social order, the concept of the unity of man and heaven (天人合一) means to develop the goodness in human nature endowed by Heaven through cultivation. See the "Zhongyong" 中庸 in the *Liji* 禮記 and the *Mengzi* 孟子 (Lau and Chen 1992; Lau 2003).

nature and Confucian nurture, the *Yucong* has combined the two into a third perspective: both nature (including the natural way, inborn human nature, naturalness, spontaneity, broadly as represented by heaven) and nurture (learning, education, moral cultivation and, cultural practice as represented by human efforts) play a role in human development and social construction. Nurture, therefore, is to ensure that natural conditions will continue for the development of human potential; nature is not to eliminate artifice altogether, but to promote a course of development by cultivation in accordance with one's natural pattern endowed by heaven. In this way the *Yucong* reconciles the apparently diametrical roles and functions of nature and nurture in human development.

The Guodian corpus contains four texts under the title *Yucong*: *Yucong* 1, 2, 3 and 4. As *Yucong* 1, 2 and 3 share some common features it is generally agreed that they should be treated as a set. Their unique physical features (short strips bound with three rather than two strings) and the elegant calligraphy suggest that they may have been a collection of words of wisdom highly valued by their owner and intended for frequent reading and reference (Cook 2012: 799; Ding 2000: 217–19). *Yucong* 4 is a different text in both form and content, particularly its physical features and calligraphic style (Cook 2012: 799). *Yucong* 1 stands out for encapsulating the ideas of cosmogony, humanity and thus the relationship between nature and nurture; *Yucong* 2 mainly comprises statements about various human emotions and affections as the manifestations of human nature and desires; *Yucong* 3 has been noted for differentiating social relationships, such as the father–son blood relationship that should be maintained, whereas the ruler–minister relationship is essentially a selective one. Notwithstanding the differences in foci, what unifies these three texts are the thematic emphases on (1) the creation of cultural patterns (*wen* 文) that is based on nothing more than human nature endowed by *tian*, specifically, human dispositions and receptive capabilities; (2) human nature that generally manifests in and derives its meaning from, the environment and social relationships in which it is embedded; and (3) both Daoist nature and Confucian nurture that play their part in human development, for which the purpose is to transform (*hua* 化) and actualize our heavenly endowment as humans, and thus to sustain good order by ensuring all things prosper according to their nature, their names and positions in the cosmic pattern of which man is part and by which man is defined. In discussing heaven's and man's roles the texts foreground key concepts such as *ming* 命, *wen* 文 and *wu* 物, which can carry multifaceted meanings or double connotations embracing both Daoist naturalistic and Confucian humanistic ideologies.

This chapter will focus on how Daoist nature and Confucian nurture contribute to moral development as discussed in *Yucong* 1, making references to *Yucong* 2 and 3 where relevant. I will argue that the *Yucong* texts take human development as the interplay of inborn nature and education in accordance with the heavenly way. It is the unity of the predetermined and subsequent development, acting and non-acting, the internal and external through which man accomplishes moral cultivation and social development. The order of the strips is an important part of interpreting the manuscripts and can vary according to different scholars' understanding of the texts (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998; Chen et al. 2009: 244–62; Liu 2005: 180–83; Cook

2012: 799). I will present here the *Yucong* texts in the strip order in the GDCJ based on my reading. Given the openness of ancient texts to various interpretations, mine is only one of several possible ways of reading and interpreting the texts.[5] The strip number designated by the original arrangers is provided at the end of the sentence appearing on the strip. Missing or illegible graphs from the damaged strips will be replaced with X; followed by a question mark "?" for their possible reading.

2 Heaven (*tian* 天) and Man (*ren* 人) as the Joint-Creator of Order

This section will examine how the *Yucong* texts delineate the roles of heaven and man in the cosmic order by adopting Daoist and Confucian concepts.

The *Yucong* 1 starts with a seemingly Daoist statement: "Out of non-existence, all things come into existence" (*fan wu you wu sheng* 凡物由無生),[6] followed by the affirmation that heaven and humans are, respectively, responsible for creating and reinforcing the cosmic pattern and order in the human world: *tian* constitutes constant principles and classifications, and man develops social relationships and human order (*tian sheng lun*, *ren sheng mao* 天生倫, 人生X/卯) (*Yucong* 1, strip 3).[7] Reading *tian* as being responsible for the creation of the natural order and the universal pattern embodying principles and nature of things, holds merit when we consider the terms and concepts in the sentences that follow:

> 有天有命, 有物有名。2有命有文有名, 而後4有倫。5有地有形有盡, 而後6有厚。7 …
> 11 有天有命, 有地有形, 12有物有容, 有稱有名。13 (*Yucong* 1)
>
> There is *tian* and there is endowment (*ming*); there is object (*wu*) and there is name (*ming*). There is endowment, there is pattern and there is name, and only then are there principles for social order. There is earth, there is form (*xing*) and finiteness, and then there

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[5] I have benefited from the studies of scholars such as Chen Wei, Scott Cook and Liu Zhao. All English translations of the Guodian texts in this chapter are mine. The order of strips is based on my own reading and understanding of the texts and all mistakes remain mine.

[6] For example, in the *Laozi*: "All things under heaven are generated from existence and all existence are generated from non-existence" (天下萬物生於有, 有生於無) (Lau 1996a).

[7] Further, it is stated in the same text that "only by knowing what *tian* has produced and knowing what humans have created, will you know the way; only by knowing the way will you then know *ming*" (知天所爲, 知人所爲然後知道, 知道然後知命) (strips 29 and 30). Based on the *Laozi A* text, some scholars have suggested another possible reading of this sentence: "*tian* is responsible for producing the root, man for producing the branches" (天生根, 人生末) (Chen 2000). Qiu Xigui suggests the character *gun* 鯀 should read *lun* 倫, meaning principles and classification (*lei* 類) (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 200). The character *lun* means "rationale, principles, and classifications" or "order". Some scholars read X in "人生X" as 卯. Zhou Fengwu suggests it should read *hua* 化 (Zhou 1998: 121–28). I have proposed reading X as *qing*夘, meaning patterning social order through regulating and teaching proper conduct, and the script is graphically very close to 卯. The meaning of *qing* is consistent with the rest of the passage: according to the *Shuowen Jiezi* 說文解字 *qing* means "the regulations/regulating patterns of things" (*shi zhi zhi ye* 事之制也) (Xu 1985; Zong et al. 2003: 284, Chan 2011: 75n14).

> is abundance; … There is *tian*, there is *ming*; there is earth and there is form; there is object and there is appearance (*rong*); there is family and there is name.

What is relevant is that heaven (*tian*) endows (*ming* 命) all things with their natural attributes and determines their patterns and names. The constitution of all things and cosmic principles and order are based on endowment (*ming* 命), refined pattern (*wen* 文) and name (*ming* 名).[8] The text indicates these three are closely related: both the pattern and the name of a thing are predetermined by the original and natural attributes of an object. Together with earth which produces and nourishes, *tian* endows and generates order with rules and principles that define things through pattern and name. In the Daoist sense, for example, *ming* 命 in the *Zhuangzi* is a natural process that should not be changed with human artifice but be accepted and complied with; for Confucians *ming* is understood as learning the human way.[9] Whilst *tian* is responsible for endowing things with nature, pattern and names, man, on the other hand, is responsible for creating and practising cultural refinement and moral principles in the human world. In the *Yucong*, as we will see, the practice of the human way is not separated from the way of heaven, but is observing the nature and naturalness imparted by heaven to all things. Traditionally, we tend to think the Daoist emphasizes namelessness (*wuming* 無名), as we read from the opening chapter of the *Laozi*: "what can be '*dao*ed' is not an ordinary *dao*; what can be named is not an ordinary *dao*. Having no name is the beginning of heaven and earth whilst having a name is the mother of the myriad things" (道可道, 非常道。名可名, 非常名。無名天地之始, 有名萬物之母). This in fact indicates that "name"' (*ming* 名; both the nameless and the named) has been an important cosmogonic concept in Daoist texts, with *youming* 有名 being considered the mother of all things. The *Yucong* seems to share this view of *ming* 名 through the concept of *ming* 命. The cosmic (and human) order can only be derived from, and sustained by, the proper and harmonious relationship among all things with their internal and external accountability according to their endowment in this complex cosmic web. The close relationship of *ming* 命 (literally, to command, to assign, to endow as a verb and, life, endowment, mandate, or decree as a noun)[10] with this cosmic web can be seen in *Yucong* 3[11]:

[8] Discussions of name (*ming* 名) and form (*xing* 形) can be found in early texts such as the *Laozi*, *Zhuangzi*, *Guanzi* and *Yinwenzi* (Lau 1996a, 2001; Lau et al. 1998). It is generally agreed in these texts that all things have and are defined by their forms and names.

[9] For example, 無以人滅天, 無以故滅命, 無以得殉名。謹守而勿失, 是謂反其真 ("Qiu shui" 秋水, *Zhuangzi*) (Lau 2001). 天命之謂性, 率性之謂道, 修道之謂教 ("Zhongyong", *Liji*) (Lau and Chen 1992).

[10] Earth (*di* 地) has not been mentioned as often in the text as heaven(*tian*), from which the myriad things receive the fundamental principle of existence. Nevertheless, *di* is responsible for the physical world (where finiteness and abundance are created) corresponding to the heavenly way, where all things may come into being and be nourished. Given the broad scope of meanings of such key terms as *tian*, *ming*, *xing*, I will keep the Chinese transliteration throughout this chapter, instead of using particular English translations unless it is necessary to do so.

[11] While *tian* and *ming*, *xing* and *sheng* are two pairs it is not clear if their formation is simply two separate, though related, concepts or if the pairs form a linear progression of order, or perhaps

> 有天有命, 有68a性有生, 呼68bX69a名, 69b生70a爲其型 (形)。70b命與文與,71a 有性有生71b呼物。72a 者72b. (*Yucong* 3)
>
> There is *tian* and there is *ming*, there is nature (*xing*) and there is generating and it is named; it is generated into form. Is this not *ming* and is this not pattern? To have nature and to generate are what we call object.

Ming—endowment—predetermines the characteristic features of things in terms of *xing* 性 and *sheng* 生 which are dyadic, as are *ming* 名 and *xing* 型: *sheng* generates *xing* as part of life development and both contribute to the name (*ming*) and form (*xing*) of a thing. What is noteworthy is that *wen* (pattern) is equally as important as *ming* (endowment) (*ming yu wen yu* 命與文與) in facilitating *xing* and *sheng* in that together they make a thing (*wu* 物) complete, with specific attributes, features, courses and manifestations as part of the natural order. If our assumption that the *Yucong* texts are a blending of Daoist and Confucian views is correct, our later discussion will show that *wen* (pattern) means not only the cosmic pattern in general but also cultural refinement and practice for ensuring good socio-political order in the human realm. These double connotations also support the complementarity of the way of heaven and the human way. The pairings of *ming* 命 and *wen* 文, *xing* 性 and *sheng* 生, carry descriptive and prescriptive notions: endowment (*ming*) and inborn nature (*xing*) can be considered descriptive (or what is so by nature) as they predetermine nature, its patterns, and the directions that determine the development of things; *sheng* and *wen*, which involve the actual process of life and patterning, verifiable by means of experimentation, reason, and evidence, can be considered prescriptive.[12] On the one hand, *tian* is the source of all things with which it has endowed *xing*; on the other, nature and natural order are not simply about what is predetermined, but also about *sheng*—life and a manifestation of *xing* in the course of life development. In other words, the predetermined is not a fixed blueprint, but mixed attributes that allow plasticity and adaptability in response to environmental factors for life development, to accomplish its ultimate nature and features. *Yucong* 3 further draws a macro–microcosmic parallel between the natural and human worlds and reiterates that human activities should be ordered based on the heavenly model:

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both. The syntactic structure *you* 有 (there is) . . . *you* 有 (there is) . . . presents difficulties in identifying the exact relationship between *tian*, *ming* and *xing*. The occasional usage of *er hou you* 而後有 in the passage implies a sense of "when there is X, there is Y." This relationship of *tian*, *ming* and *xing* is more explicit in the phrase "*xing* emerges from *ming*, *ming* derives from *tian*" (性自命出, 命自天降) appearing in the first line of the Guodian text *Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出and a similar version of the text contained in the bamboo manuscripts of the Shanghai Museum Collections, the *Xing qing lun* 性情論 (The Discourse on *xing* and *qing*). In short, *tian* is the source of *ming*命, which prescribes the *xing* or nature of various things. This logic of linear progression, 有天有命, 有68a性有生 . . . somehow implies *tian* precedes *ming*, which precedes *xing*, and *xing* generates objects. Whether this sequence applies to all statements is uncertain: can 有天有命, 有地有形 be taken as the same linear progression? It is possible but it sometimes makes more sense to take those pairs in the *you* 有 . . . *you* 有 . . . structure as emphasizing the duality of the related pairs with the former preceding the latter.

[12] Here, I consider "descriptive" to be used for statements about truth or what is imperative, and "prescriptive" for issues of right and value that are either subjective or aesthetic in nature.

> 天型成, 人與物斯理。17 [口]物以日, 物有理而18地能貪之生之者, 在早。
>
> *Tian*'s principled model is formed, and it is then that human beings and the various things are set in order in that way; when things are given (time), they are given patterns, and that what earth can nourish and grow have had existed earlier (i.e., without these pre-determined patterns and earth's capacity to nurture, all things will not be able to grow and sustain).

This passage introduces the notion of *li* 理 both as a noun (ordered pattern) and a verb (managing things in compliance with the patterns and inherent principles): it is with *tian* forming the model or schema that mankind and things develop or are put into their patterns. In managing the human world it means human relationships and social order should reflect and sustain *tian*'s natural order and earth's capacity to nurture; we need to abide by what heaven has endowed and patterned accordingly with the natural distinctions among things, actualizing the proper names and relationships between one being and another. For example, "the relationship between father and son is one between the high and the low and the relationship between elder brother and younger brother is one between the first and the second" (父子, 至上下也, 兄弟, 至先後也) (*Yucong* 1, strips 69, 70).[13] Recognizing and adhering to the distinctiveness of these relationships is crucial not only for the natural human propensity and thus social stability, but also for the natural order and pattern as intended by heaven. As stated in *Yucong* 1, the ultimate purpose is to ensure that "all those in high or low positions in the hierarchy of human relations have their own proper place" (*shangxia jiede qisuo* 上下皆得其所) and "all things should rest in their (proper) place/station" (*wu ge zhi yu qisuo* 物各止于其所) (strip 65). Similarly in *Yucong* 3, we read "none has not attained its proper place" (*mo de shan qi suo* 莫得善其所) and "there is no thing that will not be a [proper] thing and they will all arrive in [their ultimate peace]" (*wu wu bu wu*, *jie zhi an yan* 亡物不物, 皆至安焉) (strip 65).

3 Humanity as an Integrated Process

If both *tian* and man play a role in generating order in the natural world and the human realm, what enables man to do so? To answer this question, we need first to look at what distinguishes man from other things (*wu* 物). If *tian* is responsible for

[13] A similar message appears in another Guodian text, *Chengzhi wenzhi* 成之聞之, in which "patterning the human order" (*li renlun* 理人倫) and "regulating the human order" (*zhi renlun* 治人倫) have been used to explain how the basic principles of governing human relations between ruler and minister, father and son, husband and wife are not simply something imposed from without, but rather compliance with the constant principles of heaven; as we read: "Heaven descends the Great Norm for managing human relationships, creating a sense of appropriateness between ruler and minister, establishing a close relationship between father and son and differentiating between husband and wife. Hence the petty men disrupt the norms of heaven, going contrary to the great way, whereas the *junzi* regulates human relationships thereby complying with the virtue of heaven" (天降大常, 以理人倫。制為君臣之義, 著為父子之新(親), 分31為夫婦之辨。是故小人亂天常以逆大道, 君子治人倫以順 32天德).

endowing various entities and species with life and growth, their distinctive features, patterns and principles of development, the question remains, what makes man distinctive and what contributes to human development?

After stating that *tian* has endowed various things with their nature by defining their appearance, pattern and name, the passage in *Yucong* 1 further points out that man's likes and dislikes are inborn as well as acquired through learning:

> 有生有知, 而後好惡8生。9 有物有繇有遺(歸), 而後10教生。(*Yucong* 1)
>
> There is what is generated from life and there is knowing, which then generates likes and dislikes. There is object and there is origin and there is point of return and only after that will teaching arise.

Our likes (*hao* 好) and dislikes (*wu* 惡) are at the very heart of cultivation and constitute the essential foundation on which human qualities are to be developed. What we like and dislike inform us of how we genuinely respond to the world around us, and thus what we want to become and how we create our world.[14] These will direct man's affective propensity for completing the transformation of character.[15] The possible hypothesis from the above passage includes (1) our shared inborn qualities may contain what is good and what is not good, which are malleable with acquired knowledge; (2) we share some similar basic feelings of likes (*hao*), dislikes (*wu*) and have similar responses to a particular object or situation; (3) learning is to awaken and appropriate our shared capabilities to feel, to respond (e.g., likes and dislikes) as part of our human nature, enabling us to embark on the process of transformation arising from our natural need for development towards the completion and actualization of what we are supposed to be as humans.[16]

My discussion of moral cultivation throughout this chapter will mainly be based on the above understanding. To explain how man is capable of achieving goodness means we further assume men have the shared inborn tendency to like what is good and dislike what is not good.[17] And to further develop these likes and dislike we need to present, acquire and accumulate the knowledge of goodness.[18] In the *Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出, this drawing out of human nature as an affective response to external objects is referred to as *qing* 情 (genuine feelings and responsiveness). It is

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[14] Throughout my discussion I take *sheng* as a broad term meaning not only life but also the manifestation of nature as part of life development.

[15] The words "and then" (*erhou* 而後) in 而後好惡生 and 而後教生 show that likes and dislikes are the consequence of what we have naturally acquired and that education arises from man's natural desire to be guided to become what we ought to be.

[16] 有物有繇有遺(歸) in the passage is difficult and scholars have debated the meanings of 繇 and 遺(歸) (See Chen et al. 2009: 248n7). I take it to mean all objects have their beginning and end, which is coherent with the rest of the passage.

[17] The *Book of Odes* states that man's inborn nature of likes and dislikes is sharing the same rules as endowed by *tian*: "Heaven, in producing humans, has given them their defined objects and related rules and patterns. Of the invariable rules of nature for all humans to hold, what people love is admirable virtue" (my translation) (天生蒸民, 有物有則。民之秉夷, 好是懿德), "Zhengmin" 烝民 (Legge 1994).

[18] "Yueji" 樂記, *Liji*: "人生而靜, 天之性也; 感於物而動, 性之欲也。物至知知, 然後好惡形焉" (Lau and Chen 1992). This is also the view held in the *Xing zi ming chu*.

relevant to draw a parallel from the *Liji* which asserts that human nature as imparted by heaven is inactive at birth; it is activated by external objects as the stimuli, and expressed as human desires as part of human nature.[19] Therefore the environment and external objects are crucial in cultivating the affective faculty inherent in human nature, developing one's sensitivity to the needs and desires of oneself and others.

The process of cultivation does not stop at mere external stimulations. The *Xing zi ming chu* argues that it is through regular appropriate practices that our heart-mind can fix our intent (*zhi* 志) on what we are committed to.[20] Man has various desires and is exposed to many different external stimulations. Being able to make good choices (*shanze* 善擇)[21] and to become good is to complete the development of what we are supposed to be—to ensure the consequential actualization of all things (*wu* 物). This purpose of education to make men distinctive creatures as heaven has intended is more explicit in the following statement in *Yucong* 1:

> 有物有容, 有盡有厚,14 有美有善。15有仁有智, 有義有禮,16 有聖有善。17 夫天生百物, 人爲貴。
>
> There is object and there is appearance; there is finiteness, and then there is abundance; there is beauty and there is goodness. There is humanity and there is knowledge; there is appropriateness and there is propriety; there is sagacity and there is goodness. Of the hundred things produced by heaven, it is humanity that is of great value.

The statement "Of the hundred things produced by heaven, it is humanity that is of great value" (*tian sheng baiwu ren weigui* 天生百物人爲貴) is significant with at least three implications:

1. Man is one of the myriads of things (*wu*) given birth by heaven;
2. Man is distinct from other things for heaven makes him important;
3. Man can embody the qualities that contribute to the greatness of humanity.

Of what is produced and endowed by heaven, man's distinctive potential is to become *gui*—be important, great, noble or dignified (夫天生百物, 人爲貴). We can read this as heaven endowing mankind with the attributes and capability to become great—the copula *weigui* 爲貴 means "to make or become good"—suggesting that while man was born to have the capability of being good, he has to go through a process of *wei* to accomplish the goal of what would define the subject, man (*ren* 人). What explains the great value of man seems to lie in the features and attributes including the goodness which coexists with beauty, knowledge which coexists with humanness, and ritual which coexists with appropriateness and goodness, which coexist with sagacity (有美有善。15有仁有智, 有義有禮,16 有聖有善。17). What, then, makes possible the embodiment of beauty, humanness, knowledge, ritual, appropriateness and goodness?

[19] Besides the Guodian *Xing zi ming chu*, the *Xunzi* 荀子, the *Wenzi* 文子, and the *Huainanzi* 淮南子 also suggest that human nature arose as a response to external objects (*wu zhi er ying* 物至而應) (Lau 1992, 1996b; Lau and Liu 1991).

[20] For detailed discussion of the *Xing zi ming chu*, see Chap.12 by Shirley Chan in this volume.

[21] *Yucong* 3: 不善擇, 不爲智. Strip 38.

We shall again try to answer this question by employing our earlier discussion about the interactions of the concepts of endowment (*ming*) and pattern (*wen*), inborn nature (*xing*) and the manifestation of nature as a process of life (*sheng*). That is, if our hypothesis is correct, the above qualities that would make man important among all things would be a result of both our inborn nature and our engagement in learning and practice, in the process of full development. These two are interrelated, as the inborn nature of *xing* also determines the course of transformation and development. We can again assume from the earlier discussion that man shares the same likes and dislikes, that such aforementioned qualities as beauty, appropriateness and goodness would be what man in general would like to embody or develop, although whether everyone is able to do so is another matter.

The *Yucong*'s discussion of human development continues on how the human way is accomplished. *Yucong* 1 says:

> 人18之道也, 或由中出, 或由19外入。20 仁生於人, 義生於道。22 或生於內, 或生於外。23 其生也亡爲乎?其刑 62生德,[22] 德生禮, 禮生樂, 由樂24 知刑。25 知己而後知人, 知人而後26 知禮, 知禮而後知行。27 其知博, 然後知命。28 知天所爲, 知人所爲29 然後知道, 知道然後知命。30 (*Yucong* 1)
>
> The human way may be derived from within or internalizes what is from without. Humanity is generated from humans whereas appropriateness is generated from *dao*. It is sometimes generated from within and is sometimes generated from without. Is its generation a non-action? The form generates virtue, virtue generates the rules of propriety, the rules of propriety generate pleasure and from pleasure one learns about the form. Only by knowing oneself will one know others. Only by knowing others will one know rituals. Only by knowing rituals will one know how to act. If you have wide learning you will then know *ming*. Only by knowing what *tian* has produced and knowing what humans have created will you know the way; only by knowing the way will you then know *ming*.

The above passage presents an approach that takes the process of growth and development involving both innate quality (*nei* 內 or *zhong* 中) and external environment (*wai* 外),[23] effort-ness (*wei* 爲) and effortlessness (*wu wei* 亡爲), knowing (*zhi* 知)

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[22] There are a few possible readings for the character *xing* 刑, including punishment, or model; see Chap. 3 by He and Nylan in this volume. *Xing* 刑 is sometimes taken as 型, meaning "laws or rules." It is also possible to read 刑 as form (*xing* 形), as discussed earlier, as in *Yucong* 3. In this context, I prefer to interpret the character as "form" and "to take form" (*xing* 形). The "form" could also refer to "model" if we take "model" as a specific kind of "form" or "pattern" that would generate *de*, which has charismatic power or influence. I will explain this reading in more detail in the following discussion.

[23] In the *Liu de* 六德 the words *nei* and *wai* have been employed to conceptualize blood kin (e.g., father and son) versus public relationships (e.g., ruler and minister). Also these two types of relationships are represented by two virtues—"humanness" (*ren* 仁) and "rightness" (*yi* 義): "Humanness is internal, rightness is external . . . On the inside are established the roles of father, son, and husband; on the outside are established the roles of lord, minister, and wife" (仁, 內也。義, 外也 … 內立父子夫也, 外立君臣婦也) (*Liu de*, strips 25, 26). The nature of this relationship and related feelings and emotions are part of natural human development and have been distinctively acknowledged through the conceptualization of *sheng* 生. In the *Liu de*, the concept of *sheng* is used to describe a natural part of human development where it is emphasized that the three basic social relationships of husband and wife, father and son, ruler and subject minister are defined through inherent distinctions between male and female, closeness between father and son, and

and taking action (*xing* 行), heaven's creation (*tian suo wei* 天所爲) and man's conduct (*ren suo wei* 人所爲). Here *nei* probably means inborn nature or something that comes from within, whereas *wai* means practice as a result of cultural training or external effort. In this passage the use of the "maybe/or" (*huo* 或 … *huo* 或 …) in between "internal/within" (*nei* 内) and "external/without" (*wai* 外) suggests that human characters, being a phenotype, are a series of complex, inextricable interactions of many internal elements and the external environment; it is sometimes hard to draw a clear line between the two. And then, *Yucong* 1 uses the concepts of filial piety (*xiao* 孝) and fraternal love (*ti* 悌) to exemplify human character that is through neither "acting" nor "not acting". *Xiao* and *ti*—which have been considered by Confucians the root of humanity and natural inclination—are not acquired through absolute forceful effort (*wei* 爲), that is, they cannot be achieved with deliberate effort (*bu ke wei* 不可爲) and yet they cannot be achieved without effort (*buke buwei* 不可不爲). The passage emphasizes that both *ren* and *yi* are not from deliberate effort:

> 爲孝, 此非孝也; 爲悌,55 此非悌也; 不可爲也,56 而不可不爲也。爲之,57 此非也; 弗爲, 此非也。58 義無能爲也。53 人無能爲。83 (*Yucong* 1).
>
> Filiality practised deliberately cannot be called filiality; fraternal love practised deliberately cannot be called fraternal love. (These are not something) that can be accomplished with effort, nor can they be accomplished without effort. To act is not it; not to act is not it either. Rightness is not something effected by action; nor is humanity.

Then *Yucong* 3 makes it clear that a father's affection and a son's love are not from purposeful action, that is, they are a natural propensity and a lasting relationship that cannot be terminated. The ruler–minister relationship, which is a matter of choice, is not the same as that of the father–son relationship[24]:

> 父無惡。君猶父也，其弗惡1也，猶三軍之旌也，正也。2 以異於父者，君臣不相戴也,3 則可已; 不悅, 可去也; 不4義而加諸己, 弗受也。5友, 君臣之道也。長弟, 孝6之方也。7 父孝子愛, 非有爲也。
>
> One's father is not to be despised and in this case one's ruler is like one's father. [The ruler] is not to be despised like the flag of leading three armies, for its being upright. [The ruler] differs from the father insofar as the ruler and minister do not support each other; they may terminate the relationship; [the minister] may leave if displeased; may not accept anything improper imposed on him [by the ruler]. Friendship is the way of the relationship between ruler and minister[25]; fraternity is the way of filial piety. Filial piety to the father and affection to the son are not purposeful action.

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appropriateness between ruler and minister ("Proper distinction arises between male and female, close familiarity arises between father and son, and a sense of appropriateness arises between ruler and minister" *Nannü bie sheng yan, fuzi qin sheng yan, junchen yi sheng yan* 男女別生焉, 父子親生焉, 君臣義生焉). *Sheng* 生, rendered as "arise" or "emerge" in these passages, implies that these human relationships are part of the natural development of human society; the relationships need to be well defined and maintained accordingly.

[24] Also in *Yucong* 1: Ruler and minister, friend and friend are relationships based on choice (君臣、朋友, 其擇者也) (strip 87).

[25] The relationship between ruler and minister, and in particular their friendship, was a changing concept in the historical context of the Warring States period. During Western Zhou (1046–771 BCE), the political power structure was based upon kinship and lineage laws with patriarchal prin-

It seems that the author of the *Yucong* accepts that at least some human qualities, in particular the roots of humanity, filial piety, fraternal love, righteousness and humanity, are not products of pure human artifice or external effort. The texts nevertheless claim that effort is needed. One of the possible interpretations of this seemingly contradictory statement is: filial piety and fraternal love are natural inclinations without deliberate action; yet such love and affection need keeping and maintaining through ritual practice for patterning in harmony in order to have proper outward expressions. This takes us back to the previous passage in *Yucong* 1: after posing the question "is its generation effortless?" (其生也亡爲乎) the passage presents cyclical sorites of *nei*, inner, and *wai*, outer: formed model (*xing* 型/形) gives rise to virtue (*de* 德) which then produces the rules of propriety (*li* 禮); the latter generates pleasure (*le* 樂) which then brings about form and gives rise to virtue. The same cycle is expected to repeat. How does *xing* 型/形 give rise to *de*? We can take *xing* as any kind of infinite object or exhibit in the world around us. But more specifically, *xing* can refer to personalities arisen from proper conduct, manners, appearance or decorum through the observation of *li* from which the cultivated, socially desirable person emerges as a model with the charismatic power of *de* which in turn forms part of the exhibits of cultural patterns.[26]

We can imagine when (outer) cultural patterns become well established, then their elements and values permeate every aspect of cultural life so that the ideal of civility will find its way into people's (inner) consciousness. Here, human sensibility plays a role in our perception and responsiveness to goodness and beauty. The pleasure (*le* 樂) (this is the same character for music, *yue* 樂, denoting a general pattern of ritual and music and as such, in a broad sense, refined cultural patterns) that we experience in the perception of goodness (*shan* 善) and/or beauty (*mei* 美) from our approval of the quality of beauty causes us to seek out the sense of beauty and to perform a similar beautiful act. Through the fluid and shifting categories of decorum, politeness and sensibility, to which we are attracted and become a part, we reflect on and internalize what we think is good and beautiful. Then, the inner quality of virtue enhances outer beauty through the expression of virtue, i.e., ritual or decorum. Finally, when we realize in ourselves the proper form and conduct, we at the same time act and present ourselves as a form of "ritual"—an authentic form of

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ciples enforced by a set of rule-guided rituals. Lineage and extended families functioned as both political and social units in which rulers and minsters were related as a family in a large-scale kinship network; political order and social-political relations were defined by family rules and lineage ethics. This changed in Eastern Zhou (770–221 BCE) when the Zhou king lost control over the dukedoms, resulting in the collapse of the feudal system, with increasing social mobility. Talented men of obscure origin could move from state to state to choose whom to serve; they even rose to the heights of state power through their technical skills and personal achievement. The relationship between a ruler and a minister was no longer about loyalty and obligation to kin but how to serve the interests of the state or larger community (Hsü 1965; Allan 2015: 13.) It is in this context that in *Yucong* 1, both ruler and minister and friend and friend relationships are seen as a matter of choice.

[26] The *Wuxing* 五行, another Guodian text, argues that conduct is considered to be virtuous (*de* 德) only if it first takes shape from within a person. For detailed discussion on the *Wuxing*, see Chap. 10 by Erica Brindley in this volume.

beauty and goodness, which will in turn fulfil a pivotal role that will arouse and transform others. When relating this to our earlier discussion about form, name and appearance we can say that man can fully understand human nature as derived from heaven, and make his name correspond with his human characteristics, distinct from other species and as a member of human society.

This passage suggests lastly that the awareness and understanding of both man's and heaven's roles enables the realization of the way and the *ming* (知天所爲, 知人所爲, 然後知道, 知道然後知命).[27] That is, both heaven and man are responsible for contributing to the very same goal of unifying and harmonizing the way of man and the way of heaven, to combine and harmonize internal (*nei* 内) and external (*wai* 外) moral sources.[28] *Ming* 命 implies the fulfilment of the name and nature of what defines man as intended by the heavenly endowment, through the creation and observation of rituals and music that are crucial in constituting social norms. Related to this is *Yucong*'s emphasis on the unique characteristic of rituals in patterning and ordering our *qing* 情, which grows out of the sensual and emotional needs of man. Ritual and music, whose significance is the proper ordering and patterning of human feelings and reactions, do not go against but are created out of human nature.

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[27] Similarly, "The Great and Most Honoured Masters" (Da zongshi 大宗师) in the *Zhuangzi* states: "He who knows the part which the heaven (in him) plays, and knows (also) that which the human (in him ought to) play, has reached the perfection (of knowledge). He who knows the part which the heaven plays (knows) that it is naturally born with him; he who knows the part which the human ought to play will nourish what he does not (yet) know with what he already knows. To complete one's natural term of years and not come to an untimely end in the middle of his course is the fullness of knowledge …" (知天之所為, 知人之所為者，至矣。知天之所為者，天而生也; 知人之所為者，以其知之所知，以養其知之所不知，終其天年而不中道夭者，是知之盛也 …) (Legge 1994). For the *Zhuangzi*, to know both the heavenly way and the human way is to accept what heaven or nature has laid on us and to ensure we will be able to live skilfully and last out one's natural years (*zhong qitiannian* 終其天年). It is also mentioned in "Ren jian xun" 人閒訓 in the *Huainanzi* 淮南子that one needs to know about the heavenly way and the human way, serving two different purposes respectively—the former is needed to understand the *dao* and the latter for interaction in human society (知天之所為,知人之所行,則有以任於世矣。知天而不知人,則無以與俗交;知人而不知天,則無以與道遊) (Legge 1994). It is difficult to determine the connection between the *Yucong* and these other texts. Yet it shows these early texts shared the view that it is essential to know both the heavenly way and the human way. Zhuangzi emphasized our natural being and how we should live a life that will preserve and maximize our nature, whilst Huainanzi saw the secular side of the human way. Based on our reading of the *Yucong* so far, this line in the *Yucong* would be more like taking a perspective that combines the heavenly way and human way in understanding what heaven has endowed upon us internally and what human effort can contribute to our development.

[28] A similar approach can also be seen in the *Liu de*.

4 Cultural Patterns to Connect Humanity and Heaven

The Guodian texts underscore the interconnectedness of heaven and humanity through cultural patterns. The unity of man and heaven implies that man is to reinforce the social and cosmic order by complying with nature and principles of growth and development as endowed by *tian*. The worthy have created cultural patterns (ritual and music) by observing these inherent discourses to manage and order human affairs properly, as stated earlier in the *Yucong*: *tian sheng gun/lun*, *ren sheng qing* (*tian* constitutes constant principles and classifications, and man develops patterns for regulating things).[29] The acquisition of this knowledge or wisdom presupposes a locus in which these particular and interdependent values are exercised.

While these texts have not given any opinion on human nature being good or bad, they further acknowledge that cultural patterns are about carefully regulating (*jie* 節), refining (*wen* 文), generating (*sheng* 生), and patterning (*li* 理) human affairs in accordance with man's *qing*:

> 禮, 因人之情而爲之31節文者也。97 善理而後樂生。32 賢者能理之。54. (*Yucong* 1)
> The rules of propriety are created out of the characteristic response and manifestation of human nature (*qing*) and is referred to as regulating and patterning; only after patterning well (his *qing*), will joy arise. He who is worthy is capable of patterning *qing* well.

Rituals have this unique function in human development, making the connection of the way of man and the way of heaven an effective and natural process. It is said that rituals were created based on human disposition or feelings, which define humanity's distinctive nature, and are drawn out by external situations. *Tian* endows man with the capability of being receptive to the environment and sharing similar likes and dislikes with others. However, these likes (and dislikes) cannot be understood and actualized until the objects drawing out these feelings are created, presented and learnt. Rituals and rules of propriety were created for guiding our feelings because they draw out spontaneous human sentiments, patterning our feelings and subsequently contributing to moral development. More significantly, this patterning and ordering make us feel good and bring us pleasure, because they meet our natural desire for the beautiful and good, ultimately making us beautiful and good.[30]

The ancient texts have been the core curricula of the Ruist learning program. According to the *Yucong*, the unique cultural value of ancient writings such as the

[29] As part of the natural world, human beings are not set apart from it, and so humans should not "disrupt" (*luan* 亂) or "go against" (*ni* 逆)natural order (*Cheng zhi wen zhi* 成之聞之).

[30] Similar to the *Yucong*, the *Xing zi ming chu* details how emotional capacities and responses are drawn out by external stimuli as part of human nature. The *Xing zi ming chu* presents a long description of how human emotions are aroused when observing musical performances and experiencing the stages of mental activity that correspond to physiological responses and physical movements. Along with the sensual experience of hearing (*wen* 聞), listening to (*ting* 聽), and observing (*guan* 觀) musical performances, listeners are able to share emotions and feelings with the musical performer(s) and smoothly internalize what is entailed in the music. For a more detailed study of this see Chap. 12 of this volume.

Odes, the *Documents*, the *Rites*, and *Music* is their bringing together the way of heaven and the way of man, past and present, in joining together words and actions, and what was born with and what is taught[31]:

> 易, 所以會天道人道36也。37詩, 所以會古今之志38也者。39春秋, 所以會古今之40事也。41 禮, 交之行述也。42樂, 或生或教者也。43書,口口口口者也。44 (*Yucong* 1)
>
> The *Changes* is that by which the way of heaven and the way of man may be brought together; the *Odes* is that by which the intent of the past and present may be integrated; and the *Spring and Autumn Annals* integrates events of past and present. The *Rites* integrate actions and words; music is derived from nature and instruction. (The *Documents* is?) something for (XXXX).

The passage repeatedly uses the word *hui* 會 (to join, to be in accordance with, and to combine) suggesting the interconnectedness of the way of heaven and the way of man.[32] Therefore, learning is not the opposite of innate or genetically programmed instincts. Man, as a complex of blood-*qi*, is endowed with distinctive attributes including the derivative abilities to sense, to feel, to think and to set intent, to correspond, to interact, and to engage—these distinctive attributes make social transformation or cultural construction possible[33]:

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[31] A similar statement about rituals, music and cultural patterns appears in the *Xing zi ming chu* in which it is said the sage and the culture creator(s) have created and established such cultural patterns as music and rituals by sorting the emotions/feelings [inspired by them] (*Xing zi ming chu*, strips 15–19). Most scholars tend to believe that here *shi* 詩, *shu* 書, *li* 禮, *yue* 樂, *chunqiu* 春秋, and *yi* 易 can be taken as confirmation of the existence of the six classics and of a coherent grouping of Six Classics (all books). Others have argued that the *Yucong* passage likely refers to six bibliographic categories rather than to individual classics with those titles. For discussion on the writing and manuscript culture of these ancient texts, see Chap. 3 by He and Nylan, and Chap. 4 by Meyer in this volume.

[32] This indeed has also been acknowledged in the *Xing zi ming chu* which mentions that the cultural creators (*youweizhe* 有爲者) or the sage (*shengren* 聖人) produced and established such cultural patterns as music and rituals for teaching to manifest or internalize human feelings and emotions. The *Xing zi ming chu* shares a similar view about the ancient cultural heritage of the *Odes*, *Documents*, *Rites* and *Music*. And the ultimate purpose of teaching is to attain virtue in one's heart (*sheng de yu zhong* 生德于中) (*Xing zi ming chu*, strip 18).

[33] We can assume that "all creatures of blood and *qi*" (*fan you xueqi zhe* 凡有血氣者) would mainly, if not exclusively, refer to human beings. There are early texts sharing views on the unique attributes of humanity as a complex of blood-*qi*. But it seems the *Yucong* is one of the earliest to make an explicit claim of these features which enables man to accomplish the task of cultural transformation. Confucius ("Jishi" 季氏, *Lunyu*) stated that blood-*qi* accounts for motivational characteristics at different stages of one's life and needs to be carefully guided accordingly (Cheng 2008). Later, Mencius ("Gong Sun Chou I" 公孫丑上, *Mengzi*) emphasized the moral dimension of *qi* in human beings, which if nourished, together with the determination and guidance of heart-mind, will form a pervasive moral force (Lau 2003). Although well known for his belief in human nature being originally bad, Xunzi ("Wangzhi pian" 王制篇, *Xunzi*) admittedly illustrated the unique value of human beings and the way they enjoy a prominent position, for they in comparison to other things and species possess *qi*, life, intelligence and sense of appropriateness (水火有氣而無生, 草木有生而無知, 禽獸有知而無義, 人有氣、有生、有知, 亦且有義, 故最為天下貴也) (Lau 1996b; Watson 1996: 45).

> 凡有血氣者, 皆有喜45有怒, 有慎有莊。其體46有容, 有色有聲, 有嗅47有味, 有氣有志。凡物48有本有末, 有始有終。49容色,目司也。聲, 耳司50也。嗅, 鼻司也。味, 口司51也。氣, 容司也。志, 心司。52 (*Yucong* 1)
>
> All creatures of blood and *qi* possess (the capacities of) happiness and anger, cautiousness and gravity. In their bodies are appearance (that is, bearing/deportment/carriage), colour (that is, complexion/ facial colour/facial expression) and voice, smell and taste, dispositional energy and intent. All things have their roots and (courses of) growth, their ending and beginning. Bearing and complexion are subject to the eyes, voice is subject to the ears, smell to the nose, taste to the mouth, aura to demeanour, and intention to the heart-mind.

Using our example of man's common aspiration to become beautiful and good, the process of transformation would be an integrated engagement that involves the different human faculties, with the presentation of objects. Objects such as rituals and music are constitutive and instrumental in regulating and putting in order human affairs. With cultural practice, man, like all objects with pattern, nature, name and appearance, will fulfil his name and endowment, echoing what we have discussed in the beginning of the chapter—by modelling the heavenly way. Similar to the Guodian text *Wuxing* 五行 (Five Conducts), the *Yucong* implicitly confirms the function of the sensual organs as well as the emotional responsiveness and intellectual capability of the heart-mind in the process of moral cultivation.[34] In the Guodian *Wuxing*, this embodiment and acting out of the innate quality of virtues would bring about such physiological as well as psychological changes as jade-like skin and bronze bell-like voice.[35] The metaphorical framework of jade and bronze bell conveys the message that the human body as a complex of blood-*qi* that develops sagacity through the process of manifestation and transformation with the influence of cultural pattern (rituals and music) is more than a physical body; with its appearance, shape and pattern the body is itself a cultural construct, or a ritual vessel, that would speak its morality. Then we see in *Yucong* 3, with rituals and music, human development and self-transformation are a holistic and integrative process (*jiao* 交):

> 兼行則治者中。33交, 交行則XX 34喪, 仁也。義, 宜也。愛, 仁35也。1 義, 處之也。禮, 行之36也。37不善擇, 不爲智。38 物不備, 不成仁。39 … 踊, 哀也。三踊, 文

[34] Similar to the *Xing zi ming chu*, the Guodian *Wuxing* text stipulates that one who harmonizes (*he* 和) and assimilates/conforms to (*tong* 同) sensuality with affective and cognitive responses (of heart-mind) in moral practice will gain the greatest joy and ease.

[35] The Guodian *Wuxing*: "The reflection of the wise is circumspect. If one is circumspect, then one will attain (a thing). If one can attain it, then one will not forget it. If one does not forget it, then one will be clear-sighted. If one is clear-sighted then one will see a worthy. If one sees a worthy then one will have a jade coloration. If one has a jade coloration then one will take give form (to a thing). If it takes form to it, then one will be wise. The reflection of the sage is direct. If one is direct then one can form. If one can give form (to a thing), then one will not forget it. If one does not forget it then one can be sharp-eared. If one is sharp-eared then one can hear the Way of Gentleman. If one can hear the Way of the Gentleman then one will have a jade tone. If one has jade tone then one will give form (to a thing). If one gives form to it, then one will be a sage" (智之思也長, 長則得, 得則不忘, 不忘則明, 明則見賢人, 見賢人則玉色, 玉色則形, 形則智, 聖之思也徑, 徑則形, 形則不忘, 不忘則聰, 聰則聞君。子道: 聞君子, 道則玉音, 玉音形, 形則聖) (strip 14) (Csikszentmihalyi 2004: 77).

也。41 文依物以情行之者, 44或由其避, 或由其42 不進, 或由其可。43 … 樹也, 強取之也。46 莫得善其所。47 (*Yucong* 3)

Together with action it will enable he who regulates to maintain balance/equilibrium[36]; to integrate means to integrate with practice, which will then XX. Mourning refers to humanity; rightness refers to appropriateness. Love is humanity. Rightness is to dwell in. Rituals are to be put into practice. Without making a good choice one cannot be said to be wise. Without things being readily complete, humanity will not be accomplished … Leaping is the [expression] of grief. Leaping three times becomes a refined pattern. Those refined (cultural) patterns that are practised based on the (characteristic features) of things and *qing* could be a case of evading it, of not advancing it, or of following its own cause … What makes firmness erect is its [nature of] firmness taking hold of it. Nothing will not arrive at its best place.

Human nature is malleable. Moral cultivation and human development mean there are times when inherent attributes need to be strengthened, and at other times, to be suppressed or simply to take their own course, depending on the external environment. Nevertheless, in the phrase "what makes firmness erect is its firmness taking hold of it"—a similar phrase appears in the *Xing zi ming chu*—it is both the inherent biological factor (of *qiang* 強, firmness) and the external stimuli (to draw out that firmness) that work together to make the manifestation (of firmness) possible.[37] In the end, the cultural patterns are practised, based on the characteristic features of things and *qing*, so all things will arrive at their good course (*mo de shan qi suo* 莫得善其所). One brings an authentic self through a holistic and ongoing approach of reflected action, whereby one moves toward a sense of harmony and balance within oneself and with the world. The artful use of self through body and mind provides an opportunity for personal growth and actualizes the potential to expand the good. Being aware of the external environment affects how we react and respond. The passage makes it clear that cultural practice requires making good choices of what we should present, acquire and teach (*bu shan ze*, *bu wei zhi* 不善擇, 不爲智).

The Guodian texts in general agree that moral transformation is a two-way interaction with a unity of human nature and cultural practice, or the way of heaven and the way of man. Sometimes this is about nurturing man's nature; sometimes it is about evading what we know to be undesirable or inappropriate. In this sense, man is deemed to be developed through cultural practice which should be a scheme of careful choice. In the phrase "without the defined objects being complete,

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[36] For example, in the *Doctrine of the Mean* (中庸): "Shun loved to question others, and to study their words, though they might be shallow. He concealed what was bad in them and displayed what was good. He took hold of their two extremes, determined the Mean, and employed it in his government of the people. It was by this that he was Shun!" (舜好問而好察邇言, 隱惡而揚善, 執其兩端, 用其中於民, 其斯以為舜乎!) (Legge 1994). Another way of reading *zhong* 中 is to take it as a verb: to internalize in one's heart as in "… the ultimate purpose of teaching is to attain virtue in one's heart" (*sheng de yu zhong* 生德于中) (*Xing zi ming chu*, strip 18).

[37] It is said that could be the case of evading it, of not advancing it, or of following its own cause. This view of human nature and the process of moral cultivation is consistent with the *Xing zi ming chu* which states that "in general, *xing* can be activated, received, restrained, polished and disciplined, evoked/manifested, nourished, or extended" (凡性, 或動之, 或逆之, 或交之, 或厲之, 或出之, 或養之, 或長之) (strips 9 and 10).

humanity cannot be accomplished" (*wu bubei bu chengren* 物不備, 不成仁), the object or thing (*wu* 物), in a broad sense refers to external objects that are part of the teaching and learning environment, which can be external—something with colour, shape, movement, and which our sense of sight or hearing registers; or it can be internal—some quality of excellence or beauty that the human mind can discern.[38] In other words, without teaching and learning cultural practice, which is created for its appropriateness, man cannot complete the process of "becoming" (*cheng* 成) what he is supposed to be as a man. Further, this object *wu* could also refer to the human body itself: the original attributes of human nature ready for completion, without which humanity (*ren*) cannot be accomplished. Here, *wen* refers to cultural patterns based on the (characteristic features) of things and *qing* (文依物以情行之者). This is similar to the rules of propriety (*li* 禮) "created out of the characteristic response and manifestation of human nature, *qing*" (禮, 因人之情而爲之) mentioned in the same text.

The Guodian corpus discusses *qing*, which is a spontaneous and genuine affective response to the external environment and an essential part of the life process, as part of human *xing*. The features and capacities derived from human *xing* produce morally congenial sensual feelings and spirit. They are morally congenial because they are spontaneous emotional tendencies conducive to moral development, waiting to be evoked by external stimuli.[39] In the *Yucong*, *sheng* 生, which is often translated as life and growth, is closely related to *xing* in the broader sense that it is the manifestation of the nature of things in the course of life development. *Sheng* 生 and *xing* 性 coexist. 性 has been often translated as 'nature'; it can also be understood as 'by nature', for example, as a natural response to the external environment being part of the process of life and growth. Both *Yucong* 1 and 2 have frequently used the character 生 to describe the manifestation of various *qing*, as part of human *xing*.[40] The seemingly naturalist perspective of *tian* has moral implications: the various emotions and feelings are the external manifestations of *xing*, human nature, which brings out the creation of rituals and music (情生於性, 禮生於情) (*Yucong* 2, strip 1). On the other hand, rituals and music draw out moral potentialities. Related to the Daoist doctrine of non-action was the idea of no desires, which meant that no one should have excessive desires because such desires are bound to cause injury both to oneself and to others, whereas Confucians acknowledge desire as part of human nature. But the *Yucong* seems to take the term *yu* 欲 (desire) in a neutral sense. *Yucong* 2 aligns *yu* to *xing* 性 by mentioning that *yu* arises from *xing* (e.g., 欲

[38] It shares the view with *Yucong* 1 where we have seen that human development is an integrated process that involves both inner and outer elements.

[39] See Chap. 12 in this volume.

[40] *Yucong* 2 is largely composed of statements about how various feelings and dispositions (such as love, joy, loyalty, and also hatred and anger) were evoked (*sheng* 生) as part of the manifestation of *xing* and to meet our desire (*yu* 欲). For example, in *Yucong* 2: *Qing* (dispositions) derive from *xing* (human nature); *li* (rituals) derive from *qing* (dispositions); awe derives from reverence; the sense of shame derives from awe … love derives from *xing*; intimacy derives from love; loyalty derives from intimacy (情生於性, 禮生於情,1 嚴生於禮, 敬生於嚴,2 兢生於敬, 恥生於兢,3 悡生於恥, 廉生於悡4) (strips 1, 2, 3, 4).

生於性, 慮生於欲), which may or may not be morally desirable. This can be taken as the 'nature via nurture' approach, or in the Guodian *Laozi*'s own words "assisting the naturalness of all things" (*fu wanwu zhi ziran* 輔萬物之自然) (A: 13; C: 14). The characters *sheng* 生 (being born from, to give birth) and *chu* 出 (derive, come forth from) have been more frequently used in the *Yucong* than has the character *xing* 性. *Sheng* has appeared more than eighty times (about twenty times in *Yucong* 1 and sixty in *Yucong* 2 and eight times in *Yucong* 3), most of which relate to the manifestation of *xing*, for example, in terms of thinking, intent (*si* 思, *zhi* 志), feelings or dispositions, as in *Yucong* 2 and *Yucong* 3. Thus the author of the texts is making the point that culture and ritual practice are created by reconciling man's nature, disposition and desire, thence they would make man's "becoming" a process that is relatively effortless, bringing joy and making all things arrive in their proper place (*mo de shan qi suo* 莫得善其所).

This takes us to the place in *Yucong* 1 where we have "All things have their roots and their branches; (all things) have their beginning and their end" (*fan wu you ben you mo*, *you shi you zhong* 凡物有本有末, 有始有終49).[41] This raises further questions: what are roots (*ben*) and branches (*mo*)? What are the beginning (*shi*) and the end (*zhong*)? What do these phrases contribute to our discussion about human development and order and patterning? There are different answers according to how we have read the texts so far. *Ben* and *shi* would be something related to what is predetermined by *tian* or by nature; how things are in their original state as created by nature; *mo* and *zhong* would be how accomplishedthings are—for example, man as a complex of blood and *qi*—at the end of their course of development and transformation. This process could be about the transformation from nothingness in the beginning to somethingness at the end (e.g., all things come into existence from non-existence as stated in the beginning of *Yucong* 1); or from what *tian* originally

[41] Similar wording appears in the *Great Learning* (Daxue 大學): "Things have their root and their branches. Affairs have their end and their beginning" (*wu you ben mo, shi you shi zhong* 物有本末, 事有始終). This is used to describe the Confucian notion of the process of self-cultivation beginning with the sincerity of the heart-mind and ending with the ability to pacify all under heaven. In the *Zhuangzi*, *shanshi shanzhong* 善始善終 refers to "having a good end and good beginning" of one's life by preserving his body and form through hiding the world from the world" (夫大塊載我以形, 勞我以生, 佚我以老, 息我以死。故善吾生者, 乃所以善吾死也 … 若夫藏天下於天下, 而不得所遯, 是恆物之大情也。特犯人之形而猶喜之, 若人之形者, 萬化而未始有極也, 其為樂可勝計邪! 故聖人將遊於物之所不得遯而皆存。善妖善老, 善始善終, 人猶效之, 又況萬物之所係, 而一化之所待乎!) There is the great Mass (of nature)—I find the support of my body on it; my life is spent in toil on it; my old age seeks ease on it; at death I find rest in it—what makes my life a good makes my death also a good … But if you could hide the world in the world, so that there was nowhere to which it could be removed, this would be the grand reality of the ever-during Thing. When the body of man comes from its special mould, there is even then occasion for joy; but this body undergoes a myriad transformations, and does not immediately reach its perfection;—does it not thus afford occasion for joys incalculable? Therefore the sagely man enjoys himself in that from which there is no possibility of separation, and by which all things are preserved. He considers early death or old age, his beginning and his ending, all to be good, and in this other men imitate him;—how much more will they do so in regard to That Itself on which all things depend, and from which every transformation arises! ("Da Zongshi" 大宗師, *Zhuangzi*) (Legge 1994: 242–43).

endowed all things with, to what has ended with human effort, patterned and accomplished through cultural practice and education. In this way the ultimate goal of a government is to establish and accomplish a cultural pattern so that it will transform and realize people's moral character and spiritual wellbeing (*hua minqi* 化民氣) into what it is meant to be:

> 政不達文生乎不達其然。[42] (*Yucong* 1)
>
> If government cannot establish a cultural pattern [for moral transformation], what is inborn in man will not achieve its potential.

Realizing the fluid character or spirit of the people (*minqi* 民氣), the purpose of cultural patterning is not to depart from the way of heaven but to observe and understand the nature of all things, including the distinctiveness of human nature endowed by heaven.[43] To transform is therefore to realize the innate potential that cannot be achieved otherwise (生乎不達其然), and to imbue people's character with morality. This process relates to knowing the functions and causal relations symbolized by and expressed in transformation (*hua* 化), the process by which all things come into being and becoming.

5 More on Learning: *Yucong* 3

As we have seen, the *Yucong* texts foreground the importance of engaging experience based on the assumption that human nature is malleable and transformable and that education and culture play a role in human development and social construction. *Yucong* 3 states how the various means of acquiring knowledge can improve/benefit (*yi* 益) or injure/diminish (*sun* 損) our *de*-virtue and goodness[44]:

> 與爲義者遊，益。與莊9者處，益。起習文章，益。10與褻者處，損。與不好11學者遊, 損。處而無 12習也, 損。自示其所能,損。13自示其所不足, 益。佚, 益。崇志, 益。存心, 益。15 [有]所不行, 益。必行, 損。16從所少好, 與所少樂, 損。(*Yucong* 3)
>
> One will benefit from roaming with those who practise appropriateness; one will benefit from abiding by those who are dignified. One will benefit from taking up the practice of cultural refinement. It is harmful to one to abide by the frivolous, and those who dislike learning. It is harmful [if one is in good] company yet does not practise goodness. It is harmful to boast about one's ability; but is beneficial to be honest with one's own shortcomings. It is beneficial to have lofty aspirations, noble intentions and to preserve one's mind-heart. It is beneficial to be selective of what one should do; it is harmful if one insists on taking action on all things [indiscriminately], and pursuing trivial interests and happiness.

[42] It is difficult to translate *qiran* 其然, literally "so, be as it is." It could refer to the potential in life to be achieved in certain circumstance.

[43] To examine closely the way of heaven so as to transform the character of the people (*cha tiandao yi hua minqi* 察天道而化民氣) (*Yucong* 1).

[44] I take virtue *de*德 and goodness *shan* 善 as the objects of the verbs "to benefit" (*yi* 益) and "to diminish" (*sun* 損), because these two are mentioned in the same text as follows: "appropriateness is what improves virtue, and it is the way of [expressing] goodness" (義, 德之進也, 義, 善之方也).

Confucius was well known for his commitment to learning rituals and social rules, and for recognizing their function in maintaining social order by following these rules patterned with cultural refinement. Mencius believed that education cultivates pre-existing good tendencies. To Xunzi, another Confucian follower, the primary aim of education was to regulate man's natural desire by mastering a Way that is the artificial product of human invention; it is possible for man to become good but it is through education, which is a lengthy endeavour that requires a great deal of effort and dedication from the individual; it is not something that comes naturally to us. It is generally agreed that, on the other hand, the purpose of learning, for Laozi and Zhuangzi, was to be free from the rules and discrimination created by man, for such endeavours are the source of our frustration and diminution and will weaken and harm human life. According to the Daoists, to attain *dao*, therefore, one needs to be carefree and float with *dao* beyond constraints by accepting constant changes in nature.[45] When we read *Yucong* carefully we can see the text promotes the Confucian concept of appropriateness (*yi* 義), practice of cultural refinement (*wen* 文), and setting one's intention (*zhi* 志); yet it shares the Daoist ideas of intuitive responsiveness to changing circumstances and not acting upon what should not be acted upon, but roaming freely in thought with an acceptance of indeterminacy.

The phrase "roaming about" (*you* 遊) although also meaning "befriend with" in this context, indicates a certain degree of freedom and effortlessness, characterized by the natural adaptability of the flow of water in a stream. The passage acknowledges that "It is beneficial to be selective of what one should do; it is harmful if one insists on taking action on all things [indiscriminately]" ([有]所不行, 益。必行, 損), and that any form of assertiveness and coercion in the process of cultivation gains nothing but inflicts damage on human well-being and human development. It is not clear what is meant by trivial happiness (*shao le* 少樂) when the author says "it is harmful to pursue trivial interests and happiness"; this nevertheless suggests there is a greater joy and contentement that one should pursue. As we move on, we can see that joy and contentment is when one has become a person that has genuinely accomplished *de* 德—a term which appears in both the Confucian and Daoist texts as an ability to influence and lead people to a world of good order and har-

[45] See for example, Laozi's *jue xue wu you* 絕學無憂, and "[As it is said], those who know (the *Dao*) do not speak of it; those who speak of it do not know it;" and "Hence the sage conveys his instructions without the use of speech." The *Dao* cannot be made ours by constraint; its characteristics will not come to us (at our call). Benevolence may be practised; Righteousness may be partially attended to; by rites men impose on one another. Hence it is said, "When the *Dao* was lost, its characteristics appeared. When its characteristics were lost, benevolence appeared. When benevolence was lost, righteousness appeared. When righteousness was lost, ceremonies appeared. Rites are but (the unsubstantial) glossiness of the *Dao*, and the commencement of disorder." Hence (also it is further said), "He who practises the *Dao*, daily diminishes his doing. He diminishes it and again diminishes it, till he arrives at doing nothing. Having arrived at this non-inaction, there is nothing that he does not do." (夫知者不言, 言者不知, 故聖人行不言之教。道不可致, 德不可至。仁可為也, 義可虧也, 禮相偽也。故曰:『失道而後德, 失德而後仁, 失仁而後義, 失義而後禮。禮者, 道之華而亂之首也。』故曰:『為道者日損, 損之又損之, 以至於無為, 無為而無不為也。』) ("Knowledge rambling in the north" [Zhi bei you 知北遊], *Zhuangzi*) (Legge 1994: modified).

mony. For the former, *de* mainly means the moral power embodied in the social context with key virtues of humanness and righteousness in compliance with the rules of propriety; whereas the latter means natural power with spontaneity and minimal human interference. It is possible that the term *de* in the *Yucong* is the result of cultivating and attaining the blending of the two[46] with a combination of the internal and external, as we have discussed earlier. Pleasure and joy can be attained by a sense of freedom, a freedom that is allowed within the boundary of appropriateness, when pursuing *de*, for learning and acquiring knowledge is to exercise our natural ability fully and freely. With this, the author has carefully demarcated the journey of human development between nature and effort with a balance of the two leading to enhanced expressions of creativity and original thought in the authentic self.

Yucong 3 continues the discussion of learning by incorporating various sayings and ideas from the early texts.[47] These texts contain phrases that embrace both Daoist and Confucian attitudes towards life: the Daoist joyful and carefree character, observing and living in harmony with the nature of things in the process of transformation, with relatively spontaneous and effortless action. At the same time, it asserts that man must set his will on Confucian virtues such as humanity, rituals and appropriateness that complement the moral, duty-conscious, and purposeful character:

> 思無疆，思無期，思無邪,[48] 思48無不由義者。49志於道，狎於德，依於50仁，遊於藝。[49]51 善日化我(義), 我(義)日化善, 賢52 者唯其止也以異。53 樂, 服德者之所樂也。54 … 人之性非與? 止乎其57有性有生, 呼生。有X(德?) 58[50] 得者樂, 失者哀。59 … 毋意, 毋固,64a 毋我, 毋必。[51]65a 無物不物,64b 皆至焉。65b無無由也者, 66 a無非樂者。66b名二，物三。67a 生為貴。67b 有天有命，有68a 性有生，呼68bX69a 名。69b 生70a 爲其型。70b 命與文與,71a 有性有生71b 呼物。
>
> One's thoughts should be without limits, without end, and without depravity. This is when there is no thought that does not abide by appropriateness. Let one's intent be set on

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[46] Based on *Yucong* 1, these would include beauty (*mei* 美), goodness (*shan* 善), humanity (*ren* 仁), wisdom (*zhi* 智), righteousness (*yi* 義), rituals (*li* 禮) and sagacity (*sheng* 聖) (strips 15–17); in *Yucong* 3, these would be mainly *yi* and *shan*.

[47] There is no evidence to suggest the affiliations or connections of those texts to the *Yucong*. However, it is possible that these sayings, if not the texts from which the sayings were quoted, which were not necessarily in their present forms as a whole, were common during the time and that the author(s) was familiar with these sayings. There may be sayings from other texts that have been traditionally attributed to different schools of thought, which cannot be detailed here due to the scope of the present discussion.

[48] The phrases 思無疆, 思無期, 思無邪 appear in the *Book of Odes* "Jiong" 駉 (Legge 1994).

[49] Similar wording associated with Confucius appears in the *Analects* "Shuer" 述而: 志於道, 據於德, 依於仁, 游於藝 (Cheng 2008).

[50] Li Ling reads the illegible character here on strip 58 as *yue* 閱 (experience) (Chen et al. 2009: 262n48). I propose to read it as virtue (*de* 德), which would be more coherent with what follows: "Those who attain it [i.e., virtue] find happiness, those who lose it are sorrowful" (得者樂, 失者哀). This is consistent with another sentence in the same text: "Happiness is the happiness that can only be attained by those who are complete in virtue" (樂, 服德者之所樂也) (strip 54).

[51] The *Analects* IV.4 is slightly different: "There were four things from which the Master was entirely free. He had no foregone conclusions, no arbitrary predeterminations, no obstinacy, and no egoism" (子絕四: 毋意, 毋必, 毋固, 毋我) (Cheng 2008).

> the Way; be familiar with virtue; be in accordance with humanness; and roam in arts. Day by day, goodness transforms into appropriateness and appropriateness transforms into goodness. The worthy are different (from others) as they only come to rest in it (i.e., goodness). Happiness is the happiness that can only be attained by those who revere virtue. Those who revere it (i.e., virtue) find happiness, those who lose it are sorrowful. Have no presumption, have no obstinacy, have no egoism, have no arbitrary predetermination. When there is no thing that will not be fit as a thing, all will arrive in [their proper place]. When there is none that is not based on its own cause there is none that is not happy. There are two to be named and three that can be called objects.[52] What is generated is valued. There is *tian* and there is *ming*; there is nature (*xing*) and there is generating and it is named; it is generated into form. Is this not *ming* and is this not pattern? To have nature and to generate are to be what we call object(s).

A few observations regarding human cultivation can be made from the above: (1) one's mind and intent are without limits, having no depraved thoughts and with no absolute rules one, should simply adapt to what is appropriate (*yi* 義); (2) it is through daily transformation (*hua* 化) that one arrives in one's goodness (*shan* 善) and appropriateness (*yi* 義); (3) the attainment of virtue (*de* 德) will bring joy and satisfaction (*le* 樂), and finally, (4) through transformation one is meant to fulfil one's name (*ming* 名) and live to one's form (*xing* 型) in compliance with nature's endowment and what is patterned through culture (*ming yu wen yu* 命與文與).

Hua 化, characterized in both Daoist and Confucian texts, conceptualizes a process of "becoming" that is natural, spontaneous, changing and adaptable to arrive in what is supposed to be[53]; it is to return to a mode of existence that is in harmony with the cosmos when all things will be actualized to be a proper thing and when all will be in the proper place in happiness (無物不物, 皆至焉。無無由也者, 無非樂者).

6 Conclusion

Based on the discussion of human development in the *Yucong* texts, this chapter shows that Daoist and Confucian teachings have not necessarily been rivals, as traditional views tend to hold. The texts present and interweave the two threads of teachings containing Daoist and Confucian precepts and sayings. The texts were not trying to determine if human nature was originally good or bad. Instead, the *Yucong* focuses on human development as an ongoing process of transformation,

[52] In the *Guanzi* ("Shuyan" 樞言), we have: 凡人之名三, 有治也者, 有恥也者, 有事也者。事之名二, 正之察之, 五者而天下治矣。名正則治, 名倚則亂, 無名則死, 故先王貴名 (Lau et al. 2001). We are not sure if the *Yucong* here refers to the same things.

[53] The term "transformation" (*hua* 化) appears in such texts as the *Liji*, the *Zhuangzi* and the *Xunzi* describing the process of transforming people's character. In general, the Confucian texts connect transformation with teaching and ritual practices. *Hua* appears in the *Zhuangzi* more than seventy times emphasizing the natural process of changes; *hua* has also been used together with *yu* 育 (nourishing and nurturing by heaven and earth), indicating the process of transformation as a naturally requisite process of growth for all things in nature.

integrating both biological and social factors; this process assumes men share the same likes and dislikes through inborn nature and acquired experience; man is of the greatest value and is pivotal in connecting the way of heaven and the way of man, with the embodiment of virtue through human transformation, a process that involves what is endowed by heaven, the inborn, innate, spontaneity, naturalness, and non-action on the one hand, with learning, responsiveness, patterning *wen* 文 and creativity on the other. To answer partly how it is possible that the manifestation of human nature is a combination of what is natural or spontaneous and what is a product of human effort, the *Yucong* affirms the characteristic feature of cultural pattern, created with an understanding of human nature, in particular our natural responsiveness to, and perceptive capability of, the environment. Our inherent likes and dislikes can be patterned and harmonized with Daoist effortlessness and spontaneity in response to the presentation of rituals and a Confucian commitment to virtue. By taking this middle-ground, the texts formulate a more practical way for human development. Human development, in this context, does not involve a fundamental change of human nature with excessive action, but a natural transformation of human character with what was endowed by Heaven, which at the same time satisfies human's inherent needs of liking and disliking. Human development can be considered a holistic approach recognizing and integrating the variables, both psychological and physical, biological and social attributes of humanity feeding into the crucial part of the evolving cosmic order.[54]

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[54] For a discussion of the relationship between body and mind as described in the Guodian corpus, see Chap. 13 by Lisa Raphals in this volume.

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Chapter 15
The Debate Over Coercive Rulership and the "Human Way" in Light of Recently Excavated Warring States Texts (Updated)



Scott Cook

The debate over whether it is best to rule the populace by educating it in the intrinsic virtues of acting ethically, or rather by compelling it to behave correctly through the threat of punishments and the enticement of rewards, is doubtless one of the most central and enduring polemics in the long history of Chinese political thought. Distant echoes of this debate may even be heard in relatively recent statements by JIANG Zemin, who once called for the state's balanced use of both "rule of law" (*fa zhi* 法治) and "rule of virtue" (*de zhi* 德治), viewing them as the two "important means of maintaining social order and normalizing human thought and behaviour."[1] As this example underscores, the two philosophies of statecraft are not, after all,

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An earlier version of this article first appeared in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 64:2 December 2004: 399–440. I am grateful to the editors of *HJAS* for allowing me to reprint it in updated form in the present volume. Aside from some minor editorial and formatting changes, the updates are exclusively to the translations of the Guodian passages, made in order to reflect my latest thinking on the manuscripts in question—especially changes in the strip ordering of *Zun deyi* 尊德義, which in fact end up better suited to reinforce the central point I make in this paper (Cook 2012). I have also added to one *Cheng zhi* 成之 passage an extra portion not included in the original. Finally, in the interest of brevity, I have curtailed or eliminated most of the textual notes pertaining to the Guodian manuscripts, as for these readers may easily turn to Cook 2012. Everything else in the paper, save for one additional footnote (n8), remains as it was in the original article.

[1] From his "Speech at the Central Ideological and Political Work Conference" (在中央思想政治工作會議上的講話) (June 2000). Though the "rule of law" involves more than merely the use of rewards and punishments, the terms *fa* 法 and *de* 德 here show vestiges of derivation from the earlier dichotomy. In Jiang's words, they are "mutually interconnected and mutually reinforcing": while the rule of law "normalizes behaviour" through "authority and force," the rule of virtue "elevates ideological recognition and moral consciousness" through "persuasion and guidance."

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mutually exclusive, and countless intermediary positions have arisen within this age-old argument over their priority. Nonetheless, ever since the debate first evolved over the early years of the Warring States period (475–221 BCE), its terms have tended to become polarized along the two extremes of "virtue" and "coercion."

The rise of centralized states that marked the beginning of that era brought with it certain challenges, demanding the judicious response of traditional philosophies of rulership at the same time that they stimulated the creation of altogether new doctrines. The philosophical and historiographical literature of the period abounds with texts that pass various judgments upon such issues as the state's creation of manifestly promulgated legal codes and its methodical use of punishments or "organized violence" more generally—issues central to the social and political changes of the time. The treatment of those issues, moreover, presents a complex and ever-changing picture. As recent studies have shown, for instance, not only were the matters of law and punishments central to Warring States narratives regarding the creation of civilization by mythical emperors of the past; more importantly, the structure of those narratives evolved over time in a manner determined by the concerns of individual authors and how they dealt with the current institutional realities of their own day.[2] A similar path of evolution is likewise evident in the more discursive forms of philosophical argumentation of the period, as well as in the development of a variety of tropes and analogies employed therein.

Recently, a set of manuscript texts has come to light that brings the terms of the debate into sharper focus. Using these texts, the present essay aims to expand upon previous studies by describing in detail the path along which the argument over "virtue" versus "coercion" would develop from the early years of the Warring States up until the onset of unification. By the time of imperial rule, proponents of the contested priorities would achieve something of an uneasy reconciliation, but by no means the final word, as the discourse would continue to be refined and revisited throughout the remainder of Chinese history. Given that scholars in the Chinese tradition have always looked back to early antecedents for authoritative guidance in this as in other matters, in order to properly situate the debate within its historical context we must closely examine the textual history of the period in which the parameters of that discourse were ultimately set.

The texts in question are from the cache of Warring States-period bamboo manuscripts excavated in 1993 from a Chu-region tomb in Guodian village, Jingmen 荊門, Hubei province (*Guodian Chumu zhujian* 郭店楚墓竹簡),[3] and a similarly

[2] See especially Lewis (1990) and Puett (2001: 92–140).

[3] Photographs and transcriptions of the texts, written on sets of bamboo strips of varying lengths that were excavated from the Guodian tomb back in 1993, are published in Jingmenshi Bowuguan (1998). Scholarly consensus places the date of interment around 300 BCE; the texts themselves, of course, may have been conceived, and later copied, much earlier. For the excavation report, see (Hubeisheng Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1997). For an overview of the find in English, see the preliminary essays in Allan and Williams (2000) (and now Cook 2012). In this paper, I will be concentrating mainly upon five 32.5 cm Confucian manuscript texts entitled *Ziyi* 緇衣, *Cheng zhi* 成之 (originally titled *Chengzhi wenzhi* 成之聞之), *Zun deyi* 尊德義, *Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出, and *Liu de* 六德 (the latter four all have a distance of about 17.5 cm between the places on their strips

dated group of Chu-tomb manuscripts purchased soon thereafter by the Shanghai Museum (*Shanghai bowuguan cang Zhanguo Chu zhushu* 上海博物館藏戰國楚竹書).[4] Using new information garnered from these finds, scholars have already come a long way toward re-envisioning the cultural and intellectual history of the Warring States. Among the Confucian[5] works contained within the two corpuses, the discovery of such texts as *Ziyi* (in both finds)—hitherto among the many *Liji* 禮記 chapters suspected of being a Han dynasty contribution, despite its traditional ascription to the figure of Zisi 子思 (ca. 483–402 BCE)—has given us cause to rethink much of the temporal framework for both ideas and texts of the period. Most of the initial scholarship on these texts, aside from that geared toward philological issues, has tended to focus on the relatively narrow question of authorship or master-lineage affiliation.[6] While acknowledging the contributions of these studies, I propose here to concentrate instead on a question they have largely neglected: what do these texts tell us about broader trends and debates within the social and intellectual history of the era as a whole?

A prominent and intriguing facet of these texts is the insistence with which they engage, both directly and indirectly, in the aforementioned debate against the use of coercive measures as the primary means of bringing order to the state.[7] This polemic is certainly not unique to these texts, but the debate receives especially concentrated treatment within them; most notably, the texts invoke a consistent set of terminology that would eventually define the parameters for all further deliberation on the subject. The texts in question would appear to have been written down at a time when that debate was at its height—that is, before the Qin state acquired so much

where they were strung together; in the former, this distance is about 13 cm, a feature it shares with *Wuxing* 五行). Each of these texts has calligraphic features that serve to distinguish them from each other (with the exception that *Xing zi ming chu* and *Liu de* share the same hand), though they otherwise show various affinities in wording and content suggesting (along with, more superficially, their similarity in dimension) that on some level they formed a coherent group of closely related texts; for details, see Gu (2000a).

[4] Photographs and transcriptions of this corpus, written on sets of bamboo strips of varying lengths in a script similar to that of the Guodian manuscripts, have been published serially. References in this paper will all be to the first volume, which contains two texts, *Ziyi* and *Xingqing lun* 性情論 (i.e., *Xing zi ming chu*), that overlap with those found at Guodian (see Ma 2001). The Shanghai Museum manuscripts were purchased, in two batches, from the Hong Kong antiquities market in 1994, after having been looted by grave robbers from an unknown location; based on both content and calligraphic features, they appear to derive from the same general region and temporal proximity as the Guodian manuscripts. On these points, see Ma (2001: 2). Given that all references in this article to the Shanghai Museum texts will be only to the two that are shared with Guodian, I will henceforth refer to all texts in question collectively as the "Guodian (and Shanghai Museum) texts."

[5] I refer to the texts as "Confucian" because they either refer directly to Confucius as their "master" or share a set of principles in common with practically all other texts that do so, such as a firm belief in the emulative power of the ruler's virtue as highlighted and promulgated through ritual and music.

[6] Among the earlier and more seminally important articles by Chinese scholars on these issues are Li (1999a, b), Pang (1999), and Liao (1999). For my own views, see Gu (1999). See also Goldin (2000) and Puett (2004).

[7] I first explored these issues in Gu (2000b). For further discussion of legal issues in these texts, see Weld (2000).

power as to render any categorical arguments against the effectiveness of rulership through law and punishments no longer sustainable. They thus yield invaluable new information on the emergence of this age-old debate over the relative merits of persuasion and coercion.

The first part of this paper will focus on how this particular set of texts goes about making the argument against coercive order and in favour of rulership through ritual and musical education—skills in which the authors themselves were assumedly expert. They did this by staking the claim that ritual and music—or the "human way" (*ren dao* 人道), or "way of the people" (*min zhi dao* 民之道)—derive ultimately from human nature itself, and that because of this they are uniquely able to provide that nature with a kind of harmony and rhythm that keeps it within its proper balance without the least bit of coercion. All coercive measures, in contrast, are doomed to fail precisely because they go against the grain of human nature and in the end meet only with evasion and resistance.[8] Moreover, because human nature is heavenly endowed, because it directly reflects the way of Heaven, the human way of ritual and music is none other than the human manifestation of the inviolable cosmic order itself. The paper will then describe in further detail how these claims and their associated terminology would influence the subsequent development of this debate in the later Warring States and beyond.

1 Legal Reform and Its Opponents

As the Chunqiu period (770–476 BCE) drew to a close, the structure of government became more centralized and its bureaucracy more specialized, and along with this came a significant increase in social mobility. In such an environment, the old ritual code of the aristocracy ceased to be adequate to maintain order, and it was increasingly deemed necessary to establish a clear and unmistakable set of laws that would be binding upon all levels of society.[9] According to textual records, some of the important moves toward a formal legal code took place during Confucius's lifetime (551–479 BCE). If the *Zuo zhuan* 左傳 is to be believed, it was in the year now

[8] The human nature spoken of here refers, of course, to that as conceived by the early Confucian philosophers, which itself was not entirely consistent over time. For rival thinkers such as Han Fei and his predecessors, who took a more cynical view of human nature as motivated solely by selfish interests of pleasure-seeking and pain-avoidance (and largely devoid of the capacity for transformation), a reliance on coercive measures naturally made sense. And so it could be argued, as one of the anonymous reviewers for this volume has astutely pointed out, that the issue in question may not be so much one of whether or not to rely on human nature as it is a fundamental difference in the conception of the content of that nature. This is certainly true to a degree, but the Confucians were far from incognizant of the inexorable motivating drives of human emotions and desires, and in fact their entire program was designed to channel and harness precisely those forces toward more productive ends, as should become clear in what follows below.

[9] For an overview of these changes, see Hsü (1965: 86–100).

known as 536 BCE (Zhao 6) that the state of Zheng 鄭 first cast upon bronze a code of punishments:

> In the third month, the people of Zheng cast a document of punishments (*xing shu* 刑書). Shuxiang 叔向 (of Jin 晉) had a letter sent to Zichan 子產 (of Zheng) as follows: "At first, I had hopes for you, but now no longer. In the past, the former kings assessed matters [on their own merits] to determine sanctions; they did not create a penal code (*xing bi* 刑辟), as they were fearful that [this would cause] the people to have contentious minds (*zheng xin* 爭心). Still unable to forbid and prevent [the people's transgressions], [the former kings] confined them with propriety, restricted them with governance, conducted them with ritual, guarded over them with trust, and supported them with humanity. They instituted salaries and positions, so as to encourage their allegiance; they determined punishments and penalties (*xingfa* 刑罰) severely, so as to lend awe against their transgressions. Fearing this not yet [sufficient], they instructed them in loyalty, encouraged them through [exemplary] conduct, taught them with duties, employed them with harmony, supervised them with dedication, oversaw them with force, and determined judgments with firmness (*li zhi yi qiang, duan zhi yi gang* 蒞之以彊, 斷之以剛) … Consequently, the people were capable of being employed with duties and did not give rise to misfortune and disorder. If the people know there is a [penal] code (*bi* 辟), they will hold no scruples toward their superiors; they will all have contentious minds, seeking corroboration [for their actions] in the document [of laws], and completing [their tasks] through chance, and they cannot be governed (*fu ke wei yi* 弗可為矣). (Yang 1990: 1274–75)[10]

Twenty-three years later in the account (513 BCE; Zhao 29), Confucius himself is given to express a similar lament over the casting of Fan Xuanzi's 范宣子 penal code upon a bronze tripod in the state of Jin:

> Confucius said, "Will Jin not perish! … it now casts aside these [traditional] standards (*du* 度) and makes a punishment tripod (*xing ding* 刑鼎). The people now examine the tripod [to know the punishments]—on what basis will they revere the noble (*he yi zun gui* 何以尊貴)? What undertakings (*ye* 業) will the noble have to maintain? The noble and base will lose their order—on what basis will one govern the state (*he yi wei guo* 何以為國)? (Yang 1990: 1504)

In both of these passages, the development of a manifest penal code is portrayed as a threat to the prevailing order, in which the role of ritual (*li* 禮) and the virtues of moral suasion loom large. Clearly, however, what concerned these thinkers as characterized in the Zuo zhuan was not the use of punishments per se, but rather the ministerial class's loss of the authority to determine the nature and extent of those punishments. By its nature, ritual served to highlight hierarchical social relationships, thus investing the law*giver* with solemn authority; manifest, written law, in contrast, divested the superior of much of that authority by placing clear limits upon his discretion in both judging crimes and passing sentences. In time, the Confucian polemic would shift its target away from the state's manifest promulgation of the legal code itself to its reliance on coercive measures in the first place. Nonetheless, its early concerns with the legal code are instructive in understanding the initial motivations that served to shape the debate.

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[10] While these speeches as recorded in the *Zuo zhuan* can hardly be taken as faithful recountings of actual dialogues, I am assuming here that the general ideas they convey may well have some basis in historical fact.

The precise nature of the shift in rhetorical strategy is evident in the Guodian (and Shanghai Museum) manuscript texts, as is well exemplified by *Ziyi*, the one excavated text for which we also have a received counterpart. The central message of *Ziyi* is about rulership through example, about leading by use of the influential powers of both words and actions (*yan xing* 言行). Placing this message in direct opposition to rulership through coercive measures, the *Ziyi* addresses the use of punishments in several places, including the opening passage:[11]

> The Master said, "If one is as fond of beauty as one is of black [courtly] robes (as in the Ode 'Black Robe,' where the wife devotedly attends to the making of clothing for her husband), and as despising of the wicked as one is of slanderers (as in the Ode 'Xiang bo' 巷伯, which sings of throwing slanderers to 'the wolves and tigers'), then {noble ranks will not be transgressed, and the people will act with honesty;} the people will all submit, and yet the implements of punishment will not be blunted [through overuse]." The Ode says, "Model after the pattern of King Wen, and the myriad states will place their trust in you." (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 129, strips 1–2; Cook 2012: 375–78)[12]

The *Ziyi* again speaks of punishments in the twelfth passage:

> The Master said, "If he who heads the people instructs them through virtue and brings them in line through ritual (*jiao zhi yi de, qi zhi yi li* 教之以德, 齊之以禮), they will have minds that are motivated [to do good]; [but] if he instructs them through governance and brings them in line through punishments (*jiao zhi yi zheng, qi zhi yi xing* 教之以正[政], 齊之以刑), the people will have minds bent on evasion." Thus if he cherishes them with fatherly devotion, the people will endear themselves to him; if he binds them with trust, the people will not betray him; if he oversees them with reverence, the people will be of a submissive mind. The Ode says, "My great officers are reverent and frugal, and there is [thus] no one who lacks restraint." The "Lü xing 呂刑" (Punishments of Lü) says, "[The Miao people 苗民] did not employ positive instruction, [but rather] constrained through punishments,

[11] In the received version, the text's polemic against punishments is even more pronounced, as the twelfth passage of the excavated versions (cited next) is located in the position immediately following this opening passage (among many other differences in the ordering of passages), and this, in turn, is preceded with an introductory, summarizing statement not found in the excavated versions: "The Master spoke thus: 'If those above are easy to serve, and those below are easily known, then punishments will not be copious.'" While the fact of this rearrangement and addition is certainly of some significance, the polemical target of the *Ziyi*'s philosophy of rulership by example nevertheless remains clear throughout the excavated versions of the text as well.

[12] In the current version of this paper, I have included cross-references for all passages to Cook (2012), where all the details on textual issues and interpretive choices may be found; for the sake of brevity, I have truncated most of the textual notes for the Guodian passages found within the original paper itself. For the Shanghai Museum version of this passage, which is largely consistent with the Guodian version, see Ma (2001: 174–75, strip 1). I have supplied, for reference, the bracketed {} line about the transgression of noble ranks on the basis of the received version of this passage; see Sun (1989: 1322). The received version also has *xian* 賢 (worthies) in place of *mei* 美 (beauty), and lacks the extra *hao* 好 and *wu* 惡 before the Ode titles in the first line. For alternative readings of the line on "the implements of punishment" in particular and my reasons for not adopting them, see, respectively, Boltz (2002) and Cook (2002); see also Li (2002) and Cook (2012: 377n11). The *Shi jing* quote here is from the final lines of "Wen Wang" 文王, the first ode in the "Da ya" 大雅 section; see Karlgren (1950: 185 (#235)). For the "Ziyi" and "Xiang bo" Odes, see Karlgren (1950: 51 and 150–52 (#75 and #200)), respectively.

> creating five abusive punishments (*wu nue zhi xing* 五瘧之刑) and calling them 'laws' (*fa* 法)." (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 130, strips 23–27; Cook 2012: 399–402)[13]

The target of attack in this passage is no longer the promulgation of manifest legal codes but rather the use of coercive measures in themselves. Nonetheless, the defence of traditional noble rights and responsibilities, with its emphasis on the role of charismatic authority and the non-transgression of noble ranks, would appear to remain at the heart of this admonition. It is the duty of the ruler, and all those in superior positions, to act in an exemplary and responsible manner. In arguing that there will be little need for punishments to begin with, the passage offers a new way of framing the defence of traditional moral authority. No longer is it claimed that the power to punish should be in the hands of superiors simply so that they might thereby secure the proper respect of their subordinates. Rather it is argued that traditional hierarchical distinctions must be highlighted through the practice of ritual and the display of charismatic authority because doing so would virtually eliminate the need for punishments in the first place. Certainly the Confucians were not so impractical as to argue for the abolition of punishments altogether; they still reserved *some* place, however small, for the punishment of the incorrigibly bad,[14] and implicit in their arguments was the assumption that the power to punish would remain in the hands of the charismatic authority figures. And yet, largely because of their authority itself, that power would hardly ever be utilized.

Charismatic authority—that is, the power of virtue (*de* 德) to inspire emulation, along with its visible and audible manifestation in ritual practices, music, and dance—is thus proffered in these texts as the exclusive and requisite means by which the people may be properly ordered. Indicating the importance of this view is the fact that one line of particular relevance is shared by no less than three of the Guodian texts. This line, which forms the eighth passage in the Guodian and Shanghai Museum versions of *Ziyi* and the fourth passage in the received version, runs as follows:

> The Master said, "In serving their superiors, subordinates do not follow that which they command (*ming* 命), but rather follow the example of their conduct (*xing* 行). If the superior is fond of something, then among the subordinates will invariably be those even more

[13] Cf. Ma (2001: 187–90 (strips 12–14)) and Sun (1989: 1323). This is the third passage in the *Liji* version. The various versions contain some minor discrepancies; most notably, the received (*Liji*) version does not contain the *Shi* quotation, one that, moreover, is not to be found in the present *Shi jing* corpus. For the original context of the "Lü xing" line, see Qu (1995: 191). For a cogent analysis of the "Lü xing" chapter and later variations thereof in terms of the development of narratives concerning the origins of punishments and the state, see Puett (2001: 101–11). Note that a version of the quote attributed here to Confucius is also to be found in *Lun Yu* 2.3.

[14] This is at least implied in the thirteenth passage of *Ziyi*: "The Master said: 'When governance and teaching are not successfully implemented, punishments and penalties will be insufficient to cause shame, and noble ranks will be insufficient to motivate.' Thus superiors must not administer punishments partially or bestow noble ranks lightly. The 'Kang gao' 康誥 says: 'Make reverent and enlightened your penalties.' The 'Lü xing' speaks of the 'proper way of administering punishments.'" (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 130, strips 27–29; Cook 2012: 402–03). Cf. Ma (2001: 189–91 (strips 14–15)) and Sun (1989: 1326).

so (*shang hao ci wu ye, xia bi you shen yan zhe yi* 上好此物也,下必有甚安[焉]者矣).” Thus the superior cannot but be cautious over what he likes and dislikes—he is the standard (*biao* 禀[表]) for the people. (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 129, strip 14–15; Cook 2012: 390–91)[15]

The same quote that is here attributed to Confucius is found again verbatim in the *Zun deyi* text, but without the attribution:

In serving their superiors, subordinates do not follow that which they command, but rather follow the example of their conduct. If the superior is fond of something, then among the subordinates will invariably be those even more so. For only thus may virtue be transformed and deeds be turned [to advantage] (*de ke yi er shi ke zhuan* 德可易而施可轉). (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 174, strips 36–37; Cook 2012: 660)

The second half of the dictum, with slight variation, is also to be found in *Cheng zhi*:

Thus if the superior submits to something himself (*shen fu zhi* 身備[服]之), then among the people will invariably be those who do so even more (*min bi you shen yan zhe* 民必有甚安[焉]者). (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 167, strip 7; Cook 2012: 600–02)[16]

And this is followed in turn by an elaborative passage that itself also finds a rough parallel in the received “Biao ji” 表記 chapter of the *Liji*, a text traditionally associated with (and close in form to) *Ziyi*:

When the ruler dons his sacrificial robes and cap and stands atop his royal steps, everyone in the hall is overcome with respect. When the ruler dons his hempen mourning garments and occupies his position, everyone in the hall is overcome 【with grief. When the ruler dons his helmet and armour and stands amidst the military drums】, everyone in the army is overcome with courage. If the superior takes the lead (*chang* 昌[倡]) in something, it is rare for the people not to follow (*cong* 從). Nevertheless, if what he holds is not abundant, then his gravity will not be considered great. (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 167, strips 7–10; Cook 2012: 600–02)[17]

The cohesiveness of these texts does not necessarily imply common authorship, but it does suggest that the texts derived from a common chain of transmission (presumably both oral and textual) among the followers of Confucius, and that they also made use of a shared set of terminology to promote a collective philosophical position. The following section will explore further ways in which this group of texts goes about arguing for that collective stance.

[15] I have omitted the *Shi jing* quotation that comes at the end (or at the beginning of the next passage in the received version). The Shanghai Museum version (Ma 2001: 182–83, strips 8–9), aside from being marred by a lacuna, precisely parallels the Guodian text; for the text of the received version, see Sun (1989: 1323).

[16] Note that the “Da xue” 大學 chapter of the *Liji* (commentarial sections 9 and 10) shares a number of formal similarities with both these quotes and the *Ziyi* more generally, and that yet another version of the line appears in *Mengzi* 孟子 5.2 (3A.2) (上有好者,下必有甚焉者矣), where it is also attributed to Confucius. Note also that *Cheng zhi* refers to the text originally titled by the editors as *Cheng zhi wen zhi*.

[17] For the “Biao ji” parallel, see Sun (1989: 1306).

2 Flood Control and the “Human Way”

The notion of charismatic authority, of moral exemplariness and all its attendant responsibilities, is repeatedly advocated throughout the Guodian Confucian texts, just as it is throughout the Confucian tradition. The idea, moreover, is one formulated in terms of an opposition to coercive government, against which the institutions of ritual and music are upheld as the principal means of promulgating the ruler’s conduct and achieving order in the state. *Zun deyi* 尊德義 provides a good example of how the argument is framed within the Guodian texts. It begins (in its current arrangement) with the statement “By honouring virtue and propriety (*zun deyi*) and having a clear understanding of human relations (*min lun* 民倫), one may serve as ruler” (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 173, strip 1; Cook 2012: 639–40). It then goes on, in a somewhat obscure passage, to mention briefly the various roles played by rewards and punishments, rank and position, military campaigns, executions, and the like, and concludes with the caveat: “If these do not follow the [proper] way, they will not succeed” (*bu you qi dao, bu xing* 不由其道,不行) (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 173, strip 3; Cook 2012: 643–44).[18] A few lines later, the text elaborates on this idea that there is one particular way proper to the successful rulership of human beings:

> The sage’s rulership of the people is [in accordance with] the way of the people (*min zhi dao*). Yu’s 禹 channeling of water was [in accordance with] the way of water. Zao Fu’s 戚(造)父 driving of horses was [in accordance with] the way of horses. Hou Ji’s 后稷 cultivation of the land was in accordance with the way of the land. There is nothing that does not have its way, and the way of humans is closest [to us] (*ren dao wei jin* 人道為近). Thus it is the human way that the noble man takes as paramount (*ren dao zhi qu xian* 人道之取先). (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 173, strips 6–9; Cook 2012: 645)

The notion here is quite clear: just as Yu could control the floods only by going along with the natural flow of the river and guiding it through channels that allowed it to continue onward along its course in a more controlled and directed manner, one can order the people only by guiding them along their natural course through the uniquely human channels of ritual and music. To rule the people through coercive measures is akin to damming up rivers to stop floods: it is to go against the grain of human nature, to violate the natural order of things, and as such it is doomed to failure. Thus the text later extols the power of virtue (*de*) and its expression through the channels of ritual and music (*li yue* 禮樂):

> Thus in leading the people in the [proper] direction, only virtue is capable of this. The outflow of virtue is even swifter than commands transmitted through postal stations. There is nothing that can carry as heavy a load as it, and when it has made its connection, one is not even aware of it.
>
> Now of all things that give rise to virtue, there are none greater than ritual and music. They channel happiness and harmonize sorrow (*zhi le he ai* 治樂和哀), and nurture the heart/

[18] Or, as the text elsewhere puts it: “If you instruct the governance, but do not instruct the people, the governance cannot be implemented” 教其政, 不教其人, 政弗行矣 (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 173, strips 18b–19; Cook 2012: 664–65).

> mind in compassion and integrity, so that one's faithfulness and trust increase daily without any self-awareness (*zhong xin ri yi er bu zi zhi ye* 忠信日益而不自知也). The people can be made to follow a certain course, but cannot be made to understand it (*min ke shi dao zhi, er bu ke shi zhi zhi* 民可使道之,而不可使知之). The people can be led, but cannot be coerced (*min ke dao ye, er bu ke qiang ye* 民可導也,而不可強也) … [If one] honors humanity, holds faithfulness dear, respects solemnity, and makes his home in ritual, and carries all this out without exception, then the people cannot be deluded. To go against this would be insane.
>
> Punishments do not pertain to the noble man, and ritual does not pertain to the petty man … (*xing bu dai yu junzi, li bu dai yu xiaoren* 刑不逮於君子, 禮不逮於小人). (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 174, strips 28–29, 31a, 21b–23a, 20b–21a, 31b–32a; Cook 2012: 660–64)[19]

With this last line, the text echoes one found in the "Qu li" 曲禮 chapter of the *Liji*: "Ritual does not descend to the common people; punishments do not ascend to the great ministers" (*li bu xia shuren, xing bu shang dafu* 禮不下庶人, 刑不上大夫) (Sun 1989: 81–82)—which may well describe conditions that prevailed prior to the promulgation of penal codes. In *Zun deyi*, however, the line appears to have moral (rather than class-based) implications, with the sense perhaps that true nobility in human character can be brought about only through such channels as ritual, and never through coercive measures. Elsewhere, the text extols the transformative instructional powers of ritual and music as follows:

> Thus it is in instructional guidance that those who govern [must] place their priorities. If [the ruler] instructs them with ritual, the people will become resolute and well ordered; [if he] instructs them with music, the people will harmoniously accord with virtue like the sounds of bells and chimestones; … if [he] presides before them with virtue, then the people will with goodness advance to him (*xian zhi yi de, ze min jin shan yan* 先之以德,則民進善安[焉]). (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 173, strips 12–16; Cook 2012: 250–54)[20]

That there is a single "way" proper to humans is an idea these texts reiterate with mantra-like insistence, and they consistently associate this way with the ritual expression of basic human relationships. The *Liu de* text—in my own rearrangement of the strips—begins with much the same point:

> If the noble man desires to seek out the way of [ruling] humankind (*ren dao*),【and yet does not】follow the way proper to it (*you qi dao* 由其道), then even [one as sagely as] Yao 堯 will be unable to find it thus. Among living people,【there must invariably be husbands and wives, fathers and sons, rulers and ministers—these】are the six positions (*liu wei* 六位). There those who lead others, and those who follow them; those who direct others, and【those who】serve them; those who instruct, and those who learn—these are the six duties (*liu zhi* 六職). Once there are the six positions, these【six duties】are thereby assigned; and once the six duties are apportioned, the six virtues (*liu de*) are thereby distinguished (*bie* 別).【The way of】the six virtues【is such that, on a large scale, they may be used to order】the people; and on a small scale, they may be used to cultivate the self. Those who would create ways [of governing the people] must follow such [a course] (*wei*

[19] Note that this represents a different strip ordering than that presented in the original version of this paper.

[20] The translation of the line about music is especially tentative; for an alternate reading, see Chen (2000: 70).

> *dao zhe bi you ci* 為道者必由此). To what do the “six virtues” refer? They refer to sagacity and knowledge; humanity and propriety; loyalty and fidelity. (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 187, strips 6–10, 47, 1; Cook 2012: 771–73)[21]

Thus to govern the people successfully, one must, again, do so via a means that goes along the invariable grain of natural human relationships—and it is upon this basis that ritual is built. As the (*Liji* chapter) “Fang ji” 坊記—another one of the texts closely associated with *Ziyi* (and hence also traditionally ascribed to Zisi)—puts it: “Ritual is that which provides regularity and refined pattern to natural human affections (*yin ren zhi qing er wei zhi jie wen* 因人之情而為之節文), so as to provide embankments (*fang* 坊) for the people” (Sun 1989: 1281).[22] This passage, too, makes an analogy to water control: rather than building dams that would obstruct human nature, ritual provides embankments that simply allow it to flow along its *course* without overflowing its *bounds*. Ritual thus provides human nature with a rhythm and order through which it may develop along its path in a healthy and harmonious manner. Human beings, like all things in nature, must be guided and not coerced. As the *Cheng zhi* text puts it:

> If the superior does not make use of the proper way (*bu yi qi dao* 不以其道), it will be difficult for the people to follow him. For this reason, the people can be respectfully guided (*dao*), but they cannot be forcefully contained (*yan* 弇); they can be driven and steered (*yu* 御), but cannot be pulled around by the nose (*qian* 牽). (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 167, strips 15–16; Cook 2012: 604)[23]

Throughout *Cheng zhi*, emphasis is placed on how the noble man (/ruler) must first “establish” his virtue (*cheng zhi* 成之) within himself before he can serve as model to the people. The text thus states that “it is deeply that the noble man seeks it within himself” (*qiu zhu ji* 求者[諸]己也深); that one must “examine and reflect upon oneself” (*cha fan zhu ji* 察反者[諸]己) before one will “be able to know others”; and that “thus the noble man values bringing things to completion. It has been said that those who employed their people in ancient times were persistent in seeking it in themselves” (*qiu zhi yu ji wei heng* 求之於己為亙[恆]) (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 167–68, strips 10; 19–20; and 30, 1; Cook 2012: 602–03, 606–07, and 614–16). Such exhortations are set against the negative ramifications of the coercive measures that will necessarily follow if the ruler does not cultivate his moral character:

> The instruction of the noble man is such that if he is not fully immersed (*jin* 浸) in his guidance of the people, his genuine influence (*chun* 淳) will not run deep. Thus if he lacks it in himself and [merely] preserves it in his rule, then although he piles up his commands, the

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[21] The coarse brackets 【 】 here indicate lacunae in the strips. Note that while *Liu de* elsewhere allows for the use of punishments, the emphasis remains on how they and all other methods of rulership will not have the least efficacy unless they are grounded in the primary means of the “human way” and the charismatic model.

[22] An identical quote is also to be found in the Guodian text *Yucong 1* 語叢一.

[23] The graph rendered here as *yan* 弇, “forcefully contained,” has been interpreted by some as having a *gong* 公 phonetic and thus alternately read as 壅, to “obstruct” in the sense of “block up” or “clog up” with earth (see Zhang 2002: 234). If correct, this would fit even more aptly with the metaphor of damming up flood waters.

> people will still not follow him. Thus the repeated practice of subjugation through might, punishments, and penalties results from those above not embodying [virtue] in themselves. As a noble man of old once said, “Warfare and punishment are the ruler’s fall from virtue (*zhui de* 述[墜]德).” (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 167, strips 4–6; Cook 2012: 599–600)

Like the *Liu de* text, *Cheng zhi* defines the proper way of human rulership in terms of the guidance of human relations, and maintains that such a way is ultimately in accordance with Heaven’s constant virtue:

> Heaven sends down great constancy (*tian jiang da chang* 天降大常), so as to bring order to human relations (*ren lun* 人倫). These are instituted as the proprieties of ruler and minister, manifested as the closeness between father and son, and apportioned as the distinction between husband and wife. Thus the petty man wreaks havoc upon Heaven’s constancy (*tian chang*) so as to violate the great Way, [whereas] the noble man brings order to human relations so as to accord with Heaven’s virtue. (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 168, strips 31–33; Cook 2012: 622–23)[24]

These texts time and again reiterate the notion that ritual, music, and charismatic moral suasion are the only ways proper to human governance, in direct opposition to all coercive means (except insofar as these latter are considered a mere supplement or last resort)—a belief that would largely continue as a staple in Confucian thought throughout the Warring States period. Xunzi 荀子 (ca. 340?–245 BCE), for instance, makes a similar point when stating that if the ruler “follows the proper way (i.e., of ritual), he will succeed; if he does not follow the proper way, [things] will go to waste” (*you qi dao ze xing, bu you qi dao ze fei* 由其道則行, 不由其道則廢) (“Yi bing” 議兵; Wang 1988: 281). The argument central to all these texts is that ritual and music ultimately derive from natural human dispositions and affections themselves; they work by channelling human nature along paths determined by its own natural tendencies, and by keeping it within bounds all the while. They provide human nature with ordered and patterned expression; or, in musical terms, they provide it with the harmony and rhythm that allow for the healthy development of both personal moral growth and social interaction.[25] The idea that ritual and music

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[24] See also strip 40: “The noble man treats the six positions with caution so as to pay homage to Heaven’s constancy” (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 168; Cook 2012: 624–25). Some have speculated that these lines might have been mistakenly transposed from *Liu de*, but differences in calligraphic style would appear to forbid this possibility.

[25] Here I would differ somewhat from Goldin, who argues of the Guodian Confucian texts that “it is evident that they regularly understand *xing* to be naturally deficient of ‘morality’ 義, which must be attained from the ‘outside’” (Goldin 2000: 118–19). To be sure, *xing* in and of itself is basically neutral in these texts, and there is certainly no Mencian argument for the intrinsic goodness of human nature. At another level, however, *xing* is still the ultimate basis for the *dao*, the source and grounding of its very existence—certainly this is so in *Xing zi ming chu*. The *Yucong* 語叢 materials in the Guodian find also present examples of such an organic view, at least concerning *li* (ritual): “Ritual is that which accords with human affections and provides them with rhythm and refined patterns” (禮因人之情而為之節文者也) (*Yucong 1*, 194, strips 31, 97; Cook 2012: 833); and, in a line that even more closely parallels the *Xing zi ming chu*, “The affections are born of [human] nature; ritual is born of the affections” (情生於性,禮生於情) (*Yucong 2*, 203, strip 1; Cook 2012: 849–50). I would thus concur, rather, with what Goldin notes later in his article, that, for both Xunzi and the Guodian texts, “the rituals are right because they embody the way of humanity (*ren dao*), and not merely because the sages dictated them” (Goldin 2000: 125).

are essentially a sublimated form of human nature is given its clearest expression in the text entitled *Xing zi ming chu*, which opens as follows:

> In general, although all people possess [human] nature (*xing* 性), their heart-minds have no fixed inclinations, [which instead] depend upon [external] things to arise, depend upon gratification to take action, and depend upon practices to become fixed. The vital energies (*qi* 氣) of joy, anger, grief, and sorrow are [human] nature; once they manifest externally, things take hold of them. [Human] nature comes via mandate (*ming* 命), and [this] mandate is sent down from Heaven. The Way begins with the affections (*qing* 情), and the affections are born of [human] nature. [The Way's] beginnings are close to the affections, while its finalities are close to propriety. Those who know the affections can bring it forth, while those who know propriety can instill it. (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 179, strips 1–4; Cook 2012: 697–700)[26]

Human nature is heavenly endowed, and thus of the same order as everything else in the natural world. It is, however, neutral in terms of the specific paths it will take. We have, within us, basic dispositional tendencies toward certain types of emotional expression, but which of these will take hold at any given moment depends entirely on the things and situations we encounter, to which we react. Given this built-in potential for emotional imbalance, and hence, conceivably, for creating great disorder, it is necessary to guide or channel human interactions so as to lend order, rhythm, harmony, and stability to social relations. The means by which this is accomplished is the human Way, the guiding "Dao." This, then, is the sense in which the Way "begins with the affections," while "its finalities are close to propriety": it serves to channel human affections along their natural course, but in such a way as to keep them from overflowing the bounds of propriety.

The terms "propriety" (*yi*) and "the Way" (*dao*) are defined later in *Xing zi ming chu*. *Yi* is "the standards of all [forms] of goodness" (*qun shan zhi jue* 群善之蕝), while *dao* is defined as "the courses [properly taken] by all things" (*qun wu zhi dao* 群物之道) (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 179, strips 13–14; Cook 2012: 707–08).[27] I take this again (following *Zun deyi*) in the sense that water has its way, horses have their way, the land has its way, and human beings have their way, all of which anyone who would attempt to order them must invariably follow. The human way is such that it may be guided by the "four pathways" of the *Documents*, the *Odes*, ritual, and music, which once again take their origins in human affections:

> In general, for all ways, the pathways of the heart-mind (*xin shu* 心述[術]) are primary. The Way has paths [in] four [directions], [but] only the human way (*ren dao*) is worthy of being taken; the [other] three paths are merely taken, and that is all.[28] The Odes, Documents,

[26] Cf. Ma (2001: 220–24, strips 1–2). For a somewhat different translation, particularly regarding the final three lines, see Goldin (2000: 119). See also the translations of Puett (2004: 44–46).

[27] Cf. Ma (2001: 229, strip 7).

[28] These few lines are problematic. I tentatively understand the "four paths" in the sense of all possible directions, of which the human way is the only one worth taking. I further see the *shi*, *shu*, *li*, and *yue* as aspects of that way, and not as the "three paths" (*li* and *yue* together) standing outside it, especially since these four (*shi*, *shu*, *li*, and *yue*) are clearly referred to as *si shu* 四術 in the "Wang zhi" 王制 chapter of the *Liji* (Sun 1989: 364). The *si shu* here, however, appear to refer to something different. I thus understand *shi*, *shu*, *li*, and *yue* as the specific types of *xin shu*, which

> Ritual, and Music all in their beginnings arose from mankind. The odes [of men] were created for a purpose (*you wei wei zhi* 有為為之); the [words of their] documents were expressed for a purpose; [their] rituals and music were performed (*ju* 舉) for a purpose. The sages compared their types and arranged and assembled them (*lun hui zhi* 侖[論]會之); observed their succession and reordered them into better accord (*ni shun zhi* 逆訓[順]之); gave embodiment to their propriety and provided it with regularity and refined pattern (*jie wen zhi* 即[節]文之); ordered the affections [they expressed by] drawing them out and reimplanting them (*chu ru zhi* 出內[入]之); and then returned [this all] back [to the people] so as to instruct them. Instruction (*jiao*) is that by which one gives rise to virtue within (*sheng de yu zhong* 生德于中). Ritual arises from the affections (*li zuo yu qing* 禮作於情), but also elevates them. (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 179, strips 14–18; Cook 2012: 708–14)[29]

Ritual and music, along with the other two paths of poetry and documents, are viewed in this passage as simply an ordered extension and reimplantation of natural human expression. Human beings express themselves through song and music and other forms of declaration, and they regularize their interactions with family members and others in ritual-like ways, all quite naturally as a result of their situational contacts with the external world. The self-conscious action of the sage, however, is needed to bring order to these forms of expression, and then to reintroduce them to society as sublimated forms of virtuous expression that will in turn serve to influence, guide, and instruct the people in such a way as to provide their affective reactions with rhythm and order. Without such a process of channelling, human expression would inevitably lead itself astray.[30] This is especially clear in the case of musical expression: "The music of Zheng 鄭 and Wei 衛 give free rein to indulge in the wrong kinds of sounds" (*fei qi sheng er zong zhi* 非其聲而從[縱]之), whereas the sagely musical dances *Shao* 韶 and *Xia* 夏 "express musical happiness over [human] affections" (*yue/le qing* 樂情) (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 180, strips 27–28; Cook 2012: 717–20).[31] Music is a uniquely powerful motivational force that arises naturally from basic human dispositions: "In general, whenever [expressive] voices/sounds derive from affections genuinely (*qi chu yu qing ye xin* 其出於情也信), their entry into and inciting of the heart-mind is profound (*qi ru ba ren zhi xin ye hou* 其內[入]拔人之心也厚)" (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 180, strip 23; Cook

serve merely to guide (and not coerce) humanity along its natural course—the human way, which is the only thing capable of being guided. This serves to reconcile these lines with what follows, wherein *shi*, *shu*, *li*, and *yue* are extolled precisely because they channel the human heart and its affections in accordance with their own tendencies.

[29] Cf. Ma (2001: 229–35, strips 7–10). This translation is somewhat tentative; for alternate translations, see Goldin (2000: 121–22) and Puett (2004: 48–50).

[30] Given the text's opening lines on the initial neutrality of the human mind and its subsequent emphasis on education through the Odes, Documents, Ritual, and Music, scholars have tended to read the *Xing zi ming chu* as espousing a kind of forced remoulding of human nature through the "artifice" of education. To counter this misreading, we must again emphasize what the text itself does: that all these classical forms of education bear an organic relationship to human nature itself. Puett makes a similar point when he argues that *qing* "becomes the basis of the ethical system in the text: by defining it as the inherent emotional disposition of humans, the authors are able both to explicate the emergence of the traditions … and to defend their importance" (Puett 2004: 51).

[31] Cf. Ma (2001: 243–46, strips 16–17).

2012: 715–18).[32] Music may thus in turn be used to guide and instruct the people’s heart-minds and channel their affections, through harmony and rhythm, toward the goal of orderly and productive social interaction.[33]

Unlike *Ziyi*, *Zun deyi*, and *Cheng zhi*, *Xing zi ming chu* is not overtly directed against the use of coercive measures per se. It does, however, elaborate upon the notion of a particular way of properly ruling human beings that arises from within human nature itself, which is in turn endowed by Heaven; the text thus forms part of a broader philosophy in which the overall debate is grounded. The Guodian Confucian texts with which we have dealt here, not to mention the *Wu xing* essay, all make similar claims about the human way, and they view that way as ultimately deriving from the “Way of Heaven” (*tian dao* 天道) itself, as a manifestation of “Heaven’s virtue” (*tian de* 天德) or “Heaven’s constancy.”[34] As part of the inviolable cosmic order, human society can be regulated only in accordance with its own nature and never coerced against its innate will. The sage ruler and his sagely accoutrements—ritual and music—are thus needed after all, for the grass must sway in the direction of the ruler’s wind if it is to sway at all. Any attempts to use coercive measures based on an explicit legal code to replace the authoritative prestige of rulers and others in high positions are condemned as both impracticable and misguided.

3 Making Right of “Might”[35]

In their consistent use of such expressions as the “human way” (*ren dao*), the “way of the people” (*min zhi dao*), and “following/utilizing the [proper] way” (*you qi dao* 由其道/*yi qi dao* 以其道), the Guodian (and Shanghai Museum) texts would appear to have adopted a relatively consistent set of coded terms to signal the primacy of governance through ritual, music, and moral suasion. Though these texts were not necessarily conceived by the same group of authors or even during the same time

[32] Cf. Ma (2001: 239–40, strip 14). Compare Xunzi’s statement on music, that “it enters people deeply and transforms them quickly” (其入人也深, 化人也速). See the “Yue lun” 樂論 chapter (Wang 1988: 380).

[33] In regard to its notions of human affections arising only upon contact with external things, and of the forms of human emotional expression (especially that of music) being ordered and rechannelled to influence the populace in turn, the *Xing zi ming chu* resonates to a striking degree with the opening sections of the *Yue ji* 樂記. This latter was an early Han compilation that drew upon various Warring States sources, among them supposedly the philosophy of second-generation Confucian disciple Gongsun Ni Zi 公孫尼子. It is thus not unreasonable to speculate upon some connection between the *Xing zi ming chu* and that particular figure (see Chen 1999; Gu 1999: 196–99; Goldin 2000: 143–44). I explore these issues more fully in Gu (2001).

[34] For the relevant passages from the *Wu xing* essay, where the term *tiandao* is used, see Jingmenshi Bowuguan (1998: 149–50, strips 5, 20, and 26–27) and Cook (2012: 486–87, 500, and 504–05).

[35] The next two sections of this paper follow closely the examples and line of argument first presented in Gu (2002)

period, they do represent various expressions of the same basic Confucian concern, set against the growing threat of a kind of "rule of law"—as in the *Zuo zhuan* account showing Confucius himself ostensibly lamenting such developments in his own time. Later on, following the governmental reforms of Marquis Wen of Wei 魏文侯 (r. 446–397 BCE) and the later legal reforms (*bianfa* 變法) of Shang Yang 商鞅 (ca. 390–338 BCE) in Qin—not to mention the philosophical discourse that arose in support of such reforms—the threat to the traditional Confucian ideal of rulership through ritual and music became increasingly acute. In the context of these trends, a sustained philosophical reaction against them, such as that seen in the Confucian texts of Guodian, began to take shape.

The debate would continue to unfold throughout the Warring States and on into the Han; and even if a tenuous reconciliation was eventually achieved between the antipodal methods of rulership—through ritual and through punishments—striking the appropriate balance between the two would remain a major source of concern throughout imperial China. In the Warring States context, the terms used in the Guodian (and Shanghai Museum) texts to describe the Confucian ideal are also to be found in support of like notions throughout a variety of other texts as well. Close analysis of the contexts in which these terms occur reveals much about how the debate would evolve throughout the period and helps us to better situate the Guodian texts within their intellectual milieu.

The *Guanzi* 管子, a work that is notoriously difficult to both date and to pin down to any consistent philosophical position, provides us with an instructive point of departure. If one accepts the traditional association of the text with the legendary Jixia 稷下 centre of Qi, then, given the variety of scholars that ostensibly debated in that centre's residence, it is not surprising that the text would represent a somewhat eclectic amalgamation of different positions.[36] The work was, moreover, clearly compiled over a great span of time. For instance, the "Xing shi" 形勢 chapter, with its relatively archaic brand of rhymed prose, probably dates to the early Warring States period, whereas its straightforward commentary, "Xingshi jie" 形勢解, is clearly of much later date, perhaps even Western Han.[37] The chapter that opens the work, "Mu min" 牧民, holds a particularly broad range of ideas. This breadth may be attributed to the possibility that parts of its now-lost commentary, "Mumin jie"

[36] For more on Jixia, see Qian (1990: 231–35). Sivin has with some reason argued against the usual descriptions of the Jixia "academy" by noting, among other things, that it was more a centre of patronage than a true institution. However, Sivin's claim that "philosophers rarely carried on oral debates with living rivals" is not substantiated by the sources (Sivin 1995: 19–28). For one example of such a Jixia debate, see the passage on the "skilful debater" Er Yue 兒說 in the "Waichushuo, zuoshang" 外儲說左上 chapter of the *Han Feizi* (see Wang 1998: 269). Aside from the question of oral debates, debates of sorts were being carried out in written texts as well, and such textual interplay appears to increase in texts that likely took shape around the time the Jixia centre was flourishing.

[37] Detailed evidence for this partly impressionistic conclusion lies beyond the scope of this paper. The relationship between the two may be compared to that of the so-called *jing* 經 and *shuo* 說 sections of the "Wu xing" essay; the latter, which was found accompanying the former in a Western-Han tomb at Mawangdui 馬王堆, but not in Guodian, is likely of later date.

牧民解, were interpolated into it.[38] Be that as it may, "Mu min" expresses a relatively complex, two-sided position on the use of punishments, and in doing so employs terminology reminiscent of that used in the Guodian texts, such as "driving the people" (*yu min* 御民), "guiding the people" (*dao min* 道民), and "according with the people's hearts-and-minds" (*shun min xin* 順民心).

According to "Mu min," the essentials of "herding the people" lie in such agricultural tasks as "tending to the four seasons," "preserving the granaries," "tending to the five grains," "cultivating mulberry and hemp," and "rearing the six types of domesticated animals." For it is only when the people "have sufficient clothing and food" and the "state's resources are plenty" that the people can "appreciate the regulations of ritual" (*zhi lijie* 知禮節) and be content with their various lots (Dai 1936: 1). Once these conditions are fulfilled, the ruler's most important task is then to serve as a shining example to his subjects so as to bring stability to human relations: "When those above follow standards, the six relations will be secure." As with such texts as *Ziyi*, the essence of "driving," "guiding," or "convening" (*zhao* 召) the people lies in the values, priorities, and likes and dislikes of those in power:

> The bridle-and-reins by which to drive the people (*yu min zhi pei* 御民之轡) lie in the values of those above; the gate through which to guide the people (*dao min zhi men* 道民之門) lies in the priorities of those above; the road through which to convene the people (*zhao min zhi lu* 召民之路) lies in the likes and dislikes of those above. (Dai 1936: 3)

Through the ruler's moral exemplarity, the "four guide-ropes" (*si wei* 四維) of the state—ritual, propriety, honesty, and sense of shame (*li yi lian chi* 禮義廉恥)—gain widespread currency and order is achieved: "When the four guide-ropes are unfolded, the ruler's commands are implemented" (Dai 1936: 1). Elsewhere, the text speaks of the "guiding norms for according with the people" (*shun min zhi jing* 順民之經) in terms of respectfully attending to the sacrifices to the various spirits and ancestors, and it also stresses the importance of employing worthy people in office in accordance with their talents (Dai 1936: 1–2). As the text sums this up, "Prosperity in governance lies in according with the people's hearts-and-minds (*shun min xin*); the destitution of governance lies in going against the people's hearts-and-minds"—entailing a policy that is spoken of in terms of giving them "relaxation and happiness," "wealth and nobility," "preservation and security," and "life and nurturance" (Dai 1936: 2). Then, taking on a decidedly Laoist tone, the text tells us that by thus "according with the people's hearts-and-minds" the ruler may, in turn, get the people to accord with his own wishes, paradoxically making them willing to accept "sorrow and toil," "impoverishment and humility," "peril and endangerment," or even "annihilation," all "on his behalf." The passage then neatly sums this up with the political principle: "Thus knowing how giving may serve as taking is the treasure of governance" (故知予之為取者, 政之寶也) (Dai 1936: 2).[39]

[38] On this point, see Li (1988: main text 4–5).

[39] Compare *Daode jing* chapter 36: "If you are going to take from them, you must first give to them" (將欲奪之, 必固與之).

The task of "according with the people's hearts-and-minds" naturally involves the "lessening of punishments" (*sheng xing* 省刑):

> Thus punishments and penalties are insufficient to strike fear in [the people's] intentions, and executions are insufficient to make them submit in their hearts. If punishments are copious and yet [the people's] intentions are not fearful, then [the ruler] will be unable to implement [successfully his] commands; if executions are numerous and yet [the people] do not submit in their hearts, then those in high position will be in peril. (Dai 1936: 2)[40]

At the same time, however, stability in the state depends on both "lighting up the road to certain death" (*ming bi si zhi lu* 明必死之路) and "opening the gateway to certain gain" (*kai bi de zhi men* 開必得之門); that is, it entails "making punishments severe" (*yan xingfa* 嚴刑罰) and "making rewards assured" (*xin qingshang* 信慶賞). Having moved beyond the simple polemic against the use of practically all punishments, "Mu min" presents a more nuanced position that argues for the need to both lessen and simplify punishments while simultaneously making them more manifest and strict. On the one hand, the text utilizes terminology similar to the "way of the people" locutions put forth in the presumably earlier Confucian texts and likewise argues for the lessening of punishments. Yet on the other hand, its own notion of "according with the people's minds" has in fact been radically reconstituted vis-à-vis prior formulations in such a way as to argue *for* a kind of rule of law. The text holds that laws must, certainly, justly accord with human nature and its proper sentiments, and that education is still paramount in achieving an orderly society. It places the focus of that education, however, on teaching the people exactly what gets rewarded and punished, and it maintains that the strictness of punishments itself is what lessens the need for punishments in the first place. This latter argument is especially clear in the "Ba guan" 八觀 chapter of the *Guanzi*:

> Thus if the lay of circumstances (*xingshi* 形勢) is such that people are unable to do wrong (*bu de wei fei* 不得為非), then the wicked and depraved will become honest and sincere. If prohibitions and penalties are awesome and severe (*jinfa wei yan* 禁罰威嚴), then the indolent and negligent will be put in order. If the statutes and commands are prominent and clear (*xianling zhu ming* 憲令著明), then the rough and barbarous will not dare violate them. If prizes and rewards are assured and invariable (*shangqing xin bi* 賞慶信必), then those with merit will be encouraged. If those instructed and habituated in [proper] customs are numerous, then the ruler's people will gradually transform without knowing it. For this reason, when an enlightened ruler occupies the supreme position and punishments are lessened and penalties few (*xing sheng fa gua* 刑省罰寡), this is not because [people] deserve to be punished and yet are not, or that they deserve to be incriminated and yet are not (*fei ke xing er bu xing, fei ke zui er bu zui ye* 非可刑而不刑,非可罪而不罪也). The enlightened ruler is one who shuts the gate, blocks the road, and covers the tracks, ensuring the people will have no routes to lead them to the land of transgressions and wrongs. Because of this, the people will come to walk the proper paths and practice goodness as if it were in their natures to do so. Thus crimes and penalties will be few (*zuifa gua* 罪罰寡) and the people will thereby be well ordered. (Dai 1936: 73)[41]

[40] Cf. the translation of Rickett (1985: 54).

[41] Cf. the translation of Rickett, who understands the sense of 非可刑而不刑 … somewhat differently, rendering the *er* 而 more in the sense of *ze* 則: "Unless the punishments are necessary, he does not punish …" (Rickett 1985: 1:226). He also chooses to link the *ruo xing ran* 若性然 to what follows rather than what precedes it.

The argument here has the air of a measured response to the Confucian claim that "the people can be guided but not coerced" and similar "anti-legalist" notions articulated in the Guodian and other texts. While "Mu min" stresses teaching through example, and "Ba guan" likewise emphasizes the transformative power of instruction, both these *Guanzi* chapters argue forcefully that the deterrent power of clear laws and strict punishments is at least as important as moral suasion in putting a stop to the proliferation of crime and punishment itself—a goal they otherwise share with the Confucian texts.[42] Indeed, these chapters argue against Confucian claims in a way that was very much influenced by the Confucians themselves, or at least in a manner that was designed to appeal to or appease these worthy opponents. Thus the argument that stern law enforcement will cause the people to do good "as if it were in their natures" to do so speaks precisely to the question of what constitutes the "way of the people."[43]

As they are written in a relatively developed expository form compared with such episodic texts as *Ziyi*, the various *Guanzi* chapters referred to above would seem to postdate the initial formulation of the types of texts represented in the Guodian find. And as they show all the signs of reconciling the extremes of an earlier polemic, they would further appear to have been written in later response to the debate in which those latter texts had engaged. Whether this attempt at reconciliation and redirection represents the eclectic influence of Jixia must, for now, remain a matter of conjecture. The prospect is intriguing, however, especially as the staunchly Confucian Xunzi, who ostensibly spent a good portion of his life in the surroundings of that centre, presents a similarly complex attitude toward law and punishments. As is his penchant more generally, Xunzi vehemently criticizes the extremes of his opponents' stances on this issue and yet simultaneously absorbs aspects of their arguments into his own defence of the Confucian position. Thus, having seen first hand the strength and order achieved by the prototypically "legalist" state of Qin 秦, he affirms a place for punishments in rulership, stating that "if the punishments fit the crimes" (*xing dang zui* 刑當罪) then,

> Those who do good will be encouraged, while those who do bad will be discouraged. Punishments and penalties will be greatly lessened and [the ruler's] prestige will flow forth (*xingfa qi sheng, er wei xing ru liu* 刑罰綦省, 而威行如流); governmental commands will be perfectly clear and [the ruler's] transformative influence will be spirit-like (*zhengling zhi ming, er hua yi ru shen* 政令致明, 而化易如神). ("Junzi" 君子; Wang 1988: 451)[44]

[42] As "Xing shi" puts it, "At times embracing and at times inspiring awe (且懷且威), the way of the ruler is complete" (Dai 1936: 5).

[43] Other chapters of the *Guanzi* contain related expressions that likewise speak to the ultimate goals of lessening punishments and creating an orderly society. "Xiao kuang" 小匡, for example, attributes to Guan Zhong 管仲 himself the claim that "the way to cherish the people" (愛民之道) consists in "lessening punishments and lightening taxes" and that "the way to employ the people" (使民之道) lies in being impartial and not draconian in the implementation of punishments. See Dai (1936: 122–23). For similar phrases, see also the "Junchen, xia" 君臣下 chapter (Dai 1936: 175–76).

[44] For a more detailed treatment of Xunzi's position on the use of punishments in the context of this debate, see Gu (2000b: 22–24).

Xunzi thus adopts the same deterrence argument seen in the *Guanzi*, that the threat of punishments itself will radically curtail the need for punishments. Yet as the self-proclaimed inheritor of the Confucian tradition, Xunzi was equally committed to de-emphasizing punishments, which in his view were merely an accessory to instruction through ritual and music. Promoting the "exaltation of ritual" (*long li* 隆禮) as the occupation of the true "king" (*wang* 王), Xunzi demoted the "emphasis on laws" (*zhong fa* 重法) as the technique of hegemons (*ba* 霸):

> Thus rewards are not employed and yet the people are encouraged; penalties are not employed and yet [the ruler's] prestigious influence carries forth (*fa bu yong er wei xing* 罰不用而威行)—for this is what is called the "prestige of the way and virtue" (*daode zhi wei* 道德之威). ("Qiang guo" 彊國; Wang 1988: 291–93)[45]

Clearly differentiating the "prestige of the way and virtue" from the "prestige/might of violence and inquisition" (*baocha zhi wei* 暴察之威) or the "prestige/might of madness and recklessness" (*kuangwang zhi wei* 狂妄之威), Xunzi in effect reconceptualizes the whole notion of "might" or "prestige" so as to make it accord with the traditional Confucian position. Not surprisingly, Xunzi inherits from earlier Confucians the notion of a "proper way" for ruling the people. The "Yi bing" 議兵 chapter frames this in the form of Xunzi's answer to a question put forth by Li Si 李斯:

> Ritual is the pinnacle of order and discrimination, the foundation of a strong state, the way to prestigious influence, and the confluence of accomplished reputation. It is by following it (*you zhi* 由之) that kings and dukes may obtain the world; it is by not following it that they lose their sacred altars. Thus strong armour and sharp weapons are not enough to obtain victory; high city-walls and deep moats are not enough to maintain security; and stern commands and copious punishments (*yan ling fan xing* 嚴令繁刑) are not enough to inspire awe. If [the ruler] follows the [proper] way, he will succeed; if he does not follow the [proper] way, [things] will go to waste (*you qi dao ze xing, bu you qi dao ze fei* 由其道則行,不由其道則廢) …
>
> Those below harmonize with their superiors as shadows or echoes (*xia zhi he shang ye ru ying xiang* 下之和上也如影嚮). Only when there are those who [*in spite of this*] do not follow commands does one deal with them through punishments … Thus when punishments and penalties are reduced, [the ruler's] prestige flows forth (*xingfa sheng er wei liu* 刑罰省而威流); for this there is no other reason than that he follows the proper way (*you qi dao*) … A traditional text (*zhuan* 傳) states: "His might/prestige is awesome yet not used; punishments are set aside and not employed" (*wei li er bu shi, xing cuo er bu yong* 威厲而不試, 刑錯而不用)—this is what it refers to. (Wang 1988: 281, 284)[46]

In exalting ritual at the expense of punishments, Xunzi not only inherits the language of "following the proper way" (*you qi dao*) from earlier Confucian texts, but also adopts similar language regarding the immediate and invariable effects of moral suasion.[47] The influence of the earlier texts, such as those found at Guodian, is unmistakable.

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[45] Xunzi's criticism can in part also be seen as a censure of the Mohist position, wherein the use of punishments is given greater emphasis.

[46] Cf. the translation of Knoblock (1990: 229–31).

[47] In particular, compare the language of "harmonizing with superiors as shadows or echoes" and "following the proper way" to such passages as those associated with notes 15–16, 18–19, and 23 above.

The *Lüshi chunqiu* 呂氏春秋, a work likely compiled shortly after Xunzi's death, likewise utilizes the language of "following the proper way" and specifically contrasts it with coercive governance. As a text that sought to incorporate and, to the extent possible, merge all the disparate philosophical positions of the Chinese world as a blueprint for its unification, the *Lüshi chunqiu* certainly did not reject the use of punishments and penalties. However, quite in contrast to the more uncompromisingly "legalist" philosophy that would be adopted by the Qin under Li Si's 李斯 advocacy, the *Lüshi chunqiu* promoted a government of compassion for and leniency toward the people that was much more in line with the Confucian position. Like Xunzi, then, the *Lüshi chunqiu* relegated the use of punishments and penalties to the role of achieving "small accomplishments." The work's "Gong ming" 功名 chapter opens as follows: "[If the ruler] follows the [proper] way (*you qi dao*), then a meritorious reputation will be inescapable, just as a shadow follows the gnomon or an echo follows the cry" ("Zhongchun ji" 仲春紀 section; Bi 1936: 21). The text then describes the ideal ruler as one of "abundant virtue" (*de hou* 德厚) to whom even the barbarians will submit, just as fish and turtles are attracted to deep pools. This he achieves through non-coercive means, for just as "coerced laughter is not joyful and coerced crying is not sorrowful,"

> The way of coercion (*qiangling zhi wei dao* 彊令之為道) is such that it can be used to accomplish small things but not to accomplish great ones … Jie 桀 and Zhou 紂 beckoned [the people] with the way to drive them off (*yi qu zhi zhi dao zhi zhi* 以去之之道致之)—although penalties were heavy and punishments severe, of what use could they be? (Bi 1936: 21–22)

The "Gui dang" 貴當 chapter likewise speaks of "following the proper way" in terms of the ruler rectifying himself, according with human nature, and setting the proper example: "A great and prominent reputation cannot be forcefully sought (*bu ke qiang qiu* 不可彊求)—one must follow the [proper] way (*bi you qi dao* 必繇其道)" ("Bugou lun" 不苟論 section; Bi 1936: 315). Human nature (*xing*), "the foundation of the myriad things," is described as the invariable "algorithm of Heaven and Earth" (*tiandi zhi shu* 天地之數) of which we "affirm it along the lines of its inherent attributes" (*yin qi guran er ran zhi* 因其固然而然之). This implies the regulation of human affections through the guidance of ritual, music, and moral suasion:

> Mourning garments are displayed and the people know to mourn; *yu*-mouth-organs and *se*-zithers are displayed, and the people know to be happy; Kings Tang 湯 and Wu 武 cultivated their conduct and the world followed; Jie and Zhou gave loose to their conduct and the world rebelled. What need is there for words? The noble man examines what lies within himself (*shen zai ji zhe* 審在己者), and that is all. (Bi 1936: 315)[48]

The relationship between these two modes of governance, that that of non-coercion should have priority but that both means are ultimately necessary, is most clearly stated in the "Yong min" 用民 chapter:

[48] The phrase *qi dai yan* 豈待言 ("What need is there for words?") appears also in the "Jing tong" 精通 ("Jiqiu ji" 季秋紀) and "Jing yu" 精諭 ("Shenying lan" 審應覽) chapters. Cf. the translation of Knoblock and Riegel (2000: 620).

> In all cases of employing the people, the best means is to use propriety (*yi*), and [only] after this comes the use of rewards and penalties. From ancient times to the present, there has never been a case where [the ruler's] propriety was insufficient to die for, and his rewards and penalties were insufficient to dissuade or entice, and yet he was able to employ his people. There is no constancy in the employment or non-employment of the people—one will succeed only if he obtains the [proper] way (*wei de qi dao wei ke* 唯得其道為可). ("Lisu lan" 離俗覽 section; Bi 1936: 244)[49]

"Yong min" later illustrates through a couple of analogies the necessity of basing all coercive means upon a broad foundation of compassion and benefit:

> If one does not achieve [the legendary charioteer] Zao Fu's way (造父之道), but merely achieves his might (*wei* 威), this will be of no benefit to horse-driving (*yu* 御). The case of the unworthy ruler is similar: he does not achieve the [proper] way, but merely increases his [own] might. The greater his might, the less his people can be employed. The rulers of lost states mostly employ their people with great might.
>
> Thus while one cannot be without might, it is insufficient to rely upon solely. Its role may be compared to that of salt in flavour: whenever salt is used, there is some [staple food] that supports it (*you suo tuo* 有所託), and if it is not [added in] just [the] right [amount], it will spoil its support and it cannot be eaten. It is likewise with might: it must have something supporting it before it can be implemented. Wherein lies its support? It is supported by compassion and benefit (*aili* 愛利). Only when the heart-and-mind of compassion and benefit is conveyed can might be implemented. If might is too extreme, the heart-and-mind of compassion and benefit ceases; if this happens, and [the ruler] merely rushes to implement might, he will invariably bring calamities upon himself. This is how the Yin and Xia [dynastic lines] were cut short. (Bi 1936: 245)[50]

The emphasis on such terms as propriety (*yi*), compassion (*ai*), and benefit (*li*) in this chapter may betray something of a Mohist influence. However, its main line of thought, in terms of allowing for coercive measures only insofar as they enhance a more fundamentally humane form of governance, derives from the earlier Confucian tradition—and this is concordant with the great recognition accorded to the transformative power of music elsewhere in the work.[51] Moreover, the chapter that immediately precedes this one, "Shang de" 上德, specifically argues that the imperceptible power of governance through virtue and propriety eliminates the need for all punishments and rewards in the first place; and it does this in a language reminiscent of the Guodian text *Zun deyi*: "Thus [Confucius(?)] said, 'The swiftness of virtue is quicker than commands transmitted through postal stations'" (*de zhi su ji*

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[49] Cf. Knoblock and Riegel (2000: 488–89).

[50] Cf. Knoblock and Riegel (2000: 492).

[51] The terms *ai* and *li*, which later Mohists themselves take as more or less equivalent to *ren* and *yi* (see "Jing shuo, xia" 經說下), are common throughout the *Mozi* 墨子, and the pair even appears as a positive virtue in the *Xunzi* on a couple of occasions. The term-pair *aili* appears in a total of six *Lüshi chunqiu* chapters, but three of these are concentrated in the "Lisu lan" section, the same section in which the "Shang de," "Yong min," and "Shi wei" chapters all appear—chapters devoted largely to discussion of the role of "might" and "penalties" and the need to base these on virtue and human sentiments. The cohesiveness of the "Lisu lan" section is also indicated by the fact that certain idiosyncratic phrases occur throughout different chapters of the section, such as the phrases speaking of the need to be "fully familiar with" (*shou* 熟) a certain "discourse" (*lun* 論; as in 此論不可不熟).

hu yi you chuan ming 德之速疾乎以郵傳命) ("Lisu lan" section; Bi 1936: 242).[52] It also speaks of the priority of virtue over military might (*xian de hou wu* 先德後武) and clearly opposes penalties and rewards as the "governance of a declining age" (Bi 1936: 241–42). Nonetheless, the *Lüshi chunqiu* does reserve a place for—indeed, argues for the necessity of—rewards and penalties. "Yong min" explicitly states that the key to employing the people lies in the "substantialness" (*chong* 充, *shi* 實) of penalties and rewards, defining the notion in terms of the people's aversions toward disgrace and harm and desires for glory and profit. Ultimately, however, the text's main emphasis is on how such rewards and penalties need to be tempered and based upon a foundation of humane governance.

4 Horse Driving and the Reining of Human Affections

Of great interest here is how "Yong min" employs the horse-driving analogy to drive home the point of humane governance. This, too, is in some ways yet another literary echo of the type of discourse earlier evident not only in the Guodian texts, but also in a number of other Warring States texts bearing upon similar issues of statecraft. This section will explore the subtle ways in which these texts utilize and develop this trope as a tool for both arguments and refutations within the ongoing debate over whether it is best to persuade or to compel.

Recall how the Guodian text *Zun deyi* employs the analogies of the Great Yu controlling of the floods, Zao Fu's driving of horses, and Hou Ji's cultivating of the land to illustrate the way in which the sage rules his people: just as rivers, horses, and the land each have their proper "way" to be tamed—that which accords with their natures—so too do the people. Cultural heroes like Yu and Hou Ji appear often in Confucian works as models for the enlightened ruler. The *Mengzi*, for example, tells of how Shun civilizes the people by sending Yi 益 to control the fires, Yu to dredge the nine rivers, Hou Ji to teach the people farming, and Xie 契 to teach the people the five orders of human relations; it thus explicitly links flood control and farming with the ordering of human society. In another of several passages mentioning Yu's control of the floods, Meng Zi 孟子 states: "Yu's controlling of the waters was [in accordance with] the way of waters" (*Yu zhi zhi shui, shui zhi dao ye* 禹之治水, 水之道也), and speaks of "floods" (*hong shui* 洪水) as "something the humane person detests" (*ren ren zhi suo wu* 仁人之所惡).[53] An Eastern Han work, Xu Gan's 徐幹 *Zhong lun* 中論, would later borrow the analogy in a way even more reminiscent of the Guodian texts:

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[52] This quotation immediately follows another brief quotation attributed to Confucius. It is unclear whether the *gu yue* 故曰 that precedes this quotation is meant to also refer to Confucius ("Thus [he also] said") or to a more general maxim ("Thus it is said"). The parallel phrase from *Zun deyi* (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 174, strips 28–29, 31–32; see above) is not cited there as a quotation, whereas it is quoted in the *Mengzi* (3.1 [2A.1]) as a saying of Confucius.

[53] *Mengzi* 5.4 (3A.4) and 12.11 (6B.11), respectively. See also especially 8.26 (4B.26).

> Thus the Great Yu was skilled at controlling waters, whereas the noble man is skilled at guiding people (*dao ren* 導人). In guiding people, one must follow in accord with their natures (*yin qi xing* 因其性); in controlling waters, one must follow in accord with their momentum (*shi* 勢). ("Gui yan" 貴言; Xu 2000: 86)

Hou Ji, too, is sometimes employed to similar purposes, as when the "Shou shi" 首時 chapter of the *Lüshi chunqiu*, for example, utilizes the analogy of his "awaiting the spring" (*dai chun* 待春) to illustrate the importance of "encountering the right time" (*yu shi* 遇時).[54]

When it comes, however, to the question of moral education versus coercive governance, the analogy of Zao Fu's horse-driving bears the greatest interest. The phrase "driving the people" (*yu min*) is common in pre-Qin texts, as in the line from *Cheng zhi* (strips 15–16) quoted above: the people "can be driven (*yu*), but cannot be pulled around by the nose (*qian*)." The distinction between the two can be illustrated by a passage from the "Xue ji" 學記 chapter of the *Liji*: "The noble man illustrates through teaching; he guides, but doesn't pull" (*dao er fu qian* 道而弗牽) (Sun 1989: 966). This accords well with the notion from *Cheng zhi* that the people can be respectfully guided (*jing dao* 敬導)" or "driven" but cannot be "contained" (*yan*) or "pulled around."[55] Zao Fu's art of driving hoses likewise becomes a choice analogy for the enlightened ruler's governing of his people—though precisely wherein that art lies would become a focal point in subsequent debates over where the priorities of rulership should be placed.

The horse-driving analogy is employed again in the chapter that follows "Yong min" in the *Lüshi chunqiu*, "Shi wei" 適威. In a story borrowed from earlier sources, a certain Dongye Ji 東野稷 appears, on the surface, to be a master horse driver; he gives an exhibition in which his horses "advance and retreat in accord with the ink-line, and circle left or right in accord with the compass," to the point that "there was nothing in even Zao Fu's driving that would have surpassed it."[56] He goes on to demand too much from his horses, however, and in the end "wears them out" (*bai qi ma* 敗其馬); this illustrates a principle of rulership:

> Thus in directing its people (*shi qi min* 使其民), the chaotic state neither assesses human nature, nor reverts to human affections. It makes its instructions copious and blames those who are unaware of them; it makes its commands numerous and censures those who fail to

[54] "Thus it is timeliness (*shi* 時) that the sage values most. When the rivers have frozen solid, Hou Ji plants no seeds. Hou Ji's planting of seeds must await the spring. Thus people, though wise, will accomplish nothing if they do not encounter the proper time" (Bi 1936: 145).

[55] For more on the distinction between *yu* and *qian* in this passage, see also Qian (2000: 142–43). The superiority of "driving" over "pulling around" and the connection of the former with Zao Fu can even be found in the *Han Feizi*, though to somewhat different purposes; see the "Waichushuo, youxia" 外儲說右下 chapter, "Jing/shuo si" 經/說四 sections, in Wang (1998: 332, 342–43).

[56] The story also appears, with some slight variation in the characters involved, in both the "Ai Gong" 哀公 chapter of the *Xunzi* (and later sources based on it) and the "Da sheng" 達生 chapter of the *Zhuangzi*, the latter of which this particular version seems to be based upon (although the context there is somewhat different). The *Xunzi* version draws a conclusion similar to that given here, ending with the line: "There has never been one who could impoverish those below without being in peril."

> comply; it creates great perils and punishes those who dare not brave them; it creates heavy burdens and penalizes those who cannot bear them. The people advance out of desire for reward, and retreat out of fear of incrimination … This is a matter of [the ruler] being unable to employ the right amount of might (*bu neng yong wei shi* 不能用威適). (“Lisu lan” section; Bi 1936: 246–48)[57]

Dongye Ji is, in the end, inferior to Zao Fu precisely because he does not assess his horses’ basic nature and whether they are able to bear such harsh and copious demands. Ruling the people likewise requires that the enlightened ruler must invariably “assess human nature” and “revert to human affections.” A similar point is made in the *Guanzi*, commenting on a line from its own “Xing shi” chapter that reads “Zao Fu’s art was not a matter of his driving” (Zao *Fu zhi shu fei yu ye* 造父之術非馭也):

> Zao Fu was a skilful driver of horses. He was skilful at observing his horses, regulating their food and drink, assessing the horses’ strengths, and examining their fleetness of foot, and he could thus take distant routes without wearing down his horses. The enlightened ruler is like Zao Fu: he is skilful at ruling his people, assessing their strengths, and examining their skills and abilities, and can thus erect accomplishments without oppressing or harming his people. (“Xingshi jie”; Dai 1936: 327)

Here, too, the emphasis is on the need to assess the strengths and abilities of the people, a demand the “Shi wei” chapter of the *Lüshi chunqiu* discusses within the context of despotic government and severe penalties. The contrast of rulership through education to rulership based solely on rewards and penalties is one made repeatedly throughout the *Lüshi chunqiu*.[58] Accordingly, “Yong min” and other chapters of the work locate Zao Fu’s art outside the realm of might and severity and, by that analogy, describe the proper way of rulership as a kind of guidance in accord with human nature.

In contrast, the *Han Feizi* 韓非子, a work (or set of texts) composed not long before the *Lüshi chunqiu*, puts the analogy to a rather different use. Han Fei was radically opposed to the notion of “according with the people’s heart-and-minds,” as the following passage from “Xian xue” 顯學 makes clear:

> Today, those who do not understand rulership invariably say, “obtain the people’s hearts-and-minds” (*de min zhi xin* 得民之心). If one could rule by obtaining the people’s hearts-and-minds, then there would be no use for [such ministers as] Yi Yin 伊尹 and Guan Zhong; one would simply heed the people’s wishes. That the people’s wisdom cannot be employed is like the case with the mind of an infant: … the infant is unaware how great benefit can be

[57] Cf. Knoblock and Riegel (2000: 495–96).

[58] See, for example, the following lines from the “Yi shang” 義賞 chapter, which can be read as a kind of compromise between, on the one hand, the importance of rewards and penalties, as advocated in such texts as the *Han Feizi*, and, on the other, their ultimate subservience to “education” and “propriety”: “The handle of rewards and penalties (賞罰之柄) is that by which those above direct (*shi* 使) [the people]. If they are applied on the basis of propriety, then the way of loyalty, trust, and endearment will become manifest. The longer it is manifest, the more it will grow, so that the people become secure in it as if it were in their natures—this is what we refer to as the fruition of education (*jiao cheng* 教成). When education bears fruit, even generous rewards and stern might cannot stop it[s effects]” (“Xiaoxing lan” 孝行覽 section; Bi 1936: 146). Compare the 安之若性 wording to the penultimate line of the “Ba guan” passage from the *Guanzi* quoted earlier.

> derived from enduring small hardships. Now when those above … devise punishments and make penalties heavy in order to prevent depravity, [the people] consider their superiors severe … These are means by which to achieve order and security, and yet the people know not to delight in them … It is thus clear that the wisdom of the people cannot be used. (Wang 1998: 463–64)[59]

Whether or not the "prominent" Confucians would agree with this interpretation of their position, Han Fei clearly opposed their notion of the "way of the people." In "Jian jie shi chen" 姦劫弑臣, the *Han Feizi* turns the horse-driving analogy against the Confucians:

> Today's practitioners of the arts of learning all persuade rulers not by telling them to "use their position of might and severity (*weiyan zhi shi* 威嚴之勢) to hem in wicked and depraved ministers," but rather by saying that "it is all a matter of humanity, propriety, kindness, and compassion" (*ren yi hui ai* 仁義惠愛) … For stern punishments are what the people fear, and heavy penalties are what the people abhor. Thus the sage displays what they fear so as to forbid their depravity, and arrays what they abhor so as to bind them from wickedness. Thus the state is secure, and violence and turmoil do not arise. By this we know how humanity, propriety, kindness, and compassion are inadequate to the task, whereas stern punishments and heavy penalties can be used to order the state.
>
> Without the might of the whip (*chuice zhi wei* 捶策之威) or the instalment of the bit (*xianjue zhi bei* 銜橛之備), even Zao Fu would have been unable to subdue his horses … Without the position of might and severity, or the standards of rewards and penalties, even Yao and Shun would have been unable to achieve order. The rulers of today all lightly abandon heavy penalties and severe punishments, put compassion and kindness into practice, and yet hope to accomplish the exploits of a hegemon or king—indeed, they cannot approach this. (Wang 1998: 104–05)[60]

In the *Lüshi chunqiu*, "merely achieving Zao Fu's might" is described as an inadequacy that brought about the downfall of the tyrants Jie and Zhou. The *Han Feizi* counters that type of view with its diametric opposite, that the sages Yao and Shun could not have achieved their rule *without* "the might of the whip."

Thus at the twilight of the Warring States period, there appears to have been a common, if implicitly stated, recognition that both "education" and "might" were necessary ingredients in successful rulership. Yet philosophers differed radically over the question of which ingredient should have priority, and, through the course of this debate, both Confucians and their rivals continued to employ the horse-driving analogy inherited from their Confucian predecessors. As the debate continued on into the Han dynasty, it would take on new meaning in the context of the Qin's recent failures and ostensible penchant for harsh rule. The "Sheng de" 盛德

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[59] Cf. the translation of Watson (1964: 128–29).

[60] As a text committed to the notion that the ways of the past need not apply today, the *Han Feizi*'s appeal to Yao and Shun here would seem to be in order to counter the Confucians through their own form of argumentation by appeal to antiquity. Note that Zao Fu appears also in the "Waichushuo, youxia" chapter (*jing/shuo* 1), where he is portrayed as a horse-driver who controls through the might of the bridle and whip, whereas another famous charioteer, Wang Liang 王良 (Wang Zi Yuqi 王子於期), is described as one who controls his horses through the rewards of grain and water. The point of the passage is simply that rulers should not share their monopolization of rewards or punishments with their ministers. See Wang (1998: 330, 333–35).

chapter of the *Da Dai Liji* 大戴禮記, likely written in the Western Han, again employs the horse-driving analogy to reiterate the long-standing Confucian position, reinforcing the superiority of the "standards of virtue" (*defa* 德法) over the "standards of punishments" (*xingfa* 刑法) through a rather detailed discourse on the ultimate sources of punishments and penalties:

> Thus it is said that punishments and penalties have sources (*yuan* 源) from which they arise. If you do not place your efforts in blocking the sources [of transgression] but rather at punishing and killing [the transgressors], this is tantamount to setting traps for the people so as to despoil them (*wei min she xian yi ze zhi* 為民設陷以賊之). The source of punishments and penalties lies in the failure to regulate indulgences and desires, likes and dislikes.
>
> Thus the bright hall [represents] the standards of Heaven, and ritual measures are the standards of virtue; they are that by which to drive/steer (*yu*) the people's indulgences, desires, likes, and dislikes, so as to cautiously follow the standards of Heaven and complete the standards of virtue. The standards of punishment are that whereby one strikes awe in those who do not practise the standards of virtue …
>
> The standards of virtue are the bit (*xian*) by which to drive the people; the officers are their reins (*luan*); punishments are their whip (*ce*). The Son of Heaven is the driver (*yu*), and his chamberlain and grand scribe are his left and right hands. The ancients took the standards [of virtue] as their bit and bridle, the officers as their reins, punishments as their whip, and others as their hands; they thus were able to drive/steer the world for hundreds of years without decline. One skilled at driving horses straightens the bits and reins, levels the bridles and whip, balances the horses' strengths, and harmonizes the horses' hearts; thus while his mouth makes no sounds, his hands do not wave, and he employs not his whip, the horses still run for him. One skilled at driving the people straightens his standards of virtue, puts his officers in order, and balances the people's strengths and harmonizes their hearts; thus while his mouth utters no words of judgment, and he employs no punishments, the people are well-ordered nonetheless.
>
> Thus the people praise him as virtuous … Those who cannot drive/steer the people cast aside the standards of virtue. This is like, when driving horses, to do so by casting aside the bit and bridle and solely employing the whip: invariably, the horses will get injured and the chariot will break down. If one lacks the standards of virtue and relies solely on the standards of punishment to drive the people, the people's hearts-and-minds will take flight and the state will invariably perish … Thus it is said that the standards of virtue are the foundation upon which to drive/steer the people. (Wang 1983: 144–46)[61]

The passage is consistent with the nuanced position that would become common in the Han, a position that sought both to model after and yet distinguish itself from the strict rule of the Qin. In spirit, however, it clearly inherits the rhetoric of the Confucian tradition, especially with its Mengzian notion that punishments "entrap the people"[62] and its insistence that punishments, while necessary, should have only the secondary function of deterring "those who do not practice virtue." The metaphors are certainly somewhat mixed—with the restraining "bit" now used as an analogy for ritual measures—but the whip still represents punishments, and the

[61] This passage can also be found in the "Wuxing jie" 五刑解 chapter of the *Kongzi jiayu* 孔子家語.

[62] See *Mengzi* 1.7 (1A7): "To punish the people after sinking them into crimes—this is tantamount to entrapping the people."

trick, once again, is to have its mere presence as a deterrent to obviate any need for actually applying it.

The primacy of governance through virtue and ritual education, and the notion of averting the implementation of punishments thereby, would continue to be dominant themes in the political discourse of the Han. A passage from the "Tai zu" 泰族 chapter of the *Huainanzi* 淮南子 illustrates how many of the specific notions expressed much earlier in the Guodian (and Shanghai Museum) texts continue to be closely echoed some two centuries hence. "Tai zu" speaks not of "ordering" or "controlling" (*zhi*), but rather of "following in accordance with" (*yin* 因); but in this context, the two amount to the same principle.[63] Just as Heaven, Earth, and the four seasons do not so much create the myriad things as do they facilitate the conditions for their procreation, "the sage, in ruling the world, does not change the people's natures (*fei yi min xing* 非易民性) but rather nurtures in accord with what they [already] possess and cleanses it."[64] This echoes the line from *Zun deyi*: "Instruction is not a matter of changing one's (/the people's) way, but rather of instructing (them in) it" (*jiao fei gai qi dao, jiao zhi ye* 教非改其道, 教之也) (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 173, strip 4; Cook 2012: 644–45). The passage then brings in the analogies of some of the same cultural heroes seen earlier, referring to the nature of Yu's flood-control works as "following in accordance with the flow of the waters" (*yin shui zhi liu* 因水之流), of Hou Ji's land cultivation as "following in accordance with the lay of the land" (*yin di zhi shi* 因地之勢), and of Kings Tang and Wu's conquering of their respective predecessor dynasties as "following in accordance with the people's desires" (*yin min zhi yu* 因民之欲) (Liu 1989: 670).[65] It concludes these examples with the statement: "For only when things have that by which they are self-so (*you yi zi ran* 有以自然) will human affairs be well-ordered." The text then goes on to discuss this accordance with human nature in terms of the institution of the various rituals and musical forms:

> The people have natures such that they are fond of sensual pleasures, and thus there is the great marriage ritual. They have natures such that they will eat and drink, and thus there are the proprieties of the great banquet. They have natures such that they become joyous and happy, and thus there is the music of bells, drums, pipes, and strings. They have natures such that they become grave and mournful, and thus there are the regularities of mourning garments, crying, and foot-stomping. Thus the former kings, in instituting standards, followed in accord with the people's likes and provided them with regularity and refined pattern (*yin min zhi suo hao, er wei zhi jie wen* 因民之所好, 而為之節文). (Liu 1989: 670)

[63] As Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 points out, the notion of *yin* is one that spans all "schools of thought," appearing prominently in the work of Shen Dao 慎到, the *Zhuangzi*, and even the *Lunyu* (Xu 1975: 2:142–43, 155–58). Xu also makes a point of noting how the "Tai zu" chapter bears an especially close relation to Confucian thought and argues that the chapter has a special status within the *Huainanzi* (Xu 1975: 150–52).

[64] For this and the following excerpts, see Liu (1989: 669–71).

[65] A parallel passage is to be found in the "Quan yan" 詮言 chapter, which cites the same four figures and examples in support of its statement that "It is 'following in accord' that the three dynasties took as their way." Instead of Tang and Wu "following the people's wishes," however, they are there spoken of as "following in accord with the times" (因時也). See Liu (1989: 477).

The last line echoes closely the line from the "Fang ji" chapter of the *Liji* quoted earlier: "Ritual follows in accord with human affections and provides them with regularity and refined pattern." As "Tai zu" puts it, the marriage ritual is instituted (*zhi* 制) in accord with the people's fondness for sensual pleasures so that "there will be distinctions between male and female," the "sounds of the Ya 雅 and Song 頌" are rectified (*zheng* 正) in accord with the people's joyous music so that their "airs and customs will not run astray," and so forth. As this section of the passage sums up, "These are all things people have in their natures (*xing*) and which are brought to completion through the craftsmanship of the sage (*shengren zhi suo jiangcheng* 聖人之所匠成)." Such is precisely the point of *Xing zi ming chu*, with its notion that "the Way begins with the affections, and the affections are born of human nature"—with its idea that the sage, through the instruction of "arrangement and assembly," "provision of regularity and refined pattern," and the like, "gives rise to virtue within" through the crafted instruction of what is already inherent in human nature to begin with.[66] Finally, the passage elaborates on this point of education, linking it to the notion of achieving a kind of might or prestige without the use of coercive measures:

> Thus without having [it in] their nature, they cannot be instructed; and though they have [it in] their nature, without providing them nourishment (*yang* 養), they cannot abide by the Way … People, by nature, have the endowment of humanity and propriety (*ren yi zhi zi* 仁義之資), but without a sage to create standards (*fadu* 法度) and instruct them in them, they cannot be made to take it in the proper directions.
>
> Thus the former kings, in their instruction, encouraged good by following in accord with what [the people] took joy in, and prohibited wickedness by following in accord with what [the people] abhorred. Thus while they made no use of punishments and penalties, their prestige flowed forth like a current (*xingfa bu yong er wei xing ru liu* 刑罰不用而威行如流); though they lessened governmental commands, their transformative influence shone forth like the spirits.[67]
>
> Thus if one follows in accord with [the people's] natures, all the world will heed and follow; [but] if one goes against their natures, standards will be suspended and not employed (*fa xuan er bu yong* 法悬而不用). (Liu 1989: 671)[68]

The parallels with the notion of a "human way" as expressed in the Guodian (and Shanghai Museum) texts are so close that one would suspect the *Huainanzi* authors were in part working with some of the same texts, or others closely related to them, as their basis.[69]

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[66] Refer back to strips 14–18 (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 179), quoted above.

[67] This line closely parallels a line from the "Junzi" chapter of the *Xunzi* quoted above.

[68] As mentioned earlier, the *Yue ji* also describes the ability to set aside the use of punishments as one of the positive effects of musical influence: "Rebellious people do not arise, the feudal lords submit as guests, weapons and armour are not used, the five punishments are not employed, the hundred surnames have no worries, and the Son of Heaven does not get angry. This is how it is like when music has 'arrived' (*da* 達)" (Sun 1989: 978).

[69] Liu Lexian has drawn similar conclusions regarding a different chapter of the *Huainanzi*, "Mou cheng" 繆稱 (Liu 2000). And for an insightful analysis of the *Huainanzi*'s "Fan lun" 氾論 chapter in relation to the *Xing zi ming chu*, see Puett (2004: 62–64).

5 Conclusion

Throughout the texts of Guodian and the Shanghai Museum discussed above, a concerted emphasis on rulership through ritual, music, and charismatic moral suasion appears in the context of repeated criticism of all coercive forms of governance. In light of this emphasis, the texts would appear to have been conceived at a time when longstanding noble rights and authority were giving way to an emerging notion of the rule of law that accompanied an increase in social mobility. The Confucian thinkers represented in these texts came up with the notion of a "human way" as a means of subverting that trend, arguing that ritual and music have their basis in human nature and that the exemplary powers of moral suasion would all but eliminate the need to employ punishments in the first place. Eventually even the Confucians would have to admit a place for certain "legalist" concepts and a broader, though still limited, use of punishments for the incorrigible. Nonetheless, their early ideas proved to have remarkable staying power, and were in turn adopted by a great variety of thinkers who, in formulating theories of statecraft, sought to find the perfect balance between the two ideals of education through moral suasion and coercion through rewards and punishments. The history of Warring States thought is in part a history of the evolution of this debate, and throughout it the language of a "human way," as well as the arguments and analogies we first see formulated in the Guodian and related texts, would continue to dominate the discussion. By the time of the Western Han, the ideas, arguments, analogies, and phrases associated with this debate would come to form a stock repertoire from which governmental officers and candidates for office could draw in promoting the adoption of state policies, or in simply displaying their erudition, knowledge of history, and ability to apply learned arguments to contemporary situations. Thus when, in 81 BCE, Emperor Zhao 漢昭帝 (r. 87–74 BCE) asked examination candidates to respond to the question of "what ailed and vexed the people," a "Worthy and Excellent" (*xianliang* 賢良) candidate was able to reply as follows:

> In ancient times, [rulers] made earnest their teaching so as to guide the people (*du jiao yi dao min* 篤教以導民), and made manifest their laws so as to rectify punishments (*ming pi yi zheng xing* 明辟以正刑). The relationship of punishment to governance is like that of the whip to horse-driving. A skilled driver cannot drive without the use of a whip; [rather,] he possesses the whip but does not make use of it (*you ce er wu yong* 有策而勿用). The sage borrows the law so as to complete his instruction; when his instruction is complete, punishments are not applied (*jiao cheng er xing bu shi* 教成而刑不施). Thus his might is stern, but he kills not; punishments are set up, but [crimes] are not violated (*wei li er bu sha, xing she er bu fan* 威厲而不殺, 刑設而不犯). Today, we abandon the guiding network and cannot implement it, and we destroy the rituals and proprieties and cannot keep [the people] in bounds. The people become ensnared in our nets, and we then hunt them down with punishments (*min xian yu wang, cong er lie zhi yi xing* 民陷於網, 從而獵之以刑). This is like opening the gate to their pen and then shooting them down with poison arrows, not stopping until they are extinguished. (*Yantie lun* 鹽鐵論, "Hou xing" 後刑; Wang 1992: 419–20)

And a "Cultured and Learned" (*wenxue* 文學) candidate was likewise able to argue:

> When roads and pathways are numerous, people know not which one to follow; when laws and commands are numerous, the people know not what to avoid. The legal institutions of the former kings were as illuminating as the sun and the moon, and thus the people did not get lost; they were as spacious as a great highway, and thus the people were not deluded. Even those in secluded and remote regions were clearly aware of [the laws], and even foolish girls and ignorant women knew what to avoid. Thus laws and commands were not violated, and jails and prisons were not employed.
>
> Formerly, the Qin's laws were copious and lethal, and the network [of laws] was as dense as congealed lard. And yet superiors and subordinates evaded each other, and wickedness and artifice sprouted and grew. When they sought to bring this under control, those in charge were as if trying to rescue charred wood from a raging fire, and they could not put a stop to it. It was not that their net [of laws] was sparse and crimes slipped through, but that they abandoned ritual and propriety and gave rein to punishments and penalties (*liyi fei er xingfa ren* 禮義廢而刑罰任) … Thus the [proper] way to rule the people is simply to put your earnest efforts into instruction (*gu zhi min zhi dao, wu du qi jiao er yi* 故治民之道, 務篤其教而已). (*Yantie lun* 鹽鐵論, "Xing de" 刑德; Wang 1992: 565–66)[70]

By this time, the notion of a proper "human way" and its associated arguments had become an integral part of the arsenal that could be drawn upon at will in criticizing policies of excessively intricate laws and overly harsh punishments. The early development of these arguments, whose use would continue throughout later ages, can be traced to debates emergent at the time of the recently unearthed manuscripts of Guodian and the Shanghai Museum.

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[70] The translation here is based on the text as Wang has emended it. A line of argument similar to that of this passage and sharing some of the language appears also in the opening section of the "Kuli liezhuan" 酷吏列傳 chapter of the *Shi ji* 史記. Like "Hou xing," this "Xing de" chapter also employs the horse-driving analogy, wherein the candidate states that "laws and position" (法勢) are like the reins and bridle, which can be employed to advantage only at the hands of a skilled driver/enlightened ruler who does not "abandon the arts of humanity and propriety" (廢仁義之術) (Wang Liqi 1992: 568). Phrases similar to "the way to rule the people" (治民之道)—such as "the way to order the people" (理民之道), "the way of showing people affection" (子民之道), and "the way to herd the people" (牧民之道)—appear throughout the *Yantie lun*; see, for example, Wang Liqi (1992: 29, 79, and 192).

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Chapter 16
The Guodian Confucian Texts and the *Xunzi* 荀子



Tang Siufu

1 Introduction

There is general consensus that the interment of the Guodian manuscripts can be dated at around 300 BCE (Cook 2012: 5). Besides a few Daoist texts like the *Laozi* 老子 and *Taiyi shengshui* 太一生水, the bulk of the manuscripts can be classified as of Confucian nature with their emphasis on virtues like humaneness (*ren* 仁) and propriety (*yi* 義), and the importance of ritual (*li* 禮) and music (*yue* 樂), as well as the Classics like *Shi* 詩 (The Book of Odes) and *Shu* 書 (The Book of Documents) for both personal cultivation and governance. It is likely that these Confucian texts contain the doctrines of Confucian disciples falling between the time of Confucius and that of Mencius (Cook 2012: 2; Li 2002: 4–5). As such they provide valuable resources, even if partial and incomplete, for understanding the state of Confucian thought before it took a more mature shape in either the received texts of the *Mencius* or the *Xunzi*. Many scholars, particularly those from mainland China, believe that the Guodian Confucian texts belong to the lineage of Zisi 子思 (the grandson of Confucius) and Mencius (Cook 2012: 108–21). A few dissenting opinions suggest instead that the texts have a close affinity with the school of Xunzi (Goldin 2005: 36–37). The aim of this chapter, however, is not to adjudicate on the question of lineage or doctrinal typology, but to compare and analyze the Guodian Confucian texts and the *Xunzi* so as to better understand the development of early Confucianism. I shall firstly review the Guodian Confucian texts basically along two crossing axes: ethical cultivation and political governance. The chapter will then compare and contrast the general positions of the Guodian Confucian texts and the *Xunzi*, and attempt to answer why Xunzi diverges from the position of the Guodian texts at certain points. With such a comparison and analysis, it is hoped that we can better

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understand the philosophical frameworks of the Guodian Confucian texts and the *Xunzi*, and better appreciate their significance.

2 Common Concerns of the Guodian Confucian Texts

Since the chapter is concerned with the Guodian Confucian texts as a group, I tend to emphasize the common grounds of the texts at the expense of their differences.[1] This is not to dismiss divergences among the texts nor disregard the significance of such divergences. And even if I run the risk of over-generalization, I believe such a task of philosophical reconstruction is nonetheless rewarding, because it helps put the various texts in context, draws out their interconnections, and highlights their contributions to a common Confucian vision. This is a vision first initiated by Confucius 孔子 the Master (*fuzi* 夫子), which aims to re-establish the Confucian Way (*Dao* 道), the all-embracing normative human order that consisted on the one hand of the socio-political order of roles, ranks, and proper behaviour, and on the other hand of internal ethical cultivation of living individuals (Schwartz 1985: 62–67). I believe an investigation of the ways the Guodian Confucian texts respond and contribute to such a common vision constitutes a worthwhile framework of understanding and evaluating these texts. It is also in relation to such a common Confucian vision that I compare the Guodian Confucian texts and the *Xunzi* in the latter part of the chapter, hoping to shed light on the development and transformation of Confucianism as a common cause.

Thus I propose that we assess the interconnections of the Guodian Confucian texts along two crossing axes of ethical cultivation and political governance. By ethical cultivation I mean the cultivation of various Confucian virtues such as humaneness and propriety that make one a better person ethically. Although ethical cultivation puts the individual person at its focus, the cultivation of virtue necessarily involves others, as it is through the interplay of different human relationships—such as the relationship between father and son—that the various virtues are primarily exemplified. Political governance, on the other hand, involves the public issues of running a country and also the relationship between the ruler and the people. The two axes cross because the relationship between the ruler and the people, and the matter of running a country both heavily involve ethical cultivation, and also because ethical cultivation requires its manifestation not only in families and between close friends, but also in society and other public domains. Yet the two axes

[1] Some might doubt whether the "Confucian" texts truly represent Confucian positions. Such a possibility cannot be ruled out beforehand without a detailed examination of the texts. It is an interesting project in itself to investigate whether certain non-Confucian positions are presented under the guise of certain Confucian values and ideas. However, it is a project beyond the scope of this paper. Here I begin with the common assumption that this group of Guodian texts represents Confucian positions and investigate how such positions contribute to realizing the Confucian vision of restoring order to the world. Nonetheless I thank an anonymous reviewer for alerting me to this possibility.

are nonetheless distinct because their respective demands might diverge or even conflict and create dilemmas. By presenting ethical cultivation and political governance as two crossing axes, the chapter certainly suggests that these two axes are closely related and even interdependent. However, the chapter is not committed to any further substantive position regarding the relation between ethical cultivation and political governance, such as whether, for Confucianism, politics is wholly dependent on ethics, or whether politics is an end in itself for Confucianism (El Amine 2015: 2–16).

Now, what sort of common ideas might be discerned in the Guodian Confucian texts as a group, given the background axes of ethical cultivation and political governance? Cook has already identified four central notions that are shared among the Guodian Confucian texts: the close relation between Heaven (*tian* 天) and human natural endowment; a concern with the paths to virtuous cultivation; an emphasis on education and moral suasion as well as the key role of cultural tradition; and an aspiration to the symphony of virtues in the example of musical harmony (Cook 2012: 139–75). Cook has made a major contribution by pointing out the common concerns of the Confucian texts. Yet if we intend to more systematically assess the contributions of the Guodian Confucian texts to the cause of Confucianism, such common concerns need to be arranged and analysed within an overarching framework of the Confucian vision. I already mentioned that the vision of Confucius was to restore order to the world through an articulation of the normative cultural tradition. The Confucian cause is thus political and ethical at the same time. Order of the world refers to harmony, peace and order, and flourishing at every level. Politics is necessary for such a task and ethical order alone is inadequate. Yet ethics is central to such a vision as well, as order of the world is primarily achieved not through force and coercion, but through ethical suasion and transformation.

3 Governance Through Ethical Cultivation

The Guodian Confucian texts in general closely follow such a common vision of Confucianism. For example, *Zi yi* 緇衣 (Black Robes), *Zhongxin zhi dao* 忠信之道 (The Way of Loyalty and Trustworthiness), *Cheng zhi* 成之 (Bringing Things to Completion) and *Zun deyi* 尊德義 (Honouring Virtue and Propriety) are mainly concerned with how a ruler should govern his people through ethical cultivation. Here, governance through ethical cultivation has three interrelated aspects: first, the ruler should devote himself to ethical cultivation. Second, the ruler should exemplify his ethical conduct and treat his people ethically. Third, the people should also be educated and transformed ethically.

Zi yi (ZY) suggests that those who possess the state, that is, the ruler, should make manifest his likes and dislikes to the people so that the people clearly know

how to behave and will not go astray (ZY 2).[2] If the ruler loves humaneness, then the people will go after humaneness without delay (ZY 10–11). Such is the case because the ruler functions as the heart-mind (*xin* 心) while the people function as the body (*ti* 體); just as the body follows the preferences of the heart-mind, the people follow the likes and dislikes of the ruler (ZY 8). Yet the people can cleverly discern the true preferences of the ruler, such that they will not easily follow the words of the ruler but only the preferences shown in the deeds of the ruler (ZY 14). Thus, the ruler must be cautious over his words and his deeds. It is only through a match between words and deeds that the ruler can establish trustworthiness in the people (ZY 34–35). The people might be led to avoid committing wrongs through political orders and punishments, but it is only through the education of virtue and the cultivation of ritual (*li* 禮) that they are motivated to behave well on their own initiative (ZY 23–24). Thus, if a country fails in its education and ethical cultivation, then neither punishments nor rewards will be sufficient to bring it into order (ZY 27–28). Consequently, it is all the more important that the ruler be earnest in his own ethical cultivation and be the model for the people (ZY 44).

Zhongxin zhi dao (ZXZD) emphasizes the importance of loyalty (*zhong* 忠) and trustworthiness (*xin* 信). Again the message is about the close relation between ethical cultivation and governance. The text points out that the ultimate expression of loyalty is not to deceive or ingratiate and the ultimate expression of trustworthiness is not to cheat the uninformed (ZXZD 1). Through the accumulation of loyalty and trustworthiness on the part of the ruler, the people will come to love and trust him (ZXZD 2). It is also suggested that loyalty and trustworthiness enable one to emulate Heaven and Earth (*di* 地) because Heaven and Earth behave in a similar way: Earth provides nurture without being pleaded to, and one can rely on Heaven's movements without any prior arrangement (ZXZD 4–5). It is as if there is robust loyalty and trust between Heaven, Earth and man so that each can be reckoned on performing its role without failure. Thus, when loyalty becomes the prevailing way, then the hundred artisans will not cut corners and everyone will have enough goods to sustain them; when trustworthiness becomes the prevailing way, then everything becomes accomplished and the hundred excellences (*baishan* 百善) are established (ZXZD 6–7). Finally, the text points out that loyalty is the substance of humaneness while trustworthiness is the expectation of propriety (ZXZD 8).

Cheng zhi (CZ) is in many ways similar to *Zi yi*, both suggesting that the ruler acts as a model for the people and thus ethical cultivation of the ruler is paramount to governance. Yet, while ZY tends to stress the consistency of words and deeds, and the importance of making manifest to people the likes and dislikes of the ruler, CZ emphasizes that ethical cultivation is ultimately about one's own self (*ji* 己). Thus, CZ repeatedly admonishes the noble man (*junzi* 君子) that he must embody (*shen* 身) ethical teachings. It might be suggested that acting out ethical teachings in deeds is precisely such an embodiment and, as such, this idea of CZ need not be different

[2] For easy reference, I list only the text's corresponding slip number which is based on Bowuguan 1998. Most of the time I simply paraphrase the meaning of the text, for which purpose I frequently consult the translation of Cook 2012.

from the key message of ZY. Nonetheless, CZ chooses to highlight the internal aspect of such embodiment, suggesting that it is a matter of seeking within one's own self (*qiu zhu ji* 求諸己) and this is the foundation (*ben* 本) of everything else (CZ 10). CZ also suggests that such seeking within one's own self requires not only persistence (*heng* 恆) but also urgency (*ji* 疾) and only in this way can there be deep penetration (*shen zhi* 深之) and completion (*cheng zhi* 成之) (CZ 29, 22–23, 1).[3] Presumably such seeking within one's own self is precisely the shaping of one's inborn nature in accordance with the way of the good (*shan dao* 善道). CZ points out that the original nature (*xing* 性) of the sage and the average man is the same, but the sage practices good ceaselessly and, ultimately, his virtue become vast and great (*hou da* 厚大) and seemingly incomparable to that of the ordinary man (CZ 26–28). CZ also suggests that the noble man properly orders human relationships (*ren lun* 人倫), such as realizing the propriety between ruler and minister, the affection between father and son, and the distinction between husband and wife, so as to follow Heaven's constancy (*tian chang* 天常) (CZ 31–32). Given that CZ also says that seeking within one's own self is also the way to follow Heaven's constancy (CZ 38), it is possible to infer that seeking within one's own self has to be exemplified in proper human relationships and the two are mutually constitutive. In this way, CZ makes an important move to connect human relationships with one's nature, suggesting that it is through proper human relationships and the corresponding virtue that a person develops his nature and brings it to completion. CZ thus brings out the close connection between internal cultivation and social relationships, between ethical cultivation and political governance, and also between human affairs and Heaven.

Zun deyi (ZDY) elaborates on the importance of virtue for the way of man (*rendao* 人道). ZDY points out that one important aspect of being the ruler is to honour virtue and propriety (*zun de yi* 尊德義), and to have a clear understanding of the relationships of the people (*ming hu minlun* 明乎民倫) (ZDY 1). By relationships of the people ZDY likely means the proper order of the people. As such, *minlun* 民倫 might also be seen as the manifestation of *rendao*. ZDY suggests that governance should abide by the way of man, just as an excellent charioteer drives horses in accordance with the way of horses (ZDY 5–7). ZDY believes that only virtue (*de* 德) can lead the people in the right direction, implying that virtue precisely embodies the way of man. And among the virtues, the most important and also the most effective are ritual (*li* 禮) and music (*yue* 樂) (ZDY 28–29). Without education, the people might be prosperous, but they will not be harmonious, secure, or happy (ZDY 27). Without education, the people might be numerous, but they will not be well-ordered, compliant, or at peace (ZDY 12). The education of ritual and music will make the people well-ordered and compliant with virtue (ZDY 13). And when the priority of government is the education of virtue, then the people will become truly good (ZDY 16). This is particularly the case because the people cannot be coerced but can be led (ZDY 22). Thus, even though reward and punishment might

[3] There have been heated debates over the ordering of the slips. For a summary of these debates, see Cook 2012: 590–98.

be useful for certain purposes, they will not succeed in the end if not employed in accordance with the proper way of the people (ZDY 2–3). Regarding the matter of leading the people, the people are such that they follow not the orders of the ruler, but his deeds. And the ruler's influence on the people is so pervasive that no matter what is liked by the ruler, it will be followed by the people with even greater fervour. Given this nature of the people, it becomes possible to transform them through virtue. For the ruler can then lead the people to like and practise something that initially brings about minor harm but will ultimately realize major advantages (ZDY 36–38). Yet the ruler must then know the way and know how to conduct his deeds. For this he must begin with knowing himself and knowing ritual and music (ZDY 8–11).

Liu de 六德 (The Six Virtues) elaborates on the way of man (*rendao*) and its major content, the six positions (*liu wei* 六位) and the corresponding six virtues (LD 6–10). The six positions are ruler and minister, father and son, and husband and wife (LD 8). The six virtues are sagacity (*sheng* 聖) and wisdom (*zhi* 智), humaneness and propriety, and loyalty and trustworthiness (LD 1). LD points out that propriety is the virtue of the ruler, for the ruler is responsible for directing others in an appropriate way (LD 14–15). Loyalty is the virtue of the minister, for the minister should serve the ruler with the utmost effort so as to accomplish goodness for the people, not shying away even when faced with toilsome tasks or life-threatening situations (LD 15–17). Wisdom is the virtue of the husband, for the husband is responsible for leading the family and should be wise in judging what actions are correct and what actions are incorrect (LD 18–19). Trustworthiness, or fidelity in this case, is the virtue of the wife, for the wife should abide by the marriage vows without wavering for the rest of her life (LD 19–20). Sagacity is the virtue of the father, for the father not only sires and rears his children, he also teaches and instructs them (LD 20–21). Humaneness is the virtue of the son, for the son is one who is harmonious and earnest in cultivating his talents (LD 21, 23).[4] LD also points out that the six positions and the six virtues can all be found in the six Classics—*Odes* (Shi 詩), *Documents* (Shu 書), *Ritual* (Li 禮), *Music* (Yue 樂), *Changes* (Yi 易), and *Spring and Autumn Annals* (Chunqiu 春秋)—presumably suggesting that the six Classics are precisely concerned with the maintenance of the six positions and the cultivation of the six virtues (LD 24–25). LD does mention that the former kings took filial piety (*xiao* 孝) and brotherly love (*ti* 悌) as the basis of the education of people (LD 40). This is the case because the cultivation of virtue begins firstly within the family and only when the affection between father and son is properly maintained can there be propriety between ruler and minister (LD 39). Also, the relationship between the six virtues is such that when the father is sagacious, then the son will be humane; when the husband is wise, then the wife will be trustworthy; when the ruler is proper, then the minister will be loyal. Thus, it is said

[4] Here I follow the interpretation and translation of Cook. The text itself is difficult to apprehend and gives rise to different interpretations, as there are some missing characters in the strip (Cook 2012: 782–83).

that the sagely gives rise to the humane, the wise leads the trustworthy, and the proper directs the loyal (LD 34–35).

LD also suggests that humaneness is a matter of the internal (*nei* 內), and propriety is a matter of the external (*wai* 外). Ritual and music are common to both (*gong* 共) the internal and the external, and presumably they can bring the two together. The positions of father, son and husband belong to the internal, while the positions of ruler, minister and wife belong to the external (LD 26–27). Such a division between the internal and external can be seen as further elaboration of the idea that the family is the basis of the cultivation of virtue. As such, it may be inferred that the accomplishment of the three internal positions and the corresponding virtues act as the basis for the proper establishment of the three external positions and the corresponding virtues. Thus humaneness, as the representative virtue of the internal, can also be understood to be the basis for propriety, which is the representative virtue of the external. LD does points out that the way of the six virtues is such that on a small scale (*xiaozhe* 小者) they can be used to cultivate the self, while on a large scale (*dazhe* 大者) they can be used to order the people (LD 47). Given that the family is the beginning and the basis of the cultivation of virtue, the issue of large or small scales can be seen as not only pertaining to the scope of the application of the six virtues, but also concerning the extension of virtue. Cultivation of the self is said to be small scale because virtue is primarily limited to the person himself, while on a large scale virtue is extended to all the people. Understood in this way, the small is actually the basis of the large, and thus the cultivation of the self is the basis of the ordering of people. Evidence for such an understanding is that LD says that all six virtues are necessary for governing the people. LD points out that only persons of sagacity and wisdom can establish ritual and music, institute punishments and laws, so as to teach the people and give them a sense of direction (LD 2–3). And only persons of humaneness and propriety can bring father and son close together, harmonize the great ministers, and mollify the conflicts of neighbours (other vassal states) (LD 3–4). And only persons of loyalty and trustworthiness can assemble the people, cultivate the land so that people's needs in both matters of life and death are satisfied (LD 4–5). Such descriptions of the six virtues might appear puzzling because presumably the six virtues are matched with the six positions, yet the descriptions all suggest how the people are governed. But the puzzle can be solved with the extension of virtue. It is true that the six virtues are best exemplified in the corresponding six positions, yet it means only that the six virtues are most effectively nurtured in the corresponding six positions, not that they cannot be applied to other positions, nor that they cannot be extended to other people or situations. On the one hand, LD suggests that the way of man is constituted in the six positions and the corresponding six virtues. On the other hand, LD points out that the family represents the beginning and the basis of the cultivation of virtue, that the internal is the basis of the external, and that the cultivation of the self is the basis for the ordering of the people. Together, these two sets of ideas in LD confirm the dominant position of the Guodian Confucian texts: that ethical cultivation is the basis of

political governance, and, particularly, the cultivation of the self is the basis of the ordering of the people.[5]

4 Issues of Ethical Cultivation

The five Guodian texts as discussed above are concerned either directly with political governance, or the interrelation of ethical cultivation and political governance. In contrast, the other two major texts, *Wuxing* 五行 (The Five Conducts) and *Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出 (Human Nature Comes via Mandate) are primarily concerned with ethical cultivation. *Wuxing* (WX), as its title suggests, talks about the five conducts or the five virtues of humaneness, propriety, ritual, wisdom and sagacity. The text elaborates on two major distinctions among the five conducts. First, WX suggests that for at least four of the five conducts there is a distinction between mere conduct (*xing* 行) and virtuous conduct (*de zhi xing* 德之行). The virtue of sagacity is likely to be special in that there is probably no way for it to take shape only externally.[6] The distinction depends on whether the conduct in question takes shape from within (*xing yu nei* 形於內) or not (WX 1–3). The distinction is meant to highlight the difference between virtuous conduct that is done out of the person's own initiative and with the right motivation, and mere conduct that has only the behavioural resemblance but need not have the corresponding internal motivation. There is also a second distinction between virtuosity (*de* 德) and goodness (*shan* 善). WX suggests that harmony among the five virtuous conducts brings about virtuosity while harmony among the four mere conducts brings about goodness. WX also says that goodness is the way of man while virtuosity is the way of Heaven (*tian dao* 天道) (WX 4–5).

Now of course the two distinctions are closely related, for virtue/virtuosity (*de*) is central in both. So the idea of *de* is the key to understanding the text. WX repeatedly points out that delight (*le* 樂) is essential for *de*. For example, the text suggests that if one hears of the Way (*dao* 道) and delights in it, then one can be said to be having a fondness for virtue (WX 50). On the other hand, if one has no delight in certain behaviour, then one is correspondingly without virtuosity (WX 6, 8, 21). WX also suggests that virtuosity cannot be brought to completion without being

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[5] Cook points out that for some scholars LD represents a uniquely provocative example of the Confucian prioritization of familial values over political values (Cook 2012: 751). Cook himself thinks that the text might be unique in its frankness, but the precedence of familial values over political values is arguably the mainstream Confucian position (Cook 2012: 759). This is indeed the case. A similar position can already be found in the *Analects*, where Youzi 有子, a disciple of Confucius, pronounces that filial piety and brotherly love are the basis of being a proper human being and will make sure a person behaves well in the political realm (*Analects* 1.2) (Lau 1992). Since filial piety and brotherly love are the basis of political values, it can be inferred that when the two do conflict, familial values will take precedence over politics (Lau 1992).

[6] There is some debate over whether the same distinction applies as well to the virtue of sagacity (Cook 2012: 486; Csikszentmihalyi 2004: 279).

aspired to (*zhi* 志), while goodness cannot be approached without enactment (*wei* 為) (WX 7–8). Such a contrast between goodness and virtuosity strongly suggests that while goodness is primarily concerned with actions and behaviour, internal psychological states such as intention and aspiration play a special role in virtuosity. It is probably in line with such a concern with internal psychological states that WX makes a claim of the dominating role of the heart/mind. WX points out that the six organs—ears, eyes, nose, mouth, hands and feet—are the servants of the heart/mind, and whatever decisions are made by the heart/mind will be followed accordingly without disobedience by the six organs (WX 45–46). It is possible to infer from such claims of the text that virtuosity is rooted in certain states of the heart/mind. Aspiration, delight, as well as security (*an* 安) are states of the heart/mind when one reaches virtuosity. But why does a person have such states of the heart/mind when in possession of virtuosity? Now WX also suggests that a noble man is a person in whom all five virtuous conducts take shape internally and who can act on them in a timely manner. And a gentleman of purpose (*zhishi* 志士) is someone who aspires to the way of the noble man (WX 6–7). WX also says that singularity (*yi* 一) is the essence of a noble man, and a noble man is cautious in his solitude (*shen qi du* 慎其獨) (WX 16).[7] WX likewise suggests that sagacity is to hear of the way of the noble man and understand it. And a sage is someone who understands the way of Heaven. When someone practises the Way in a timely manner, then there is virtuosity (WX 26–27). Thus aspiration, delight and security are aspects of virtuosity in relation to the way of the noble man. When the way of the noble man is fully understood, a person then also wholeheartedly aspires to, delights in and feels secure in it. His conduct takes shape within and there is virtuosity. It is also such a person who can maintain singularity of purpose no matter whether he is alone or in the presence of others, meaning that his purpose remains constant and unified no matter what. Since the heart/mind of the person is firmly anchored in the way of the noble man, his body and all his organs will thus follow the way of the noble man without failure.

WX seems to believe that knowing the way of Heaven is essential to, or is the same as, fully understanding the way of the noble man. Although there is no further explanation of this idea in the Guodian text, we might suppose that it is because a secure foundation is found for the way of the noble man. Heaven thus both explains and justifies the way of the noble man. WX says that a noble man gathers great achievements (*ji da cheng* 集大成), and it is through advancement (*jin* 進) that one becomes a noble man (WX 42). WX lists the various ways to advance, including knowing something through the eyes, through analogy, or through examples. Then there is the Heavenly knowing through intuition or divination (*ji* 幾) (WX 47–48).[8] Again, the meaning of the sentence is unclear and there is no further explanation. Presumably WX thinks that Heaven plays a special role in one's advancement to the

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[7] Instead of "solitude" *du* 獨 might also be read as "single-mindedness", with *shen qi du* 慎其獨 meaning "cautious over single-mindedness", or "cherishing single-mindedness" (Chan and Lee 2015).

[8] There are various interpretations of the meaning of the character *ji* 幾 (Cook 2012: 518).

noble man. Maybe through a special connection with Heaven a person can then gain insight into the way of the noble man, which then helps him become a noble man and achieve virtuosity. Presumably it is out of such understanding that WX says that sagacity, through knowing the way of Heaven, is the basis of the other virtues and also the resulting virtuosity (WX 28). In contrast, humaneness plays a central role in goodness, where there is understanding, security, practice and respect in behavioural terms but is seemingly without an ultimate foundation (WX 30–31). Through such an articulation of the five conducts and virtuosity, WX complements the political texts, particularly *Cheng zhi* and *Zun deyi*. All five political texts that I have discussed above suggest that ethical cultivation of the ruler is the basis of government. *Cheng zhi* mentions that the ruler must embody ethical teachings through seeking within one's own self. *Zun deyi* suggests that it is through virtue/virtuosity that the ruler leads the people in the right direction. WX explains in further detail how to embody ethical teachings and to achieve virtuosity: that is, a person achieves sagacity through understanding the way of Heaven. Sagacity enables a person to fully understand the way of the noble man and to harmonize all five virtuous conducts. In such a state of virtuosity, a person delights in, and feels secure in, the way of the noble man. The noble man can thus maintain a singularity of purpose and is similarly cautious in his solitude. It is also through virtuosity that a person influences others deeply and can thus lead people in the right direction.

Xing zi ming chu (XZMC) tackles another aspect of ethical cultivation, which is the relation between human nature and education. XZMC points out that although all people possess human nature (*xing* 性), their heart/mind has no fixed intentions (*zhi* 志). It is when people come into contact with external things that intentions first arise. Intentions issue into action in accordance with gratification (*yue* 悅). Yet it is practice (*xi* 習) that fixes the heart/mind's intentions. Human nature comes from Heaven's mandate (*ming* 命), and emotions (*qing* 情) such as joy, anger, grief and sorrow come from human nature. The Way (*dao* 道), on the other hand, begins with emotions. Although the Way in its beginning is close to emotions, in its finality it is instead close to propriety (*yi* 義) (XZMC 1–3). The text also proclaims that all people within the four seas have the same human nature, but they employ their heart/minds in different ways and that is the result of the different education (*jiao* 教) that they receive (XZMC 9). The text suggests human nature might be affected in different ways. Among them, practice nurtures (*yang* 養) our nature and the Way develops (*zhang* 長) it (XZMC 11–12). The text also says that the pathway of the heart/mind (*xin shu* 心術) is primary for the Way. And among the four pathways of the Way, only the way of man is capable of being guided.[9] The *Odes*, *Documents*, *Ritual* and *Music* all arise from mankind. The sage observed and compared all the relevant expressions of man, then arranged and assembled them in a proper order and recorded them in the four classics. The four classics thus became the basis of education and only such an education gives rise to virtue (*de* 德) within (XZMC 14–18). The rest of the text then discusses music as the most effective way of cultivating the heart/mind. In particular, it highlights that the heart/mind must be sought

[9] There is speculation on what the other three pathways are (Cook 2012: 710–11).

in an authentic way (XZMC 37). And music, with its genuine sounds coming from emotion, can penetrate and transform the heart/mind deeply and quickly (XZMC 23, 36).

In my opinion, through such discussions XZMC attempts to answer two fundamental questions regarding ethical cultivation: First, what is the origin and purpose of ethical cultivation? Second, why is ethical cultivation motivating and effective? Regarding the first question, XZMC suggests that the origin of the Way is emotion and human nature. Yet the Way is not just the satisfaction of emotions, for the Way also aims at propriety and, by inference, other ethical values. It is reasonable to say that the Way constitutes the overarching framework of ethical cultivation and in turn is also constituted by ethical cultivation, for it is through ethical cultivation that the Way is realized. In this sense, practice and education, as components of ethical cultivation, are also aspects of the Way. Given that the pathway of the heart/mind is primary for the Way, then practice and education are likely concerned with the pathway of the heart/mind. That is, practice and education are meant to regulate the heart/mind and its intentions. Indeed, the text suggests that practice fixes intentions. Since the text also suggests that practice nurtures human nature, it is possible to infer that fixing intentions has a close relationship with the nurturing of human nature. XZMC likely assumes that intentions control human actions, for the text says that intentions wait for (*dai* 待) gratification to take action (*xing* 行). Given such an assumption, it is possible to infer that fixing intentions is meant to ensure a certain kind or pattern of actions so that our nature and emotions can be properly satisfied and nurtured. Practice and education, for their part, are meant to bring about the right kind of intentions and actions. The Way, and in particular the way of man, then represents the proper pattern of human emotions, intentions and actions. It is possibly based on such an understanding that the text says that the Way develops human nature. For presumably only through such a proper pattern can human emotions, intentions and actions be matched with each other harmoniously and a good life for man achieved. Thus, although the origin of ethical cultivation is human nature and emotions, the purpose of ethical cultivation is to realize ethical values and virtuosity, since it is believed that human nature can only be nurtured and developed through the Way.

Regarding the second question, the text's answer is closely related to its answer to the first. We have already seen above that XZMC believes that the Way originates from emotions and human nature, and at least one of its purposes is to develop human nature. XZMC seems to assume that there is no fundamental divergence between human nature and ethics. The text does not describe any direct conflict between human nature and virtue, even though it is said that emotions might lead to indulgence in improper music (XZMC 27). On the contrary, the text does explicitly say that human nature gives rise to humaneness which in turn serves as the orientation (*fang* 方) of human nature, and that trustworthiness is the orientation of emotions (XZMC 39–40). Given that human nature has a natural inclination to realize and develop itself, the fact that the Way and its embodiment in ethical cultivation can nurture and develop human nature helps to explain why ethical cultivation is intrinsically attractive and motivating: the motivation to engage in ethical cultivation

comes precisely from the natural motivation of man to satisfy and develop his nature. The suggestion of the text that humaneness comes from human nature and that humaneness and trustworthiness serve as the orientation of human nature and emotions, respectively, further clarifies the close relation between virtue and human nature: virtue is not an external constraint on human nature but the natural outgrowth of it, which helps to nurture and develop human nature.[10] XZMC describes in details how proper music cultivates our natural emotions. Such a detailed articulation of musical cultivation illustrates how ethical cultivation in general should proceed. The text is of the opinion that ethical cultivation should remain true to our human nature and emotions, meaning that ethical cultivation must not be hypocritical and fabricated, but must resonate with the genuine expressions of our nature. It is believed that only in this way can ethical cultivation be effective and successful.

5 Texts on Related Concerns

The three remaining Confucian texts—*Lu Mu Gong wen Zisi* 魯穆公問子思 (Lord Mu of Lu Asked Zisi), *Qiong da yi shi* 窮達以時 (Poverty or Success Is a Matter of Timing), and *Tang Yu zhi dao* 唐虞之道 (The Way of Tang and Yu), all deal in one way or another with political governance and its interaction with ethical cultivation. *Lu Mu Gong wen Zisi* (LMGWZ) is comprised of only eight short strips and is the shortest text of the Guodian corpus (Cook 2012: 419). The text is concerned with the question of what kind of person a loyal minister is and records conversations of Lord Mu of Lu with Zisi and another minister, CHENGSUN Yi. When asked by Lord Mu what kind of a person a loyal minister is, Zisi replied that a loyal minister constantly talks about his ruler's flaws (LMGWZ 1–2). Lord Mu was displeased but CHENGSUN Yi praised Zisi and explained that someone who constantly talks about his ruler's flaws will distance himself from salary and rank, and such a person can do so only out of considerations of propriety (LMGWZ 7).[11] Through such conversations, the text obviously thinks that a loyal minister should serve his ruler with propriety. Pleasing the ruler so as to get a better salary and higher rank should not be his concern. And one major exemplification of his loyalty to his ruler is to constantly point out the ruler's flaws, supposedly helping the ruler to rectify his flaws and become a better ruler.

Qiong da yi shi (QDYS) investigates the roles played by human effort and uncontrollable factors. The text suggests Heaven and man play different roles and it is

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[10] Here my reading of the text is a bit different from that of Goldin (2005: 38–39). Goldin tends to use a narrow conception of morality, limiting it to propriety (*yi* 義), while I tend to employ a broader conception of morality, including within it humanness (*ren* 仁). Thus although I agree with Goldin that according to the text our inborn nature is not yet moral, I do not think that morality or ethics is consequently wholly external to our nature.

[11] There is a lacuna before the character *yi* 義 (propriety) on strip 7. Scholars have speculated on the possible missing characters (Cook 2012: 426). Here for the sake of simplicity I mention only propriety.

important to be perceptive of the distinction between Heaven and man (*tian ren zhi fen* 天人之分), for only then does one know how to act (QDYS 1). The text then points out that even if a person is worthy (*xian* 賢) enough, he will not be able to accomplish much if the time is not right (*shi* 世). Yet if the right time comes, then there will be no difficulties for him in becoming successful (QDYS 2). The text then gives a series of examples of past sages and worthy people. In all these examples, there is a sharp difference between the person's life experiences before and after, either rising from obscurity to a significant position, or declining from numerous accomplishments to execution. The text points out that the different experiences result not from the person's qualities, but are a matter of circumstance. Circumstantial happenings come from Heaven, the text says, implying that they are beyond human control (QDYS 11). Since human effort cannot guarantee the results of one's actions, the text advises that a person move not for success or fame. Doing so, he will then not be distressed if in poverty, nor be embittered if not appreciated by others (QDYS 11–12). The text points out that since doing good or bad is up to the person himself, a person should be constant regarding his virtue and conduct, notwithstanding poverty or success (QDYS 14). The text concludes that since poverty or success is a matter of timing, the noble man is earnest about returning to himself (*fan ji* 反己), implying that returning to one's own self is the way to maintain constancy in virtue and conduct (QDYS 15).

Tang Yu zhi dao (TYZD) talks about the way of ruling of the sage kings Yao 堯 and Shun 舜. The text points out that the way of Tang 唐 and Yu 虞 (the names of the states of Yao and Shun respectively) was such that they abdicated in favour of worthies rather than passing the throne to their own sons. And they brought benefits to the whole world rather than to themselves. Abdication in favour of a worthy successor, rather than strict hereditary succession, is the pinnacle of sagacity, and bringing benefits to the whole world without benefiting oneself is the height of humaneness. The text also suggests that the completion of sagacity requires the ruler to rectify himself before he rectifies the world (TYZD 1–3). The text then points out that the practice of Yao and Shun was to love their parents and to honour the worthy. Loving parents is filial piety, and the wider application of filial piety is to love all the people of the world. Honouring the worthy so that there is abdication, and the effect of abdication ensures that there is no hidden virtue in the age. Filial piety is the acme of humaneness, and abdication is the height of propriety. It is important to maintain both humaneness and propriety, so that one has to love one's parents as well as honour the worthy, not abandon one for the other (TYZD 6–9). The text thus makes a forceful connection between ethical cultivation and political governance by stringing together three pairs of conduct into two groups and ultimately into a coherent framework. The three pairs of conduct are: abdication and benefiting the whole world; loving parents and honouring the worthy; humaneness and propriety. First there is the virtue of humaneness, which is first exemplified and cultivated in loving one's parents through filial piety, and then extended to loving the whole world. Second there is the virtue of propriety, which is exemplified in honouring the worthy and abdication, with the latter having the impact of promoting virtue among the people. The text highlights that both groups of conduct were

equally important for the rule of Yao and Shun and neither can be forsaken for the other. In the concluding part of the text, the importance of ethical cultivation is again highlighted. On the one hand, it is said that having the throne and possession of the world did not augment (*yi* 益) Yao and Shun, and losing the world through abdication did not diminish (*sun* 損) them (TYZD 19). This can only be because they did not value external possessions like the throne but valued only their own virtue. On the other hand, it is further explained that abdication refers to upholding virtue and investing in worthies. Uphold virtue and the world becomes enlightened; invest in worthies and the people are transformed. And the text stresses that there is no way to transform the people without abdication (TYZD 20–21).[12]

6 Guodian Confucian Texts and Remaining Questions

In the previous sections I have analyzed all the Confucian texts in the Guodian corpus, except the *Yucong* 語叢 (Thicket of Sayings). The *Yucong* texts on the whole, consisting of fragmented aphorisms, present few arguments on the theme of ethical cultivation and governance. Since this chapter is concerned with the Guodian Confucian texts as a group on that theme, I have excluded the *Yucong* texts from my analysis. As seen from the previous analyses, the Guodian Confucian texts present a rudimentary framework of governance through ethical cultivation, which starts from self-cultivation, progresses through harmonizing the family, and culminates in transforming the whole world. This framework became a dominant idea of Confucianism in later ages and is best represented by the eight stages of cultivation in the “Great Learning” (*Daxue* 大學) chapter of the *Liji* 禮記 (Book of Ritual). Although the framework itself might still be rudimentary, the Guodian Confucian texts as a whole offer comprehensive and highly coherent ideas on governance through ethical cultivation. However, when compared with later Confucian texts such as the *Mengzi* and the *Xunzi*, are there any distinctive features of the Guodian Confucian texts as a whole? Now of course the Guodian Confucian texts differ stylistically from the *Mengzi*’s lengthy dialogues and the *Xunzi*’s argumentation essays, and such literary features impact on the scale and style of arguments.[13] However an investigation of such stylistic features is beyond the scope of this chapter. Besides stylistic features and their implications, I can identify three features of the Guodian

[12] Now such a claim that abdication is necessary for the transformation of the people is certainly distinctive among the Guodian Confucian texts and seems to contradict the position of other texts, which only suggest ethical cultivation is necessary for the people’s transformation. I think we need to read such a seemingly radical claim in context. TYZD argues that abdication exemplifies upholding virtues and investing in worthies, and it is based on such a conclusion that the text further claims that abdication is necessary for the people’s transformation. Thus it is actually upholding virtues and investing in worthies, ethical cultivation in other words, that brings about the transformation of the people. Seen in this light, the position of TYZD is no different from that of the other Guodian Confucian texts.

[13] I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me.

Confucian texts. First, there is no clear engagement with other schools of thought. It might be that other schools of thought were not yet influential at the time of the Guodian Confucian texts, or the authors of the texts did not think it important to debate with other schools. Although influences of other schools might be found, such as the notion of benefit (*li* 利) as a possible influence of Mohism, and ordained nature (*xingming* 性命) as a possible influence of Zhuangzi (both notions appear in TYZD), there is no explicit reference to either Mozi or Zhuangzi or other non-Confucian thinkers in the texts. Second, the Guodian Confucian texts do not offer any explanation of the causes of disorder. The texts seem to have an overwhelming confidence in the Confucian framework of governance through ethical cultivation and seem to assume that, once such a framework is implemented, order will be established or restored in the world. Although XZMC briefly mentions the improper music of states like Zheng 鄭 and Wei 衛, and CZ refers to the petty man (*xiaoren* 小人) wreaking havoc upon Heaven's constancy, there is no systematic explanation of the causes of disorder and badness. One might be tempted to ask, if all is well, why is there disorder in the first place and the need to restore order? Third, there is no systematic discussion of the foundation and justification of rulership. The texts seem to assume that the ruler has authority and immense influence upon the people. The texts are concerned with whether the ruler himself is ethically cultivated or not, and how he might transform the people. There is no systematic reflection upon questions such as why a ruler is necessary for the world, what the ultimate basis of the ruler's authority is, and why the people are moved to obey the ruler. I suggest it is precisely against questions like these that Xunzi offers his version of Confucianism which, although sharing a lot of common ground with the Guodian Confucian texts, also has distinctive differences.

7 Xunzi's Defence of Confucianism

Although Goldin's suggestion that Xunzi belongs to the same lineage as the Guodian Confucian texts might be challenged, his assumption that Xunzi had knowledge of the Guodian texts is otherwise very probable (Goldin 2005: 57). It is likely that Xunzi was familiar with materials of the Guodian Confucian texts, as there are many similar ideas in the text of the *Xunzi*. Since these similarities are too many to list, I give only a few significant passages as examples. When asked how to run the state, Xunzi replies that there is only the need to cultivate one's person (*xiushen* 修身). Then he uses several examples to illustrate the responsive relationship between the ruler and the people, such as that the ruler is a basin and the people are the water, and if the basin is round, then the water will be round (K12.4/H12.142–148).[14] Xunzi clearly accepts the idea that the ruler must earnestly engage in ethical cultivation and act as the moral exemplar for the people. Xunzi also says that Heaven and

[14] The number K12.4 refers to Knoblock's section number (Knoblock 1988–1994). I also list the chapter number and line numbers of the corresponding passage of Hutton (2014).

Earth are the beginning of life while ritual and propriety (*li yi* 禮義) are the beginning of order. The noble man is the beginning of ritual and propriety and is mother and father to the people (*min zhi fu mu* 民之父母). The noble man also establishes the proper relationships between ruler and minister, father and son, elder and younger brothers, and husband and wife. Such proper relationships are called the great root (*da ben* 大本) and they share the same pattern with Heaven and Earth (*yu tiandi tong li* 與天地同理) (K9.15/H9.290–306). Xunzi's idea that Heaven gives rise to life but it is through ritual and propriety that the noble man gives rise to order (*zhi* 治) shares an affinity with the idea in XZMC that the Way begins with emotions that come from Heaven, but is completed only with propriety. The same term, *min zhi fu mu*, is also employed in LD, in the discussions of the six positions. Although the relationship of elder and younger brother is not directly mentioned in LD, the text does mention brotherly love (*di* 弟 as 悌). The idea that the Confucian order shares the same pattern with Heaven is manifest in the Guodian Confucian texts, though we shall see below that Xunzi has distinctive interpretations of this idea that distance him from the Guodian texts.

Xunzi also talks about the grand manifestation (*da xing* 大形) of the ultimate Way (*zhi dao* 至道) and suggests one exemplification of it is such that the ruler sits by himself and yet the whole world follows him as if they were a single body, just like the four limbs follow the heart/mind. The idea that the people are the body while the ruler is the heart/mind occurs in ZY as well, where the importance of being manifest to the people is under discussion. Similarly, in a reply to King Zhao of Qin 秦昭王, Xunzi points out that when a Confucian follower becomes the people's superior, he will manifest loyalty and trustworthiness, love and beneficence (*ai li* 愛利) to his subordinates (K8.2/H8.72–79). The importance of loyalty and trustworthiness on the part of the ruler is stressed in ZXZD, while loving and benefitting the people is also emphasized in TYZD. As the last example, I might mention Xunzi's distinction of the internal and external, where the relationship of father and son belongs to the internal while the relationship between ruler and minister belongs to the external (K23.5a/H23.265–267). A similar idea is also central in LD.

Xunzi clearly espouses the Confucian framework of governance through ethical cultivation. Yet when compared with the Guodian Confucian texts, Xunzi offers some additional explanations for the framework and at other times gives alternative interpretations of the framework. In response to the brutal power politics of the late Warring States China and criticisms from all sides by the enemies of Confucianism, Xunzi possibly thinks it necessary to better explicate and justify the Confucian framework (Schwartz 1985: 257, 290).[15]

Xunzi explains the necessity of governance. He suggests that it is necessary for man to live in a community (*qun* 群), and it is also because man lives in a community and cooperates that we excel over other animals. Yet community living requires

[15] Since this chapter compares the Guodian Confucian texts and the *Xunzi* in relation to the Confucian vision of restoring the normative human order, naturally I tend to emphasize their commonalities rather than their divergences. This is not to suggest that there are not grave differences between the two, nor that such differences are unimportant.

proper distinctions (*fen* 分), otherwise there are conflicts and disorder. The ruler is the pivot of managing distinctions and is good at running the human community (K9.16a/H9.316–348; K10.4/H10.105–111). Through such arguments, Xunzi makes three important points: firstly, by and large man must live in a community. There might be a few hermits, but hermits are also dependent, however remotely, on the human community culturally, technologically and environmentally. Secondly, community living requires regulation and norms. Even decisive physical force cannot replace such norms, for otherwise there will still be conflicts and disorder. Thirdly, regulation and norms are dependent on an authoritative source to be effective. Thus, a ruler is also necessary for community living. In this way, Xunzi makes a powerful case for the Confucian vision, which combines authority with ethical norms: community living requires authority, but authority cannot be based on physical force only and must be based on ethical norms as well. Xunzi firmly believes that ritual and propriety and other Confucian virtues are precisely the embodiment of the proper norms of the human community. That is why he claims that the Confucian order shares the same pattern with Heaven and Earth. In an important way, Xunzi's explanations also complement the response of Confucius to the hermits. Through the mouth of Zilu 子路 Confucius once replied to the criticism of an old hermit, saying that the relation between old and young, and the propriety between ruler and minister cannot just be abolished, and it is impermissible to bring chaos to the great relation (*da lun* 大倫) in order to keep oneself clean (*Analects* 18.7).

Furthermore, Xunzi explains the source of disorder. Xunzi suggests that there will be conflicts and disorder if community living is without distinctions. But why should this be the case? Xunzi explains the origin of ritual and points out that man is born with desires, and necessarily seeks to satisfy his desires, yet without proper measures and standards to guide his search, inevitably there will be conflict and disorder. Ritual is just the measure to guide the proper satisfaction of desires (K19.1a/H19.1–11). Xunzi gives more detailed arguments of this point in chapter 23 of his book and suggests that human nature is bad (*xing e* 性惡) while goodness comes from artifice (*wei* 偽). By human nature, Xunzi refers to all natural dispositions and inclinations, particularly natural emotions and desires. Xunzi does not think that reflective activities of the heart/mind are a part of human nature, because such activities are conscious and deliberate and are the expression of human effort rather than blind activities of our biological nature. Through such a division between nature and artifice, Xunzi explains why nature alone will necessarily lead to conflict and disorder, because natural emotions and desires themselves are blind and chaotic. Reflection, deliberation and choices are only possible with the heart/mind. Through accumulation of reflection and practise (*xi* 習) of actions, the sage found the proper norms and established ritual and propriety. Ritual and propriety are not only necessary for social order but also necessary for individual good life. This is because everyone needs an ethical framework to order their own chaotic emotions and desires. In this way Xunzi explains both the human propensity to conflict and disorder, as well as the possibility and prospect of order and prosperity. Scholars

have pointed out that Xunzi develops some ideas of the XZMC (Liang 2008: 142–57; Chan 2012). Indeed, Xunzi claims that ritual nurtures desire, and that nature and artifice must be combined so as to bring about order for the whole world (K19.6/H19.359–370). Such positions are close enough to the ideas of XZMC.

Xunzi also establishes a firmer foundation for the Confucian framework of governance through ethical cultivation. Although the Guodian Confucian texts realize the importance of the way of man, they still tend to base the authority of the way of man on Heaven. For example, *Cheng zhi* thinks that ethical cultivation is to follow Heaven's constancy. WX also believes that knowing the way of Heaven is essential to fully understanding the way of the noble man and is a distinctive feature of being a sage.[16] However, in middle to late Warring States China, there was a profound metaphysical doubt as to whether Heaven stands on the side of Confucian ethics (Graham 1989: 107–11). Different thinkers proposed different understandings of Heaven and there seemed to be no conclusive evidence for the ethical nature of Heaven. Although Xunzi still thinks that the Confucian order shares the same pattern with Heaven and Earth, he does not think that its authority and justification are based on Heaven. Xunzi thinks rather that Heaven refers to a whole set of regularities and principles that operate by themselves and are indifferent to human conditions. Goodness and badness are instead based on human responses to circumstances (K17.1/H17.1–5). Xunzi also suggests that the Way refers not to the way of Heaven nor the way of Earth, but the way of man (K8.3/H8.101–103). The way of man, in turn, does not consist of any esoteric qualities, but the measures to ensure that human life can flourish over ten thousand ages. Xunzi is full of confidence that the Confucian order of humaneness and propriety represent precisely the proper measures that consider both the long run and the consequences (*chang lü gu hou* 長慮顧後) so that the people can be protected for ten thousand ages (K4.11/H4.268–271). Xunzi describes such a life as harmonious and unified community living (*qun ju he yi* 群居和一) (K4.12/H4.298–306). Xunzi also says that it is a life where everyone can fulfil their abilities, achieve their intentions, and find comfort and joy (K12.6/H12.243–244). For Xunzi, Confucian ritual marks out the Way so that people can live a good life in a precarious world (K17.11/H17.238–246). In other words, the Confucian order is an open and transparent system and its reasonableness can be judged by the kind of life lived by the people. Xunzi firmly believes that there is clear evidence for the superiority of the Confucian framework. Arguably his belief was borne out in history, where Confucianism became a dominant ideology for nearly 2000 years and is still the most influential element of Chinese culture.

[16] For a detailed discussion of the role of Heaven in the Guodian manuscripts, readers might consult Chan 2011, 2012.

8 Conclusion

I have analysed the Guodian Confucian texts along the two axes of ethical cultivation and political governance. I have also assessed the Guodian Confucian texts as responses to the Confucian vision of restoring order to the world. From the analyses of the Guodian Confucian texts we can indeed see a firm commitment to the equal importance of ethical cultivation and political governance, maybe best epitomized in the claim of loving parents and honouring the worthy, as seen in *Tang Yu zhi dao*. A similar claim of the division of the internal and the external, with humaneness belonging to the internal and propriety belonging to the external, is also seen in *Liu de*. Although there is a rudimentary framework of governance through ethical cultivation in the Guodian Confucian texts, they do not engage in certain questions: there is no systematic discussion of the causes of disorder and chaos, and thus the necessity of ethical cultivation and political governance; they do not adequately explain the foundation of rulership; and they do not engage with or foresee the challenges from other schools, for example, challenges concerning the ethical nature of Heaven. I suggest that it is in response to such questions that Xunzi articulates his understanding of the Confucian framework of governance through ethical cultivation.

Clearly there is a close connection between the Guodian Confucian texts and the *Xunzi*. Even if the Guodian Confucian texts and the *Xunzi* are not in the same lineage, we can still perceive a clear trajectory from the former to the latter. Xunzi develops certain potentialities of the Guodian Confucian texts and crafts a mature version of the Confucian framework of governance through ethical cultivation. More connections of the Guodian Confucian texts with not only the *Xunzi* but with other Confucian texts are certainly to be found. What is already certain is that the Guodian Confucian texts allow us to see the burgeoning development of Confucianism after Confucius, and the rich potentialities they hold for its later development.

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Chapter 17
From the *Liu wei* 六位 (*Six Positions*) Discussed in the *Liu de* 六德 (*Six Virtues*) to the *San gang* 三綱 (*Three Principles of Social Order*)



Li Rui

1 Introduction

In his tribute to the late Wang Guowei 王國維 (1877–1927), Chen Yinke 陳寅恪 (1890–1969) remarked that "the definition of Chinese culture is contained in the doctrine of the Three Major and Six Minor Principles (三綱六紀) proposed in the *Baihu tong* 白虎通." (Chen 1993: 10) During the May Fourth Movement, this doctrine, considered the core of the ritual system, was criticized by anti-traditionalist thinkers such as Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀 (1879–1942) as the pivot of pernicious influence that Confucius and Confucian thought had exerted on later generations. Today, we can adopt a more rational attitude toward this doctrine and ask: is it part and parcel of Confucianism? Has it existed since the time of Confucius, or was it proposed by later generations, as an elaboration of his teachings?[1]

2 The Notion of the "Liu wei" in the Early Chinese Texts

The relevant chapter of the *Baihu tong* explicates what are known as the Three Major and Six Minor Principles 三綱六紀 as follows:

> 三綱者何謂也? 謂君臣、父子、夫婦也。六紀者, 謂諸父、兄弟、族人、諸舅、師長、朋友也 … 何謂綱紀? 綱者, 張也。紀者, 理也。大者為綱, 小者為紀。所以張理上下, 整齊人道也。

[1] This chapter was originally written in Chinese and was translated by Daniel Lee with editorial modifications by Shirley Chan. Unless otherwise stated, citations of texts were rendered by the translator having consulted multiple sources.

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> What are the Three Major Principles? They are ruler and minister, father and son, and husband and wife. The Six Minor Principles are father's brothers, older and younger brothers, clansmen, mother's brothers, teachers and elders, and friends … What is meant by major and minor principles? Major principles are [the core] set up (*zhang* 張). Minor principles are [additional] arrangements (*li* 理). A major principle is the greater; a minor principle is the lesser. Hereby [social] hierarchy is set up and arranged (*zhang li shang xia* 張理上下), and the human *dao* is put in order (*zheng qi ren dao* 整齊人道). (Chen 1994: 373–74)

The Three Major Principles constitute the core of the doctrine discussed, and reliance on the "major and minor principles" is how "[social] hierarchy is set up and arranged, and the human *dao* is put in order." The source of such thinking can be retraced to the *Yueji* 樂記, when Zixia 子夏 says to Prince Wen of Wei 魏文侯:

> 夫古者天地順而四時當, 民有德而五穀昌, 疾疢不作而無妖祥, 此之謂大當。然後聖人作為父子君臣, 以為紀綱。紀綱既正, 天下大定。

> In antiquity, the world went along [the right course] and the four seasons came at the appropriate [time], the people were virtuous and the five crops abundant, diseases did not arise and there appeared no omens—this is called the great appropriateness (*da dang* 大當). Then the sages established the principles of [governing the relationships between] father and son and ruler and minister. Once these were correct, great stability [prevailed] in the realm. (Ruan 1980: 1540B)

The Guodian bamboo manuscript known as the *Tian chang* 天常 (originally titled *Cheng zhi wen zhi* 成之聞之) contains a similar statement:

> 天(建)大常, 以理人倫, 制為君臣之義, 著為父子之親, 分為夫婦之辨。是故小人亂天常以逆大道, 君子治人倫以順天德 … 是故唯君子道可近求而可遠措也 … 昔者君子有言曰: "聖人天德", 蓋言慎求之於己可以至順天常矣 … 是故君子慎六位以嗣天常。

> To arrange human relations according to the great regularity (*da chang* 大常) ordered by heaven [is to] stipulate that there be dutifulness between ruler and minister, familial affection between father and son, and distinction between husband and wife. The petty man rebels against heavenly regularity and opposes the great *dao*. The gentleman regulates human relations and goes along with heavenly virtue … Therefore, the gentleman's *dao* is such that he can seek [it] close by and apply [it] far … The gentlemen of the past had a saying: "The sage possesses the heavenly virtue." This means that if one carefully seeks it in oneself, one can attain and go along heavenly regularity … For this reason, the gentleman is cautious regarding the six positions in order to follow heavenly regularity. (Li 2005: 176–77, as revised)

As the graphs *dang* 當 (appropriateness) and *chang* 常 (regularity) were used interchangeably at that time, the great appropriateness mentioned in the *Yueji* can be identified with the great regularity discussed in the *Tian chang* (Gao and Dong 1989: 299).[2] Likewise, the "establishment of the principles of [governing the relationships between] father and son and ruler and minister" (作為父子君臣) mentioned in the *Yueji* can be identified with the "stipulation that there be dutifulness between ruler and minister, familial affection between father and son, and distinction between husband and wife" (制為君臣之義, 著為父子之親, 分為夫婦之辨)

[2] In ancient Chinese phonology, *dang* 當 is listed under the section *duan* initial (light tone) (端紐陽部), whereas *chang* 常 is under *chan* initial (light tone) (禪紐陽部). Both are alveolar sounds with the same finals; their pronunciation is very similar.

discussed in the *Tian chang*. The *Tian chang* also proposes relying on the relationships between ruler and minister, father and son and husband and wife to "arrange human relations" and to bring stability to the realm.

The Six Positions (*liu wei* 六位) as can be inferred from the *Tian chang*, and especially from the Guodian manuscript the *Liu de* 六德 (Six Virtues), refer to "husband and wife, father and son, and ruler and minister" (夫婦、父子、君臣). The *Liu de* mentions not only Six Positions, but also Six Stations (*liu zhi* 六職) and Six Virtues (*liu de* 六德): the ruler's dutifulness and the minister's loyalty, the husband's wisdom and the wife's trustworthiness, and the father's sagacity and the son's humaneness (君義臣忠,夫智婦信,父聖子仁). According to this text, these principles are discussed in the *Shi* 詩 (Odes), the *Shu* 書 (Documents), the *Li* 禮 (Rites), the *Yue* 樂 (Music), the *Yi* 易 (Changes), and the *Chunqiu* 春秋 (Spring and Autumn Annals):

> 故夫夫, 婦婦, 父父, 子子, 君君, 臣臣, 六者各行其職而獄犴無由作也, 觀諸詩、書則亦載矣, 觀諸禮、樂則亦載矣, 觀諸易、春秋則亦載矣。

> The husband [should act as] husband, the wife [should act as] wife, the father [should act as] father, the son [should act as] son, the ruler [should act as] ruler, and the minister [should act as] minister—if these six proceed according to their stations, there is no need for [the institution of] prison. [This] is also recorded in the *Odes* and the *Documents*, the *Rites* and the *Music*, the *Changes* and the *Spring and Autumn Annals*.[3]

The object here is the same as in the doctrine of the Three Principles. The expression Six Positions can also be found in "Dao zhi" 盜跖, one of the miscellaneous chapters of the *Zhuangzi* 莊子:

> 滿苟得曰: 小盜者拘, 大盜者為諸侯, 諸侯之門, 義士存焉 … 子張曰: 子不為行, 即將疏戚無倫, 貴賤無義, 長幼無序。五紀六位,將何以為別乎? 滿苟得曰: 堯殺長子, 舜流母弟, 疏戚有倫乎? 湯放桀, 武王殺紂, 貴賤有義乎? 王季為適(嫡), 周公殺兄, 長幼有序乎? 儒者偽辭, 墨者兼愛, 五紀六位將有別乎 …

> Man Goude said: "The petty thief is imprisoned but the great thief becomes a feudal lord; the gates of the feudal lords are where righteous gentlemen are to be found." "But," said Zi Zhang, "if you do not care for conduct, then there cease to be any ties between close and distant kin, any dutifulness between the noble and the base, any order between the elder and the young. How is one to distinguish the five principles and the six positions?" Man Goude said, "Yao killed his eldest son, Shun exiled his mother's younger brother—are there any ties between close and distant kin here? Tang banished his ruler Jie, King Wu killed his ruler Zhou—is there any dutifulness between the noble and the base here? King Ji had his youngest son as his heir, the Duke of Zhou killed his elder brother—is there any order between the elder and the young here? With the Confucians and their fake speech, and the Mohists and their all-encompassing care, will the five principles and the six positions be distinguished?" (Guo 2012: 977–98)

Sima Biao 司馬彪 glosses Six Positions found in this passage precisely as the relationships between ruler and minister, father and son, and husband and wife, and this is contextually coherent. The assertion that "the petty thief is imprisoned but the great thief becomes a feudal lord …" is similar to another Guodian text, the *Yucong*

[3] My own interpretation, with Wuhan Daxue and Jingmenshi Bowuguan 2011.

4 語叢四: “Those who steal a belt buckle are executed but those who steal a state become feudal lords; the gates of the feudal lords are where righteous gentlemen are found” (Bowuguan 1998: 217) This shows that even if the above dialogue is not factual, the sentiment expressed in it is not out of touch with the zeitgeist prevailing then. As can be seen, the notion of the Six Positions was in wide circulation at the time, and it occupies an important place in Confucian doctrines—otherwise Man Goude would not have made so much effort to refute it.

Scholars have discussed numerous notions similar to the Six Positions found in extant literature of early times. A relatively important one is the relationships of “husband and wife, father and son, older and younger brothers, and ruler and minister” as the “eight elements of good governance” (*ba zheng* 八政) in the “Chang xun” 常訓 chapter of the *Yi Zhou shu* 逸周書 (Huang et al. 2007: 56). Also, in “The Twenty–Fifth Year of Prince Zhao” 昭公 二十五年 chapter of the *Zuo zhuan* 左傳, Zi Da Shu addresses Zichan:

> 夫禮, 天之經也, 地之義也, 民之行也。天地之經, 而民實則之……為君臣上下, 以則地義; 為夫婦外內, 以經二物; 為父子、兄弟、姑姊甥舅、婚媾姻亞, 以象天明。
>
> Ritual is the warp of heaven, the rightness of earth, and the conduct of the people. Since it is the warp of heaven and earth, the people take it to be their rule … The high and low of ruler and minister imitate the rightness of earth; the outside and inside of husband and wife differentiate between the two; [the relationships between] father and son, older brother and younger brother, paternal aunts, sororal nephews and maternal uncles, and relatives by marriage, emulate the brightness of heaven. (Ruan 1980: 2017B–18B)

In the “Liyun” 禮運 chapter of the *Liji* 禮記, Confucius says:

> 以正君臣, 以篤父子, 以睦兄弟, 以和夫婦。
>
> Rectifying [the relationship between] ruler and minister, making sincere [the relationship between] father and son, making amicable [the relationship between] older brother and younger brother, and harmonizing [the relationship between] husband and wife …

He also says:

> 父慈、子孝、兄良、弟弟、夫義、婦聽、長惠、幼順、君仁、臣忠十者,謂之人義。
>
> The father’s kindness, the son’s filiality, the older brother’s goodness, the younger brother’s respectfulness, the husband’s dutifulness, the wife’s obeisance, the elder’s benevolence, the younger’s deference, the ruler’s humaneness, and the minister’s loyalty—these ten are called human duty. (Ruan 1980: 1414B–22B)

According to tradition, the then middle-aged Confucius said this when he was an official in the state of Lu. It can be postulated that human relationships have long been closely linked to politics and have attracted much attention.

However, differentiating the father–son relationship from the manifold human relations and according particular importance to it appears to have been Confucius’ initiative. In the “Aigong wen” 哀公問 chapter of the *Liji* 禮記 we read:

> 公曰: 敢問為政如之何? 孔子對曰: 夫婦別、父子親、君臣嚴, 三者正, 則庶物從之矣。
>
> The prince said: “Dare I ask how to govern?” Confucius replied: “[The relationship between] husband and wife is [based on] distinction, [the relationship between] father and

> son, [on] close kinship, and [the relationship between] ruler and minister, [on] respect. If these three are correct, the myriad things follow suit.” (Ruan 1980: 1611C)

The “Aigong wen yu Kongzi” 哀公問於孔子 in the *Da Dai Liji* 大戴禮記 and the “Da hun” 大昏 chapter of the *Kongzi jia yu* 孔子家語 contain similar discourses. Confucius takes the rectification of the Six Positions to be the foundation of governance. Confucius probably uttered the above in his later years after his return to the state of Lu. It departs from his earlier view of the tenfold human duty as recorded in the “Liyun” 禮運 chapter of the *Liji*. One can refer the removal of the brotherly relation to “Yan yuan” 顏淵 of the *Lunyu* 論語: “Sima Niu asked with concern: ‘All men have brothers, I alone do not.’” (人皆有兄弟, 我獨亡) (Liu 1990: 488). As not everyone has siblings the relationships among brothers can be excluded from general discussions (it was later incorporated into the Six Minor Principles). According to the traditional view, Confucius edited the *Odes*, the *Documents*, the *Rites*, the *Music*, the *Changes* and the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. The poems “Guan ju” 關雎, “Lu ming” 鹿鳴 and “Qing miao” 清廟 (three of the so–called four openings (*si shi* 四始) opening the “Feng” 風, the “Ya” 雅 and the “Song” 頌 sections of the *Odes*) thematise the core values of the relationships between husband and wife, ruler and minister, and father and son respectively (Li 2004: 39–45). The extant *Documents* is incomplete; the Eight Elements of Good Governance mentioned in the *Yi Zhou shu* relate to the Six Positions; the *Rites* includes marriage and funerary ritual, as well as rites pertinent to meetings between the ruler and his ministers; and the *Music* complemented the *Rites*. Confucius “became fond of the *Changes* in his old age” (老而好《易》),[4] and the “Xu gua” 序卦 of the *Changes* makes this cosmological statement corresponding to his thinking:

> 有天地, 然后有萬物; 有萬物, 然后有男女; 有男女, 然后有夫婦; 有夫婦, 然后有父子; 有父子, 然后有君臣; 有君臣, 然后有上下; 有上下, 然后禮義有所錯。

> There is [the relationship of] heaven and earth, and then there are the ten thousand things; there are the ten thousand things, and then there is the [relationship of] male and female; there is [the relationship of] male and female, and then there is [the relationship of] husband and wife; there is [the relationship of] husband and wife, and then there is [the relationship of] father and son; there is [the relationship of] father and son, and then there is [the relationship of] ruler and minister; there is [the relationship of] ruler and minister, and then there is the [the relationship of] the high and the low; there is the [the relationship of] the high and the low, and then ritual and duty intersect. (Ruan 1980: 96A)

Finally, the *Spring and Autumn Annals* speaks of names and roles and emphasizes the distinction between ruler and minister, father and son, and husband and wife (Guo 2012: 1062). As can be seen, the traditional texts of the *Odes*, the *Documents*, the *Rites*, the *Music* and the *Book of Changes* all lend support to the locus of the *Liu de*.

To summarise, the relationships between “husband and wife, father and son and ruler and minister” constituting the Six Positions and emphasized in Confucianism were established in the later years of Confucius’ life. However, there is immense

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[4] Liao 1998: 280. A similar statement can be found in the “Hereditary House of Confucius” in the *Shiji* 史記孔子世家 (Sima 1982: 1937).

difference between this conception and the doctrine of the Three Principles where "the ruler is the minister's guiding principle, the father is the son's guiding principle, and the husband is the wife's guiding principle." The familiar Three Principles are characterized by unidirectional authority—the ruler, the father and the husband can lack benevolence and kindness and do not need to meet the proper standards, while the minister, the son and the wife must meet standards of loyalty and filiality. Additionally, the sequence of pairings in the two conceptions are different. Hence the conclusion: the doctrine of the Three Principles is not Confucius' teaching.

3 The Interpretations of "Liu wei" by Different Schools of Thought After Confucius

It was the later generations of Confucians who strove to promote the fundamental importance of the relationships between "ruler and minister, father and son and husband and wife" over many other human relationships, incorporating them into a cosmogonic theory corresponding to "the regularity of heaven", and granting them sacrosanct authority as *a priori* moral imperatives. An early sign of this tendency can be observed in the *Tian chang* and Zixia's statement in the *Yueji* as discussed previously. In the "Teng Wengong A" 滕文公上 chapter of the *Mengzi*, Mencius says:

> 人之有道也, 飽食暖衣, 逸居而無教, 則近於禽獸。聖人有憂之, 使契為司徒, 教以人倫: 父子有親, 君臣有義, 夫婦有別, 長幼有序, 朋友有信。
>
> There is a *dao* that people follow: if they are fed, clothed and comfortably lodged but not taught they are little different from birds and beasts. The sage [Yao] worried about this and appointed Xie as the Minister of Instruction to teach proper human relations: affection between father and son, dutifulness between ruler and minister, distinction between husband and wife, order between the old and the young, and trustworthiness between friends. (Jiao 2015: 313)

Here, proper human relations are determined by the sage. In the "Wang zhi" 王制 chapter of the *Xunzi*, Xunzi states:

> 君臣、父子、兄弟、夫婦, 始則終, 終則始, 與天地同理, 與萬世同久, 夫是之謂大本 … 君君、臣臣、父父、子子、兄兄、弟弟一也。
>
> The relationships between ruler and minister, father and son, older and younger brother and husband and wife begin and end, end and begin. [They] share the same arrangement 理 as heaven and earth and last for ten thousand generations. Thus, this is called the great root. .. The ruler [should act as] ruler, and the minister [should act as] minister; the father [should act as] father, the son [should act as] son; the older brother [should act as] older brother, and the younger brother [should act as] younger brother. (Wang 2013: 139)

Here, proper human relations share the same pattern as heaven and earth. This kind of thinking would ultimately be affirmed from the political perspective in the *Baihu tong*.

It was not only in Confucianism that the relationships between “ruler and minister, father and son and husband and wife” were seen as important. Contemporaneous schools often focused on the Six Positions in their discussion of order and disorder in the realm, and considered the goodness and badness of human relations to be the criteria for the assessment of all phenomena. They did not necessarily use the term Six Positions, but that was their gist. For instance, in the Guodian *Laozi C* 老子(丙) we read:

> 故大道廢, 安有仁義。六親不和, 安有孝慈。邦家昏【亂】,【安】有正臣。
>
> Once the great *dao* is lost, how can there be humaneness and duty? Once the six familial [relations] are not in harmony, how can there be filiality and parental love? Once the state is in disorder, how can there be upright ministers?” (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 121)

Wenzi gives the following response to King Ping:

> 是以君臣之間有道, 則【忠惠; 父子之】間有道, 則慈孝, 士庶間有道, 則【相愛】。
>
> Therefore, if there is [a proper] *dao* between ruler and minister, there is loyalty and benevolence; if there is [a proper] *dao* between father and son, there is kindness and filiality; if there is [a proper] *dao* between the gentlemen and the people, there is mutual care. (Hebei Cultural Relics Research Centre Ding Zhou Han Bamboo Corpus Editorial Team 1995: 29, supplemented with *Tong xian zhen jing* 通玄真經)

This point is made even more clearly in the received literature produced by other schools. In the “Jian ai B” 兼愛下 chapter of the *Mozi* 墨子, we read:

> 故兼者, 聖王之道也, 王公大人之所以安也, 萬民衣食之所以足也。故君子莫若審兼而務行之, 為人君必惠, 為人臣必忠, 為人父必慈, 為人子必孝, 為人兄必友, 為人弟必悌。
>
> Thus, all-inclusiveness is the *dao* if the sage king, that by which kings, princes and great people brought peace, and that by which there is enough food and clothing for the people. Therefore, there is nothing as [important] for the gentleman as examining all-inclusiveness and practising it diligently. The ruler must be kind; the minister must be loyal; the father must be merciful; the son must be filial; the older brother must be cordial; and the younger brother must be respectful. (Sun 2017: 126)

Even the reformers interested in penal codes acknowledged this. For example, the following exchange is recorded in the “Zhi yi” 執一 chapter of the *Lüshi Chunqiu* 呂氏春秋:

> 吳起謂商文曰: 事君果有命矣夫! 商文曰: 何謂也? 吳起曰: 治四境之內, 成馴教, 變習俗, 使君臣有義, 父子有序, 子與我孰賢? 商文曰: 吾不若子。
>
> Wu Qi addressed Shang Wen: “Is the efficacy of a ruler really predetermined by fate?” Shang Wen replied: “What do you mean?” Wu Qi asked: “Which one of us is wiser when it comes to governing the state within the four borders, accomplishing civilization and changing customs, so that there is dutifulness between ruler and minister and order between father and son?” Shang Wen answered: “I do not compare with you.” (Chen 2002: 1144)

In the “Hua ce” 畫策 chapter of the *Shang jun shu* 商君書, we find the following passage: “So–called rightness: the minister [ought to] be loyal, for the son [ought to] be filial; there [ought to] be ritual between the young and the old; there [ought to be] distinction between the male and the female” (所謂義者: 為人臣忠, 為人子孝, 少長有禮, 男女有別) (Jiang 1986: 113). In the *Shenzi* 慎子, it is proposed that:

"If the ruler is enlightened and his ministers upright, the state shall have good fortune; if the father is kind and his sons filial, and the husband trustworthy and his wife virtuous, the house shall have good fortune" (君明臣直, 國之福也; 父慈子孝, 夫信妻貞, 家之福也) (Xu 2013: 97). In the opening passage of the "Chu fang" 處方 chapter of the *Lüshi Chunqiu*, we read: "In all governing, roles must first be determined. If the ruler, the minister, the father, the son, the husband and the wife are all in an appropriate position, those below will not overstep their rank and those above will not act carelessly, the young will not be violent, and the old will not be negligent" (凡為治必先定分。君君臣臣父父子子夫夫婦婦六者當位, 則下不踰節而上不苟為矣, 少不悍辟而長不簡慢矣) (Chen 2002: 1680). Even the "Tian dao" 天道, an outer chapter of the *Zhuangzi*, recorded the following comment:

> 君先而臣從, 父先而子從, 兄先而弟從, 長先而少從, 男先而女從, 夫先而婦從。夫尊卑先后, 天地之行也, 故聖人取象焉。
>
> The ruler precedes, the minister follows; the father precedes, the son follows; the older brother precedes, the younger brother follows; the elder precede, the younger follow; the man precedes, the woman follows; the husband precedes, the wife follows. The precedence of the superior over the inferior is how the world proceeds and whence the sage draws his model. (Guo 2012: 474)

In the *Wei li zhi dao* 為吏之道, a Qin-dynasty bamboo text excavated at Shuihudi 睡虎地, Yunmeng 云夢 county, the following is stated: "The ruler should be benevolent, the minister should be loyal, the father should be kind, the son should be filial … The ruler's benevolence, the minister's loyalty, the father's kindness and the son's filiality are the root of [good] governance" (為人君則惠, 為人臣則忠, 為人父則慈, 為人子則孝. .. 君惠臣忠, 父慈子孝, 政之本也) (Shuihudi Qinmu Zhujian Zhengli Xiaozu 1978: 285;Cai 2015: 142–44). The kind of content featuring in the *Wei li zhi dao* can also be found in the *Zheng shi zhi chang* 政事之常 excavated from Wangjiatai Tomb 15 at Jiangling 江陵王家臺, the Qin bamboo manuscript *Wei li zhi guan ji qian shou* 為吏治官及黔首 purchased by the Yuelu Academy 岳麓書院 of Hunan University, and the Qin manuscript *Cong zheng zhi jing* 從政之經 collected by Peking University. This shows that by the time these texts were written respect for human relations, including those between ruler and minister and father and son, had already become common currency among intellectuals. The "Zhong xiao" 忠孝 chapter of the *Hanfeizi* 韓非子, on the other hand, features an idea close, in content and sequence, to the doctrine of the Three Principles:

> 父而讓子, 君而讓臣, 此非所以定位一教之道也。臣之所聞曰: "臣事君, 子事父, 妻事夫。三者順, 則天下治; 三者逆, 則天下亂。" 此天下之常道也。
>
> For fathers to yield to sons and for rulers to yield to ministers is not the *dao* of determining the positions and unifying the teaching. I have heard the following: "The minister serves the ruler, the son serves the father, and the wife serves the husband. If these three [relations] operate smoothly, the realm will be in order; if they run contrary [to what has been said], the realm will be in disorder." This is the constant *dao* of the realm. (Wang 2016: 510)

Judging by "I have heard the following" (臣之所聞), this conception must have emerged even before Han Fei. However, there is no such statement in the received *Xunzi* 荀子, which means that Han Fei probably did not hear it from his teacher.

The human relationships discussed in the *Laozi* 老子 and the *Wenzi* 文子, among other texts, cover more or less the same as the Three Major and Six Minor Principles, and their core ideas can be reduced to the relationships between "husband and wife, father and son, and ruler and minister". One may thus say that many influential thinkers active during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods organized their teachings around the question of how to harmonise human relations—this includes the apparently relentless intellectuals who focused predominantly on penal codes. Moreover, the goals of these thinkers were largely similar, as they all hoped for fathers to be kind, sons to be filial, rulers to be benevolent, ministers to be loyal, husbands to be trustworthy, and for wives to be virtuous. Although the particular virtues associated with these roles may have differed from one thinker to another, the Six Positions remained the same, only the proposed means for realizing the relevant ideals varying. Since these means lay at the root of the individual teachings, the specific paths leading to their convergence are worth commentators' attention. However, it is also important to note the commonly esteemed goal, especially since it underwent gradual refinement and internalisation, so much so, that it became difficult for later scholars, in their thinking and personal conduct, to escape this "self–evident" framework. To summarize, what the Confucians called the Six Positions is by no means an equivalent of the later Three Major Principles. On the other hand, the Six Positions were discussed by other schools as well. Any school, irrespective of what dominance it had achieved, would have accorded importance to this notion.

4 From the "Liu wei" to the "San gang"

In the "San gang liu ji" 三綱六紀 chapter of the *Baihu tong* we read:

> 君臣、父子、夫婦, 六人也, 所以稱三綱何? 一陰一陽謂之道, 陽得陰而成, 陰得陽而序, 剛柔相配, 故六人為三綱。
>
> Ruler and minister, father and son, and husband and wife are six people, why then are they called the Three Major Principles? One *yin* and one *yang* are [together] referred to as [one] *dao*: *yang* gets *yin* and is made complete, *yin* gets *yang* and is given its place in the order. The hard and the soft join together and thus six people form three principles. (Chen 1994: 373–74)

As can be seen, the doctrine of the Three Principles sorts the ruler–minister, father–son and the husband–wife relationships by the *yang* and *yin* rubrics. In the Guodian manuscript *Liu de*, in contrast, the Six Positions are classified into those internal to the family 門內 and those external to the family 門外:

> 仁, 內也。義, 外也。禮樂, 共也。內位父、子、夫也, 外位君、臣、婦也。疏斬, 苴绖, 杖, 為父也, 為君亦然 … 為父絕君, 不為君絕父 … 門內之治恩掩義, 門外之治義斬恩。
>
> Humaneness is internal, and duty is external. Ritual and music are common. The internal positions are those of the father, the son, and the husband; the external positions are those of the ruler, the minister, and the wife. The coarsest garment, hemp belt and walking stick are [used] to mourn one's father; it is the same for one's ruler. .. In the case of one's father's

death one ceases to mourn one's ruler but not vice versa. In governing the family, kindness overrides duty; in governing [the state] outside the family, duty is dissociated from kindness. (Wuhan Daxue and Jingmenshi Bowuguan 2011: 125, and my interpretation)

The concepts of the Six Positions and the Three Principles are thus fundamentally different. That said, Confucians were adepts of the *Changes* (Zhou yi 周易) and according to the "Tian xia" 天下 chapter of the *Zhuangzi* "[the function of] the *Changes* is to guide *yin* and *yang*" (《易》以道陰陽) (Guo 2012: 1062). Hence, the following question must be addressed: did the Three Principles appropriate the *Changes* to its doctrine?

We know that the sources of what is said in the *Baihu tong* lay in the "Ji yi" 基義 chapter of Dong Zhongshu's *Chunqiu fan lu* 春秋繁露:

凡物必有合 … 陰者陽之合, 妻者夫之合, 子者父之合, 臣者君之合。物莫無合, 而合各有陰陽, 陽兼於陰, 陰兼於陽; 夫兼於妻, 妻兼於夫; 父兼於子, 子兼於父; 君兼於臣, 臣兼於君。君臣、父子、夫婦之義, 皆取諸陰陽之道, 君為陽, 臣為陰; 父為陽, 子為陰; 夫為陽, 妻為陰 … 王道之三綱, 可求於天。

All things must have their counterpart … *Yin* is the counterpart of *yang*; the wife is the counterpart of the husband; the son is the counterpart of the father; the minister is the counterpart of the ruler. Nothing is without its counterpart, and each matching relation has its *yin* and *yang*. *Yang* is connected to *yin*, *yin* is connected to *yang*; the husband is connected to the wife, the wife is connected to the husband; the father is connected to the son, the son is connected to the father; the ruler is connected to the minister, the minister is connected to the ruler. The duty between the ruler and the minister, the father and the son and the husband and the wife stems from the *dao* of *yin* and *yang*: the ruler is *yang* and the minister is *yin*; the father is *yang* and the son is *yin*; the husband is *yang* and the wife is *yin* … The three major principles of the kingly *dao* can be sought from heaven. (Su 2015: 242–44)

Dong Zhongshu was a Ru scholar, but on closer examination it is not difficult to discover that the discourse in the *Chunqiu fan lu* differs from the tenets of the *Changes*. In the "Kun wenyan" 坤·文言 chapter of the *Changes*, we read: "the *dao* of the earth is the *dao* of the wife and the minister" (地道也, 妻道也, 臣道也) (Ruan 1980: 19A). "Xici shang" 繫辭上 has: "the *dao* of the *qian* 乾 represents the male, the *dao* of the *kun* 坤 represents the female" (乾道成男, 坤道成女) and "one *yin* and one *yang* is called *dao*" (一陰一陽之謂道) (Ruan 1980: 76A, 78A). However, the characteristic of the *Changes* is precisely change, and the "Shuo gua zhuan" 說卦傳 chapter states:

乾, 天也, 故稱乎父; 坤, 地也, 故稱乎母; 震一索而得男, 故謂之長男; 巽一索而得女, 故謂之長女; 坎再索而得男, 故謂之中男; 離再索而得女, 故謂之中女; 艮三索而得男, 故謂之少男; 兌三索而得女, 故謂之少女。

The *qian* is heaven and therefore it is applied to the father; the *kun* is earth and therefore it is applied to the mother; in the *zhen* 震, the first line is male and thus it designates the elder male; in the *xun* 巽, the first line is female and thus it designates the elder female; in the *kan* 坎, the second line is male and thus it designates the middle male; in the *li* 离, the second line is female and thus it designates the middle female; in the *gen* 艮, the third line is male and thus it designates the young male; in the *dui* 兌, the third line is female and thus it designates the young female. (Ruan 1980: 94C)

The maleness and the femaleness of the six children of the *qian* and the *kun* do not correspond to the *qian* and the *kun*, instead, the father and the mother correspond to them.

Dong Zhongshu was an expert in "inferring the alternation of *yin* and *yang* from disasters and rare omens recorded in the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, [according to which] one must block *yang* and arouse *yin* in order to bring rain, and do the reverse in order to stop it" (Sima 1982: 3128). The doctrine of *yin* and *yang* featured prominently in Dong's thinking. The conception recorded in "Ji yi" comes closest to the following remark found in the Mawangdui silk text *Cheng* 稱:

> 凡論必以陰陽【明】大義。天陽地陰 … 主陽臣陰。上陽下陰。男陽【女陰】。【父】陽【子】陰, 兄陽弟陰。長陽少【陰】。貴【陽】賤陰。達陽窮陰。
>
> Any conception must use *yin* and *yang* to [clarify] the great rightness. Heaven is *yang* and earth is *yin* … The ruler is *yang*, the minister is *yin*. The superior is *yang*, the subordinate is *yin*. The male is *yang*, [the female is *yin*]. [The father] is *yang*, [the son] is *yin*. The older brother is *yang*, the younger brother is *yin*. The old are *yang*, the young are [*yin*]. The noble are [*yang*], the base are *yin*. Arriving at *yang* and exhausting *yin* … (Mawangdui Hanmu boshu zhengli xiaozu bian 1976: 94)

The division of the Six Positions into internal and external found in the *Liu de*, on the other hand, is seen not only in many sections of the *Liji*, but also in the "Gongsun Chou B" 公孫丑下 chapter of the *Mengzi* 孟子:

> 景子曰: 內則父子, 外則君臣, 人之大倫也。父子主恩, 君臣主敬。
>
> Jingzi said: "In the family, there is the father and the son; outside the family, there is the ruler and the minister—these are the great human relations. Between the father and the son, the ruling [principle] is kindness; between the ruler and the minister, the ruling [principle] is reverence." (Jiao 2015: 278)

It is also seen in the "Xing e" 性惡 chapter of the *Xunzi* 荀子: "The man in the street can know the duty between father and son in [his home] and the uprightness between ruler and minister outside [his home]" (涂之人者, 皆內可以知父子之義, 外可以知君臣之正) (Wang 2013: 524). This shows very clearly that the discourse of the Six Positions had continuity but that Dong Zhongshu had chosen not to uphold this Confucian tradition but adopted ideas from the *yin-yang* doctrine; he remoulded the Six Positions into the Three Principles. Therefore, the Three Principles are neither Confucius' ideology nor Confucian thought; the doctrine is unrelated to Confucius or Confucianism.

As I noted earlier, all the early intellectual camps developed their ideologies in connection with the husband–wife, father–son, and ruler–minister relationships. The difference lay in how each school sought to realize their ideal. Since this constituted the starting point of each school's doctrine, Dong Zhonghu's reform turned out to be no small matter, as it arguably led to the transformation of the Confucian school. Using *yin-yang* thought as the basis of these relationships naturally resulted in the emphasis on *yang* relative to *yin*. The social ideal was supposed to be realized by means of acting in tune with *yin* and *yang*, to be practised according to the principle of the *dao* of dutifully honouring the noble and revering the senior (*gui gui zun zun de yidao* 貴貴尊尊的義道). On the other hand, the principle behind the differ-

entiation of the Six Positions into those "inside the family" and "outside the family" was the *dao* of familial affection based on humaneness (*qin qin de rendao* 親親的仁道). The difference between the two approaches is made clear in the "Sangfu si zhi" 喪服四制 section of the *Liji*:

> 恩者仁也 … 其恩厚者其服重, 故為父斬衰三年, 以恩制者也。門內之治恩掩義; 門外之治義斷恩。資於事父以事君, 而敬同, 貴貴尊尊, 義之大者也。故為君亦斬衰三年, 以義制者也。

> Kindness is humaneness … The deeper the kindness, the heavier the mourning. Therefore, for one's father, one wears coarse clothing for three years—this is due to kindness. Inside the house, kindness trumps duty; outside the house, duty severs kindness. One draws on [the way] one serves one's father to serve one's ruler, [and so] the reverence is the same. To honour the noble and to revere the senior (*gui gui zun zun* 貴貴尊尊)—this is duty at its greatest. Therefore, to wear coarse clothing for one's ruler for three years as well is due to duty. (Ruan 1980: 1964C–65A)

The idea expressed here is similar to that found in the *Liu de*. According to the principles prescribing the use of mourning garments, the most severe mourning is reserved for the father and the eldest son, and the source of this is consanguineous humaneness; as far as the ruler is concerned, one merely "draws on [the way] one serves one's father" (資於事父以事君); this is "honouring the noble and revering the senior" (貴貴尊尊). It is perhaps important to point out that in antiquity the ruler could be selected, whereas the relationship between father and son and familial affection were innate, beyond choice and change. Slips 78, 80, 81, 69, 70 and 89 of the Guodian manuscript *Yucong* 1 語叢一 likewise advocate this:

> 父, 有親有尊。長弟, 親道也。友、君、臣, 無親也。父子, 至上下也。兄弟,【至】先後也。君臣、朋友, 其擇者也。

> In the case of one's father, there is affection and there is seniority … Humaneness and care are the *dao* of familial affection. Between friends and between the ruler and the minister there is no affection. The father and the son are the ultimate high and low. The older brother and the younger brother are the [ultimate] prior and posterior. The relationships between ruler and minister and between friends are elective. (Li 2005: 46)

There is an innate affection between father and son and between older and younger brothers, but no such affection between friends or between ruler and minister. Therefore, the hierarchical character of the relationships between father and son and older and younger brothers is a matter of course, while the relationships between ruler and minister and between friends are elective. For the same reason, slips 1–7 of the *Yucong* 3 語叢三 state:

> 父無惡。君猶父也, 其弗惡也, 猶三軍之旌也, 正也。所以異於父者, 君臣不相戴也, 則可已; 不悅, 可去也; 不義而加諸己, 弗受也。

> There is no badness in the father. The ruler is similar to the father in that he [should] not be bad. This is like the banners of the three armies being equal. The difference between the ruler and the father is that, if the relationship between ruler and minister is not harmonious, it can be severed, and if one is displeased, one can leave. If something unrighteous is put on me, I shall not accept it. (Wuhan Daxue and Jingmenshi Bowuguan 2011: 158, with my interpretation)

The statement that "there [should] be no badness in the father" found here foreshadows the concept that the father is the guiding principle for the son. However, the ruler is merely an imitation of the father and so, in order for him not to be bad, an appropriated *dao* must be followed.

These traditional ideas had already been challenged in the mid-Warring States period. The opening section of the seventh scroll of the *Han shi waizhuan* 韓詩外傳 records a well-known story (the one found in the "Xiu wen" 修文 chapter of the *Shuo yuan* 說苑 is roughly the same):

> 齊宣王謂田過曰: 吾聞儒者喪親三年，喪君三年，君與父孰重? 田過對曰: 殆不如父重。宣王忿然曰: 曷為士去親而事君? 田過對曰: 非君之土地，無以處吾親; 非君之祿，無以養吾親; 非君之爵，無以尊顯吾親。受之於君，致之於親。凡事君，以為親也。" 宣王悒然無以應之。《詩》曰: 王事靡盬, 不遑將父。

> King Xuan of Qi said to Tian Guo: "I have heard that Confucians mourn their kin for three years and their ruler for three years. Of one's father and one's ruler, who is more important?" Tian Guo replied: "I'm afraid [the ruler] does not match the father." King Xuan said indignantly: "How, then, could a gentleman abandon his kin to serve his ruler?" Tian Guo replied: "If it were not for the ruler's land, there would be no place for my kin; if it were not for the ruler's bestowals, there would be no [way for me] to feed my kin; if it were not for the ruler's titles, there would be no [way for me] to honour my kin. I receive it from the ruler and deliver it to my kin. All service to the ruler is done for the kin." King Xuan became anxious and found no way to respond. In the *Odes*, it is said: "Service to the king is ceaseless, no time to care for one's father!" (Qu 2012: 309)

King Xuan of Qi's response implies an intention to challenge the authority of the father in favour of that of the ruler. By the time of the Qin unification and the Han, even though scholars might hold that "if the relationship between the ruler and the minister is not harmonious, it can be severed, and if one is displeased, one can leave", the reality was that there were no states left to wander about in in the hope of finding a ruler who would follow the proper *dao*—only the "barbarians". The relationship between ruler and minister was thus gradually moulded by political reality.

Moreover, as can be seen from the Qin bamboo manuscript *Shan nü zi zhi fang* 善女子之方, completed no later than the time of the First Emperor and collected by Peking University, the way of discussing the *dao* of husband and wife had also changed. Although the text says that "the husband and the wife are like the exterior and interior (表與裏), like *yin* and *yang*", the emphasis here is on the wife's "deriving her honour from complying with the husband's family", her respect for the husband, and the fact that she must "bend and receive orders" (Beijing Daxue Chutu Wenxian Yanjiusuo 2012: 67).

The fundamental feature of the transformation from the Six Positions to the Three Principles was the strengthening of the authority of one side of each relationship relative to the other, the implication of which was that the status of the "ruler" was enormously raised. In the ritual system, familial affection was by default more important than duty, which naturally implied the notion of appropriating the way of serving one's father for serving one's ruler; here, the relationship between father and son outweighed that of the ruler and minister. In the *yin-yang* doctrine, on the

other hand, both relationships were subsumed under the *yin-yang* schema, and respect toward one's father and toward one's ruler was rendered equally important (the probable outcome was that the relationship between ruler and minister was deemed more important than that between father and son). The first principle allowed for the emergence of the critical concept of following the *dao* rather than the ruler; the latter principle featured, regrettably, loyalty and filial piety as mutually exclusive.

The Six Positions morphing into the Three Principles meant a transformation of the core of original Confucian thought: a change from "familial affection" (*qin qin* 親親) to "respect" (*zun zun* 尊尊). The Three Principles found in the *Baihu tong* appear to resemble the Six Positions found in the *Liu de* but they are in fact different. The theoretical basis of the Three Principles confirmed in the *Baihu tong* is not at all the Confucian ritual system and Confucian thought but the *yin-yang* doctrine, and, in practice, it is Han Fei's model. Those who established the Three Principles in the *Baihu tong* were indeed Confucian scholars. However, the tradition they carried on was no longer that of original early Confucian teaching.

After the Qin unification, with the clan system supplanted by the commandery system, the ruler's authority became stronger and that of the patriarchal lineages weakened, and the idea that the wife ought to take orders from the husband prevailed in society. The doctrine of the Three Principles thus found fertile soil. Han Fei's thought, including his doctrine of the Six Positions, was very much favoured by the First Emperor. The Han inherited the Qin system. Although according to the "Lishu" 禮書 chapter of the *Shiji* 史記, "Emperor Wen of Han was fond of Daoist Learning" and although Liu Xiang 劉向 is recorded in the "Zheng shi" 正失 section of the *Fengsu tongyi* 風俗通義 as remarking that "Emperor Wen studied the Huang–Lao doctrine", the "Ru lin liezhuan" 儒林列傳 chapter of the *Shiji* is clear that "Emperor Wen was originally fond of the doctrine of the Legalist School" (Sima 1982: 1160; Wang 1981: 96; Sima 1982: 3117). Furthermore, according to the *Wan Shi Zhang Shu liezhuan* 萬石張叔列傳, "during the time of Emperor Wen, [Zhang Shu 張叔 (Ou 歐)] used his expertise in the Legalist doctrine to serve the crown prince" (Sima 1982: 2773). Emperor Xuan of Han summarised the problem correctly: "The house of Han, since coming to power, has fundamentally confused the system using the *dao* of hegemonic rule" (Ban 1962: 277). Daoism and Huang–Lao thought served as mere fringe adornment for the penal code, and officialdom became similarly adorned with Confucian discourse. In order to establish itself as the uniquely authoritative school, Confucianism had to radically transform itself. The chosen path was a Confucian–Legalist fusion, with Confucianism as the *yang* element and Legalism as the *yin*. The price for this arrangement was to become immense (I have discussed this in more detail elsewhere).

To summarise, the doctrine of the Three Principles is the result of political change and ideological struggle. Confucianism exploited its inclusiveness and used it as a banner in the campaign aimed at resolving the contradictions among the hundred schools and the conflict between early Confucianism and monarchical power. Confucianism drew support from that power, thereby gaining political sanction; monarchical power, in turn, drew support from transformed Confucian thought,

thereby building a theoretical foundation for its regime and a means to subjugate or contain recalcitrant ideologies and rival doctrines. In claiming to rule according to the principles of filial piety, the Han monarchy supported the implementation of Confucianism as the state ideology. However, the Confucian principle of familial affection and the spirit of following the *dao* rather than the ruler had largely been lost by then. And as these early Confucian checks against monarchical power lost effectiveness, the doctrine of the Three Principles became Confucianism's own snare. Even though later Confucians devised all kinds of methods to check the expansion of monarchical power, they were unable to go beyond the reformed concept of the relationship between ruler and minister they had brought on themselves. For this reason, if we say that the Three Principles later became the tool of institutional oppression, this is not related to Confucius and original Confucian thought; rather, it is an inadvertent result of the transformation of Confucianism during the Han, brought about through an incorporation of extraneous ideas.

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Chapter 18
Guodian: A New Window for Understanding the Introduction of Buddhism into China



Kenneth W. Holloway

This chapter builds upon research showing that the Guodian corpus has a coherent religious philosophy. The implications of this coherence have yet to be explored to their fullest potential, particularly as it relates to later developments in Chinese history. Having a new window into the religious world of pre-Han China should have transformed our assessment of historical developments at a fundamental level. In truth, deeply rooted historical trends are difficult to overturn. Previous scholarship privileged institutional questions, which skewed the discussion toward the elite levels of discourse. In contrast to the older search for how texts can shed light on the upper echelon of society, my work has sought to gaze downward at lower social strata to understand how it can offer insight into individual practices of self-cultivation. My approach reflects current trends in religious studies which value social history over an older political focus. A heightened interest in the role of embodiment has been a natural outgrowth of my inquiry into how these texts would have affected individuals. One influence on this analysis is the work of Richard Shusterman, whose somaesthetics helps to reconstruct features of texts that are otherwise visible only in hazy outlines.[1]

Prior to continuing to describe the argument of this chapter within the framework of religious studies in East Asia, it is important to pause to underscore a few aspects

[1] My first two books outline the coherence of the Guodian corpus with an emphasis on how they relate to individual practices of self-cultivation. A contrasting approach, one that focuses on elite discourse, is represented by Lewis. Richard Shusterman's work on somaesthetics and its relationship to Chinese philosophy was the subject of a 2015 special edition of *Frontiers of Philosophy in China* 10.2. This special issue does not discuss Guodian specifically, but more general connections with Confucian and Daoist thought. The connection between somaesthetics and Guodian is found in Shusterman's article (Shusterman 2009: 18–29). See Holloway 2009, 2013; Lewis 1990: 15–52; Wen 2015: 163–66.

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of the Guodian corpus which make it both coherent and unique. Two of the most important terms for the practice of self-cultivation in Early China are humanity (*ren* 仁) and righteousness (*yi* 義). In the received texts these two terms are either not used as a pair such as in the *Analects*, or if they are paired they are not distinguished such as in the *Mencius*. In Guodian these terms are paired with extremely high consistency and this pairing involves a sharp distinction between what the terms represent. I refer to them as binary opposites (Holloway 2009).

The opposition between the terms is often stark such as between the two options of a legal case in "The Five Aspects of Conduct" (*Wu xing pian* 五行篇 or WXP) or between options for royal succession in *Tang Yu zhi dao* 唐虞之道. This inherent tension that is built into the process of self-cultivation is present in the received corpus, such as Confucius' discussion with Ji Kangzi 季康子 or the dissonance between Mencius and Xunzi. However, if the received tradition is examined in isolation, this tension can be seen as incidental. It is only when viewed from the perspective of Guodian that it comes to be seen as fundamental to the process. Ultimately, this opposition and this tension must be transcended through the embodiment of these moral tenets, but this does not involve a disconnect from an engagement with broader societal concerns.

This embodiment of morality in Guodian will be used to sharpen the globally conceived theories of Prasenjit Duara, who has used the concepts of dialogical transcendence and circulatory history to prove that common values are shared in India and China. Duara's transnational theories are groundbreaking; his primary interest in building an analytical framework for these ideas is to situate them in as broad a transnational context as possible. For example, his first chapter moves briskly from Kant, to a discussion of heaven in early China, before analysing the environmental contributions of non-government organizations today (Duara 2015). Although Duara does not mention Guodian, I believe that using somaesthetics to develop a close reading of two sources, Guodian manuscripts and the Buddhist sutra *Vimalakirti*, will provide important grounding to what Duara has constructed as a global theory.

This embodiment focus will contribute to questioning the long-problematic idea that Buddhism was an entirely unfamiliar religious system in China. One example of this unfamiliar view that continues to remain important is Bokenkamp's approach, which explores the silence of pre-Han religious texts on the topic of the afterlife. Buddhism, through its ideas on rebirth, offered a sophisticated answer. His analysis is not primarily centred on Buddhism, but instead religious Daoist texts. As such, it can give insight into one aspect of how this conversation developed (Bokenkamp 2007).

Bokenkamp's observation that the Warring States Period had no wealth of writing on life after death is importantly supported by Falkenhausen, who works to fill in the lacuna of the textual tradition by focusing on the archaeological evidence for answers to how the afterlife was perceived in early China.[2] The problem with

[2]An exception to what I above characterise as the shortcomings of the broad approach is Falkenhausen, who provides an excellent comprehensive analysis (Falkenhausen 2006). His study

Bokenkamp's thesis is that not all Buddhist texts focus on the afterlife. In the *Vimalakirti*, for example, the emphasis is on how to live in the present moment. This highlights a social context where reincarnation or past lives are not the focus. As such, the *Vimalakirti* shares important common ground with Guodian, where there is also no interest in death or the afterlife. This lack of speculation on questions related to death has contributed to the sense that Guodian texts are not religious, which I have addressed in my previous monographs.

A new solution proposed here is to clarify Guodian religiosity by understanding it in a similarly socially oriented yet still Buddhist context. Obviously, not all Buddhist texts contain this common social ground with Guodian, but sutras that emphasize a more humanistic aspect are ideal candidates. It is worth noting that in the twentieth century the humanism of Buddhism has become the dominant interpretive lens. Most scholarship on *Vimalakirti* published between 1900 and 2011 that deals with the sutra's philosophical message has emphasized ways that it relates to practical applications in the lived experiences of practitioners. The humanistic focus of this large body of scholarship supports the goal of this chapter, which is looking for corollaries in Guodian.[3] The humanism of Buddhism cannot be decontextualized by avoiding reference to its pre-Han origins in Confucian and Daoist sources. Mutual scholarly benefit can be derived from Guodian-Buddhist studies, and the ideal starting point for this is *Vimalakirti*.

The shared focus of Guodian and *Vimalakirti* can be seen in their interest in how to both understand and perform life's duties at the present moment. However, these interests do not deny that there are significant challenges involved. What is meant by challenges is that interpersonal tension is inherent in this social context, and as such it is a central element of how these sources understand self-cultivation. There is an appreciation of social friction as something that refines us; negative experiences such as anger are included in the scope of what contributes to our religious development. The Guodian text "Discourse on Nature and Emotion" (*Xingqing lun* 性情論) contains a clear example in section 16 of the connection between friction and moral cultivation. "When people loathe you but you cannot be refuted you are one who has reached righteousness. When people refute you but you cannot be loathed you are one who is earnest in humanity" (惡之而不可非者, 達於義者也。非之而不可惡者, 篤於仁者也。).[4] Developing morality and using it in a social

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seeks to pair the rigour of deep single-tomb analysis with an aggregating of the data. Shun Kwong-loi illustrates the silence that Bokenkamp describes in the pre-Han tradition that necessitates the work of Falkenhausen (Shun 1993).

[3] As an illustration of the "large body of scholarship," please see the fascinating study of Cheng and Tse, which provides a comprehensive analysis of over a century of scholarship on the *Vimalakirti*. It categorizes the 256 Chinese and English articles that the researchers gathered, but also provides detailed discussions of scholarly trends (Cheng and Tse 2014: 1, 17–18).

[4] The Guodian text was originally entitled "Nature Emerges from Decree" (*Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出), whereas the Shanghai text was entitled "Discourse on Nature and Emotion" (*Xingqing lun* 性情論). The two almost identical texts contain a much more detailed discussion of emotion than decree/mandate, which is why the alternate name *Xingqing lun* is being used here. Ding provides an excellent collection of commentaries and transcriptions, and is a primary source that I used in

context is not an easy process, it involves people hating you in a variety of ways. This embrace of tension is different from much of the received tradition. One example is in *Mencius* 3B:9 where a broad overview of history from a political perspective is provided. Here, the *Mencius* sees moral cultivation as bringing harmony and tranquillity. 3B:9 continues to provide specific examples of how a sage ruler's virtuous actions can eliminate difficulties and unpleasantness. It is possible for a sceptic to speculate that the Guodian sees itself as a guide to morality in fallen times, but the "Discourse on Nature and Emotion" does not contain any evidence to support such a reading. Instead, it distances itself from the Mencian worldview by seeing dialogical transcendence as an attainable goal that is achieved through the embrace of the friction of everyday life.

A similar embrace of tension as an important component of self-cultivation is exhibited in the Buddhist sutra *Vimalakirti*. The hero of this eponymous sutra is a layperson with the unique ability to embarrass even the wisest and most capable of the Buddha's disciples. Throughout the text, conflict arises between the protagonist, Vimalakirti, and virtually everyone he meets. This can be seen in the third chapter of the sutra where the ten most revered disciples of the Buddha each recount instances when their knowledge of the dharma was shown to be inferior to the layperson Vimalakirti. Monastics who are Buddhist specialists, having their behaviour corrected by a simple merchant, is just the beginning of the text challenging normative social hierarchies. The text continues to build on this theme of nondiscrimination in the fourth chapter where Bodhisattvas explain how their understanding of the dharma was corrected by Vimalakirti. All of this reaches a crescendo when the Bodhisattva of Wisdom, Manjusri, visits this now infamous merchant. A crowd gathers to observe the encounter, which culminates in the ninth chapter where Manjusri is himself shown to have inferior wisdom to Vimalakirti. I will return to this ninth chapter below, but suffice it to say that the Guodian focus on embracing the friction of human relationships is entirely compatible with this Buddhist sutra.

Earlier scholarship was uninterested in the social implications of interpersonal tension of Buddhism, because scholars began with a conviction that otherworldly concerns were paramount. This is surprising since many Zen texts contain encounters where the process of self-cultivation involves embarrassment and clashes of egos. The work of Morten Schlütter, who is part of a new generation of scholars, sees the development of Zen as occurring in and inseparable from a social context. This leads him to conclude that social engagement is the primary standard by which Buddhists judged themselves during the Song dynasty (Schlütter 2008).

Scholars have been slow to notice the potential of Guodian-Buddhist compatibility, because of the prevalence of nation-bound narratives that imagine a rupture between India and China. This rupture is further widened by the added notion that modernity represents a break from the traditional past. The multiple fashions in

producing my own transcription and translation. I felt that the meaning being reflected better by the title of the Shanghai edition was so important I put it on page 1 of my monograph entirely dedicated to explaining the text. In the Appendix to that monograph I then cite every single difference between the Guodian and Shanghai editions (Holloway 2013: 121–22; Ding 2002).

which time and space become divided inhibits our understanding of how ideas developed through complex conversations instead of a linear progressive model. A more natural model of circulation is necessary, but empirical evidence of this is difficult to pinpoint (Duara 1995). It is imperative that new discoveries such as Guodian be analysed from a transnational perspective in order to avoid simply reifying outdated analytical models.

Another rupture has been manufactured by the specialization of scholars. One such specialization is the result of political periodization. By allowing major events in government such as the Qin unification or the establishment of the Han dynasty to dictate analytical parameters, other concepts that are more enduring such as religion can end up being analysed along a timeline too short to accommodate the complexities that gave shape to its core structures. A second-division scholarship has incorrectly imposed results from a combination of modern Western notions of religious orthodoxy and the privileging of elite discourse, which erects false barriers to separate Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism. Recent scholarship has begun to remove these obstructions and it has preferred transnational and cross disciplinary approaches (Nedostup 2009). This chapter is a small contribution to this project with the goal of opening up the Guodian discovery to a wider scholarly audience.

In the first years after the initial publication of the Guodian manuscripts, there was intense interest in using the discovery to make minor corrections to preexisting frameworks. Had we found the lost texts of Zisi or possibly Gaozi? Was this the bridge between Confucius and Mencius? Which is the best philosophical school in which to categorize these texts? It seemed that to many scholars, the first task to be done in understanding these bamboo strips involved learning how to file them away in the correct archive drawer instead of delving into deeply contextualised readings. My approach as laid out in my first two monographs was to begin by endeavouring to read the texts in as isolated a manner as possible to prevent external presuppositions from stifling voices that had laid silent for two millennia.[5]

A final reason that friction in Buddhism was not seen as related to its contemporary context in China was that scholars emphasized the foreignness of the religion. This was exacerbated by a tendency to draw conclusions based on an institutional perspective instead of an analysis that focuses on embodied aesthetics. It is true that some aspects of Buddhism were incompatible; monastic rules had to be changed when Buddhism entered China, but this would be of less concern to lay believers. The traditional attire of monastics in India was incompatible with the colder climate of China, for example, and begging was a consistently problematic issue. However, when rules did not work they were often simply rejected. In contrast to the rejection

[5] Li Xueqin and Liang Tao are representative advocates of the Zisi and Mencius approach; Pang Pu saw reading Guodian as between Confucius and Mencius and, for good measure, Tao Lei saw resonance with Gaozi (Li 1999: 75–80; Liang 2001: 40–46; Pang 1998; Tao 2002: 169–76; Holloway 2009, 2013).

of certain practices of Buddhism, what became popular can be an important clue to the Indian ideas that overlapped with indigenous Chinese sensibilities.[6]

The now dated idea that Buddhism was a fundamentally incompatible religion struggling to gain popularity in a Chinese world except through adaptation can finally be refuted with the help of the recent discovery of a Sanskrit version of this popular sutra. In 1999, Japanese researchers found a mislabelled copy of the *Vimalakirti* sutra in the Potala Palace in Tibet. Although this sutra was translated as early as the Han dynasty, the famous translation of Kumarajiva was pivotal to the text becoming popular. Previous scholars have argued that this translation process was one of adaptation to a Chinese context. Since the original Sanskrit edition was lost we had no way of knowing exactly how much the original text might have been changed. Now that a Sanskrit edition is available we can see that the Kumarajiva edition is actually quite faithful to the original. More importantly, it is now possible to measure the *Vimalakirti*'s compatibility with the indigenous ideas of Guodian (Hureau 2006; Huang 2011).

The *Vimalakirti*'s popularity in China is remarkable. One example of this popularity is exhibited in its prevalence among Dunhuang manuscripts. A concordance to Dunhuang lists 284 manuscript copies of the *Vimalakirti*. While some of the copies cited are quite brief, others contain sizable portions of the text. There are other sutras with even greater numbers of copies in the Dunhuang corpus, such as the *Diamond Sutra* and the *Lotus Sutra*. However, the *Vimalakirti* was still copied at an impressively high frequency (Shi 1996: 305–12). This chapter posits that it is the structural compatibility between *Vimalakirti* and indigenous Chinese beliefs, as seen for the first time in Guodian, which can contribute to an understanding of why certain sutras were accepted while others did not circulate widely. The most important element for being able to find this compatibility relies on a clear understanding of the coherent religious philosophy of the Guodian tomb corpus. This coherence eludes research that is predicated on a school-based analysis of Guodian. Instead, it must be recognized that the high degree to which religious ideas categorized as Confucian were integrated with Daoist ideas provided a mechanism for the further incorporation of a new set of ideas, Buddhism.

Research on the Guodian corpus has helped to overturn older scholarly approaches that saw early China as a balkanized world where Confucianism was at odds with Daoism. Such divides among schools were previously seen as a dominant feature of the Warring States. However, the notion of distinct schools has been surprisingly slow to eradicate. This idea was initially revised from being a phenomenon of the Warring States into the Han, and now has been shown as not important even in the Han dynasty. The current state of the field understands the fixation on divisions in Chinese religions and philosophies as more a reflection of the Western

[6] Two classic works that saw a clear rupture between Indian and Chinese religion are Zürcher 1959 and Ch'en 1973. Heirman covers the tension between rules for Buddhism that worked in India but encountered difficulty in China (Heirman 2008: 257–72). Mather's approach, interestingly published between Zürcher and Ch'en, demonstrates convincingly that the *Vimalakirti* was able to bridge the China–India divide and become massively popular (Mather 1968: 60–73).

world than anything Eastern. By Western and Eastern it is important to point out that this has nothing to do with the race of the author. Instead it is the result of intellectual perspective. Put simply, if norms are derived from a European context they tend to assume a high-contrast, divided world. Prasenjit Duara terms this radical transcendence and connects it to the sharp divides that pervade Abrahamic religions. A fundamentally different view can be seen in his term dialogical transcendence, which describes a system common to Hinduism, Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism, where continuity exists from the individual through the divine. Guodian texts are a perfect model of dialogical transcendence, and this facilitated the incorporation of Buddhism into China.[7]

Before such a thesis can be fully explored, it is important to begin by proving that early China was fundamentally dialogical and highly syncretic: neat dividing lines did not exist between Confucianism and Daoism. Both Mawangdui 馬王堆 and Guodian contained texts that scholars have misleadingly divided into the categories of either Confucian or Daoist (Laozi) affiliated, despite the consistency of their intermingled interment. Mawangdui is a particularly important context for reading Guodian in that the silk texts showed that the so-called Confucian text WXP appears directly after an early edition of Laozi's *Daodejing*. There is no greater spacing among lines of Laozi's text and the first line of the WXP, which had been ascribed a different affiliation. While this chapter will continue to use the terms Confucianism and Daoism, it will simultaneously be showing how these categories are porous and common elements are dominant in the Guodian corpus.[8]

The religious system that unites Guodian texts is based on an understanding of self-cultivation as a process with a beginning in dualistic elements that develops out of what is internal and pre-existent. This can be seen in the value of happy and angry emotions as a starting point in the "Discourse on Nature and Emotion". Section 12 of the text describes two extremes, being happy and angry to the point that it affects the body. Happiness produces singing and dancing, while anger results in beating one's breast and leaping around. Another example of duality is in the previously discussed example of positive moral behaviour eliciting the negative responses of refutation and loathing in section 16. In the WXP the five forms of moral behaviour all exist in a dualistic relationship that is to be transcended. Through the maturation of these internal sources, transcendence is achieved, and this establishes parity with the divine. There is a continuity between the internal and the universal which unites

[7] Queen, Smith, Csikszentmihalyi and Nylan make a solid case for schools not being important in China from the Warring States through the Han (Queen 2001; Smith 2003; Csikszentmihalyi and Nylan 2003). Mollier and Wu Jiang fill in the history by focusing on the medieval, and early modern periods respectively (Mollier 2008; Wu 2011). Duara's work is incredibly important for describing what he calls circulatory history, whereby ideas develop across national boundaries through dialogue instead of within nationally confined narratives. There is important common methodological ground in twentieth-century scholarship in that ideas are understood as developing in a diverse social context instead of a rarefied institutional atmosphere (Duara 2015: 119–55).

[8] Images of the original silk manuscript can be found in Guojia Wenwuju Wenxian Yanjiushi 1980: 16.

what might otherwise be perceived as distinct dualities.[9] These dualities are interesting in that they often are pairings in twos, but the heart of what is meant by duality is a more generalized concept. In other words, a duality can be among three or even more elements; the goal is to promote a harmonization of these opposing moral forces. This harmonisation, however, does not involve an elimination of the intrinsic distinctions among the constituent elements. In the WXP, there are strong elements that exist in pairs such as humanity and righteousness or sagacity and wisdom. However, at the highest levels of cultivation, all five aspects of moral conduct exist in a dualist relationship in that they are united yet still distinct elements. This distinction is even manifest at times as mutually irreconcilable, leading to the importance of appreciating tension as an unavoidable part of harmony.

The above analysis of nonduality in Guodian is the result of reading it in the context of nonduality in *Vimalakirti*. This Buddhist text helped solve an interpretive problem that I struggled with in my first book. In the text of the WXP, dualities abound such as the aforementioned humanity and righteousness or wisdom and sagacity. The problem is that these pairings remain part of an important set of five terms. I worked to find ways to justify the use of the category "binary opposites" in my book, but it was unavoidably awkward. An additional factor was that in Guodian, although the dualist side of self-cultivation is an obviously dominant feature, there is no term in the text that can be used as evidence to support this claim.

There are two benefits that can be achieved for reading Guodian in a broader Asian religious context. One is a better understanding of how duality works and the second is an appreciation of how it can be a core element of religious practice. Chapter 9 of the *Vimalakirti* sutra is entitled "Entering the Gateway of Nonduality" (*Ru buer famen* 入不二法門). In it there are 32 instances of bodhisattvas describing how dualities can be transcended, and they are all wrong. They do not answer the question properly. Tension is again the prevalent theme of the text. What is fascinating about the descriptions in the chapter is that the word *er* 二 is a term native to the text, and this should obviously be translated as duality. However, despite prefacing subsequent statements with this character for two, there are several instances in the chapter where dualities are not groupings of two items. At times, bodhisattvas discuss three items as illustrations of dualist thinking. One example of a grouping of three such items is Buddha, dharma, and sangha, which the text says exist in duality. In addition, the self, a single item, is again described as a duality. I should note that what is wrong about the 32 instances is unrelated to the issue of the number of items being listed. The problem is that when attempting to describe what constitutes a non-dualist religious view, it is fundamentally beyond language. This is the profound silence that Vimalakirti selects at the end of the chapter as his answer to how to enter the gateway of nonduality. The result of his brilliant silence is that 5000 bodhisattvas enter the gateway of nonduality and achieve enlightenment.

A necessary step toward achieving enlightenment in *Vimalakirti* is the frustration inherent in 32 people struggling and failing to properly understand how dualities

[9] This continuity is what constitutes the dialogical characteristic of the process, as will be discussed further at the end of this chapter.

function. The process of understanding the universal, and simultaneously achieving parity with it, is one that consistently involves friction. This friction is also exhibited in the body of Vimalakirti being sick. There are two reads of the sickness, one is in the fifth chapter of the sutra where he says that the cause of his disease is the ignorance of all beings. Hamlin emphasizes what he terms *upayic* magic as the explanation of the illness. In contrast, his reading of the disease sees its function as primarily salvific in transforming others. As will be discussed below, Guodian contains a corollary in the embodied moral manifestations of jade-skin and a voice resembling a bronze bell. Having jade and bronze attributes is a way that bodies become vehicles for transforming others. This transformation in Guodian is categorized into the visual and auditory, which are also the fundamental ways that people interact with Vimalakirti's embodied program of liberation (Hamlin 1988: 100–02). Salvation through the embodiment of moral principles firmly embeds enlightenment in a this-worldly social and human context.

Guodian religion sees morality as inseparable from embodiment. In the WXP, morality grows in the body; this is where it initially forms. This embodiment transforms a person and what she or he does into a sacred act through the process of self-divinization discussed below. There is not a divide between mind and body so this moral understanding, which is tempting to describe as a mental phenomenon, is inseparable from what a person does. Morality's impact on action can be conceptualized in two ways. One method sees morality dictate orthopraxy in that a specific action must be selected to the exclusion of another. However, this is not the case in Guodian, where choices are not presented in absolute terms, but instead should be dictated by both the embodied cultivation of the actor and the circumstances she or he encounters. In the first lines of the WXP there are five repeated lines that state that when humanity, righteousness, the rites, wisdom, and sagacity are each formed in the body, one's actions become virtuous (*de zhi xing* 德之行). Without specifying any particular action, the text continues with a statement that if you do not form these morals internally, what you do is relegated to regular or common action (*xing* 行).

A second Guodian text, *Tang Yu zhi dao*, describes two specific and opposing examples of such virtuous actions: one is abdication, the other is passing on the throne through inheritance. Abdication is to follow righteousness and inheritance is humanity. In antiquity, at the time of Yao and Shun, the correct choice was to abdicate. However, it is important to understand that both options are equally moral. If the circumstances were different, abdication could become the correct choice. The more important point is that choices in Guodian exist in a continuum of conflict instead of in a utopian realm devoid of sharp divisions (Holloway 2009: 17–23, 104–30).

The key to understanding the conflict that exists between choices in Guodian is to analyze cultivation as a process. At its highest level, Guodian is focused on the practice of transcendence. This term refers to the ability of an individual to surpass normal limitations and reach a level that is divine. Michael Puett has employed an elegant term for this, "self-divinization" (Puett 2002). The reason that this term would also properly describe Guodian is that the individual level is not eradicated in

the process of achieving parity with heaven. In the WXP, for example, it describes external manifestations of morality in the form of jade-like skin and a voice that resembles a bronze bell. This is the culmination of a developmental process whereby the embodiment of morality results in a religious transformation of the individual that others can see. After developing morality internally, the result is an ability to transform others. The seventh chapter of the WXP illustrates this:

> 聖之思也輕, 輕則形, 形則不忘, 不忘則聰。聰, 則聞君子道, 聞君子道則玉音, 玉音則形, 形則聖。■[10]
>
> Sagacious thoughts: [they] are light; being light they form, forming they will not be neglected, not neglecting you will have keen hearing; having keen hearing you will hear the way of the noble man; hearing the way of the noble person [your voice] will be like jade; being like jade you will be formed; being formed you will be sagacious. ■

The process of developing sagacity begins with thoughts, which are internal. It is only after listening to another person who has already mastered the process of self-cultivation that someone seeking to develop sagacity is able to begin embodying it. The process of development then matures and becomes externally apparent through a change in how you sound, which presumably is how you in turn pass this on to others.

Seeing and hearing from one who has been able to develop a moral body sows the seeds of morality in the next person. The relationship between these manifestations and divinity is explained in Chapter 11 of the WXP: "Being adept [at virtue] is the way of humans while being virtuous is the way of heaven. Only those who have virtue, can have a bronze [bell] voice and jade vibrancy" (善, 人道也。德, 天[道也]。唯有德者, 然後能金聲而玉振之) (Holloway 2009: 134). There are two elements to this: heaven, which is virtuous, and human, which is adept. These two concepts, virtue and adeptness, are terms of art within the text. Adept is combining four of the five aspects of conduct, while virtue is combining all five. The quote that describes this is found at the start of the second chapter of the WXP. "There are five aspects of virtuous conduct that, when united, are called virtue itself. When only four of these actions are united it is called being adept [at virtue]. Adeptness is the way of humans while virtue is the way of heaven" (德之行五和, 謂之德, 四行和, 謂之善。善, 人❹道也。德,天道也).[11] Being adept is heaven, which correlates to practising all five ways of being moral. This means that practising the five moral aspects elevates the human to divine status.

This process of spreading morality means that the practitioner literally becomes a ritual vessel such as we find in abundance in Warring States tombs. The reference to jade and bronze refers directly to the ritual implements common at this time in China and is a direct reference to the religiosity of the process. However, instead of relying on this as an external implement to connect with divinity through a religious offering, it is done through the human body's actions as a vessel for this ritual power. This self-divinization enables others to also become divine. However, this

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[10] This translation is adapted from Holloway 2009: 133.

[11] The numbers in black circles in the translation here indicate the ends of bamboo strips in the Guodian edition (Holloway 2009: 131).

higher order status of divinity is not something that ever leaves the human realm. There are hints of a connection to the divine in other pre-Qin sources such as *Mencius* 5A:5 where he quotes the Great Declaration as a canonical source for the idea that heaven hears and sees as the people hear and see. In the *Mencius*, the connection between the people and the divine could be simply metaphorical, but in Guodian this is the goal of self-cultivation and it is literal. Our skin and voice come to resemble jade and bronze.

It has taken considerable time for the uniqueness of Guodian to be appreciated, but based on the evidence offered above the significant overlap with Buddhist sources is clear. An earlier moment where this began to be explored was where I argued that *upaya* or skilful means was an important common construct between Guodian and Buddhism (Holloway 2013). The heart of this thesis was that morality existed on two levels, one lower and one higher, that were bridged by the process of self-cultivation. In light of Prasenjit Duara's magnum opus, a new framework is now available for advancing an understanding of overlap between Indian and Chinese sources (Duara 2015). One of his concepts, dialogical transcendence, is ideally suited for analysing the Guodian corpus. He defines this concept as follows.

> Historically, a less radical, "dialogical transcendence" has pervaded most Asian societies. The ultimate truths and ethics of these traditions to which the *virtuosos*—who are not necessarily the elite—have special access through their knowledge and cultivation of the practices of the mind and body, are open to most people with the material, social and spiritual capacities to access these truths. Despite the harsh forms of discrimination levied against them, even the Untouchables in Indian society, like slaves in other societies, could develop and access forms of transcendence drawn from but also opposed to the wider cosmology that oppressed them. This kind of transcendence is *dialogical* insofar as it permits coexistence of different levels and expressions of truth. As such, it is to be distinguished from the Hegelian idea of the dialectic where one of the two terms negates and supersedes the other. This coexistence took place by debate and disputation, through mutual disregard, and more often by covert circulatory practices of absorption or unacknowledged "borrowings" and hierarchical encompassment. Disciplinary practices of self-cultivation and self-formation that sought to link the self, and/or the community or locality to the transcendent ideals did not typically or historically eliminate other groups or immanent expressions of religion based on doctrine, although there were certainly historical cases in which it did occur. (Duara 2015: 6)

There are two ways that Duara's theory is useful for understanding Guodian. First, the integration of a transcendent construct, heaven, into the human realm raises a host of analytical problems. Foremost among these is how something can be both transcendent and simultaneously present in humans, which has led previous scholars to argue that early China lacked transcendence (Hall and Ames 1987: 12–17).

Dialogical transcendence in the WXP is a process where individual moral elements must be put into practice that simultaneously exclude and include other elements. This contradiction and harmonization is evident in the example the text provides in sections 22–23:

22.不簡, 不行。不匿, 不辯❸❼於道。有大罪而大誅之, 簡也。有小罪而赦之, 匿也。有大罪而弗❸❽大誅也, 不行也。有小罪而弗赦也, 不辯於道也。■[12]

22. Without admonishment you cannot act [appropriately]. Not being lenient you cannot have insight into the way ❸❼. Meting out a capital punishment for a serious crime is admonishment. Issuing a pardon for an insignificant crime is being lenient. Not ❸❽ meting out a capital punishment for a serious crime is not acting [properly]. Not issuing a pardon for an insignificant crime you cannot have keen insight into the way.

In section 23 we are told that admonishment is used for great cases that are rare while humanity is for lesser more common cases. The section continues to state that admonishment is the method (方 *fang*) of righteousness and a pardon is the method of humanity.

Keeping in mind that transcendence involves harmonizing all five of the aspects of moral conduct, the text has presented a problem that can only be solved by understanding that conflicting ideas must have a way to exist simultaneously. In Duara's model the bodily locus is a key element to rejecting the simple solution of the Hegelian dialectic where transcendence would negate or replace other modes of thought and action. Being dialogical does not mean conflict is eradicated; it is a fundamental part of his example where he cites it as a resource for untouchables to challenge oppression in India.

The key to Duara's dialogical approach is that he sees the world as existing in such a way that there is a continuum from the individual process of self-cultivation through its collective manifestation in all under heaven (*tianxia* 天下). This collective does not exist separate from its realization by individuals. Unlike commonly described notions of transcendence that involve a departure from the mundane, Duara's dialogical does not accept dividing the process from the product. A dialectical view sees the world in an either-or fashion where transcendence eclipses and negates the individual. My understanding of what he distinguishes as dialectical is that it would see the world as a series of either-or binary decision such as we find in the code of a modern computer. In a world of zeroes and ones there is no third options of both. One way of analogizing this third option is to consider it from a quantum perspective where zeroes are always also ones.

The particular side of the quantum theory that is useful for understanding the ability of transcendence to simultaneously exist on multiple levels is analogous to the famous concept of superposition. In superposition, a single light particle may pass through two slits in a barrier at the same time. This superposition is visible in a detector when the single particles cause their own interference. Passing through both slits is analogous to Duara's argument that the higher-level realm also exists at the lower level. This is unlike the "either/or" option that we are used to in a standard Newtonian model as represented in the common binary systems of standard computers.[13]

[12] Holloway 2009: 137–38.

[13] What is messy about the comparison I am drawing here is that in the superposition model there is self-negation when the particles interfere with themselves, and this is measurable by the light detectors on the far side of the slits. Duara's model is instead situated on the laser side of the slit, when the particle enters in both simultaneously and do not interfere with each other (Menzel et al. 2012: 9314–19).

This dialogical view fits perfectly with the way Guodian texts employ humanity and righteousness as requiring conflicting actions in judging a legal case. Humanity and righteousness are positive terms. Since they must be harmonized, it is incomprehensible to imagine turning one on and the other off. This is also the key to appreciating how *Tang Yu zhi dao* is not advocating an either-or approach to questions of royal succession. One option must be adopted, abdication or inheritance, but reading it in the context of the WXP requires arriving at an understanding of how these two options must be dialogically transcendent. I have proposed a temporal solution to the problem by suggesting it might be possible to find harmony by aggregating one's actions across a series of encounters (Holloway 2009). This is easy to establish in the WXP since it has a concrete example of balancing that is illustrated in how one judges a legal case. The text sees two choices, either forgiving a person with humanity or executing a criminal by choosing righteousness. Legal cases quite naturally exist in a series, so attaining balance over time is not a difficult argument. Even though the element of time might be necessary to logically prove the harmonization, somehow this higher attainment must also be present at every moment.

An illustration of how higher and mundane worlds might coexist in Guodian is found at the end of the first chapter of *Vimalakirti*. Here, the wisest disciple of the Buddha, Shariputra, is struggling to understand how the mundane world could in fact be a heavenly realm. The Buddha tells him famously that if the mind is pure, anywhere you go can be pure as well. Still unable to process these conflicting views, the Buddha uses magic to show how the mundane world is a heaven. The Buddha then says "My Buddha land has always been pure like this. But because I wish to save those persons who are lowly and inferior, I make it seem an impure land full of defilements" (我佛國土常淨如此。為欲度斯下劣人故，示是衆惡不淨土耳).[14] What this means is that the mundane world that most people observe would be understood by an enlightened person as being simultaneously impure and divine.

In conclusion, analysing the Guodian corpus presents many interpretive challenges. Indian sources can be a useful tool in solving what might otherwise be intractable contradictions. Prasenjit Duara's theory of dialogical transcendence is particularly well suited to assisting in this field of research because it was designed with all of Asia in mind, including Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, and Daoist religious ideas. The study of Guodian is aided by integrating it into a transnational framework. There is also benefit that can be enjoyed by Buddhology by looking to Guodian for answers as to why certain ideas flourished while others failed to establish a following. Current interest in the Humanism of Buddhism cannot properly be understood without analysing the source of these ideas in the pre-Qin world. Similarly, the religiosity of Guodian can easily be overlooked as merely a secular philosophy without the aid of Buddhist sources.

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[14] The quote above is from Kumarajiva, but the Sanskrit version is very similar. "My pure land is ultimately is this way. Furthermore, it is to enlighten low and inferior beings that the Tathagata exhibits this world filled with errors and faults" (我的淨土始终是這樣。而為了教化低劣衆生, 如來展現充滿錯誤過失的淨土) (Watson 1997: 30; Huang 2011*:* 41–42).

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